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SUMMARY 
 
This work entails a study of some of the schemes that are employed by country 
residents when companies and trusts are used as vehicles for investing in offshore tax-
haven and low tax jurisdictions so as to avoid taxes. 
 
The study also entails a critical analysis of the effectiveness of the some of the laws in 
South Africa that curb such offshore tax avoidance schemes. Similar laws in the United 
Kingdom and in the United States are analysed in order to come up with some 
 ix 
 
recommendations that could be considered for possible reform of the relevant South 
African laws where they are found wanting.  
 
Since offshore tax avoidance is an international issue, the effectiveness of the 
recommendations of some international organisations in preventing the depletion of 
countries’ tax bases are also analysed.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Adam Smith, in his famous work on “the wealth of nations”, states the following: 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government as nearly 
as possible in proportion to their respective abilities that is in proportion to the revenue which they 
respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals 
of a great nation is like the expense of management to the joint ventures of a great estate, who 
are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate. In the 
observance or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation.1 
 
In the past three decades, the world has generally witnessed radical changes in the 
patterns of population growth, peoples’ expectations, and levels of personal wealth. 
These changes have created increasing political and economic instabilities that have led 
governments of both developed and developing nations to continuously levy high taxes, 
in order to meet the rising demands and expectations, as well as the associated costs of 
providing new and improved infrastructure. With the introduction of new taxes and the 
continuous increase in the rates of the existing taxes, taxpayers have come to realise 
that often, the after-tax receipts increase less substantially or less rapidly than gross 
receipts. This, coupled with inflation, has often resulted in earnings being largely 
minimal, and many taxpayers have been propelled into higher income tax brackets, 
although their real purchasing power has risen little, if at all.2 Today, even the individual 
worker can see that a tax system, in which higher income brackets produce 
                                                 
1 A Smith “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (1776) Vol 2 at 350-351, 
edited by RH Campbell, AS Skinner & WB Todd. See also AS Silke Tax Avoidance and Tax 
Evasion Within the Framework of the South African Income Tax Legislation with Specific 
Reference to the Effects on the Fiscus and to Current Anomalies and Inequalities (1959) at 561. 
BJ Arnold The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison (1986) at 
56 states that the dominant purpose of any income tax system is to raise revenue to finance 
government expenditure.  
2 United Nations: Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters: 
International Co-operation in Tax matters: Guidelines for International Co-operation against the 
Evasion and Avoidance of Taxes (With Specific Reference to Taxes on Income, Profits, Capital 
and Capital Gains) (1984) at 11. 
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progressively higher tax rates, is stifling to individual initiative and productivity.3 In order 
to lessen their tax exposure, taxpayers get involved in tax avoidance schemes, with the 
aim of minimising their tax liabilities.  
 
1.2 DEFINING TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
The term “tax avoidance” is different from the term “tax evasion”. The difference 
between these two terms lies in the fact that tax evasion is illegal. It is generally defined 
as the non-compliance with the tax laws and includes activities (like the falsification of 
tax returns and books of account) that are deliberately undertaken by a taxpayer to 
illegally free himself from the tax, which the law charges upon his income. Tax 
authorities normally resort to criminal prosecution to prevent tax evasion.4 On the other 
hand, tax avoidance involves using perfectly legal methods of arranging one’s affairs, so 
as to pay less tax. This is done by utilising loopholes in tax laws and exploiting them 
within legal parameters.5 Although tax avoidance may be against the purpose of the law, 
no legal measures can be taken to prevent it, unless the legislature amends the law and 
prohibits the practice in question. In this regard, the courts hold the view that no legal 
obligation rests upon a taxpayer to pay higher taxes than he is legally bound to under 
the taxing Act and that a taxpayer is not prevented from entering into a genuine, or bona 
fide, transaction which, when carried out, has the effect of avoiding or reducing liability 
to tax. This view is brought out by the following dicta expressed in various court 
decisions. In Levene v IRC,6  Viscount Summer held that 
                                                 
3 A Starchild Tax Havens for International Businesses (1994) at 4; A Ginsberg International Tax 
Havens 2 ed (1997) at 10. 
4 D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) in par 29.1; K Huxham & P Haupt Notes on 
South African Income Tax (2007) at 350; s 75 of the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
provides for a fine or imprisonment of up to 60 months; see also OECD Issues in International 
Taxation No 1 International Tax Avoidance and Evasion (Four Related Studies) (1987) at 1 where 
tax evasion is defined. V Krishna Tax Avoidance: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule (1990) at 9, 
also distinguishes between tax evasion and avoidance.      
5 Meyerowitz in par 29.1; Huxham & Haupt at 350-351. On the meaning of ”tax avoidance” see also 
L Olivier “Tax Avoidance Options Available to the Commissioner for Inland Revenue” (1997) 4 
South African Law Journal  at 1-3. A Rapakko Base Company Taxation (1989) at 39 states that it 
is the courts that are ultimately faced with the difficult task of having to draw a line in certain 
practical cases between tax avoidance and evasion. 
6 [1928] AC 21. 
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[i]t is trite law that His Majesty’s subjects are free, if they can, to make their own arrangements so 
that their cases may fall outside the scope of the taxing Act. They incur no legal penalties, and 
they, strictly speaking, no moral censure if having considered the lines drawn by the legislature for 
the imposition of taxes, they make it their business to walk outside them.  
 
Lord President Clyde held in Ayrshire Pullman Motors Services and D M Ritchie v IRC, 7 
that 
[n]o man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or otherwise, to arrange his legal 
relations to his business or to his property so as to enable the In-land Revenue to put the largest 
possible shovel into his stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow - and quite rightly - to take 
advantage, which is open to it under the taxing Statues for the purpose of depleting the taxpayer’s 
pocket. The taxpayer is in the like manner, entitled to be astute to prevent, so far as he honestly 
can, the depletion of his means by the Revenue.  
 
Lord Tomlin also held in the celebrated case of Duke v Westminster,8 that 
[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate 
Act is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, 
then however inappropriate to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may 
be of his ingenuity, he can not be compelled to pay an increased tax.  
 
From the above, it can be deduced that the courts hold the view that it is open to any 
taxpayer to arrange his affairs, so as to avoid or reduce tax by preferring the kind of 
transaction that is not taxed, or that is taxed at a lower rate. But if the taxpayer has 
organised his affairs in such a way as to attract tax liability in terms of the clear letter of 
the law, he is liable to pay the tax, no matter what the resulting hardship.9 
 
 
 
Impermissible tax avoidance 
                                                 
7 Ayrshire Pullman Motors Services and DM Ritchie v IRC 14 TC 754.  
8 ICR v Duke of Westminster 51 TIR 467. South African courts have also expressed the view 
contained in this dictum on numerous occasions, for instance in Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 (A) 
at 483F; CIR v Estate Kohler and others 1953 (2) SA 584 (A) at 591F-592H; see also CIR v 
Sunnyside Centre (Pty) Ltd 1997 (1) SA 68 (A) at 77F in which Schutz JA commented that, 
“Companies are often used in a variety of ways to avoid taxes. When a scheme works, no tears 
are shed for the commissioner. That is because the taxpayer is entitled to order his affairs so as to 
pay the minimum of the tax. When he arranges them so as to attract more than the minimum he 
has to grin and bear it.”  
9 In CIR v Delfos [1933] AD 242 at 253, it was held that: ”If the person sought to be taxed comes 
within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the 
judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, can not bring the 
subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the law the case 
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Although tax avoidance is not illegal, in 2005, SARS released a discussion paper on tax 
avoidance.10 It contains a discussion of what is referred to as “impermissible tax 
avoidance”. In attempting to describe “impermissible tax avoidance”, the discussion 
paper refers to certain “tax avoidance” practices that extend beyond what is legally 
acceptable. Reference is made to the Australian Report on Business Taxation,11 which 
refers to a form of “tax avoidance” which is essentially a misuse or abuse of the law that 
is driven by the exploitation of structural loopholes in the law to achieve tax outcomes 
that were not intended by Parliament. It also includes the manipulation of the law and a 
focus on form and legal effect rather than substance. Lord Templeman explained this 
state of affairs as follows in the United Kingdom case CIR v Challenge Corporation 
Ltd:12 
Income tax is avoided and a tax advantage is derived from an arrangement when the taxpayer 
reduces his liability to tax without involving him in the loss or expenditure which entitles him to that 
reduction. The taxpayer engaged in tax avoidance does not reduce his income or suffer a loss or 
incur expenditure but nevertheless obtains a reduction in his liability to tax as if he had. 
 
The economists Brooks and Head13 comment as follows on this type of tax avoidance: 
[i]n legal discussions of tax avoidance, the primary focus is clearly on contrived and artificial 
schemes, which do not change the substantive character of an activity or transaction but may 
serve nevertheless to bring the activity within some tax-exempt or more tax-favourable legal 
category.  
 
Drawing upon these definitions, the Discussion Paper uses the term “impermissible tax 
avoidance”, to refer to artificial arrangements, with little or no actual economic impact 
upon the taxpayer, that are usually designed to manipulate tax laws in order to achieve 
results that conflict with or defeat the intention of Parliament.14 
 
The discussion paper however, distinguished the term ”impermissible tax avoidance” 
from the term “tax planning”. Noting that “tax planning” is concerned with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
might otherwise appear to be.” See also, Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC [1921] 1 KB at 64.   
10  Law Administration SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income 
Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962) (2005). 
11  Australian Government Final Report of the Review of Business Taxation: A System Redesigned 
(1999) at 6.2(c). 
12  [1987] AC 155. 
13  M Brooks & J Head “Tax Avoidance: In Economics, Law and Public Choice” in GS Cooper Tax 
Avoidance and the Rule of Law (1997) at 71 as quoted by SARS “Discussion Paper on Tax 
Avoidance at 4. 
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organisation of a taxpayer’s affairs so that they give rise to the minimum tax liability 
within the law, without resorting to “impermissible tax avoidance” that is described 
above.15 It is reasoned that the term “tax planning” is similar to the term ”tax mitigation”, 
which was described as follows in CIR v Challenge Corporation Ltd:16    
Income tax is mitigated by a taxpayer who reduces his income or incurs expenditure in 
circumstances which reduce his assessable income or entitle him to reduction in his tax liability.  
 
In the United Kingdom case CIR v Willoughby,17 the court held that the hallmark of tax 
mitigation is that the taxpayer takes advantage of a fiscally attractive option afforded to 
him by the tax legislation and genuinely suffers the economic consequences that 
Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking advantage of the option. 
 
According to SARS, the notion of “tax planning” or “tax mitigation” is in effect what Lord 
Tomlin referred to in his famous dictum: “every man is entitled to order his affairs so that 
the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be”.18 SARS 
is of the view that this type of legitimate tax planning has to be distinguished from 
“impermissible tax avoidance”.19 SARS points out that the world has changed 
enormously since Lord Tomlin made the above statement in the Duke of Westminster 
case, 70 years ago.20 Although a government may still be viewed by some as nothing 
more than a revenue-maximising “leviathan”,21 the role of taxation as a means that 
government uses to fund its expenditures cannot be underestimated. Thus, the right of 
taxpayers to minimise their tax liabilities within the bounds of the law must be balanced 
against other rights and obligations.22 In this regard, Woodhouse, J noted that: 
Nevertheless, since the House of Lords was obliged to consider the highly beneficial 
arrangements which were able to be made in 1930 on behalf of the Duke of Westminster, there 
has been a growing awareness by the legislature and the Courts alike that ingenious legal devices 
contrived to enable individual taxpayers to minimise or avoid their tax liabilities are often not 
                                                                                                                                                        
14  SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 4. 
15  SARS Discussion Papar on Tax Avoidance at 4. 
16  [1987] AC 155. 
17  [1997] 4 All ER 65 at 73. 
18  IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] 19 TC 490 at 520. 
19  SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 5. 
20  IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] 19 TC 490. 
21  Brooks & Head at 82-91; G Brennan & JM Buchanan “Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan” 
(1977) 8 Journal of Public Economic 255. 
22  SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 14. 
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merely sterile or unproductive in themselves (except perhaps in respect of their tax advantages for 
the taxpayer concerned), but that they have social consequences which are contrary to the 
general public interest.23  
 
The House of Lords itself has recognised the limits of the Duke of Westminster case. 
For example, Lord Diplock made the following statement in IRC v Burmah Oil Co Ltd24 
Lord Tomlin’s oft quoted dictum . . . tells us little or nothing as to what methods of ordering one’s 
affairs will be recognised by the courts as effective to lessen the tax that would otherwise attach to 
them if business transactions were conducted in a straight-forward way.  
 
Lord Steyn made the point even more bluntly in CIR v McGuckian:25  
While Lord Tomlin’s observations in the Duke of Westminster’s case still point to a material 
consideration, namely the general liberty of the citizen to arrange his financial affairs as he thinks 
fit, they have ceased to be canonical as to the consequences of a tax avoidance scheme.  
 
Lord Denning also made a characteristically terse admonition that “the avoidance of tax 
may be lawful, but it is not yet a virtue”.26 
 
Impermissible tax avoidance has continued to become a problem in the past decade.27 It 
often involves increasingly complex and sophisticated tax schemes that are being 
marketed by banks, multinational accounting firms and law firms particularly with respect 
to schemes involving tax havens.28 The United States Department of the Treasury has 
noted that “[s]ome commentators explain the growth in corporate tax shelters as a 
reflection of more accepting attitudes of tax advisers and corporate executives towards 
aggressive tax planning”.29 At the same time, the lucrative market for tax avoidance 
schemes and “tax optimisation” plans has led to an increase in the resources and talent 
being devoted to those areas by professional firms in many countries.30 
 
Disadvantages of “impermissible tax avoidance” 
                                                 
23  Elmiger v CIR [1966] NZLR 683 (SC) at 686.  
24  [1982] STC 30 (HL) at 32. 
25  [1997] 3 All ER 817 (HL). 
26 Re Weston’s Settlements [1968] All ER 338 at 342. 
27  SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 8. 
28  SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 5; OECD Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue (1998). 
29  United States Treasury Department The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters – Discussion Analysis 
and Legislative Proposals (1999) at 19.  Available at >http://www.quatloos.com/whiteppr.pdf<, last 
accessed 4 April 2007. 
30  SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 8. 
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The manipulation of tax laws through artificial schemes that have little economic 
substance undermines the ability of national governments to set and implement 
economic and social policies for the country.31 The loss of tax revenue caused by 
impermissible tax avoidance has the effect of limiting the government’s ability to pursue 
its economic and social objectives. This forces governments to divert scarce resources 
from their intended targets32 and to shift the burden of taxation to less mobile factors 
such as labour and consumption.33  
 
The other negative effect of impermissible tax avoidance is that it encourages the 
disrespect for the tax system.34 In view of this, the New York State Bar Association - 
hardly a “pro-tax” organisation – has stated that: 
The constant promotion of these frequently artificial transactions breeds significant disrespect for 
the tax system, encouraging responsible corporate taxpayers to expect this type of activity to be 
the norm, and to follow the lead of other taxpayers who have engaged in tax advantaged 
transactions.35  
 
It is a fundamental principle of taxation that the burden of tax should be spread as fairly 
and as equitably as possible among all the taxpayers.36 However, if certain taxpayers 
are free to arrange their affairs to reduce their tax obligation, they secure an unfair 
advantage over other taxpayers who are not in a position to take advantage of the 
loopholes in the law. The proliferation of arbitrary tax avoidance schemes leads to a 
perception that the tax system is unfair.37 Tax avoidance can be viewed as “a form of 
subsidy from those paying their fair share of tax according to the intention of the law, to 
                                                 
31  Brooks & Head at 53-91. 
32  SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 14. 
33  RS Avi-Yonah “Globalisation, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State” (2000) 
113 Harvard Law Review at 1578; See also SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 14.   
34  D Kruger & W Broomberg Broomberg on Tax Strategy (2003) 4 ed at 1; United States Treasury 
Department Report on the Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters at 19.   
35  Statement of H R Handler, on behalf of the Tax Section, New York State Bar Association, before  
the Committee on Finance (27 April 1999) at 2. Quoted in the United States Treasury Department 
Report on the Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters at 3. 
36  This principle originates from the four maxims articulated by Adam Smith – equality, certainty, 
convenience and freedom from economic burden. See Smith at 350 -351. 
37  OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition at 4. 
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those shirking their similar obligations”.38 Taxpayers engaging in impermissible tax 
avoidance are thus seen as tax “free riders”.39 The loss of revenue by the government 
as a result of wide-spread tax avoidance may also result in an increase in the rate of tax 
payable.40 This state of affairs discourages compliance, even by taxpayers that had not 
previously engaged in tax avoidance.41 The tax avoider, like the illegal tax evader, shifts 
his burden on to the shoulders of others who often are poorer tax payers. The 
prevalence of tax avoidance may lead to increased tax evasion, because, if one 
taxpayer is aware that his neighbour is not paying tax in terms of legal means which he 
cannot benefit from, he may be tempted to adopt illegal means to obtain the same or 
similar benefits of reduced taxation accruing to his neighbour.  
 
The negative effectives of tax avoidance have also been critisised by the courts. In Cot v 
Ferera,42 it was stated that:  
I endorse the opinion expressed that the avoidance of tax is an evil. Not only does it mean that a 
taxpayer escapes the obligation of making his proper contribution to the fiscus, but the effect it 
has is to cast an addition burden on taxpayers who imbued with a greater sense of civic 
responsibility, make no attempt to escape or, lacking the financial means to obtain the advice to 
set up the machinery, fail to do so. Moreover the nefarious practice of tax avoidance arms 
opponents of our capitalistic society with potent arguments that it is only the rich, the  astute and 
the ingenious who prosper in it and that ‘good citizens’ will always fare badly.  
 
And in Latilla v IRC,43 it was stated that: 
 
Judicial dicta may be cited which points out that, however elaborate and artificial...avoidance 
methods may be, and that those who adopt them are ‘entitled’ to do so. There is of course no 
doubt that they are within their legal right, but that is no reason why their efforts or those of the 
professional gentlemen who assist them in the matter should be regarded as a commendable 
exercise of ingenuity or as a discharge of the duties of good citizenship.  
 
Impermissible tax avoidance has led to a proliferation of specific anti-avoidance laws 
that are enacted in response to particular schemes. However, the increasing complexity 
of tax laws may be self-defeating, as invariably, taxpayers devise more complex 
                                                 
38  See the Australian Government’s Final Report of the Review of Business Taxation at par 6.2(c); 
SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 13. 
39  J Waincymer “The Australian Tax Avoidance Experience and Responses: A Critical Review” in GS 
Cooper Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (1997) at 256. 
40 L Olivier “Tax Avoidance and Common Law Principles” (1996) 2 Tydskrif vir Die Suid-Africaanse 
Reg at 378. 
41  OECD Report on Harmful Tax Completion in par 30; SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 
10.   
42 Cot v Ferera (1976) 2 SA 653 at 656F-G. 
43 Latilla v IRC [1943] 1All ER 265. 
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schemes and the cycle goes on. This has the effect of increasing costs for the economy, 
such as costs for continuous amendments of the legislation, administrative costs and 
increasingly comprehensive and detailed reporting requirements. Invariably, this also 
increases the compliance burdens upon all taxpayers.44 Additional costs are also 
reflected in the diversion of resources from productive investment to the development, 
marketing, implementation and subsequent defence of impermissible tax avoidance 
schemes.45 At a deeper level, impermissible tax avoidance creates significant losses for 
the economy by distorting trade and investment flows.46 This is because resources are 
reallocated or misallocated from productive investments to activities that may be 
marginally profitable to the economy.47 These distortions reduce economic efficiency 
and impede growth. 
 
In response to the SARS discussion paper on tax avoidance sections, 80A-80L (general 
anti-avoidance provisions) were inserted in to the South Africans Income Tax Act to 
deter taxpayers from engaging in impermissible tax avoidance schemes.48 This thesis 
will not however cover a detailed analysis of the general anti-avoidance provisions.49  
 
 
One of the means that taxpayers use to avoid taxes in their countries of residence is to 
move their investments offshore (i.e. out of the taxpayer’s country of residence) into a 
jurisdiction where the investments will be subject to zero or minimal taxation.50  
 
                                                 
44  OECD Report on Tax Competition in par 30; See also United States Treasury Department Report 
on the Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters at 20. 
45  J Slemrod & S Yitzhaki “The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds (1996) 
43 IMF Staff Papers at 172; SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 11. 
46  P Groenewegen “Distributional and Allocation Effects of Tax Avoidance” in D Collins Tax 
Avoidance and the Economy (1984) at 23. 
47  Groenewegen at 23; SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance at 12. 
48  For an explanation of the working of the general anti-avoidance provisions under s 80A-80L see 
Meyerowitz at 401-406; K Jordaan, A Koekemoer, M Stiglingh, L van Schalkwyk, M Wassermann 
& J Wilcocks Silke: South African Income Tax (2007) par 25.2-25.4.  
49  As is explained below, this work covers some of the specific provisions that are used to curb 
impermissible tax avoidance when investments are made in offshore companies and offshore 
trusts.  
50 HCAW Schulze “Legal Aspects of Offshore Transactions” (1994) xxvii CILSA 26; A Study by the 
Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies (Vol A) International Tax Avoidance (1979) at 29. 
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1.3  FACTORS THAT HAVE ENCOURAGED OFFSHORE TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
Historically, tax policies were developed to deal mainly with domestic economic and 
social concerns. However, the domestic tax systems of most counties also had an 
international dimension, in that they had to deal with the foreign source income of 
domestic residents, but the interaction of domestic tax systems was relatively minimal, 
since there was limited mobility of capital.51 This has changed in the past few decades, 
as a result of the major geopolitical changes that the world has seen. Notable among 
these changes have been the acceleration in the process of globalisation of trade and 
investment, and the removal of exchange controls and other barriers to the free 
movement of capital. These factors have fundamentally changed the relationships 
among domestic tax systems, resulting in an increase in international trade and the 
regional integration of national economies. This has in turn had a great impact on the 
way in which the domestic policies of various nations impact on one another. 
Globalisation has increased the mobility of capital and has also promoted the 
development of capital and financial markets, thereby encouraging countries to reduce 
tax barriers to capital flows, and to modernise their tax systems to reflect these 
developments.52 
 
This has in turn led to increased competition among businesses in the global 
marketplace. Faced with high tax rates in their countries of residence, individuals and 
multinational enterprises are increasingly developing global strategies, in order to 
maximise profits, and their links with any single country with a favourable tax climate are 
becoming more tenuous. It is a well known fact that, in all business transactions, tax is 
an expense like any other, and if businesses are to remain competitive, taxes should not 
be too high. Thus, “the possibility of reducing tax costs by basing a business in a 
favourable tax jurisdiction, is an inherent aspect of international tax planning”.53 
International businesses often consider foreign taxes to be part of their investment 
appraisals.   
                                                 
51 OECD Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998) at 13-14. 
52 OECD 1998 Report at 13-14. 
53 M Grundy The World of International Tax Planning (1984) at 1-2; Ginsberg at 5. Arnold at 62 also 
states that taxation is a factor in foreign investment decisions. 
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1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
It is a known fact that taxes have always varied, not only from individual to business, but 
also from country to country and there has always been an incentive to live or work in, 
or from, a lower-tax jurisdiction. As the wealth of both business entities and individuals 
has increased over the years, this incentive has become the foundation for business in 
its own right. It is therefore not surprising that more and more taxpayers are exploiting 
variations across international borders and international tax systems. These variations 
include differences between countries’ tax rates, legal concepts, standards of 
administration, reporting and enforcement, and governments’ attitudes towards the 
liberty and privacy of taxpayers and the confidentiality of financial and business 
transactions.  
 
Taxpayers will ensure that foreign assets and income are concealed and kept outside 
their domestic tax jurisdiction. In many cases, this very concealment can take them over 
the dividing line between tax evasion and tax avoidance.  They avail themselves of 
banking secrecy rules in other countries and other means, by which the ownership of 
assets, or income, or the transactions of their business, can be kept from the knowledge 
of the tax authorities.54 These objectives are easily achieved when investments are 
made in the so-called “tax-haven” countries, which develop tax policies aimed primarily 
at diverting finances and other geographically mobile capital from high tax to low tax 
countries.55 
 
The prospect of investing in foreign markets, where in most cases annual returns are 
guaranteed without being reduced by high taxation, is an appealing one. Statistics show 
that, over the past 30 years, the number of financial transactions that have taken place 
in or through offshore jurisdictions, have increased at a rapid rate which is showing no 
                                                 
54 United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters at 18.  
55 OECD 1998 Report at 13. 
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sign of abating.56 Furthermore, many of the world’s leading financial institutions have 
offshore activities.57 It is estimated that 60% of the world’s money is offshore, where it is 
likely to receive favourable tax treatment and be subject to fewer restrictions,58 and that 
a large proportion of the world’s private wealth is owned through offshore structures.59 In 
South Africa, where uncertainty is the order of the day, offshore transactions have 
assumed an additional psychological attraction. The ability of South Africans to invest 
offshore has been enhanced by the relaxation of Exchange Control Regulations that 
began on 1 July 1997.60  Currently the Exchange Control Regulations permit South 
African resident individuals to invest up to R2 million in direct offshore investments.61 
 
One does not need a “crystal ball” to be able to predict that in the absence of contrary 
measures, investing offshore will continue to be employed as a means of tax 
minimisation. If the ensuing tax benefits are allowed to continue unchecked, the result 
will be that the public will lose confidence in the tax system and the tax administration, 
and this will tempt many taxpayers not to comply with tax laws and to continually seek 
artificial ways around them, to the detriment of the national economy.  
 
                                                 
56  P Roper Offshore Options (1999) at 1; P Roper & J Ware Offshore Pitfalls (2000) at vii. V Tanzi 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper Globalization, Tax Competition and the Future of Tax 
Systems (1996) at 11 notes that in recent years there has been an increase in the number of 
countries and territories which impose low or even zero taxes, thereby encouraging individuals and 
enterprises to use them to establish a tax address to which income earned in other countries can 
be channelled; Ginsberg at 3 gives examples of jurisdictions such as Cyprus, Malaysia, Madeira, 
Malta, Mauritius, Nevis, Western Samoa and Gibraltar that have emerged as new tax shelters. 
57  J Ware & P Roper Offshore Insight (2001) at 3 provide examples of financial institutions such as 
CNN, Chase Manhattan, Citi Bank, Goldman Sachs Schwab, the Bank of America, Barclays Bank, 
Rothschilds, the Royal Bank of Canada and Deutsche Morgan Grenfell that have offshore 
operations; see also Ginsberg at 56.  
58  PEW Roper “Investing in the Offshore Market Place” (June 2000) Insurance and Tax Journal at 7; 
Ware & Roper at 3-4; P Gumbel “The Storms Over Tax Havens: Corporate Scandals Have 
Boosted the Pressure on Offshore Havens to Open their books. Some Have Done So - But the 
Global Crackdown Has a Long Way to Go” February 16 2004 Time Magazine at 2, where it is 
noted that the International Monetary Fund estimates that as much as $7 trillion in financial assets 
of various kinds are now held offshore. 
59  B Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service (March 2002) 7 at INT/2; see also MWE Glautier & FW 
Bassinger A Reference Guide to International Taxation: Profiting from your International 
Operations (1987) at 265. DD Beazer “The Mystique of Going Offshore” (1996) 9 The Utah Bar 
Journal  at 19 notes that approximately half of the world’s funds pass through tax havens each 
year and this is a sum which is over $5 trillion. 
60 Roper (2000) at 5; DM Davis Estate Planning (2004) in par 17.1; Ginsberg at 29 and at 581; J 
Ware & P Roper “The Impact of Residence-Based Tax on Offshore Trusts” (2001) 16 Insurance 
and Tax Journal at 21; Davis in par 17.1. 
61 South African Reserve Bank “Exchange Control Manual” in par 6.1.1. Available at 
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It is thus necessary to study some of the schemes that taxpayers employ in offshore tax 
avoidance, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation that South Africa has in 
place to curb such schemes. If no such legislation is in place, or if current legislation is 
ineffective, the methods that other countries have used to deal with this problem were 
studied, so as to come up with recommendations for the reform of our laws. 
 
The focus of this work is on the establishment of companies and trusts in offshore 
jurisdictions. The reason for choosing companies and trusts was that these are the two 
main vehicles used for investing in offshore jurisdictions.  
 
1.5 HYPOTHESIS 
 
In this work, it will be argued that there are two main factors (set out below) that 
encourage investment in offshore trusts and offshore companies. These factors have to 
be addressed, in order to curb the ensuing tax avoidance. 
 
 
 
 
1.5.1 THE EXISTENCE OF LOW-TAX AND "TAX-HAVEN" JURISDICTIONS 
 
Offshore tax avoidance through investment in offshore trusts and companies is 
encouraged by the very existence of low-tax and “tax-haven” jurisdictions.62  These are 
sovereign jurisdictions that have a right to determine their own tax policy (including 
making their country a tax haven). Other countries cannot enact legislation to remove 
the very existence of tax-haven countries.  This issue can only be addressed at an 
international level, if at all.63 This study will therefore consider the effectiveness of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
>http://www.reservebank.co.za/ <, last accessed on 16 May 2007.   
62 A tax haven is described as a jurisdiction actively making itself available for the avoidance of tax 
that would have been paid in high tax counties. OECD Issues in International Taxation No 1 20; 
see also Ginsberg at 5-6; Roper & Ware at 5. 
63 RL Doernberg, L Hinnekens, W Herrerstein & L Jinyan Electronic Commerce and Multi-
jurisdictional Taxation (2001) at 92-93. 
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recommendations offered by some international organisations that could be applied, so 
as to prevent tax havens from being used to deplete other countries’ tax bases.  
 
1.5.2 STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF TRUSTS AND COMPANIES THAT MAKE 
THEM IDEAL VEHICLES FOR OFFSHORE TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
Offshore tax avoidance is also encouraged by the structural features of companies and 
trusts that make them ideal vehicles for offshore tax avoidance. These structural 
features are used to take advantage of loopholes in the legislation. Countries often 
enact anti-avoidance legislation to close such loopholes and thus curb the ensuing tax 
avoidance. This work will discuss the effectiveness of some of the anti-avoidance 
legislation that South Africa has in place to curb the tax avoidance that results when 
taxpayers invest in offshore companies and offshore trusts. 
 
When South Africa was excluded from international affairs because of apartheid, its tax 
laws that relate to international transactions did not develop at the same pace as that of 
its trading partners. Since 1994, when apartheid was abolished and South Africa 
rejoined the global economy, South African residents have actively participated in 
international trade. This has exposed them to tax avoidance schemes that have been 
employed by other countries’ residents. At this stage, our legislation may not have 
sufficient devices in place that can counteract these tax avoidance schemes. This can 
result in a tremendous loss of revenue for the nation. It is thus necessary to make a 
comparative study of the offshore anti-avoidance legislation of other countries as a basis 
for recommendations for the reform of our legislation where necessary.  To this end, 
comparable legislation in the United States and in the United Kingdom will be studied. 
These two nations were chosen because they have had legislation that targets offshore 
tax avoidance in place for decades. Their experience in this regard is a valuable 
resource that South Africa can draw on. 
 
A study of offshore tax avoidance in the world today would be incomplete without taking 
cognisance of current developments in telecommunications that make it possible to 
trade electronically. Electronic commerce has opened up a new route for the exchange 
15 
 
 
  
of goods and services, and the accessing of offshore facilities. E-commerce is an area 
that has not yet been fully examined or regulated.64 It is feared that e-commerce will 
lead to the erosion of the tax base, because of the ease with which the jurisdictional 
requirements can be manipulated. This work does not cover a detailed study of e-
commerce, but some of the challenges that e-commerce poses to the legislation dealt 
with in this work will be briefly pointed out.  
 
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
It is recognised that offshore tax avoidance does not necessarily only take place in tax-
haven jurisdictions, but also in low-tax jurisdictions that are not necessarily tax-haven 
jurisdictions. The role of tax-haven jurisdictions will however, be emphasised, as the 
term “offshore” has historically been used in relation to islands in Europe and the 
Caribbean that are located off the mainland continents.65 This work will deal with the 
characteristics of these jurisdictions that make them ideal for offshore tax avoidance, but 
it will not include a review of any particular tax-haven jurisdiction.66 
 
International transactions offer many opportunities for avoiding taxes. The following are 
some examples:  
- the establishment of controlled foreign companies in tax havens to which a 
taxpayer can divert his domestic source income;67  
- the establishment of offshore trusts in tax havens; 
- the use of “transfer pricing” techniques whereby related companies engaged in 
cross-border transactions can manipulate transfer prices and shift profits from 
high to low tax jurisdictions;68 
                                                 
64 C Sher “Taxation of E-commerce” (2000) 39 Income Tax Reporter at 172. 
65 G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 11ed (2004) at 6. 
66 A review of particular offshore jurisdictions can be found in Spitz & Clarke.  
67  “Controlled foreign company” legislation that is discussed in detail in the preceding chapters has 
the effect of preventing the deferral of the undistributed income of a controlled foreign company, 
but it is taxed to its domestic shareholders on a current basis. See B Arnold The Taxation of 
Foreign Controlled Corporations: An International Comparison (1986) at 131. 
68  Transfer pricing legislation is used to prevent the manipulation of prices in order to reduce profits 
or increase profits artificially or cause losses and avoid taxes in a specific country. See SARS 
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- the use of unusual proportions of loan to equity capital (“thin capitalisation”) in 
order to achieve tax advantages;69 
- investment in offshore hybrid entities(e.g partnership/corporate structures);70 
- the use of “treaty shopping” techniques whereby a taxpayer avoids taxes by 
making use of advantageous tax treaties.71 
 
This work discusses the operation of some of these tax avoidance strategies and the 
effectiveness of the anti-avoidance legislation designed to curb the ensuing tax 
avoidance. The work does not entail a discussion of “thin capitalisation”. Though a 
detailed study of “transfer pricing” is not covered, some aspects of this topic are 
discussed.  
 
Although the study of exchange controls is not the main focus of this work, a discussion 
on “offshore tax avoidance” cannot be complete without reference to the role of 
exchange controls in limiting the flow of capital to offshore jurisdictions.   
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
 
The study will entail a review of South African and international textbooks, journal 
articles and case law on the topic studied as well as on related issues. 
 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
 
To abolish tax-haven jurisdictions may not be easy, as they have been in existence for 
                                                                                                                                                        
Practice Note No 7, 6 August 1999 “Section 31 of the Income Tax Act 1962 (the Act): 
Determination of Taxable Income of certain persons from International Taxation: Transfer Pricing” 
at paragraph 2.1. 
69  Thin capitalisation rules are rules used to prevent the use of unusual proportions of loan to equity 
capital in order to gain tax advantages. See M Van Blerck “Transfer Pricing and Capitalisation” 
(1995) 8 SA Tax Review at 44; The Second Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Certain Tax Structures of South Africa Thin Capitalisation Rules (1995) par 1.3b. 
70  BJ Arnold & MJ McLntyre International Tax Premier (2002) at 114.  
71  H Becker & FJ Wurm Treaty Shopping: An Emerging Tax Issue and its Present Status in Various 
Countries (1988) at 1; T Viitala Taxation of Investment Funds in the European Union (2005) at 95; 
RL Reinhold “What is Tax Treaty abuse? (Is Treaty Shopping an out dated concept?)” (2000) 53 
The Taxpayer at 673; SJ Haug “The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty Shopping 
Provisions: A Comparative Analysis” (1996) 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law at 220. 
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decades, and they have the right as sovereign nations to determine their own tax 
policies. Curbing offshore tax avoidance is going to take a concerted effort, at both the 
national and the international levels.  Nationally, countries will have to enact and/or 
reform the relevant anti-avoidance legislation where it is found wanting. Campaigns 
against tax havens by international organisations, such as the OECD, will also go a long 
way towards curbing offshore tax avoidance, more especially if countries commit 
themselves to heeding the recommendations of these organisations.
18  
CHAPTER 2 
 
LOW-TAX AND TAX-HAVEN JURISDICTIONS: CATALYSTS FOR 
OFFSHORE TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
It is scarcely possible to deal with the topic of offshore tax avoidance without 
discussing the role of low-tax jurisdictions and/or tax-haven jurisdictions. It is 
partly because of the presence of these jurisdictions that taxpayers in high-tax 
countries are encouraged to make investments in these jurisdictions where they 
will be subject to zero or minimum tax rates.  
 
2.1 WHAT IS A TAX-HAVEN JURISDICTION? 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD),1 a tax haven is described as a jurisdiction actively making itself 
available for the avoidance of tax that would have been paid in high-tax 
countries.2 It has been noted, however, that the expression “tax havens” does not 
have a precise technical meaning and that the term is commonly used in a very 
broad sense.3 The difficulty in giving “tax havens” a precise meaning lies in the 
                                                 
1 The OECD is an international organisation that was established in 1961 to contribute to 
economic development and growth in its member countries. The organisation seeks to 
promote economic development by issuing publications and statistics on various topics, 
such as competition, corporate governance, electronic commerce, trade and taxation. 
Through its publications, the OECD chooses the tools of dialogue, consensus, peer 
review and pressure in order to encourage economic development and change in the 
market economy. Though the primary focus of the OECD is on member countries, its 
additional goals of contributing to the expansion of world trade and the development of the 
world economy affect non-members as well. See OECD “History of the OECD”. Available 
at >http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,2340,and_2649_201185_1876671_1_1_1_1,00. 
html<, last accessed on 20 November 2006; JG Salinas “The OECD Tax Competition 
Initiative: A Critique of its Merits on the Global Market Place” (2003) 25 Houston Journal of 
International Law 538.  
2 OECD Issues in International Taxation No 1 International Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
(1987) at 20; see also A Ginsberg International Tax Havens 2 ed (1997) at 5-6; P Roper & 
J Ware Offshore Pitfalls (2000) at 5. 
3  M Hampton The Offshore Interface: Tax Havens in the Global Economy (1996) at 9 notes 
that there is no internationally accepted definition of exactly what a tax haven is. However, 
he describes tax havens as jurisdictions that have no or at least low direct and indirect 
taxes compared with the other jurisdictions. See also United Nations Ad Hoc Group of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters: Guidelines for International Cooperation Against the Evasion and Avoidance of 
Taxes (with Specific Reference to Taxes on Income, Profits, Capital and Capital Gains) 
(1984) at 30-31; RL Doernberg, L Hinnekens, W Herrerstein & L Jinyan Electronic 
Commerce and Multi-jurisdictional Taxation (2001) at 91.  
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fact that the definition can be given either a broad meaning or a precise one.4 In 
a broad sense, any given country can be said to serve as a tax haven in some 
respects. Almost every country in the world has a lower tax rate on some activity 
than another country’s rate on the same activity. This is because countries often 
use their tax laws to influence the use of capital. In fact income tax rates on any 
given activity are likely to vary throughout the world. If the definition of a tax 
haven is based solely on the comparison of the tax rates applicable in various 
jurisdictions, the resultant definition is unlikely to be meaningful in practice.5  
 
Similarly, if a tax haven is defined precisely as a jurisdiction which applies a low 
or zero rate of tax on all income items, on certain income items or on capital 
gains, this would encompass many countries. There are instances where 
relatively high-tax countries provide opportunities or devise policies to attract 
investment by charging low taxes in order to provide incentives and encourage 
certain economic activities.6 In practice, therefore, the term “tax haven” cannot be 
precisely defined.7  
 
Generally tax havens are divided into three main categories: the zero-tax havens 
which offer no direct taxes (like income tax and capital gains tax), the low-tax 
havens, and the typical tax havens which impose tax at normal rates but grant 
exemptions or other preferential treatment to certain categories of income.8  
                                                 
4 Hampton at 10.   
5  Hampton at 10, where it is pointed out that the complications of giving tax havens a 
precise definition lies in the fact that some high-tax countries may offer similar tax 
advantages to tax havens when, for example, tax exemptions are granted for certain types 
of businesses.   
6  MWE Glautier & FW Bassinger A Reference Guide to International Taxation: Profiting 
from Your International Operations (1987) at 228; A Ogley Tolley’s Tax Havens: A 
Practical Guide to the Leading Tax Havens of the World 1 ed (1990) at 4 notes that such 
countries cannot be considered tax havens in a strict sense since they levy direct taxes at 
normal rates while relieving from tax certain types of income. 
7 United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters at 
30-31, where it is noted that attempts to provide a single definition of a tax haven are 
bound to be unsuccessful. It is widely recognised that there is no single, clear objective 
test which permits the identification of a country as a tax haven. 
8 Ogley at 3; see also Institute for International Research Guide to Tax Havens (1977) at 3; 
Ginsberg at 5; Glautier & Bassinger at 228; see also MJ Langer “Tax Havens of the 
World” (1970) 24 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 424-425; B Spitz Tax 
Havens Encyclopaedia (1977) at 1; Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies, International 
Tax Avoidance Vol A  (1979) at 70; IFA (1981) at 32, where it is noted that the first two 
categories are predominantly made up of small economies whose revenue needs are met 
by direct taxes or by a combination of indirect taxes and low direct taxes. These territories 
20  
The OECD has divided jurisdictions that charge nil or minimum taxation into two 
main categories: tax-haven jurisdictions and harmful preferential tax regimes.9 An 
OECD report published in 199810 states that both tax-haven jurisdictions and 
harmful preferential tax regimes have harmful tax practices in place that may 
lead to the depletion of other countries’ tax bases.11 The report distinguishes 
between these two categories of jurisdiction by pointing out the characteristics 
that can be used to identify the relevant jurisdictions. 
 
2.2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TAX-HAVEN JURISDICTIONS 
 
Tax-haven jurisdictions are characterised by high levels of secrecy in the banking 
and commercial sectors.  People who transact business in or through tax-haven 
jurisdictions are therefore assured of confidentiality.12 This makes it difficult for 
foreign tax authorities to ascertain the identity of the relevant investors for the 
purposes of collecting taxes.13 It is common knowledge that many jurisdictions 
follow the common law precedent which provides for the privilege of information 
that a banker receives from his customer.14 This has evolved into a standard 
basis for protecting banking affairs and financial transactions from divulgence to 
foreign tax authorities. These secrecy provisions are, however, often abused in 
                                                                                                                                            
use the absence of direct taxation or low direct tax rates in order to promote investment in 
their financial sectors. 
9 OECD Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998) in par 75; see also B 
Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service (2002) at OECD/3. 
10 OECD 1998 Report; see also WH Diamond & DB Diamond Tax Havens of the World 
(2002) Publication 722 Release 108 at INTRO 13.  
11 OECD 1998 Report in par 75; see also Spitz & Clarke at OECD/3. 
12 Spitz & Clarke at INT/7; Ogley at 7 notes that users of tax haven will be concerned to 
ensure that their affairs remain confidential. In order to reassure users or potential users, a 
number of tax havens have introduced confidentiality laws imposing criminal sanctions on 
bankers or other professionals who betray their client’s confidence. The most notable 
examples are Switzerland and Liechtenstein; see also Hampton at 12 and 14; Glautier & 
Bassinger at 234. Some countries have tax conventions with tax havens for the exchange 
of information, but this does not entail a breach of bank secrecy. Access to information of 
a public nature may not be denied but permission has to be granted. See also RA Westin 
International Taxation of Electronic Commerce (2000) at 384. 
13  Spitz & Clarke at INT/7; Ogley at 7. 
14 Diamond & Diamond at INTRO-35 note that common law secrecy is based upon an 
implied contract between a banker and his customer requiring the banker to treat all the 
customer’s affairs as confidential. Secrecy may also be based upon statutes, which 
provide penalties, fines or imprisonment for violation of the provisions; see also DJ 
Workman “The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for Purposes of Criminally Evading Income 
Taxes” (1982) 73 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1982) at 679. 
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tax havens so as to facilitate the avoidance of taxes.15 These secrecy provisions 
serve as an incentive for offshore banking, mainly because tax havens usually 
distinguish between resident and non-resident banking activities. Non-resident 
banking activities do not have bank reserve requirements and they are taxed 
more lightly (if at all).16 This favourable treatment is based on the fact that tax 
havens thrive largely because of the presence of foreign banks since such 
financial activities generate revenue for the host country.17 In one Cayman 
Islands case,18 a bank from the United States of America which had a subsidiary 
in the Cayman Islands was issued with a summons by the United States of 
America’s Internal Revenue Service for the purpose of identifying (for tax liability) 
persons who had transferred or received large sums of money during a specific 
period. The Cayman Islands court held that the safeguarding of confidentiality 
was a cornerstone of the banking business and the preservation of this principle 
was the basis on which the economy of the Cayman Islands so substantially 
relied. It thus outweighed the interests of America’s Internal Revenue Service in 
enforcing its summons.   
 
The other characteristic of tax-haven jurisdictions is a lack of transparency and 
effective exchange of information with other governments concerning the benefits 
taxpayers receive from the tax haven.19 Information exchange provisions help in 
curbing tax avoidance as the jurisdictions concerned can share the data that are 
necessary for the effective enforcement of their tax laws.20 
Tax havens are also characterised by a general lack of foreign exchange 
controls, which in itself is one of the major incentives for investing in tax havens, 
as it enables taxpayers to transfer money subject to minor restrictions.21 In 
contrast, high-tax countries have strict exchange controls that make it hard for 
                                                 
15 Hampton at 12; Ginsberg at 13 also notes that “the common advantages of tax havens 
include freedom from liability for tax, strict laws of secrecy for banking and commercial 
transactions and no exchange controls”. See also United Nations Ad Hoc Group of 
Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters at 36.  
16 Spitz & Clarke at INT/7; Ogley at 7; B Arnold & MJ McIntyre International Tax Primer 2 ed 
(2002) at 139 also give details of the characteristics of tax havens.  
17 Spitz & Clarke at INT/7; Ogley at 7. 
18 In the matter of Bank of America Trust and Banking Corp (Cayman) Ltd, and  In the matter 
of Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association 1992 93 CILR 574, read from 
G Clarke & B Spitz Offshore Service Cases Vol 1 (1999) at 158.  
19 1998 OECD Report in par 79; see also Workman at 678.  
20  Salinas at 534-535. 
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domestic residents to move their money at any time. The lack of exchange 
controls also prevents the loss of income that would result from the differences in 
the value of the currencies of different countries.22 Tax havens usually have a 
dual currency control system, which distinguishes between residents and non-
residents and between local currency and foreign currency, by allowing non-
residents’ businesses to operate effectively outside their exchange controls while 
protecting the domestic economy from such freedom.23  
 
Taxpayers are generally attracted by the reduced statutory formalities that tax-
haven jurisdictions offer, which make it easy to conduct business transactions in 
or through them. However, it is the resulting tax advantages that have 
traditionally been the driving force for offshore involvement.24 
 
Regarding harmful preferential tax regimes, the 1998 OECD Report points out 
that a harmful preferential tax regime can occur in both tax-haven and high-tax 
jurisdictions. Harmful tax regimes are characterised by having no or low effective 
tax rates on income; the regimes are ring-fenced25 and there is a general lack of 
transparency and effective exchange of information with other countries.26  
Despite the fact that preferential tax regimes also play a role in offshore tax 
avoidance, it is the tax-haven jurisdictions that are mainly notorious in this 
regard. Writers on this topic have noted that the concept of “tax havens” is 
central to the idea of offshore tax planning.27 This assertion is based on the fact 
                                                                                                                                            
21  Glautier & Bassinger at 238. 
22 Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies at 76. 
23  Hampton at 13-14; see also Workman at 680. 
24  J Ware & P Roper Offshore Insight (2001) at 3; see also Glautier & Bassinger at 244-245.  
25 The term “ring-fencing” refers to the artificial demarcation or limitation of profits or losses 
for tax purposes, ignoring the corporate form of the taxable or restricting the application of 
particular provisions to transactions inside the ring fence. See L Olivier & M Honiball 
International Tax: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 488; see also Salinas at 
540, where it is noted that ring-fencing protects a country from the financial burden of its 
own incentive regime, while adversely affecting only the foreign tax base. HCAW Schulze 
“The Free-trade Programmes of Namibia and Mauritius and the Latest Developments in 
Europe: Lessons for South Africa” (1999) 32 CILSA 185 at 202.  
26 Salinas at 541 notes that a lack of transparency involves the unclear application of a tax 
regime to a taxpayer, with the application being unavailable to the tax authorities of other 
affected countries. Ineffective exchange of information means that secrecy laws or 
administrative policies may hinder the application of tax treaties and national legislation by 
preventing home-state tax authorities from obtaining information on taxpayers benefiting 
from a preferential tax  regime; see also Olivier & Honiball at 463. 
27  Arnold & McIntyre at 8. 
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that international tax schemes used to minimise taxes often involve the use of tax 
havens and tax havens play an important part in the international operations of 
many entities.28  
 
It is worth pointing out that the term “tax haven” is sometimes used 
interchangeably with the term “offshore financial centre”. It is argued that the 
latter term better reflects the wide range of commercial and financial activities 
carried on in the jurisdictions concerned.29 Although both of these terms are used 
to refer to the withdrawal of capital from domestic jurisdictions, tax havens are 
based upon taking advantage of the taxation differences between states and they 
are usually jurisdictions that have low direct taxes or no direct taxes at all. 
Conversely, an offshore financial centre may be taken to mean a jurisdiction 
where a number of financial activities and services take place and where there 
are branches or subsidiaries of major international banks.30 Tax havens may or 
may not host a range of financial services. Although an offshore financial centre 
may be a tax haven, not all tax havens are offshore financial centres.31 For the 
purposes of this work, the term “tax haven” is used. 
 
2.3 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TAX-HAVEN JURISDICTIONS 
 
The history of the evolution of tax-haven jurisdictions shows that places offering 
foreigners little or no taxation on the investments made in these jurisdictions are 
not a new development. In the 12th Century, for example, the City of London 
exempted merchants of the Hanseatic League from all taxes.32 The cities of the 
                                                 
28  Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 1; G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 11 ed (2004) at 250 
points out that the term “offshore jurisdiction” tends to be used interchangeably with the 
term “tax haven”. 
29 Clarke at 250. 
30 Hampton at 15; Spitz & Clarke at INT/5; Roper & Ware at 5; Ware & Roper at 3.  
31  Ginsberg at 3 and Olivier & Honiball at 463 note that the term “tax havens” has become 
increasingly unpopular with both tax advisers and the authorities in the relevant 
jurisdictions as it has come to imply the circumvention of another country’s tax laws. 
Increasingly reference is being made to ”low-tax jurisdictions” or ”offshore financial 
centres” in order to create a more positive image.   
32 The Hanseatic League was a confederation of northern European trading cities which 
flourished from the 12th century to 1669. It was organised by German and Scandinavian 
seafaring merchants. Since there were no navies to protect their cargoes, no international 
bodies to regulate tariffs and trade, and few ports had regulatory authorities to manage 
their use, the merchants banded together to establish tariff agreements, provide for 
common defence and to make sure ports were safely maintained.  The basis of the 
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Hanseatic League33 owed much of their prosperity to the favourable tax 
treatment given to commerce.34 In the 15th century, Flanders (now a part of 
Belgium) lifted the duties on much of its trade and imposed very few exchange 
restrictions. As a result, it became a flourishing international commercial centre 
where many English merchants sold their wool rather than in England, where 
they were taxed heavily.35 Similarly, in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, the 
Netherlands imposed very low duties and few restrictions and was consequently 
able to attract thriving trade to its ports.36 Switzerland has historically also been 
known as a tax haven for capital flight, a practice that dates back to Roman 
times.37 By the 1930s, the Bahamas were already being used by wealthy 
Canadian and United States citizens as a location for private offshore trusts and 
holding companies in order to protect their assets from excessive taxation.38 
Despite their early existence, tax havens were not frequently used for tax 
avoidance purposes and for most people they still represented the proverbial “pot 
of gold at the end of the rainbow” - a fantasy beyond reach.39 The original 
concept of tax havens as a means of avoiding taxes was first introduced in 
                                                                                                                                            
League’s power was its monopoly of the Baltic trade and its relations with Flanders and 
England. The league became so profitable and so powerful that it survived for more than 
three centuries. The decline of the Hanseatic League after the 15th century was caused 
by the closing and moving of trade routes and the development of nation states. See 
Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia “Hanseatic League”. Available at   
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanseatic_League<, last accessed on 18 May 2007; see also 
J Mills “The Hanseatic League in The Eastern Baltic” (May 1998). 
Available at >http://depts.washington.edu/baltic/papers/hansa.html>, last accessed on 28 
May 2007. See also C Doggart “Tax Havens and Their Uses” (1990) Special Report No. 
1191 The Economist Publication at 1. 
33 At the height of its power in the late 14th century the Hanseatic League included over 160 
cities and towns, among them Lübeck, Hamburg, Cologne, Breslau, Krakóów, Visby, 
Bruges, Bergen and Novgorod. See Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia “Lists of Former 
Hansa Cities”. Available at 
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanseatic_League#Lists_of_former_Hansa_cities<, last 
accessed on 18 May 2007; see also 
  >http://depts.washington.edu/baltic/papers/hansa.html<, last accessed on 18 May 2007. 
See also HCAW Schulze International Tax-free Trade Zones and Free Ports: A 
Comparative Study of their Principles and Practices (1997) at 34, where mention is made 
of some of the cities in the Hanseatic League.   
34  Doggart at 1; see also J Mills “The Hanseatic League in The Eastern Baltic” (May 1998).  
Available at >http://depts.washington.edu/baltic/papers/hansa.html>, last accessed on 28 
May 2007.  
35  Doggart at 1. 
36  Doggart at 1. 
37  Hampton at 17. 
38  United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters at 
30; Hampton at 17. 
39  E Chambost Using Tax Havens Successfully (1978) at 13; Ogley at 3 notes that originally 
tax havens enjoyed a certain mystique and were regarded as a vehicle used only by the 
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international business after World War 1 and since then tax havens have 
proliferated on every continent around the world.40 By the 1960s to 1970s, many 
United States banks had set up branches in Caribbean tax havens to serve as 
Euro-currency booking offices.41 For many years, the core offshore jurisdictions 
have been islands in Europe and the Caribbean that are located off the shores of 
the mainland continents. That is why the term ”offshore” is used in respect of 
these jurisdictions although the term also applies to land-locked jurisdictions.42 
But from the 1960s onwards, the scale on which individuals43 have shifted their 
operating bases from place to place in search of tax relief has increased 
tremendously. This has generally been encouraged by developments in 
telecommunication and the worldwide removal of obstacles to the free movement 
of persons and property.44 The increased tax rate differences among countries 
that have emerged in recent decades have also encouraged the diversion of 
funds and business transactions from jurisdictions with high taxes to low-tax 
jurisdictions which offer a more favourable environment for depositing funds and 
transacting business. In fact the use of a suitable tax-haven jurisdiction appears 
to have become a necessary component of international tax planning and many 
of the world’s business transactions take place in tax-haven jurisdictions.45 
Furthermore, the offshore industry has grown substantially in the past decade. 
Today’s leading mutual funds, stock broking firms and banks are based offshore 
and tax havens completely dominate such international activities as shipping, 
aircraft financing and captive insurance.46 
                                                                                                                                            
very wealthy. 
40  Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 2-3. 
41 Hampton at 17.  
42 Clarke at 6. 
43  V Tanzi International Monetary Fund Working Paper: Globalization, Tax Competition and 
the Future of Tax Systems (1996) at 9 notes that in recent years there has been an 
increase in the incomes that individuals derive from investments made in other countries. 
This is because information technology encourages the investment of personal savings 
abroad. As a result, the total and global incomes of individuals now contain a large and 
growing component of foreign-earned income. 
44  Tanzi at 4; Salinas at 533. See also Ogley at 3 who states that the growth in international 
trade and the developments in telecommunication have led to a substantial growth in the 
number of tax havens. However, the increased telecommunication has led to a reduction 
in unit costs and this has resulted in tax havens being used by a larger sector of society.  
45 Ginsberg at 5-6; Glautier & Bassinger at 228 note that the use of tax havens has been 
favoured by those most affected by high rates of direct taxation, namely business 
corporations, wealthy individuals with high levels of personal income and trusts 
established to protect accumulated wealth against death and succession duties. 
46  J Christensen “Tackling Dirty Money: Illicit Capital flight and Tax Evasion” (World Social 
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The significance of tax havens lies in the fact that large amounts of money are 
sheltered there. The tax bases of other countries could well become depleted as 
a result. It is therefore necessary to explore ways of curtailing the use of tax 
havens for offshore tax avoidance.   
 
As will be pointed out in subsequent chapters, domestic legislation can be 
enacted to close the loopholes in the law that encourage tax avoidance when 
investments are transferred to offshore companies and offshore trusts, but 
domestic anti-avoidance measures cannot remove the very existence of low-tax 
or tax-haven countries. Since each country has the right to determine its own tax 
policy (including establishing a tax haven), this issue can only be addressed at 
an international level, if at all.47  
 
2.4 A SURVEY OF SOME INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES TAKEN TO 
STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAX HAVENS   
 
As the growth of tax havens continues to be a major cause of the depletion of 
countries’ tax bases, the international community has taken some measures to 
stifle their development. A brief survey of the past and present steps taken by 
some of these bodies will now be offered and the effectiveness of the measures 
introduced considered. 
 
European Union (EU) initiatives against tax havens 
 
In 1992, the EU issued a report containing recommendations on company 
taxation in Europe that would prevent residents of member countries from 
transferring investments to other member countries that levied lower taxes. One 
                                                                                                                                            
Forum - Bamako, Mali. 19-23 January 2006) at 9. Available at 
>http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/World_Social_Forum_at_Bamako_-_JEC_-
_Jan_2006.pdf<, last accessed 3 July 2007.Isle of Man Treasury “Island ‘Committed to 
Global Business Growth’” (February 2007) Isle of Man Financial Review at 1; J Alm, JM 
Vazquez & M Rider “The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy” (2006) at 208. 
Available at >http://books.google.co.za/books?id=0X4ZNFtChHcC&pg= 
PA207&ots=TbmB9R90XI&dq=tax+haven+investments+in+last+5+years&sig=KLQXSFA0
umEI3C3jiYlxoz3hm7A#PPA208,M1<, last accessed 28 May 2007. 
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of the recommendations was to establish a minimum and a maximum corporate 
income tax rate for member countries of 30% and 40% respectively. However, 
this recommendation was not followed. Ten years later, in 2002, corporate 
income tax rates still varied greatly, the lowest being 16% in Ireland and the 
highest 40% in Greece. In addition, in some jurisdictions like Gibraltar (which is 
regarded as part of the United Kingdom in terms of EU law), some offshore 
companies still enjoyed tax-free status.48 The EU drafted a directive on a 
common withholding tax which was designed to prevent the flow of funds to low-
tax jurisdictions. It required member states to charge a minimum withholding tax 
of 20% on non-resident income from savings accounts. For example, if a resident 
of the United Kingdom had a savings account in Luxembourg, Luxembourg was 
required either to withhold 20% of that person’s income or to forward the details 
of the investment to the United Kingdom’s Inland Revenue Department. This 
directive was also to be followed by the Channel Islands dependent territories, 
namely; Guernsey and Jersey, and the Caribbean dependent territories, such as 
the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, the Turks and Caicos and British Virgin Island. 
However, the directive was met with objections from countries such as the United 
Kingdom, which were concerned that measures relating to withholding taxes and 
the sharing of information could reverse the flow of funds and have a negative 
impact on promoting the “Eurodollar” as a currency that could successfully 
compete against the American dollar as a world currency.49 
 
In 1997, the EU Council of Economic and Financial Ministers (ECOFIN) agreed 
on a package of measures to tackle harmful tax competition in order to help 
reduce distortions in the single market and to prevent excessive loss of tax 
revenue.50 The measures included: a “Code of Conduct” on business taxation,51 
a commitment to a draft a directive to deal with taxation of savings, including 
withholding taxes on bank interest payments and share dividends, and a 
                                                                                                                                            
47 Doernberg et al at 92-93. 
48 J Kesti KPMG European Tax Handbook (IBFD 2003) at 14; Olivier & Honiball at 475. 
49 Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 24. 
50  T Bennet International Initiatives Affecting Financial Havens (2001) at 115. 
51  The “Code of Conduct” is a political commitment, not a legally enforceable rule. See W 
Bratton & J McCahery “Tax Coordination and Tax Competition in the European Union: 
Evaluating the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation” (2001) 28 Common Market Law 
Review 677. 
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commitment to a draft directive on interest and royalty payments between 
companies.52 
 
In terms of the Code of Conduct, EU member countries were called upon to stop 
any measures that constituted harmful tax competition and to desist from 
introducing any new measures.53 It was agreed that all harmful tax measures 
were expected to be withdrawn by 1 January 2003.54 “Harmful tax measures” 
were defined as measures (including administrative practices) which affected in a 
significant way, the location of business activity in the Community, and which 
provided for a significantly lower effective level of taxation than the general level 
of taxation in the member States concerned. A group of representatives of the 
EU member States called the “Primarolo” group was set up to gather information 
and to assess any national tax measures that might fall foul of the Code.55 In 
1998 the Primarolo group came up with a report that blacklisted harmful national 
tax measures.56 
 
As a result of the Primarolo report, in 1998, the EU came up with a 
Communication on Unacceptable State Aid in regard to Direct Business 
Taxation.57 In 2000, the State Aid in the form of tax incentives was prohibited in 
the European Community as it distorts competition.58 As a follow-up measure, 
several investigations were conducted in 2001 to determine whether the member 
countries had complied with the Communication. For example, in 2001, an 
investigation was conducted into the Gibraltar qualifying offshore company’s 
rules and the Gibraltar exempt offshore company’s rules. The outcomes of the 
investigation were favourable to Gibraltar.59  
 
                                                 
52  Bennet at 115.  
53   BJM Terra & PJ Wattel European Tax Law 4 ed (2005) at 242; MF Ambrosanio & MS 
Caroppo “The Reponses of Tax Havens Against Harmful Tax Competition: Formal 
Statements and Concrete Policies” (October 2004) Quaderni Dell’Instituto Di Economia E 
Finanza  6. Available at http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza/ 
Quaderni/571004.pdf< last accessed 25 June 2007. 
54  B Spitz Offshore Strategies (2001) at 251; P Laidlow Tolley’s International Tax Planning 
(2000) at 19-20; Bennet at 115. 
55  Terra & Wattel at 284; Bratton & McCahery at 701. 
56  Ambrosanio & Caroppo at 6; see also Terra & Wattel at 284. 
57  Terra & Wattel at 288. 
58  Terra & Wattel at 288. 
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The EU also addressed the harmful tax competition that came about when 
certain member countries, like Luxembourg and Switzerland attracted the 
savings income of non-resident individuals. This they did by upholding bank 
secrecy and exempting from withholding tax, interest paid to non-residents. This 
facilitated non-declaration of income, thus draining other States tax revenues, 
notably.60 Consequently, in 2003, the EU issued a Directive on a common 
system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between 
associated companies of different member States (Interest and Royalty 
Directive).61  
 
In 2003, the EU also issued a Directive on the effective taxation of savings 
income as part of the policy package for preventing harmful tax competition (The 
Savings Income Directive).62 The application date of this Directive was set on 1 
January 2005 on condition that an agreement was reached with certain countries 
on equivalent effective taxation measures on their part. In 2004, agreements 
were signed with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino,63 in terms 
of which, a system of exchange of information on harmful tax competition was to 
be effected on 1 July 2005.64 Commenting on the EU initiatives against harmful 
tax competition, it has been noted that,  
The EU has a better chance to curbing tax competition among its own members, both 
through its directives and through the European Court of Justice, which is steadily, 
enforcing tax harmony in the name of the single European market. But any success the 
EU achieves internally may simply make it more vulnerable to tax competition from non-
EU countries.65  
 
The 1998 G7 initiatives 
 
In 1998, the G7 countries66 put forward a number of initiatives, in terms of which 
                                                                                                                                            
59 Kesti at 14; Olivier & Honiball at 475. 
60  Terra & Wattel at 243. 
61  Directive 2003/49/EC as read from Terra & Wattel at 627. See also Bennet at 115. 
62  Directive 2003/48/EC as read from Terra & Wattel at 643.  
63  Terra & Wattel at 643. 
64  Terra & Wattel at 243; Christensen at 9.  
65  Bennet at 35. 
66  The term “G7 Countries” refers to the Group of Seven Industrialised Countries. Before 
1997, this group comprised: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America. In 1997 Russia formally joined the group and now it is 
referred to as the G8. However, Russia is not included in the group's economic meetings 
for financial officials since its economy is comparatively small as measured by gross 
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they put in place a comprehensive Code of Conduct on Business Taxation. The 
initiative committed the G7 nations to take international action on tax-related 
issues by allowing the exchange of information among member states.67 The G7 
noted that with the globalisation of business and use of the Internet, the threat of 
the depletion of countries’ tax bases as a result of investment in tax havens has 
been exacerbated, and made it clear that they would be less tolerant of the use 
of tax haven bank secrecy and tax avoidance by the residents of high-tax 
countries.68 The G7 agreed to reinforce the initiatives of EU and the OECD in 
tackling harmful tax competition and obtaining information about transactions in 
tax havens and preferential tax regimes.69  
 
In 1999,70 the G7 held a summit in which member countries reaffirmed their 
support of the OECD initiatives against harmful tax. In the 2000 summit,71 the G7 
welcomed the OECD 2000 Report on Progress on Identifying and  Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices (that is discussed below)72 and urged all jurisdictions to 
make commitments to eliminate harmful tax practices.  In line with the OECD 
recommendations, the G7 also called on all countries to work towards a position 
where they can permit access to, and exchange of, bank information for tax 
purposes.73 In 2001 the G7 commended the OECD member countries for their 
commitment to eliminate harmful tax practices and urged the OECD to continue 
to monitor the effective implementation of those commitments. The G7 also 
commended the OECD for its continual dialogue with non-OECD member 
                                                                                                                                            
domestic product. The term G7 now refers specifically to the seven countries excluding 
Russia, in the context of meetings for finance ministers and governors of central banks 
from those countries. See Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia “G8”. Available at 
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G8#History<, last accessed 16 May 2007. 
67 G8 Information Centre: The Birmingham Summit “G7 Initiative on Harmful Tax 
Competition” (15-17 May 1988). Available at >http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1998 
birmingham/harmfultax.html<, last accessed 3 July 2007. See also Diamond & Diamond 
at INTRO 23;  
68 Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 23. 
69  See G8 Information Centre: The Birmingham Summit.  
70  G8 Information Centre “Cologne Summit” (1999). Available at 
>http://www.g8.fr/evian/English/navigation/g8_documents/acrchives_from_previous_su…
<, last accessed 3 July 2007. 
71  G8 Information Centre: Kyushu-Okinawa Summit “Actions against Abuse of the Global 
Financial System” (21 July 2000) in par C. Available at 
>http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2000okinawa/abuse.htm<, last accessed 3 July 2007. 
72  OECD Report of the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and Recommendations by the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs “Towards Global Tax Co-operation Progress in Identifying and 
Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices”. See the discussion on this report in fn 101 below. 
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countries to eliminate harmful tax practices and it encouraged other countries to 
associate themselves with the OECD initiatives.74  
 
The Edwards Report  
 
In 1998, the United Kingdom’s Home Secretary presented the Edwards Report to 
Parliament. This report, officially entitled “Review of Financial Regulations in the 
Crown Dependencies”, described a study of the financial regulations in the 
United Kingdom Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Sark, Guernsey and the Isle of 
Man.75 The matters investigated included cooperation by Jersey with foreign tax 
authorities regarding tax evasion and avoidance on Jersey; the operation of 
secretly-owned unsupervised companies on the Isle of Man; and the use of 
fictitious nominee directors in Guernsey and Sark.76 The report accused Sark of 
using nominee directors for offshore companies without the knowledge of the 
true owners, thus allowing the offshore companies to enjoy secrecy and tax-free 
status.77 
 
The Edwards Report recommended certain measures with which these 
jurisdictions were required to comply.78 In general, the findings of the report were 
favourable to these jurisdictions. The report commended the relevant 
jurisdictions for the way in which they have developed their offshore finance 
                                                                                                                                            
73  See G8 Information Centre: Kyushu-Okinawa Summit.  
74  G8 Information Centre: G8 Finance Minister’s Meeting Rome, Italy “Fighting the Abuse of 
the Global Financial System” (7 July 2001) in par D. Available at 
>http://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/262/2/fm010707-b.htm<, last accessed 3 
July 2007. 
75  Bennet at 37. 
76 Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 25. 
77 Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 26. 
78 The Report recommended that 
   - offshore companies in these jurisdictions be forced to make public account  filings; 
  -  ownership of offshore companies should be disclosed to the Islands’ regulators; 
 -  there should be a crackdown on professional offshore advisers and rigid new 
regulations should be implemented to control persons assisting with company 
formation; 
 -  there should be stricter supervision of attorneys and accountants in both British 
dependencies and persons onshore who are involved in offshore structuring and 
servicing; 
 -  stringent action be taken against offshore trust companies by enforcing greater 
transparency and documentation of trustees and beneficiaries; 
 -  investigations be made into the increase in the use of offshore trusts with the 
intention of making them the principle target of future changes. See Diamond & 
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centres and the manner in which those centres are regulated.79 The Report’s 
recommendations were duly considered both within the respective jurisdictions 
and in the United Kingdom. Some of the jurisdictions took steps to comply with 
the recommendations of the Report.80 However some of the recommendations 
were not easily complied with as they required a substantial number of legislative 
changes, in some instances, whole revision of certain laws.81 
  
The KPMG Report 
 
In 1999, the British government released its plan for the Dependent Territories in 
a White Paper,82 in which it outlined the terms and conditions expected of the 
British Overseas Territories of Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the 
Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands. In response to 
the White Paper, in 2000, the government of the United Kingdom engaged the 
global advisory and accounting firm KPMG to investigate the financial regulations 
in the above British Overseas Territories. The findings of the KPMG report were, 
however, favourable to the territories.  The criticism levelled against the 
investigation was that it was partially funded by these territories themselves and 
was therefore not very critical of them.83  
 
The OECD onslaught against tax havens 
 
Of all the different international initiatives against tax havens, the OECD has 
probably played the leading role as it continues its onslaught against tax havens 
up to the present day. It is thus necessary to investigate the effectiveness of this 
campaign.  
                                                                                                                                            
Diamond at INTRO 26; Bennet at 38-39. 
79  Volaw Trust & Corporate Services Ltd, Channel Islands “The Edwards Report – 27 
November 1998”. Available at >http://www.volaw.com/pg428.htm<, last accessed 27 June 
2007. 
80 Ware & Roper 24 at 32; see also Olivier & Honiball at 475. 
81  Volaw Trust & Corporate Services Ltd, Channel Islands. Available at 
>http://www.volaw.com/pg428.htm<, last accessed 27 June 2007. 
82 Foreign and Commonwealth Office “Partnership for Progress and Prosperity - British and 
Overseas Territories” (17/3/99). Available at 
>http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Pa
ge&cid=1018028164839<, last accessed 18 May 2007. 
83  Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 28; Ware & Poper at 33; Olivier & Honiball at 475. 
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In its 1998 report, the OECD pointed out that tax-haven jurisdictions and harmful 
preferential tax regimes distort financial and investment flows among countries.84 
The harmful tax practices of these havens undermine the integrity and fairness of 
tax structures; they discourage compliance by all taxpayers; they cause 
undesirable shifts of part of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases such as 
labour, property and consumption; and they increase the administrative costs 
and compliance burdens on tax authorities and taxpayers respectively.85 In order 
to counter those harmful tax practices, the OECD came up with certain 
recommendations that countries may adopt in order to enhance the effectiveness 
of their domestic legislation in curbing offshore tax avoidance.86  
 
The OECD recommended that countries should have rules concerning the 
reporting of international transactions and foreign operations of resident 
taxpayers and should exchange any information obtained under such rules. It 
was also recommended that countries consider undertaking coordinated 
enforcement programmes (such as simultaneous examinations, specific 
exchange of information projects, joint audits, and joint training activities) in 
relation to income or taxpayers benefiting from practices constituting harmful tax 
competition. Another suggestion was that countries review those rules that apply 
to the enforcement of the tax claims of other countries in order to assist in 
recovering such tax claims.  
 
A further recommendation was that countries should adopt effective legislation to 
curb offshore tax avoidance. Such legislation includes “controlled foreign 
company” (CFC) legislation,87 ”transfer pricing” legislation (as that recommended 
                                                 
84 1998 OECD Report in par 75; see also Spitz & Clarke at OECD/3. 
85 Ware & Roper at 27 state that according to member states, tax havens have increased 
their flow of funds, thereby undermining the onshore jurisdictions. 
86 1998 OECD Report at 67-71.  
87  Controlled foreign company legislation ensures that the undistributed income of a 
controlled foreign company is not deferred, but is taxed in the hands of its domestic 
shareholders on a current basis. Olivier & Honiball at 463; B Arnold The Taxation of 
Foreign Controlled Corporations: An International Comparison (1986) at 131; R Jooste 
“The Imputation of Income of Controlled Foreign Entities” 118 (2001) The South African 
Law Journal at 473-474; see also A de Koker Silke on South African Income Tax: Being 
an Exposition of the Law, Practice and Incidence of Income Tax in South Africa (2004 
service 29) vol 1 in par 5.43. 
34  
in the 1995 OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing88), and also “thin capitalisation” 
legislation.89  
 
The OECD also recommended that in order to counter harmful tax competition, 
countries should review their laws, regulations and practices which govern 
access to banking information with a view to removing impediments to the 
access to such information by tax authorities.90 The OECD went on to 
recommend that countries should intensify international cooperation in response 
to tax competition. Furthermore, member countries were required to refrain from 
adopting new measures or strengthening existing measures (legislation and 
administrative practices) that constitute harmful tax practices. They were also 
required to review their existing measures and identify those that constitute 
harmful tax practices. OECD member countries were called upon to produce a 
list of tax-haven jurisdictions. Countries that have particular political, economic or 
other links with tax havens were asked to ensure that those links do not 
contribute to harmful tax competition and in particular countries that have 
dependencies that are tax havens were requested to ensure that their links with 
these tax havens are not used in a way that increases or promotes harmful tax 
competition. Further, countries should consider the termination of their existing 
tax treaties with tax-haven jurisdictions that are used to encourage harmful tax 
competition and they should not sign treaties with such tax havens in future. It 
was also recommended that non-member countries like South Africa be 
associated with these recommendations.  
 
The 1998 OECD report gave rise to an uproar from the tax-haven jurisdictions 
                                                 
88 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators 
(1995). Transfer pricing is also described as the systematic manipulation of prices in order 
to reduce profits or increase profits artificially or cause losses and avoid taxes in a specific 
country. See South African Revenue Service (SARS) Practice Note: No. 7 Section 31 of 
the Income Tax Act 1962 (the Act): Determination of Taxable Income of Certain Persons 
from International Taxation: Transfer Pricing (1999) in par 2.1. 
89  Thin capitalisation is described as the use of unusual proportions of loan to equity capital 
in order to gain tax advantages. See United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matter at 18; The Second Interim Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structures of South Africa Thin 
Capitalisation Rules (1995) in par 1.1 where ”thin capitalisation” is referred to as a means 
of investment through debt as opposed to through equity. See also M Van Blerck 
“Transfer Pricing and Thin Capitalisation” (1995) 8 SA Tax Review at 44. 
90 Spitz & Clarke at OECD/12.  
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whose livelihood it appeared to threaten.91 The report was criticised for focusing 
only on the interests of the OECD member countries and ignoring the interests 
and concerns of the tax-haven jurisdictions as it did not engage in effective 
consultations with these jurisdictions during the drafting stage.92 This approach, it 
is argued, undermines the notion of a nation’s fiscal sovereignty.93 The 1998 
OECD report was also accused of discriminating against tax-haven 
jurisdictions.94 Some OECD member countries such as Switzerland and 
Luxemburg which are financially oriented tax havens and were most affected by 
OECD recommendations, chose not to veto the 1998 Report.95 Since the OECD 
had failed to obtain the cooperation of some of its own members it had no right to 
require non-OECD member countries to cooperate.96 
 
The report caused divisions among OECD member countries.97 It was accused 
of setting out to impose a uniform tax system on all nations. The legislators of the 
United States spoke out against the OECD, calling its initiative destructive to tax 
havens’ competitive status within the global economy.98 Paul O’Neil, the then 
United States Secretary of State, made the following statement on 10 May 2001:  
                                                 
91  M Grundy Essays in International Taxation (2001) at 1.  
92 Ware & Roper at 31; see also Spitz & Clarke at OECD/14-20. 
93 Salinas at 555. 
94 Ware & Roper at 30 note that in 1999 the Bahamas government told the OECD that the 
1998 Harmful Tax Competition Report was not balanced and that it discriminated against 
countries whose tax regimes were considered unilaterally by the OECD to be harmful; P 
Gumbel “The Storm Over Tax Havens: Corporate Scandals Have Boosted the Pressure 
on Offshore Havens to Open Their Books. Some Have Done So - But Global Crackdown 
Has A Long Way to Go” (2004) 16 Time Magazine at 42-43. Gumbel notes that Ian Kelly, 
the Isle of Man’s Income Tax Assessor, says, ”the problem for us is that we see larger 
jurisdictions doing the very things we are attacked for, and nobody brings them to 
account”. Kelly argues that ”if you don’t crack down on everyone, there is almost no point 
in cracking down on anyone”.  The author of the article also notes that tax havens still find 
themselves on blacklists even though they have taken action to become more open. It is 
hugely discriminatory and arbitrary says Deborah Drummond, a Cayman Islands Official; 
see also Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 15. 
95  RS Avi-Yonah “Globalisation, Tax Competition, and The Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State” 
(2000) 113 Harvard Law Review at 1662  
96  Avi-Yonah at 1664. 
97 Spitz at Clarke at OECD/14-20, where it is noted that: the OECD serves only the interests 
of its members and not the wider global community; the OECD lacks transparency in that 
the public is not allowed to participate; the harmful tax competition initiative is in effect the 
OECD making tax policy without the knowledge and participation of democratically elected 
bodies; the OECD has blurred the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion; and 
the OECD’s project is an attack on taxpayers’ constitutional rights, civil liberties and 
human rights.   
98 C Scott & R Goulder “U.S. Congressman Owens Calls for US Government to Rescind 
Support of OECD Tax Competition Initiative” (2001) 22 Tax Notes INT’L at 1202, as 
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Although the OECD has accomplished many great things over the years, I share many of 
the serious concerns that have been expressed recently about the direction of the OECD 
initiative. I am troubled by the underlying premise that low tax rates are somehow suspect 
and by the notion that any country, group of countries, should interfere in any other 
country’s decision about how to structure its own tax system. I also am concerned about 
the potentially unfair treatment of some non-OECD countries. The United States does not 
support efforts to dictate to any country what its own tax rates or tax system should be, 
and will not participate in any initiative to harmonise world tax systems. The United States 
simply has no interest in stifling the competition that forces governments – like 
businesses – to create efficiencies …99  
 
In general, the United States is of the view that although there is a need for 
countries to be able to obtain specific information from other countries in order to 
prevent tax avoidance, care must be taken not to interfere with the internal tax 
policy decisions of sovereign states. Furthermore, the focus of the OECD 
initiative should not be to limit tax competition; instead it should emphasise the 
need for countries to be able to obtain specific information from other countries in 
order to prevent non-compliance with tax laws.100  
 
Despite these criticisms, the majority of OECD member countries still supported 
its initiative. As a follow-up to the 1998 report, the OECD released another report 
in June 2000.101 In defence of its objectives, the OECD stated the following: 
It is important to note at the outset that the project is not primarily about collecting taxes 
and is not intended to promote the harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures 
generally within or outside the OECD, nor is it about dictating to any country what should 
be the appropriate level of tax rates. Rather, the project is about ensuring that the burden 
of taxation is fairly shared and that tax should not be the dominant factor in making 
capital allocation decisions. The project is focused on the concerns of OECD and non-
OECD countries, which are exposed to significant revenue losses as a result of harmful 
tax competition. Tax base erosion as a result of harmful tax practices can be a 
particularly serious threat to the economies of developing countries. The project will, by 
promoting a co-operative framework, support the effective sovereignty of countries over 
the design of their tax systems.102  
 
From its title,103 it is clear that the 2000 OECD Report reflects a shift in emphasis 
                                                                                                                                            
quoted by Salinas at 550; see also  Ware & Roper at 31-32. 
99  P O’Neil “What is the US Position on Offshore Tax Havens: Hearing before the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs 107th Congress” (2001) as quoted by Salinas at 
550; Grundy at 4.  
100 Salinas at 550; see also Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 16; Grundy at 4.  
101 OECD “Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Report of the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting 
and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs: Progress in Identifying and 
Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices” (2000). Available at 
>http//www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf<, last accessed 17 July 2006. 
102  OECD Report (2000) at 5. 
103 OECD “Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Report of the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting 
and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs: Progress in Identifying and 
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from “harmful tax competition”, as the 1998 report puts it, to the less tendentious 
“harmful tax practices”. This change in the terms used attracted a certain amount 
of criticism as the OECD did not distinguish between the meanings of these 
terms. It appears that the OECD defines the term “harmful tax competition” as an 
umbrella term that apparently includes “harmful tax practices” and “tax 
preference schemes”. Admittedly the OECD acknowledged in the 1998 report 
that low or no income taxes could never constitute harmful tax competition and 
that other factors were necessary, such as refusing to exchange information, 
separating foreign from domestic investors and insubstantial activities.104 It 
nevertheless failed to set out those factors that definitively tip the scale, or to 
state what relative weight should be placed on these varying factors. The closest 
the OECD came to defining these terms was by stating that harmful tax practices 
affect the location of financial and other services, erode the tax bases of other 
countries, distort trade and investment patterns and undermine the fairness, 
neutrality and broad social acceptance of tax systems generally. The report 
further stated that tax preference schemes create potential distortions in the 
patterns of trade and investment and reduce global welfare. These schemes may 
shift part of the tax burden from mobile to relatively immobile factors and from 
income to consumption and may hamper the application of progressive tax rates 
and the achievement of redistributive goals.105 The problem with the above  
is that there is hardly an income tax system that does not satisfy one of these 
descriptions, the qualifications notwithstanding.  
 
The OECD has also been criticised for lack of transparency because the 2000 
report denies that its project is about collecting taxes.106 One may well ask why 
the need to collect all the information if the project is not about collecting taxes. 
Similar criticisms have been raised about the denial that the project is about 
dictating levels of taxes or the design of tax systems.107 
 
The 2000 OECD Report identified and listed 47 jurisdictions with harmful 
                                                                                                                                            
Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices” (2000). 
104  OECD Report (1998) at 8 and 14. 
105  OECD Report (1998) at 8 and 14. 
106  OECD Report (2000) at 5. 
107  Grundy  at 3. 
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preferential tax regimes according to the criteria contained in the 1998 Report.108 
 A list of tax haven countries was also compiled. Among the jurisdictions that 
were considered to be tax-haven jurisdictions are: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Aruba, Barbados, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, the British Virgin 
Islands, the Cook Islands, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, 
Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the 
Republic of the Maldives, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Principality of 
Monaco,  Montserrat,  the Republic of Nauru,  the  Netherlands  Antilles,  Niue, 
Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, 
Turk and Caicos, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Republic of 
Vanuatu.109 The OECD was criticised, however, for doing insufficient research 
before listing these jurisdictions. For example, Grundy110 points out that Panama 
was included in the list, when Costa Rica - whose tax system is indistinguishable 
for these purposes - was not. He also suggested that Hong Kong (which also has 
a similar tax system) was not included in the list because, although Panama is 
small enough to be bullied, China is not.111  The OECD also came in for criticism 
for adopting a high-handed and dictatorial approach to these jurisdictions, most 
of which are dependent territories or former dependent territories of major 
developed nations and are not in charge of their foreign affairs. This gave rise to 
hostility and resentment, in response to which the OECD is now trying to mend 
fences.  
 
The 2000 report called on the listed jurisdictions to commit themselves to 
principles of transparency and effective exchange of information or they would be 
regarded as uncooperative tax havens that present a threat not only to the tax 
systems of developed and developing countries but also to the integrity of 
international  financial  systems.112   Of these jurisdictions, thirty-one pledged 
                                                 
108  OECD Report (2000) in par 8. The list appears in par 11. 
109 OECD Report (2000) in par 17. See also L B Samuels & D C Kold “OECD Initiative: 
Harmful Tax Practices and Tax Havens” Taxes (2000) at 240.  See also Ware & Roper at 
29; Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 13; see also Olivier and Honiball at 463. 
110  Grundy at 5. 
111  Grundy at 5. 
112 Arnold & McIntyre at 122-123 state that the tax authorities of a country often experience 
difficulty in obtaining information concerning the foreign activities of residents, let alone 
verifying the information. For example, many countries – and all tax-haven countries - 
have strict bank secrecy laws but tax havens rarely have tax treaties with developed 
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themselves to work with the OECD to counter harmful tax practices.113 However, 
by 18 April 2002,114 seven of these jurisdictions on the OECD list, namely 
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco, the Marshall Islands, Nauru and 
Vanuatu, decided that it was not in their interests to join the OECD countries and 
other members of the international community in ending harmful tax practices.115 
One of the reasons why these jurisdictions failed to cooperate was that the 
OECD had not established a “level playing field” where all affected countries 
made identical, specifically enumerated commitments. The lack of a level playing 
field for all affected jurisdictions has resulted in the OECD being perceived as 
intending to use a regulatory thrust as camouflage for its attempt to implement 
non-tariff barriers to trade, thereby undermining the competitive position of tax-
haven jurisdictions.116 It was felt that until the OECD had obtained effective 
commitments from its own member countries, it could not reasonably seek 
commitments from non-OECD members to participation in the process of setting 
regulatory standards.117 The OECD nevertheless encouraged these jurisdictions 
to reconsider their decision. On 24 November 2000, the OECD published a 
document entitled, “Framework for a Collective Memorandum of Understanding 
                                                                                                                                            
countries that provide for exchange of information concerning tax matters. Hence the need 
to enter into agreements with tax havens to ensure that they comply with principles of 
transparency and exchange of information. Samuel & Kold at 236 also point out that the 
OECD’s major concern appears to be that the absence of information exchange is a key 
condition that enables taxpayers to hide activities from domestic tax authorities. Any 
country that does not provide adequate information exchange is regarded as potentially 
facilitating the avoidance of taxes in that country. The lack of transparency is a problem 
because it inhibits the ability of other countries to take defensive action against harmful tax 
regimes. It may be indicative of favourable administrative rulings that confer lower 
effective tax rates on particular types of taxpayers, without any justification other than the 
fact that these rates are an attempt to attract certain types of activities or to favour specific 
types of taxpayers. 
113 G Makhlouf, Chair of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs “The OECD list of Un-
cooperative Tax Havens” (2002). Available at 
 >http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,2340,en_2649_33745_2082460_1_1_1_1,00.html<, 
last accessed on 18 May 2007. 
114 Seiichi Kondo, Deputy Secretary General of the OECD “OECD Ending Tax Haven Abuse” 
(18 April 2002). Available at 
  >http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,2340,en_2649_33745_2082460_1_1_1_1,00.html<, 
last accessed on 18 May 2007.  
115 Makhlouf “The OECD list of Un-cooperative Tax Havens” (2002). Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,2340,en_2649_33745_2082460_1_1_1_1,00.html<, 
last accessed on 18 May 2007.  
116  A review commissioned by the International Tax and Investment Organisation and The 
Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners conducted by E Stikeman Towards a Level 
Playing Field: Regulating Corporate Vehicles in Cross Border Transactions  (2002) at 16. 
117  Stikeman at 16. 
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on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices” (MOU).118 This document provides the 
jurisdictions identified as tax havens, guidelines required by the OECD to 
demonstrate their commitment to transparency, non-discrimination, and effective 
co-operation.  
 
A jurisdiction becomes a party to the MOU by, a press release announcement 
accompanied by details of the commitment. In addition, the MOU contains a 
“stand-still” provision, in terms of which a party to the commitment will refrain 
from introducing any new harmful tax practices. The question however is whether 
such formal commitments will be turned into real tax reforms. 
 
 
 
In 2004, the OECD published another report on the progress made on its 
“harmful tax practices” project.119  Of the 47 preferential tax regimes listed in the 
2000 report, 18 regimes had been abolished, 14 had been amended to remove 
any potentially harmful features and 13 had been found not to be harmful 
following further analysis.120  The 2004 report also stated that by 2003, 33 
jurisdictions outside the OECD had committed to the principles of effective 
exchange of information and transparency. These jurisdictions included Vanuatu 
and Nauru, which had shown no interest in ending harmful tax practices in 
2002.121 Some of these jurisdictions, along with OECD member countries, also 
developed a “Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters” (the 
Model Agreement) which serves as a model for the negotiation of bilateral or 
                                                 
118  OECD “Framework for a Collective Memorandum of Understanding on Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices”. Available at  >http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/ 
c707a7b4806fa95c125685d005300b6/c125692700623b74c12569a100492e0c/$FILE/JT0
0100664.PDF<, last accessed 10 July 2007. 
119  OECD “The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Progress Report”. 
Available at  
 >http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf< last accessed on 18 May 2007.  
120  OECD 2004 Progress Report in par 12. 
121  OECD 2004 Progress Report in par 19; currently the list of uncooperative tax havens 
consist of Andorra, Liberia, The Principality of Liechtenstein, The Republic of the Marshall 
Islands and The Principality of Monaco. See OECD “List of Uncooperative Tax Havens”. 
Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,2340,en_2649_33745_30578809_1_1_1_1,00.html<
, last accessed on 3 July 2007. 
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multilateral agreements.122 The Model Agreement seeks to promote international 
cooperation in tax matters through exchange of information by making use of 
international standards on transparency and the effective exchange of 
information. By 2004, Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the 
Principality of Monaco and the Republic of the Marshall Islands were the only 
jurisdictions that remained on the uncooperative tax havens’ list. The 2004 report 
pointed out that the OECD still engaged in a constructive ongoing dialogue with a 
number of these jurisdictions and looked forward to future commitments to 
transparency and the effective exchange of information.123 
 
The 2004 report recognised that there are limits to the usefulness of unilateral 
and bilateral measures to deal with “harmful tax practices” - a problem that is 
inherently global in nature. The OECD therefore began to consider means of 
coordinating defensive measures to make them more effective in decreasing the 
negative effects of harmful tax practices.124 Among the defensive measures that 
were identified were: 
- Use of provisions that have the effect of disallowing any deductions, exemptions or 
credit in respect to all substantial payments made to persons located in 
jurisdictions engaged in harmful tax practices. 
- Use of legislation like “thin capitalisation” provisions that restrict the deduction of 
interest payments to persons located in jurisdictions engaged in harmful tax 
practices 
- Use of legislative and administrative provisions that require any resident who 
makes a substantial payment to a person located in such jurisdiction to report such 
payments or be subject to certain penalties. 
- Use of legislation that taxes residents whose interest in such jurisdictions would 
substantially lower or defer taxes. 
- Denial of exemptions or credits for foreign taxes paid. 
- Use of legislative measures to ensure that withholding taxes at a minimum rate 
apply to all dividends, interest and royalties made to beneficial owners benefiting 
from harmful tax practices. 
- Use of special audit and enforcement programs to coordinate enforcement 
activities involving entities and transactions in jurisdictions with harmful tax 
practices. 
                                                 
122  Par 2 of the Introduction to the “Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax 
Matters” states that the Agreement was developed by the OECD Global Forum Working 
Group, which consisted of representatives from OECD member countries as well as 
delegates from Aruba, Bermuda, Bahrain, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, the Isle of Man, 
Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands Antilles, the Seychelles and San Marino. In par 4 of the 
Introduction to the Agreement it is stated that the Agreement is not a binding instrument 
but contains models for bilateral agreements on exchange of information between 
countries. See OECD “Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters”. 
Available at >http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf<, last accessed on 18 
May 2007.  
123  OECD 2004 Progress Report in par 27. 
124  OECD 2004 Progress Report in par 28. 
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- Terminating and not entering into treaties with such jurisdictions.125   
 
In September 2006 the OECD published another report on the progress of its 
harmful tax practices project.126 It reiterated that:  
by promoting the implementation of principles of transparency and effective exchange of 
information, OECD countries seek to enable each country to retain sovereignty over 
national tax matters and to apply effectively its own tax laws. The decision on the 
appropriate rate of tax is a sovereign decision of each country. The OECD member 
countries do not seek to dictate to any country, either inside or outside the OECD, 
whether to impose a tax, what tax it should be or how its tax system should be structured. 
The aim of this work is to create an environment in which all countries, large and small, 
OECD and non-OECD, those with an income tax system and those without, can compete 
freely and fairly thereby allowing economic growth and increased prosperity to be shared 
by all. Transparency and international cooperation through exchange of information are 
important elements of such an environment.127  
 
Commenting on the OECD endeavours on curbing harmful tax practices among 
OECD member countries, the Chair of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
noted that, 
 
The OECD countries embark on a difficult challenge when we commenced our work on 
countering harmful tax practices and this report reflects the success we have had in 
bringing about change. In 2000, we identified 47 potentially harmful preferential tax 
regimes in OECD countries. Of those regimes, 19 regimes have been abolished, 14 have 
been amended to remove their potential harmful features, 13 were found not to be 
harmful and only one has been found to be harmful. This Report, along with the report 
recently issued by the OECD Global Forum on Taxation on the transparency and 
exchange of information practices in 82 economies, shows that we are making real 
progress in addressing harmful tax practices. Further work is required to fully implement 
the standards we have set so that national tax laws in countries large and small can be 
fairly and effectively enforced.128 
 
The concluding remarks of the OECD in its 2006 progress report on harmful tax 
practices are: 
This part of the project has fully achieved its initial aims and the mandate given by the 
Council on dealing with harmful preferential tax regimes in member countries has 
therefore been met. Future work in this area will focus on monitoring any continuing and 
newly introduced preferential tax regimes identify by member countries. This process 
permits any member country to request a review of any newly introduced preferential tax 
regime. It also permits any member country to request a review of any existing 
preferential tax regime to the extent it considers that the nature of the regime or the 
extent and manner of its use have changed in ways that may make it harmful under the 
                                                 
125  OECD 2004 Progress Report in par 30. 
126  OECD “The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress in 
Member Countries”. Available on >http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/17/37446434.pdf<, 
last accessed on 18 May 2007. 
127  The OECD 2006 Progress Report in par 6. 
128  P Ciocca, Chair of OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ”Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Releases Outcome of Review of Preferential Tax Regimes in OECD Member Countries”. 
Available at 
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criteria established in the 1998 Report.129 
 
2.5 THE OECD CAMPAIGN AGAINST HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: DOES 
IT MARK THE DEMISE OF “TAX-HAVEN JURISDICTIONS” AND 
“HARMFUL PREFERENTIAL TAX REGIMES”?   
 
The OECD has to be commended for its onslaught against harmful tax practices. 
Although its recommendations are not binding in nature and only apply to 
member states, its project has shown the world that countries cannot encourage 
harmful tax practices without repercussions from the international community. As 
a result of the OECD initiative, a number of member countries have done away 
with their harmful preferential tax regimes.130 Furthermore, a large number of tax-
haven jurisdictions have agreed to cooperate with the OECD and implement 
transparency and exchange of information standards. The OECD has also called 
upon non-OECD member countries to associate themselves with its 
recommendations. Although the OECD may not have the power to stop specific  
jurisdictions from engaging in harmful tax practices (apart from appealing for their 
cooperation and urging other countries to issue sanctions against uncooperative 
countries), the most helpful thing that has come out of its initiative has been the 
exchange of information project which has given countries a tool for finding out 
whether their residents are involved in offshore tax avoidance. The “Model 
Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters” that the OECD 
developed, is now being used by a number of countries and it forms the basis for 
                                                 
129  The OECD 2006 Progress Report in par 16. 
130  Paragraph 9 of the OECD 2006 Progress Report states that, “of the 47 preferential tax 
regimes that had been identified as potentially harmful, 18 regimes had been abolished 
and 14 had been amended to remove their potential harmful features. Another 13 were 
found not to be harmful on further analysis.”  Paragraph 15 of the OECD 2006 Progress 
Report sets out a table of various harmful tax practices among OECD member countries 
that have either been abolished or amended. The table also sets out certain practices that 
are not considered harmful. In terms of this table, the countries that had abolished certain 
harmful tax practices are: Belgium, Canada, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. The 
countries that had amended some of their harmful tax practices are: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland. However, Luxembourg still 
maintains certain harmful tax practices. Countries with certain practices which were 
considered not harmful are: Turkey, Portugal, Norway, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Canada, 
Australia, Austria, United Kingdom, Spain, Denmark and France.  
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several tax information exchange agreements between countries.131 
Although the OECD may appear to have curtailed harmful tax practices in some 
countries, it is this author’s view that this project has merely exposed the “tip of 
the iceberg” in the fight against offshore tax avoidance. The OECD cannot 
therefore confidently claim that it has fully achieved its initial aims and that it has 
fulfilled its mandate in dealing with harmful preferential tax regimes.132  A number 
of factors have limited the effectiveness of the OECD project.  
 
It is worth pointing out that the OECD failed to acknowledge that for years its 
member nations have had dealings with tax havens and that they have lent 
credibility to many tax havens.133 The OECD member nations have also failed to 
acknowledge that they have benefited from their involvement with tax havens.134 
It is likely that the governments of these nations may not really be interested in 
putting an end to harmful tax practices. Commenting on this aspect, Grundy135 
states that harmful tax practices could be stopped immediately if the major 
powers wished to.  Cohn136 also points out that “if the political will existed, the 
                                                 
131  OECD 2004 Progress Report in par 24. For example, on 2 March 2007, Antigua and 
Barbuda and Australia signed a bilateral agreement on the exchange of information for tax 
purposes. See OECD “OECD Welcomes Tax Information Agreement between Antigua 
and Barbuda and Australia”. Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,2340,en_2649_33745_38192448_1_1_1_1,00.html<, 
last accessed on 30 May 2007. See also OECD “OECD Welcomes Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements between The Netherlands Antilles and Australia and New 
Zealand”. Available at  
 >http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,2340,en_2649_33745_38192448_1_1_1_1,00.html<, 
last accessed on 30 May 2007. 
132  The OECD 2006 Progress Report in par 16. 
133 Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 15 note that United Kingdom has for years lent credibility 
to many tax-haven jurisdictions by virtue of its affiliation with those jurisdictions. Examples 
are, Jersey Guernsey and Isle of Man which have the status of British Crown 
dependencies. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office “Partnership for Progress and 
Prosperity - British and Overseas Territories”. Available at  
>http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Pa
ge&cid=1018028164839 <, last accessed 18 May 2007. See also Wikipedia: The Free 
Encyclopedia “British Overseas Territories”. Available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crown_colony#Current_Overseas_Territories, last accesses 
on 17 May 2007. Many British banks and citizens have established businesses in these 
tax havens which are affiliated to the UK. 
134  Grundy at 2; Stikeman at 15-16. 
135  Grundy at 6-7. 
136  II Cohn “Prepared Testimony of Reuven S. Avi-Yohan, Irwin I Cohn Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan Law School before the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Hearing on Offshore Transactions” August 1, 2006. Available at 
<http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMAviYonahUafMI.pdf#search=%22Prepared%20testim
ony%20of20Avi-Yonah%20before%20permanent%20subcommitte%20>, last accessed 
on 18 May 2007. 
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tax-haven problem could easily be resolved by the rich countries through their 
own action”. For example, “they could eliminate the tax havens’ harmful activities 
overnight by refusing to allow deductions for payments to designated non-
cooperating tax havens or restricting the ability of financial institutions to provide 
services with respect to tax-haven operations”.137 Grundy further comments as 
follows: 
Why does a ship of the Royal Navy not simply sail into the harbour of St Helier, and shut 
down the Jersey offshore business in one afternoon? Does the United Kingdom perhaps 
have something to gain from refraining from such action? The UK Treasury may think that 
Jersey is responsible for what is nowadays called ‘tax leakage’, but investment houses in 
the City (London) see the Channel Islands as a wonderful source of business, as Wall 
Street in the USA sees the Bahamas, and one may hazard the guess that the Paris 
Bourse might do better if the French learnt to use Monaco (or Madrid if the Spaniards 
used Gibraltar).138 Emphasis added.  
 
From the above, it appears that tax havens offer advantages to developed 
countries. It has been observed that funds cannot remain in tax havens and be 
productive; they should be reinvested into rich and stable economies in the 
world.139 It may well be that a high percentage of most of the moneys used to 
fund investments such as shopping malls or finance companies are being 
channelled to these countries from tax-haven jurisdictions. Thus the OECD’s 
emphasis on tax-base erosion, without acknowledging that OECD countries have 
benefited from tax havens, leaves the report open to the criticism that it is merely 
an attempt by the governments of powerful countries to protect their tax 
revenues even if their citizens would benefit from lower taxes.140   
 
Another factor that could reduce the effectiveness of the OECD project concerns 
its information gathering endeavour. While the exchange of information could be 
viewed as a powerful tool in the fight against harmful tax practices, there is also a 
need to protect individuals’ right to privacy and confidentiality as information 
could get into the wrong hands and never even reach the governments that 
require it. It is doubtful whether the OECD’s information gathering project is 
equipped to ensure that the recipient of the information can be trusted with it. It 
also appears that the rules that the OECD has come up with to facilitate the 
                                                 
137  Cohn in par (e). 
138  Grundy at 6-7. 
139  Cohn in par (e). 
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cross-border exchange of information are being developed with a mixed agenda 
which includes combating trans-national crimes such as money laundering.141 
Such rules have the potential to distort trade patterns. The global sharing of 
information without regard for financial privacy and human rights could result in 
criminal access to such information at the weakest point of entry, thereby 
increasing the risk of unauthorised disclosure.142 
 
Concerns have been expressed as to whether the OECD project might be the 
forerunner of the formation of a “world tax organisation”.143 Assuming all OECD 
member and non-member states abolish harmful tax competition, would this 
imply that the world would be heading towards a “world tax organisation”, where 
countries are allocated various shares of the world tax revenues, the aggregate 
amount of which is determined by collective agreement.144  Such a development 
would be absurd as international tax competition is not limited to tax incentives; 
countries compete with one another on numerous other fronts. So if a worldwide 
pool of tax revenues were to be fixed, each country would try to enlarge its share 
by providing its “customers” with other non-tax incentives. International tax 
competition in its present form would simply take on a new character.145 
International tax competition is not unlike other forms of competition. 
Governments offer various goods and services and their citizens are free to 
choose a location that best satisfies their needs. In this regard, one wonders 
whether the OECD’s attempt to root out ”harmful tax havens” and ”preferential 
tax regimes” will achieve much success.146  
 
2.6 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES SOUTH AFRICA FOLLOW THE OECD 
RECOMMENDATIONS? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
140  AW Wright “Review: OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report Falls Short” (1998) 17 Tax 
Notes International at 461 and 463. 
141  Stikeman at 16. 
142  Stikeman in the Executive Summary.   
143  Avi-Yonah at 1662; AJ Cockfield “The Rise of the OECD as an Informal ‘World Tax 
Organisation’ Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges” (2006) 8 
Yale Journal of Law & Technology at 140. 
144  M B Weiss “International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenomenon?” 
(2001) 16 Akron Tax Journal (2001) at 126. 
145  Weiss at 127. 
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Although South Africa is not a member country of the OECD, it was awarded 
OECD observer status in 2004.147  It is worth noting that the OECD Guidelines 
have become a globally accepted standard.148 Following these guidelines is an 
important means of helping South Africa curb offshore tax avoidance. South 
Africa has therefore associated itself with the OECD recommendations on 
removing harmful tax practices. In the 2001 OECD report149 it is stated that the 
OECD has had discussions with the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).150 
The OECD has recommended that countries should come up with lists identifying 
tax-haven jurisdictions and harmful tax regimes so as to ensure that links with 
those countries are not used to promote harmful tax competition. Some OECD 
member countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have 
come up with such lists, but South Africa does not have specific anti-tax-haven 
legislation which identifies or blacklists tax havens.151 The closest that South 
Africa has ever come to compliance with this recommendation was the old 
section 9E(8) of the Income Tax Act which empowered the Minister of Finance to 
exclude specific forms of income derived from designated countries, the list of 
which was published by notice in the Gazette. This provision was, however, 
repealed with effect from 1 June 2004.152 
 
With respect to the recommendation that countries should have in place certain 
types of legislation that are necessary to curb offshore tax avoidance, South 
Africa has controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation, which is discussed in 
chapter 4 of this work. “Transfer pricing”153 and “thin capitalisation” 154 legislation 
                                                                                                                                            
146  Weiss at 124.  
147  Olivier & Honiball at 8. 
148 See SARS Practice Note: No. 7 in par 3.2.1. 
149 OECD: The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: the 2001 Progress Report.  
150 Ibid; Countries that make up the SADC are: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See Institute for Security Studies 
“Profile: Southern African Development Community (SADC)” Available at 
>http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/sadcprof.htm<, last accessed on 17 May 
2007. See also K Huxham and P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax (2006) at 
751.  
151 Olivier & Honiball at 477. 
152 S 9E was repealed by Revenue Laws Amendment Act 45 of 2003 with effect from 1 June 
2004.   
153 The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is convinced that following the OECD 
Transfer-Pricing Guidelines will help South Africa to promote tax equality and reduce the 
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is also in place in South Africa but a discussion of this legislation is beyond the 
scope of this work.   
 
With regard to the OECD recommendation that countries should introduce 
programmes to intensify international cooperation and exchange of information 
concerning transactions that constitute harmful tax competition, South Africa has 
signed “Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreements” with the customs 
administrations of certain countries. These agreements cover aspects such as 
the exchange of information, technical assistance, surveillance, investigations 
and visits by officials. As at 12 December 2006, South Africa had mutual 
administrative assistance agreements in place with Algeria, China, France, 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.155 Agreements of this 
nature have been ratified in South Africa with the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the Czech Republic, Iran, Mozambique, and Zambia. Similar agreements have 
been negotiated, but not yet signed with Angola, Brazil, Israel, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. There is also an Agreement under 
negotiation with India.156 It is hoped that entering into these agreements will help 
South Africa obtain the necessary information to curb the harmful tax practices 
that any of these countries may be involved in, even though they may not be tax 
havens themselves. It is recommended that South Africa considers negotiating 
similar treaties, with countries that are considered tax havens, especially those 
with which it has signed double taxation agreements. These countries are: 
Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, Singapore, Seychelles and Luxembourg.157 Negotiating 
                                                                                                                                            
possibility of South Africa’s contributing to the establishment of a harmful preferential tax 
regime. See SARS Practice Note 7 in par 3.2.2. 
154  The First Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax 
Structure of South Africa recommended that these rules be based on the 
recommendations of the OECD report on thin capitalisation. See the Second Interim 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structures of South 
Africa Thin Capitalisation Rules (1995) in par 1.1; OECD Issues in International Taxation 
No 2 Thin Capitalisation: Taxation of Entertainers, Artists and Sportsmen (1987) at 17.  
155  South African Revenue Service “Current List of Customs Agreements on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance” (12 December 2006). Available at 
>http://www.sars.gov.za/it/DTA/Customs%20Agreement/Current%20List.htm<, last 
accessed on 17 May 2007. 
156 South African Revenue Service “Current List of Customs Agreements on Mutual 
Admistrative Assistance” (12 December 2006). Available at 
>http://www.sars.gov.za/it/DTA/Customs%20Agreement/Current%20List.htm<, last 
accessed on 17 May 2007. 
157  See Olivier & Honiball at 24. These treaties are published in these Government Gazettes: 
Cyprus - 19638 dd 22/12/1998, Malta - 18461 dd 21/11/1997, Mauritius - 18111 dd 
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“Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreements” with these tax-haven countries 
will help South Africa, obtain the necessary information to curb the harmful tax 
competition that could be encouraged by these countries. 
 
As regards the OECD recommendation that countries should consider 
terminating their tax treaties with tax-haven jurisdictions that are used to 
encourage harmful tax competition, it should be noted that, like many other 
countries, South Africa has treaties with countries that could be considered to 
encourage harmful tax competition. The treaty with Mauritius, for instance, 
contains a tax sparing clause,158 which provides that, where Mauritius conducts 
business with South Africa, interest and royalties are not taxable in South Africa 
as Mauritius does not currently levy taxes at substantial rates.159 A tax sparing 
clause of this nature could encourage South African residents to set up offshore 
companies in Mauritius to take advantage of the tax sparing benefits. It is worth 
noting, however, that Mauritius is not among the jurisdictions listed in the OECD 
2002 list of tax havens. It is argued that Mauritius’ “free-trade zone”160  
programme which is designed to attract foreign investment for non-financial and 
non-services activities, especially in the manufacturing sector, does not fall into 
the category of harmful preferential tax regimes that the OECD initiative 
addresses. Furthermore, unlike investments in tax havens that do not require any 
substantial activity, Mauritius’s free-trade zone programme targets active 
investments like manufacturing; the programme is transparent and does not 
provide a shield against the scrutiny of foreign tax authorities.161 
 
Nevertheless, Mauritius is considered an established treaty haven for offshore 
activities, particularly in India, China and South Africa.162 It has thus emerged as 
an offshore centre for the African and Indian Ocean region. Mauritius has 
                                                                                                                                            
02/07/1997, Singapore - 18599 dd 02/01/1998, Seychelles - 25646 dd 30/10/2003, 
Luxembourg - 21852 dd 06/12/2000.  
158 The term “tax sparing” means the allowance of a credit for the amount of foreign taxes that 
were not paid because of a tax incentive or holiday in the foreign country. See Arnold & 
McIntyre at 168; see also Olivier & Honiball at 489.  
159 Olivier & Honiball at 471. 
160  “Free-trade zones” are programmes that entail policies developed by governments aimed 
at stimulating industrial and general economic development and employment. See 
Schulze (1999) at 159. 
161  Schulze (1999) at 203. 
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focussed the development of its offshore centre on the use of its growing network 
of double taxation agreements. Since 1992 the Mauritius offshore sector has 
operated in a conducive regulatory and fiscal environment. In 1992, Mauritius 
established a special regime to allow offshore business activities which were 
regulated by the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority (MOBAA).163 
This authority regulated, licensed and supervised all non-banking offshore 
business activities.164 This offshore regime allowed offshore companies to be 
established in Mauritius, with permission to access the Mauritius treaty network. 
Dividends, interest and royalties paid by the offshore company would thus not 
subject to withholding tax in Mauritius.165 In 2001, under the Financial Services 
Development Act 2001, the Mauritian government established a Financial 
Services Commission and an Advisory Council. In the new structure, MOBAA 
ceased to exist and most existing laws bearing on offshore activities were 
replaced. The Financial Services Commission now monitors the country’s stock 
exchange, offshore business activities, and the insurance industry.166  
 
Mauritius has been focussing on targeting the South African market. The gradual 
relaxation of exchange control measures in South Africa has triggered significant 
interest from South African based enterprises to set up their businesses in 
Mauritius. Mauritius is increasingly becoming an attractive location for captive 
insurance businesses, offshore banking, and as a head-quarter for multinational 
group operations.167 Mauritius’ close proximity to South Africa and its stated 
policy of preferring to conclude double tax agreements with African countries, 
along with its membership of regional bodies, such as the South African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), makes it an ideal location for setting up offshore 
                                                                                                                                            
162 R Rohatgi Basic International Taxation (2002) at 284. 
163 MP Hampton MP & JP Abbot JP Offshore Finance Centres and Tax Havens: The Rise of 
Global Capital (1999) at 232; Rohatgi at 282. 
164  Schulze (1999) at 185; Hampton & Abbot at 282. 
165 Schulze (1999) at 185. 
166  Lowtax Network (BVI) Ltd “Mauritius: Offshore Business Sectors”. Available at 
>http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jmuobs.html<, last accessed 28 May 2007. 
167  Hampton & Abbot at 231; Lowtax Network (BVI) Ltd “Mauritius: Offshore Business 
Sectors”. Available at >http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jmuobs.html<, last accessed 28 
May 2007. 
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entities.168 Mauritius’s low-cost professional skills and political stability also 
enhance the island’s attractiveness as an important offshore jurisdiction for 
South African investments.  Its extensive tax treaty network, particularly with 
African and Asian countries, offers South African residents the opportunity to 
route their investments into those regions via Mauritius.169   
 
The treaty with Ireland is another treaty that could encourage offshore tax 
avoidance.170 Although Ireland is not considered to be a tax haven, it has fulfilled 
this purpose for South Africans. This is because the tax rates in Ireland are much 
lower than in South Africa, and so it has recently proved to be a popular 
investment country from which business is done with South Africa.171 Ireland 
lacks “transfer pricing” legislation, it has no “thin capitalisation” rules, and it has 
no “controlled foreign company” legislation. This set-up encourages the 
establishment of offshore entities in Ireland.172 
 
To curb tax avoidance that could result from dealings by South Africans with 
jurisdictions such as the above, South Africa should find a way to offset the 
harmful tax practices encouraged by these jurisdictions. Although the OECD 
recommends that countries should sever their treaties with jurisdictions that 
encourage harmful tax practices, from an economic point of view this may not 
necessarily be the right approach for South Africa. Tax treaties are not generally 
negotiated on tax considerations alone. Countries’ treaty policies may take into 
account their political, social and other economic needs.173 For example, a 
                                                 
168 Olivier & Honiball at 469. 
169  Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority (MOBAA) “Mauritius: A Sound Base for 
The New Millennium” (5 July 1999). Available at 
>http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=7371&searchresults=1<, last accessed 28 
May 2007. On MOOBA see also Schulze (1999) at 185-186. 
170 Treaty published in Government Gazette 18552 of 15/12/1997. 
171 See “Musical Chairs on Tax Havens: Now it’s Ireland” New York Times of 3 August 2002 
in Olivier & Honiball at 277.  
172 M Barrett, HLB Nathans “Trading in Ireland: The Low Corporate Tax Regime” (2004) 146 
Offshore Investment.com at 25. This article further points out that Ireland also has a 
system that facilitates the exploitation of intellectual property (IP) rights and this has been 
enhanced by the abolition of stamp duty on the transfer of IP and the introduction of a 
20% tax credit for research and development expenditure in the Finance Act of 2004. 
However, the single biggest weapon that Ireland has in its tax armoury is the 12.5% tax 
rate on trading activities which is the lowest corporate tax rate in the EU and well below 
the EU average of 30%.  
173 S van Weeghel The Improper Use of Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the 
Netherlands and the United States (1998) at 257-260. 
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country may use its treaty network to attract foreign investment and to encourage 
offshore activities by its residents. For developing countries, treaties can also be 
used as a tax incentive to attract scarce foreign capital or technology by granting 
tax concessions exclusively to foreign investors over and above the domestic tax 
law provisions. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, there may be instances where the loss of tax 
revenues is significant compared with the other non-tax benefits of a particular 
tax treaty. In such cases, it is necessary for tax authorities to make an effort to 
stamp out the ensuing tax avoidance. It is recommended that SARS should 
adopt a balanced approach, by evaluating the circumstances of the treaties 
concerned and taking relevant steps to prevent tax avoidance. 
 
In the 2005 update of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the OECD introduced 
measures that countries could use to counteract any harmful tax practices 
introduced by a treaty partner after a treaty has been signed.174 This may require 
South Africa to revise its old treaties so as to include these provisions. It is, 
however, worth pointing out that it is often very difficult to revise old treaties to  
suit the new update of the OECD Model.175 According to paragraphs 33 up to 36 
of the Introduction to the OECD Model Tax Convention, the current version of the 
Commentary should be used to interpret all tax treaties. The OECD is of the view 
that changes to the Commentary are normally applicable to the interpretation of 
existing treaties. In reality, this is not usually the case, especially when it comes 
to changes that go beyond mere clarifications of certain concepts. For example, 
entirely new provisions might be included in the Commentary. In such a case, a 
revision of the treaty may be necessary in order to accommodate the new 
provisions.  The OECD does not, however, supply guidance to countries on this 
matter.176 A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this work. 
                                                 
174 Par 21.5 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. See also AJM 
Jimënez “Domestic Anti-Abuse Rules and Double Taxation Treaties: A Spanish 
Perspective” - PART 1 (2002) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 22. 
175 Jiminez at 22. 
176  K Vogel Double Taxation Conventions 3 ed (1997) at 46-47; AH Herbert & K van Rand 
Essays in International Taxation (I993) at 67-68; K Vogel “The Influence of the OECD 
Commentaries on Treaty Interpretation” (2000) 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation at 6I2.  
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2.6 CONCLUSION  
 
Although the legitimacy and appropriateness of the OECD and other international 
initiatives against tax-haven jurisdictions have been debated in the international 
arena,177 it remains to be seen how their recommendations will shape the 
existing international framework. Offshore tax avoidance is of great concern for 
all nations and it is doubtful whether it can even be resolved at an international 
level. The sceptics have observed that tax havens have been around almost as 
long as taxes. It was not until the 1970s that tax havens increased in number and 
in importance. This was when large corporations and international banks started 
developing sophisticated offshore financial markets out of the reach of the 
national regulators. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that at 
present as much as $7 trillion in financial assets of various kinds is held 
offshore.178 Regarding the question whether the recommendations of 
international organisations are likely to be able to regulate  
these practices, one cynic has observed that tax avoidance, “is like graffiti or 
pollution: if you want to get rid of it completely you will be disappointed”.179  
 
Although it is doubtful whether the initiatives targeting tax havens pose a threat to 
the existence of tax havens, it is submitted that these initiatives have at least 
made it clear to the international community that harmful tax practices that 
deplete other countries’ tax bases will not be tolerated. Taxpayers and their 
consultants are now aware that their tax avoidance schemes will be firmly 
opposed by the international community.  
                                                 
177 Salinas at 550; see also Diamond & Diamond at INTRO 16. 
178 Gumbel at 23. 
179 Gumbel at 23. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INVESTING IN OFFSHORE COMPANIES 
 
3.1 DEFINING A COMPANY  
 
In terms of section 1 of the Companies Act,1 a company is defined as including 
any association, corporation or company (other than a close corporation) 
incorporated in terms of the relevant provisions of the Act. This definition does 
not really define a company. A company has been generally defined in Smith v 
Anderson2 as an association of persons for the common object of the acquisition 
of gain. Although this description does not apply to all companies, it applies to 
most companies.3 In terms of section 1(b) of the South African Income Tax Act,4 
the definition of a company inter alia includes any association, corporation or 
company incorporated under the law of any other country apart from South 
Africa. In effect the Income Tax Act recognises offshore companies as 
companies for tax purposes.   
 
From the time a company is incorporated or registered, it exists as a separate 
legal entity that exists apart from its members. It can thus own assets, be an em- 
                                                 
1   Act 61 of 1973. 
2 [1880] 15 Ch 247 (CA) 273-74. 
3 HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ du Plessis, PA Delport, L de Koker & JT Pretorius 
Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) at 5. 
4  In terms of s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, a company is defined as including: 
-  a close corporation, 
-  any association, corporation or company incorporated in South Africa, 
-  any association, corporation or company established under any South African law, 
-  any association, corporation or company incorporated under the law of any other  
country, 
-  any co-operative, 
-  any association (formed in South Africa) to serve a specified purpose beneficial to the 
public or a section of the public (e.g. charities and foundations even if they were not 
registered as companies, 
-  a collective investment scheme in securities (shares) per the Collective Investment 
Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002, 
-  an arrangement or scheme carried on outside South Africa, where members of the 
public invest in a collective investment scheme (the investors contribute to the 
scheme and hold a participation interest).   
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ployee or be party to a contract and it is entitled to sue and be sued.5 A company 
registered in a given jurisdiction may have a subsidiary or a base company in 
another jurisdiction. Usually the base company is used as a means of conducting 
business outside the country of incorporation of the parent company.6 The base 
company acts as a holder of the legal title that belongs to the parent company, 
which may be registered outside the country where the base company is 
registered.7 It is thus entitled to the foreign income or assets of the parent 
company (even though the parent company legally owns that income and is also 
able to direct its disposal). In most tax systems, however, the foreign source 
income of a base company is not subject to domestic tax since it is a foreign 
company incorporated and recognised as a separate juridical entity in that 
jurisdiction.8 This implies that the country where the parent company of the base 
company is registered cannot apply the “residence basis” (under which a country 
is entitled to tax the worldwide income of its residents) to tax the worldwide 
income of a parent company that is derived from its base companies 
incorporated in other countries until such income is distributed to the 
shareholders as dividends.9   
 
 
 
 
3.2 WHY COMPANIES ARE USED FOR OFFSHORE TAX AVOIDANCE 
                                                 
5 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; see also Lategan v Boyes 1980 (4) SA 191 
(T) at 200; RP Crees (Pty) Ltd v Woodpecker Industries (Pty) Ltd 1975 (2) SA 485 (R) at 
489; J Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) at 241; Utopia Vakansie-
Oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A) at 176; S v De Jager 1965 (2) SA 616 (A) at 
624-25. In essence, by virtue of this separateness, the assets of the company are its 
exclusive property and the members have no proprietary rights in them. Only on 
liquidation of the company are members entitled to share in a division of the assets of the 
company. The separateness also implies that the company estate is assessed apart from 
the estates of the individual members and so the debts of the company are the company’s 
debts and not those of its members. Likewise, the profits of the company do not belong to 
the members but to the company itself. Only after the company has declared a dividend 
may the members, in accordance with their rights as defined in the articles association of 
the company, claim that dividend. See PM Meskin Henochsberg on The Companies Act 
(updated 31 March 2006) at 34; MS Blackman, RD Jooste & GK Everingham 
Commentary on The Companies Act Vol 1 (2002) at 4-19.   
6  J E Bischel & R Feinschreiber Fundamentals of International Taxation 2 ed (1985) at 83-
85; P Roper Offshore Options (1999) at 2.  
7   B J Arnold & M J McIntyre International Tax Primer 2 ed (2002) at 87. 
8 Arnold & McIntyre at 87. 
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In order to avoid taxation, a base company can be incorporated in a low-tax or a 
tax-haven jurisdiction whereby its income is sheltered and not distributed among 
the shareholders where it could be subject to high taxes.10 As long as the income 
is sheltered in the base company and not distributed, it is deferred or postponed, 
implying that the taxes due currently are postponed to a future year. Deferral 
allows the base company to have the use of the funds that would have been paid 
in taxes during the deferral period.11 The profits tied up in the low-tax jurisdiction 
where the base company is incorporated can then be cheaply accumulated 
offshore so that working capital can be used for further foreign investment 
instead of being repatriated to the parent company to be taxed.12  
 
Although income can be sheltered in the base company for a long time, at some 
point it will have to be repatriated to the parent company when dividends are 
declared. The major tax burden on profit repatriation through dividends is the 
dividend withholding tax.13 The majority of countries in the world impose 
significant withholding taxes on dividends paid to non-residents. This can be a 
major loss of income for any offshore business.14 For instance, high withholding 
taxes can push up the cost of borrowing, as banks subjected to high withholding 
taxes will need to pay higher interest rates to compete with banks in low-tax 
                                                                                                                                            
9   Arnold & McIntyre at 87. 
10   A Ogley Principles of International Tax (1993) at 152; see also Arnold & McIntyre at 77. 
11   L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 358; 
Arnold & McIntyre at 87; see also LJ Seidler & SS Karlinsky Everything You Wanted to 
Know about Tax Havens but were Afraid to Ask (1985) at 2. 
12   WH Diamond & DB Diamond Tax Havens of the World (Release No 108 Jan 2002) vol. 1 
at INTRO/1; E Tomsett Tax Planning for Multinational Companies (1989) at 11; see also A 
Jones Tax Havens and Measures Against Tax Evasion and Avoidance in the EEC (1974) 
at 7, where it is noted that where the parent company has other foreign subsidiaries, 
dividends derived from such subsidiaries can also be accumulated. And if such 
subsidiaries are disposed of or liquidated, the capital gains can be reinvested in other 
offshore projects where they will be subjected to minimum taxes. 
13 J Ware & P Roper Offshore Insight (2001) at 179 define a withholding tax as a tax 
imposed by the country which is the source of the income, on income items such as 
dividends, interest and royalties.  Specific tax treaties may reduce the rates of withholding 
taxes. See also S van Weeghel The Improper Use of Tax Treaties with Particular 
Reference to the Netherlands and the United States (1998) at 16, where it is noted that 
withholding taxes are levied on gross income rather than net income so they present 
heavy tax burdens that can be a barrier to international trade. See also M Hampton The 
Offshore Interface: Tax Havens in the Global Economy (1996) at 11. 
14   Hampton at 11. 
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jurisdictions.15 When a base company is set up in a tax-haven jurisdiction, the 
payment of withholding taxes can be avoided or significantly reduced, as most 
tax havens do not impose withholding taxes on the gross interest payable. The 
absence of indirect taxes is also advantageous for offshore businesses.16 If a 
base company is established in a territory that has a wide network of favourable 
double taxation treaties (for example the Netherlands and Switzerland), 
dividends may be subjected to minimum dividend withholding taxes.17 
 
As mentioned above, the use of base companies in tax havens does not 
necessarily result in a complete avoidance of tax, but rather in a deferral of tax. 
When the parent company or the shareholders of the company receive the 
accumulated income in the form of dividends, these are taxable, possibly without 
there being a credit or other form of relief for foreign taxes paid in previous years 
in the country from which the income was originally derived.18 To avoid the taxes 
that could result when the income is eventually repatriated as dividends, 
secondary sheltering techniques can be employed.  The main strategies utilised 
in this regard are the distribution of the income in a way that ensures that it is 
exempt from tax. This could be done by taking advantage of exemptions granted 
under any relevant tax treaty or under specific domestic legislation.19 For 
instance, in some countries’ legislation, directors’ fees and salaries are exempt 
from taxation. Other countries have affiliate exemption legislation that exempts 
from taxation dividends distributed by a subsidiary to its parent company.20  
 
Secondary sheltering can also be achieved when the base company reinvests its 
income abroad or when the income is “ploughed back” as a loan to the parent 
company.21 An example of such an operation is where a resident of a high-tax 
country who owns shares as debentures is able to transfer such shares to a base 
company in a tax-haven country, allowing the base company to use the sheltered 
                                                 
15 Hampton at 11. 
16 Hampton at 11.     
17   Tomsett at 11. 
18 Tomsett at 6. 
19 Tomsett at 6. 
20 Tomsett at 6; Bischel & Feinschreiber at 83-85; Roper at 2. 
21   Tomsett at 6. 
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income to buy other assets of the same kind in the tax-haven country.22 
Secondary sheltering could also be achieved by the alienation of the  
capital holding in the base company. This could result in the shareholders 
realising a gain that could be exempt from tax or taxable at reduced tax rates.23 
 
3.3 EXAMPLES OF OFFSHORE COMPANIES 
 
There are countless offshore-base companies and the number is increasing 
rapidly. This may be ascribed to the fact that they can be used for the same 
purpose as their counterparts in high-tax jurisdictions and yet they are subject to 
nil or minimum taxation in the offshore jurisdictions. The majority of offshore 
companies merely collect income consisting of dividends, loan interest or patent 
royalties and licence fees. Offshore companies may also hold investments and/or 
get involved in trading.24 Examples of some categories of offshore companies 
are: offshore finance companies, offshore licensing and patent holding 
companies, offshore investment companies, offshore captive insurance 
companies and offshore shipping companies. The working of these types of 
companies and the ways in which they can be used to avoid taxes are described 
below. 
 
International finance companies  
 
International finance companies are companies that are established in low-tax or 
tax-haven jurisdictions for use as borrowing or lending intermediaries by the 
parent company or subsidiaries of a multinational group of companies.25 Their 
function is to act as mediators between lenders and borrowers within a corporate 
group so that they can be used to provide member companies with loans, current 
account credit and bonds.26 Borrowing finance companies may also be  
                                                 
22 Tomsett at 6. 
23  Olivier & Honiball at 468; see also OECD Issues in International Taxation No 1 
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion (1987) at 18. 
24 Bischel & Feinschreiber at 83-85; Roper at 2. 
25 A Ginsberg International Tax Havens 2 ed (1997) at 51.  
26   A Rappako Base Company Taxation (1989) at 193 notes that the purpose of a finance 
company is to arrange capital for the members of a corporate group in the most efficient 
way. A finance company may be able to acquire capital at a lower price than the parent 
company or the operating subsidiaries. The capital is than injected either into the parent 
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used to borrow funds from other third parties that are used to finance the 
operations of other corporations in the multinational group.27  
 
The tax advantage of using international finance companies for borrowing is that 
the interest paid for the loans is generally treated as a tax-deductible expense for 
the subsidiaries which reside in a high-tax country. At the same time the interest 
received by the finance company in a low-tax country is often tax-free, or taxable 
at a very low rate.28  
 
International finance companies are also commonly used in the reduction or 
elimination of withholding taxes levied by other countries on the interest payment 
made by subsidiaries on their international borrowing or lending, especially when 
the finance company is located in a country with favourable tax treaty 
provisions.29 
 
Offshore licensing and patent holding companies  
 
Cross-border transfer of intellectual property (eg royalties, patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, brand names or other industrial property rights like know-how on 
technical or administrative matters) often attracts high taxes. Furthermore, the 
deductions that various countries allow in respect of expenditure on research and 
development or on the acquisition of patents, licenses and know-how may differ 
greatly.30 In order to avoid such high taxes, taxpayers often take advantage of 
the fact that intellectual property is intangible in nature and it can be easily 
moved from country to country through the use of planned licensing structures.31 
A taxpayer can, for instance, establish a licensing and patent holding company 
suitably located offshore to acquire, exploit, license or sublicense intellectual 
                                                                                                                                            
company or into the foreign subsidiaries for their use. This may result in tax saving. And 
the finance company may also make capital available as loan capital to the other 
members of the group. 
27 Rappako at 193. 
28 Rappako at 193. 
29   BJ Arnold The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison 
(1986) at 120; Ginsberg at 51; Rappako at 22 and at 194; Olivier & Honiball at 468. 
30   Tomsett at 43. 
31   Diamond & Diamond at INTRO /2. 
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property rights for its foreign subsidiaries in other countries.32 Profits can then be 
effectively shifted from the foreign subsidiary to the offshore patent owning 
company which may end up paying little or no tax on the royalties received.33 
Other intangible rights such as trademarks, copyrights, know-how and 
franchising rights can also be received in the form of royalties with tax 
advantages.34 
 
Another advantage of using a licensing and patent holding company located in a 
tax-haven jurisdiction to own the intellectual property is that the fees derived by 
the company from the exploitation of the intellectual property will be either 
exempt from tax or subject to a low tax rate in the tax-haven jurisdiction.35 
 
Offshore licensing and patent holding companies can also be used to avoid high 
withholding taxes that are usually charged on royalties flowing from the country in 
which they are derived.36  In most cases, high withholding taxes can be reduced 
when countries enter into double taxation treaties.37 But tax-haven jurisdictions 
usually have few or no double taxation treaties.38 In order to benefit from the 
reduced withholding taxes that treaty countries enjoy, a royalty conduit company 
can be established in a low-tax jurisdiction.  This is essentially an intermediary 
company with very narrow powers that is used to hold assets or rights as an 
                                                 
32 Diamond & Diamond at INTRO/2, where it is noted that tax havens can be used to 
designate a foreign base as a centre for administering patent and trademark agreements. 
See also P Roper & J Ware Offshore Pitfalls (2000) at 9; Olivier & Honiball at 467. 
33 Rappako at 194; C Doggart “Tax Havens and Their Uses” The Economist Publication 
(1990) Special Report No 1191 at 36-37; DD Beazer in “The Mystique of ‘Going Offshore’” 
(1996) 9 The Utah Bar Journal 20 notes that intellectual property can be owned or 
assigned to an offshore entity and then licensed or franchised to companies interested in 
exploiting the worldwide rights. The income derived can then be accumulated offshore 
and, through the selection of an appropriate jurisdiction, withholding taxes can be 
reduced. R King & B Victor Law & Estate Planning Easiguide (2006/2007) in par 19.4.3. 
34  Ginsberg at 50; see also Doggart at 36-37. 
35  Arnold at 121. 
36  B Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service (March 2002) Issue 66 at LEX/26, where it is noted 
that a withholding tax is a tax which the payer of a dividend, royalty or interest payment 
must withhold from each such payment and must pay over to his own tax authorities. In 
the case of non-residents, a withholding tax may be a final tax or it may only constitute the 
advance payment of tax. Tax treaties frequently reduce the rates of withholding taxes. 
Certain jurisdictions qualify as tax havens by virtue of the exemptions or reductions in the 
rates of withholding taxes to which its residents become entitled in accordance with the 
provisions of one or more (or sometimes a network) of tax treaties. 
37 Tomsett at 48-49. 
38   A Starchild Tax Havens for International Business (1994) at 21. 
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agent or nominee would on behalf of another company.39 The royalty conduit 
company can then be used to own license rights which it sublicenses to a second 
licensing company that is located in a territory with a favourable network of 
double-taxation treaties. The second licensing company will usually be 
responsible for the exploitation of the licensing rights from which it would earn 
only a small margin on the royalties (which would be subject to local corporate 
income tax) and the balance would be paid to the ultimate licensor. Setting up a 
royalty conduit company in one of the treaty countries can result in income being 
shifted from those countries by taking advantage of the tax concessions the 
treaty offers.40 The Netherlands is an example of a country which has been 
utilised for establishing sublicensing companies with the aid of such structures.41 
      
 
Offshore investment companies 
 
In order to avoid taxes, residents of high-tax countries often establish investment 
companies in low-tax countries.42 These companies are often “open-ended”43 in 
that they can be expanded by issuing new shares, or by buying back or 
cancelling shares. Their funds or assets may be a mixture of cash, securities or 
real estate.44 Investment companies may include companies belonging to 
corporate groups or private companies incorporated in a tax-haven jurisdiction. 
They are usually used for holding and managing portfolio investments. Their aim 
is to avoid or minimise taxes on investment income (such as dividends, interest 
and rent).  For instance, dividends received from such portfolio investments by 
the tax-haven company will be exempt from tax or subject to tax at a low rate in 
the tax-haven country.  
 
                                                 
39  Weeghel 72-73; H Becker & FJ Wurm “Treaty Shopping: An Emerging Tax Issue and its 
Present Status in Various Countries” (1988) at 658; Rappako at 16.  
40  Spitz & Clarke at 94 note that the use of tax treaties may permit the creation of a conduit 
whereby profits are transferred from one country via a third country, thus incurring the 
smallest possible total tax burden. 
41   Ginsberg at 50; Doggart at 36-37; Tomsett at 48-49. 
42   Doggart at 38. 
43   Diamond & Diamond at glossary 15 define an “open ended investment company” as the 
corporate equivalent of a unit trust in which investors’ interests are represented by 
redeemable shares. 
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Offshore investment funds such as mutual funds or unit trusts can also be set up 
by resident taxpayers as a means of deferring domestic taxes.45 In the absence 
of countermeasures, offshore investment funds can also be used to defer and 
avoid capital gains tax liability on the disposal of the shares of the fund. This can 
be done by converting what would be ordinary income into capital gains.46 The 
tax advantage of this structure is that when a fund is based in a tax haven, there 
is usually no tax or only minimum taxation on capital gains.47 Although the 
taxpayer is liable to pay capital gains tax in his country of residence, the taxes 
deferred will leave the income intact over a period of years.48 Banks usually play 
a major role in encouraging investments in offshore investment funds. Groups of 
banks are often parent companies of offshore investment funds.49 The bank 
secrecy provisions that are upheld by tax-haven banks attract individuals (such 
as expatriate employees of international corporations who earn substantial 
salaries, or independent professionals earning high fees), to invest in offshore 
investment funds where they can accumulate capital offshore and thus hide their 
wealth from “onshore” tax authorities.50 
 
 
 
 
Offshore captive insurance companies 
 
A captive insurance company can be described as a foreign insurance subsidiary 
company established by a group of companies for the purpose of insuring the 
risks of the group as an alternative to the use of external insurance markets.51 
                                                                                                                                            
44   Hampton at 26; Doggart at 38. 
45   Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies International Tax Avoidance Vol A (1979) at 81-82; 
Arnold at 120; see also Ogley at 10, where it is noted that offshore investment funds are 
often set up in tax havens where investment income is often tax free, apart from the 
withholding taxes suffered in the country of source as well as any capital gains accruing to 
the fund. 
46   Arnold at 123; Arnold & McIntyre at 86. 
47   Hampton at 26. 
48  Doggart at 38.  
49  Arnold at 120; see also Ogley at 10.  
50  Ogley at 10.    
51  Tomsett at 67; Arnold at 119; see also Doggart at 51; Starchild at 22; Hampton at 31; 
Diamond & Diamond at Glossary 2; Roper & Ware at 9; Ogley at 9; MWE Glautier & FW 
Bassinger A Reference Guide to International Taxation: Profiting from Your International 
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Foreign insurance subsidiary companies are often incorporated in tax-haven 
jurisdictions that impose nil or minimal tax on premiums on the worldwide risks of 
the parent company. The tax-haven company allows shareholders to build a 
financial bulwark against catastrophic claims at a much faster rate than if they 
insured with a company in their own country.52 This is because their location in a 
tax-haven jurisdiction ensures that they are often not subject to the same 
controls as insurance companies located in the country of the parent company, 
and they may invest surplus accumulations relatively freely without the burden of 
taxation.53 
 
In most jurisdictions, the insurance premiums paid by the parent company and its 
subsidiary are generally deductible for tax purposes and this can lead to 
considerable reductions in a group’s overall tax burden.54 This can be further 
augmented when a subsidiary company is established in a tax-haven country 
since the premiums earned by the tax-haven company and any income earned 
on the investment of the premiums are not taxed at all or are subject to a low tax 
rate in the tax haven.55 
  
 
Two of South Africa’s largest insurers, Old Mutual and Liberty Life, have offshore 
subsidiaries in the Channel Islands and in London which have been used by 
many wealthy South Africans to insure their risks.56  
 
Protected cell companies 
 
“Protected Cell Companies” (PCCs) are one of the relatively recent tools 
                                                                                                                                            
Operations (1987) at 255; Spitz & Clarke at LEX/3; PM Kiffner & WD Rohrert 
“International Tax Planning Offshore Style: An Update Case” (1985) Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 447; M Grundy The World of International Tax Planning 
(1984) at 53 notes that captive companies do not deal with the public at large but they 
insure the risks of  a multinational group of enterprises doing business in various parts of 
the world. The captive is not only used as a vehicle for self insurance but also for buying 
insurance or reinsurance wholesale and selling it retail. The use of an offshore captive 
may thus give a multinational group a tax advantage. 
52   Ginsberg at 60; see also Rappako at 28.   
53 King & Victor in par 19.4.1. 
54 Hampton at 32; Arnold at 119. 
55   Arnold at 119. 
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available for corporate tax planning.  Before describing the intricacies of the 
PCC, it is necessary to briefly explain the background which gave rise to this 
corporate structure. As explained above, available in the competitive offshore 
industry is the “captive insurance company”, which is basically an in-house self-
insurance vehicle. The captive insurance industry does not however, cater for a 
company, which is not financially capable of self-insuring itself. In order to obtain 
self-coverage, the use of a "rent-a-captive structure” was introduced.57 In terms 
of this structure, a company shares the services of a captive insurance company 
with other companies of relatively similar size, by "renting" part of the capital of 
the rented captive. Unrelated companies can then use the same captive to insure 
their risks.58 Although the “rent-a-captive structure” has cost saving advantages, 
it also has some disadvantages. For example, there is no guarantee or 
assurance that the funds provided by one company participating in the rented 
captive structure would not be used to cover any unjustified claims unrelated to 
the risks such company wanted to insure through the rented captive. 
Furthermore, there is no asset protection provided for the companies 
participating in the “rent-a-captive structure” on an individual basis. In order to 
resolve the structural inefficiencies of the "rent-a-captive structure” and to 
circumvent the disadvantages that result from its single patrimony being exposed 
to unjustified third-party claims, the insurance industry developed the concept of 
the PCC.59 
 
A PCC is a special type of corporate body that consists of several companies 
referred to as “cells” within the same legal entity. Each cell functions as an 
independent unit within the umbrella of the PCC, whereby each cell has its own 
assets, liabilities, cellular capital and accounts. The segregation or ring-fencing of 
patrimonies helps to avoid the mingling of funds and assets of the different cells, 
                                                                                                                                            
56  Ginsberg at 600. 
57  Coddan Company Formation Worldwide “Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at > 
http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-sycehless-ppc-formation.htm<, last accessed 25 
February 2007 
58  FP Ferreire “The Protected Cell Companies in a Nutshell”. Available at > 
http://www.legalinfo-panama.com/articulos/articulos_41a.htm<, last accessed 25 February 
2007. 
59  Coddan Company Formation Worldwide “Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at 
>http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 
25 February 2007 
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thus ensuring that no claim against one cell of the PCC would be covered by 
funds or assets of another cell.60 The vital legal point is that the cells are not legal 
entities. The only legal entity is the PCC, which does all the operations with the 
outside world.61 The PCC’s patrimony is composed of general assets ("non-
cellular" assets), which are separate and distinct from each of the assets 
composing the protected cells, creating what is commonly known as the "core 
patrimony". The liabilities unrelated to a specific cell are covered by the non-
cellular assets of the PCC. 62 
 
Despite being relatively new to the corporate world, the flexibility of PCCs has 
encouraged their increased use as tax planning vehicles, especially in the 
insurance industry. Their structure has also made them an ideal entity for the 
cost-effective operation of umbrella mutual funds. This is because the structure 
of the PCC appears to create "an impenetrable wall" against creditors and prying 
eyes; thus it is viewed as a valuable vehicle for purposes of asset protection and 
financial privacy.63 
 
PCCs were first incorporated in Guernsey, under the Guernsey Protected Cell 
Companies Ordinance of 1997 (as amended by "The Protected Cell Companies 
(Amendment) Ordinance of 1998”).64 Since then, other jurisdictions, primarily the 
tax-haven countries, have enacted laws to facilitate the formation of PCCs.65 The 
                                                 
60  FP Ferreire “The Protected Cell Companies in a Nutshell”. Available at > 
http://www.legalinfo-panama.com/articulos/articulos_41a.htm< last accessed 25 February 
2007. 
61  Aamil Global Financial Services Mauritius “Protected cell Companies”. Available at > 
http://www.aaamil.com/en/services_protected_cell_companies.aspx> last accessed 25 
February 2007; Isle of Man Government, Insurance and Pensions Authority “Protected cell 
Companies”. Available at >http://www.gov.im/ipa/insurance/protectedcellcompanies.xml> 
last accessed 25 February 2007. See also Coddan Company Formation Worldwide 
“Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at >http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-
sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 25 February 2007.  
62  Diamond & Diamond at Bermuda-34, where PCCs are referred to as companies that 
operate segregated accounts. 
63  Coddan Company Formation Worldwide “Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at 
>http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 
25 February 2007 
64  Coddan Company Formation Worldwide “Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at 
>http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 
25 February 2007. 
65  V Kothari “The Protected Cell Companies” Available at 
>http://www.vinodkpthari.com/protectected_cell_companies.htm< last accessed 25 
February 2007. 
66 
term “protected cell companies” is not always used in other jurisdictions, as there 
may be different legal issues that pertain to those entities. However, the relevant 
legislation of these jurisdictions has the same aim of cellular ring-fencing. The 
other offshore jurisdictions that have followed the path of Guernsey include the 
Cayman Islands with its Segregated Portfolio Companies; Bermuda, which 
passed the New Providence Mutual Ltd. Private Act that allows the establishment 
of PCC structures; Mauritius (which approved The Protected Cell Companies Act 
of 1999 [amended in 2000])66; and St. Vincent and The Grenadines with their 
International Insurance (Amendments and Consolidation) Act of 1998, which 
allows the establishment of "protected premium accounts" that have elements of 
the PCC.67 The Seychelles, PPCs are formed under the Protected Cell 
Companies Act of 2003.68  
 
Although the PCC was designed to fill a gap in the world of international business 
by improving the techniques for finance and for investment, inevitably, there are 
some ways in which taxes can be avoided by investing in these companies. 
Commenting on the tax advantages that can be derived from investing in PCC, it 
has been noted that: 
The concept is that a life insurance company, authorised in an offshore jurisdiction, 
issues a single policy to a single investor, linked to assets in a particular cell. There is the 
idea, but the aim is an age-old aim. It is tax-free roll up. The investor is hoping that the 
final returns are either tax-exempt or taxed at a lower rate. If the protected cell company 
is aggressively structured, and if it is over-aggressively marketed, that goes over the line, 
it could end up being simply attacked as yet another colorful sham.69   
 
It is worth noting that the PCC structure can also be viewed as a means of 
avoiding “controlled foreign company” (CFC) legislation. Generally, this 
legislation ensures that the undistributed income of a controlled foreign company 
is not deferred, but it is taxed in the hands of its domestic shareholders on a 
                                                 
66  Alliance Mauritius “Protected Cell Companies”. Available at >www.alliance-
mauritius.com/protected-cell-companiey.phy< last accessed 20 March 2007. 
67  Coddan Company Formation Worldwide “Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at 
>http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 
25 February 2007. 
68  Coddan Company Formation Worldwide “Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at 
>http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 
25 February 2007. 
69  Coddan Company Formation Worldwide “Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at 
>http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 
25 February 2007. 
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current basis.70  Since the PCC is a single legal entity, with one tax status, the 
cells in the PCC cannot be treated as companies for purposes of the CFC 
legislation.71  
 
In Mauritius, PCCs can be used to obtain access to double taxation treaties by 
being structured as a Category 1 Global Business Company incorporated under 
the Financial Services Development Act 2001.72 In terms of this Act, a PCC can 
be used to carry out two types of global business, namely: global insurance 
business and investment funds (ie Collective Investment Schemes). The treaty 
benefits that a PCC registered in Mauritius would enjoy include the avoidance of 
capital gains taxes and the reduction of withholding taxes on dividends and 
interest.73 
Offshore shipping companies 
 
Because the shipping industry is mobile, it is common for ship owners and 
operators to locate the ownership, operation, administration and registration of a 
ship in a tax-haven country. In some instances, the ownership and operation of a 
company may be located in two different countries; the administrative 
headquarters may be in a third country while the ship itself is registered 
somewhere else.74 This is done in order to keep the global tax burdens of the 
particular shipping company low.75 If a shipping company is registered in a tax-
haven jurisdiction, that jurisdiction can be used as a “flag-of-convenience”76 
                                                 
70  Olivier & Honiball at 358; B Arnold The Taxation of Foreign Controlled Corporations: An 
International Comparison (1986) at 131. See also Arnold & Mclntyre at 91. 
71  Alliance Mauritius “Protected Cell Companies”. Available at >http://www.alliance-
mauritius.com/protected-cell-companiey.phy< last accessed 20 March 2007.   
72  Aamil Global Financial Services Mauritius “Protected cell Companies”. Available at > 
http://www.aaamil.com/en/services_protected_cell_companies.aspx> last accessed 25 
February 2007; In terms of the Financial Services Development Act 2001, a Category 1 
Global Business Company is a company engaged in qualified global business and which 
is carried on from within Mauritius with persons all of whom are resident outside Mauritius 
and where business is conducted in a currency other than the Mauritian rupee. See also 
Alliance Mauritius “Protected Cell Companies”. Available at >www.alliance-
mauritius.com/protected-cell-companiey.phy<, last accessed 20 March 2007.  
73  Alliance Mauritius “Protected Cell Companies”. Available at >www.alliance-
mauritius.com/protected-cell-companiey.phy<, last accessed 20 March 2007.  
74  Doggart at 53.  
75  Spitz & Clarke at LEX/18; Doggart at 54. 
76 Spitz & Clarke at LEX/9 explain that the flag of a ship is the flag of the country of its 
registration. The term “flag of convenience” refers to the flag of a country which is chosen 
for ship registration in order to achieve fiscal benefits (for instance no income tax being 
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nation, which implies that its flag can be flown by non-resident shipping 
companies without their having to incur any fiscal or other controls by the flag 
country’s government. The system is also known as open registry shipping.77  
 
When foreign ship owners register under the tax-haven flag, the worldwide 
taxation of the company can be reduced and the company can also avoid other 
economic restrictions and regulations in its country of residence.78 The flag of 
convenience can also be used to keep the ship out of high tax countries’ 
catchment areas so that the real owner’s identity is concealed from the relevant 
tax authorities.79 By the middle of the 20th century, Liberia and Panama were the 
most popular jurisdictions used for incorporating offshore shipping companies80  
but since the 1990s, the Isle of Man and Cyprus have been among the most 
popular jurisdictions for this purpose.81 
                                                                                                                                            
levied by such countries on international shipping operations) and other non-tax 
advantages relating to lower labour costs and manning scales, officer and crew 
requirements and trade union practices. See also Doggart at 53; Olivier & Honiball at 469. 
77  Doggart at 53. 
78  Roper & Ware at 9; Ware and Roper at 25; Beazer at 20. 
79  Beazer at 20, where it is noted that many South African-owned ships in the apartheid era 
and also that Israeli ships escaped boycott regulations in this way. 
80  Ogley at 323 notes that the Liberian flag represents major shipping companies around the 
world and it is flown from almost every type of ocean-going vessel. Explaining how this 
works, the author notes that “Liberian maritime law requires Liberian flag ships to be 
owned by a Liberian entity using a non resident Liberian corporation or a Liberian foreign 
maritime entity. Foreign maritime entities are registered in Liberia so that a non-Liberian 
entity can qualify as the owner of a Liberian flag vessel. This registration allows a non-
Liberian corporation, trust or partnership to own a Liberian vessel and meet the ownership 
requirements of the Liberian maritime law.” See also Ginsberg at 67; Glautier & Bassinger 
at 253; Starchild at 19 also notes that Panama and Liberia were used as the major “flag of 
convenience” nations.  
81  Isle of Man Treasury “In-Brief: Shipping Registry ‘Best in World’” (Feb 2007) Isle of Man 
Financial Review at 1, where it is stated that the Isle of Man now occupies sole first 
position – rating it the best ship registry in the world; Isle of Man Treasury “2006 
Companies Act Special Edition” (Nov 2006) Isle of Man Financial Review at 6, where it is 
noted that the Isle of Man shipping registry has a high reputation as a base for 
international shipping. It is also noted that the Isle of Man offers favourable tax status for 
ship ownership and ship management services. New Isle of Man tax rules allow shipping 
companies to apply for tax holidays of up to five years. During the “holiday period” all or 
part of their profits or income will be exempt from tax. Existing legislation already provides 
for temporary tax exemptions. This means that an owner, manager or other shipping 
operator moving to the Isle of Man can operate tax-free while establishing a new 
operation. See Anglo Irish Bank “Isle of Man: Shipping and Superyachts”. Available at 
>http://www.angloirishbank.co.im/about-iom/shipping-and-superyachts.asp<, last 
accessed 22 June 2007. Cyprus is also considered as one of the leading maritime centres 
of the world. See D Kassinopoullos, Chartered Accountant “Shipping Companies in 
Cyprus”.  Available at >http://www.kassinopoullos.com/htmlsite/Cyprus%20Shipping.html< 
last accessed on 18 May 2007; see also CG Vassiliades, Ledra Management Ltd “Cyprus: 
Shipping Companies – Part 1”. Available at 
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3.4 JURISDICTION TO TAX INCOME FROM OFFSHORE COMPANIES  
 
Before any country can tax the income of the offshore investments of its 
residents, a connection, or “tax nexus” must be established between the country 
and that income. The principles which establish nexus are associated with a 
physical or legal presence in a country. The main principles for taxation used in 
the world today are the ”source” and the “residence” principles of taxation.82  
 
Under the source principle of taxation, persons are taxed on income that 
originates within the territorial jurisdiction or geographical confines of the country, 
irrespective of the taxpayer’s country of residence.83 The justification for the 
source basis of taxation is that a taxpayer can be expected to share the costs of 
running the country which makes it possible for the taxpayer to produce an 
income.84 Most African countries apply the source basis of taxation, presumably 
because it is easier to administer. 
 
Under the residence principle of taxation residents are taxed on their worldwide 
income regardless of the source of the income.85 The justification for the 
residence basis of taxation is that as a resident enjoys the protection of the state, 
he should contribute towards the cost of the government of the country in which 
he resides, even if income is earned outside that country. This basis of taxation is 
also justified by the fact that residents know that they can always return to the 
country of residence whenever they want and that they will have the protection of 
their government whenever they are abroad.86 
 
In general, the residence basis of taxation is internationally preferred as being 
                                                                                                                                            
>http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=40340&lastestnews=1< last accessed 23 
June 2007.  
82 D  Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) in par 7.1.  
83 Ware & Roper at 107; L Edwards & C Waelde Law and the Internet: Regulating 
Cyberspace (1997) at 171; H Suddards E-commerce: A Guide to the Law of Electronic 
Business (1999) 259. 
84 Kergeulen Sealing & Whaling Co Ltd v CIR 1939 AD 487 at 507.  
85 Olivier & Honiball at 51; L Olivier “Residence-based Taxation” (2000) 1 South African Law 
Journal at 20; Grundy at 3.  
86 Meyerowitz in par 7.1.  
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most effective in curbing offshore tax avoidance.87 This is because the residence 
basis of taxation ensures that the residents of a given jurisdiction are taxed on 
their worldwide income and this covers all their offshore activities. Thus 
taxpayers are prevented from channelling their income to countries with no tax or 
very low tax rates.88 The working of the residence basis of taxation in respect of 
companies is discussed below.  
 
3.5 JURISDICTION TO TAX (HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA) 
 
The first income tax laws in South Africa were based on the principle that taxes 
would be levied only on income that was sourced in South Africa.89 The 
predominant use of the source basis of taxation opened up numerous loopholes 
for offshore tax avoidance since income was taxed only when it was generated in 
South Africa. Any portion of the money generated that left South Africa was not 
taxed. Thus South Africans got involved in a wide variety of tax-efficient 
strategies involving offshore trusts and offshore companies and a number of 
offshore bank accounts were set up in tax-haven jurisdictions.90 
 
South Africa realised that a proper basis of taxation was necessary in order to 
curb offshore tax avoidance. Although the residence basis of taxation can be 
quite effective in curbing offshore tax avoidance as the worldwide income of 
residents is taxed, very few countries have the administrative capacity to cast 
their nets worldwide so this basis of taxation is usually adopted by developed and 
net capital exporting countries.91 South Africa is in a unique economic position, in 
that its economy is composed of a mixture of components typical of both a 
                                                 
87  Referring to the term “resident”, which is key to the understanding of the “residence basis” 
of taxation, art 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 
condensed version) at 26, provides that “the term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ means 
any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his 
domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature…” 
88 Olivier & Honiball at 51. 
89 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act of 2000. 
See also Meyerowitz in par 7.3.   
90  Ginsberg at 594-595. 
91 Olivier & Honiball at 51. 
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developed and a developing economy.92 The developed component of the 
economy necessitated that a basis of taxation that puts South Africa in line with 
the trend in international taxation practices as applied by major developed 
countries be introduced, but the developing component of the economy posed 
administrative challenges that made it necessary to recruit specialised tax 
experts and being able to retain them.  
 
A decision had to be made as to whether South Africa’s tax system should be 
based on the residence or source basis of taxation. Over the years a number of 
commissions of inquiry were set up to look, amongst other issues, into this 
matter.93 When South Africa rejoined the global economy after the democratic 
elections in 1994, the need to introduce the residence basis of taxation became 
even more pertinent. Since then, international interest in South Africa has also 
grown and this has encouraged South Africans to actively participate in and 
become reintegrated into the global economy. The heightened global trade 
competition and the mobility of capital in the modern world have also encouraged 
South African residents, both individuals and corporations, to make considerable 
investments offshore and also to look for ways of minimising their global tax 
                                                 
92 SARS “Discussion Paper on a Proposed System for Advance Tax Rulings” (2003) at 7. 
Available at  
>http://sars.gove.za/legislation/Discussion20%Papers/Discussion%20proposed%20 
sytem20%Advance20%Tax20%Rulings.pdf<, last accessed 7 November 2007. 
93  In 1951 the “Steyn Committee” recommended that the source basis of taxation be retained 
owing to the then perceived complexity of changing to a residence system. See the R 
Steyn (Chairman) First Interim Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Income Tax Act 
(“Steyn Committee Report”) UG No 75-1951 in par 69. In 1970, the “Franzsen 
Commission” recommended that the residence basis of taxation should be introduced as 
more income was beginning to flow out of South Africa without being taxed. This 
Commission pointed out that the introduction of the residence basis of taxation would not 
be such a complex procedure since the Income Tax Act had already deviated from a pure 
source basis through the introduction of various deeming provisions. See the DG 
Franszen (Chairman)Commission of Inquiry into the Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South 
Africa: Taxation in South Africa, Second Report RP 86/1970 in par 20 (“Franzsen 
Commission Report”). This matter was further investigated in 1987 by the “Margo 
Commission”. This Commission highlighted the need to introduce a residence basis of 
taxation, noting that if exchange controls were lifted, a worldwide basis might be 
instrumental in curbing consequential tax avoidance. This Commission further pointed out 
that the “independent national states” that then existed (and to some extent the existence 
of other countries in the Rand monetary area) exposed the system to schemes of 
avoidance, which a worldwide system of taxation could help to counter. However the 
“Margo Commission” advised that as there are complexities in administering a residence 
based taxation system, the source basis should be retained and the existing deeming 
provisions be extended. See the CS Margo (Chairman) Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa (“Margo Commission 
Report”) RP 34/1987 in par 26-30. 
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exposure. With these developments, “the Katz Commission”94 was appointed in 
1994 to inquire into the ability of the tax structure of South Africa to deal with the 
consequences of the globalisation of trade. The Katz Commission noted that 
when South Africa was barred from international trade owing to economic 
sanctions and stringent exchange control regulations, international trade in South 
Africa had dwindled. As a result, from a tax point of view, South Africa’s 
international tax principles had not developed to the same extent as those of its 
trading partners. Our international tax system had certain gaps and loopholes 
that were utilised by South African residents, as well as the residents of other 
countries, to avoid taxes.95 These loopholes were augmented by the relaxation of 
exchange control regulations in mid-1997.96 The Katz Commission 
recommended that the residence basis of taxation should not be introduced 
drastically, but that there should be a gradual adjustment of the source-based tax 
system in order to facilitate South Africa’s integration into the global economy. As 
a result of this recommendation, the source basis of taxation was applied on 
active income, and deeming provisions (which were essentially based on the 
residence principle) were applied on passive income.97 It was presumed that this 
would provide an optimum balance between the effects of the residence and the 
source bases of taxation and that this would protect South Africa’s tax base until 
a residence based system was fully adopted.98 Consequently as from July 1997, 
in the interim, awaiting the introduction of the residence basis of taxation, 
sections 9C and 9D of the Income Tax Act (now deleted) were enacted. These 
sections were introduced as anti-avoidance measures against South African 
residents intending to avoid South African tax by investing capital in offshore 
foreign entities. Taxes would be avoided by means such as recharacterising and 
converting the offshore income into non-taxable passive income (for example 
dividends), which could only be taxable in South Africa when they had been 
                                                 
94  MM Katz (chairman) Fifth Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects 
of the Tax Structure of South Africa (1997) (“Katz Commission Report”) at 4.  
95 For example, residents of countries like the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom whose international laws are well developed have advanced knowledge of the 
various schemes for circumventing anti-avoidance legislation. When residents of such 
countries got involved in international trade with South Africa, they could easily circumvent 
our anti-avoidance legislation which still lagged behind international developments. 
96  VJ Maren The Taxation of Foreign Sourced Investment Income in the Hands of South 
African Residents (1999) at 21; Ginsberg at 597. 
97 Ginsberg at 597. 
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remitted. However, such dividends would often not be remitted immediately, and 
as a result, taxation would be deferred by allowing this income to “roll up” in the 
foreign entity as long as possible. In terms of the then section 9C, investment 
income was defined as income in the form of any annuity, interest, rental income, 
royalty or any income of a similar nature.99 Section 9D was designed to tax such 
foreign source investment income in the hands of South African residents.100 
However, these provisions could not effectively counter offshore tax avoidance, 
because they covered a wide scope and they were poorly drafted.101 As a result, 
many tax planning schemes were entered into, in order to take advantage of the 
loopholes in these provisions.102 There was thus a need to improve on these 
provisions if they were to be the foundation on which a new residence-based 
structure was to be built.  
 
 
With the gradual phasing out of exchange controls, the introduction of a 
residence basis of taxation was inevitable. The tax authorities were convinced 
that the introduction of the residence basis of taxation would significantly broaden 
South Africa’s tax base, limit the opportunities for offshore tax avoidance and 
also bring South Africa’s tax system into line with international best practice.103  
Thus from the years of assessment commencing 1 January 2001, the residence 
based system of taxation was introduced in South Africa, ushered in by the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000 (the Amendment Act) which 
amended the Income Tax Act.104 Under this new system, a distinction was made 
between the taxation of residents and non-residents.105 Under the residence 
based system of taxation, the world-wide income of South African residents is 
taxable in South Africa, irrespective of whether or not it is earned in a low-tax 
jurisdiction.106 The source basis of taxation was, however, not discarded. It is 
                                                                                                                                            
98 Ginsberg at 597. 
99  Olivier & Honibll at 360, see also Roper at 64, Ware & Roper at 17.  
100  Maren at 11.  
101  D Meyerowitz, TS Emslie & DM Davis “Editorial: The Revenue Laws Amendment Act” 
(2000) 49 The Taxpayer at 181. 
102  Maren at 28.  
103  Meyerowitz et al at 181. 
104  S 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
105 The definition of “gross income” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act.  
106  S 1 of the Income Tax Act.  
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used to tax the income of non-residents which is derived from a South African 
source.107  
 
3.6 THE RESIDENCE BASIS OF TAXATION: TAXING THE OFFSHORE 
INCOME OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES  
 
Since this thesis deals partly with curbing offshore tax avoidance by companies 
resident in South Africa, it is necessary to consider the factors used to determine 
whether a company is a South African resident. The definition of a “resident” as 
defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act divides South African residents into 
two categories: natural persons (individuals) and persons other than natural 
persons (for instance companies and trusts). For the purposes of this thesis, only 
the definition of persons other than natural persons is discussed.  
 
A person other than a natural person is considered a “resident” of South Africa, if 
it is incorporated, established or formed in the Republic South Africa, or if it has a 
place of effective management in South Africa. However, in order to address any 
criticism that the world-wide test of residency would deter companies from setting 
up international headquarter companies in South Africa, an international 
headquarter company is excluded from the definition of a resident.108 Although 
this definition appears to be very wide, the requirements of this definition are 
considered alternately. This means for example that a company which is 
incorporated in South Africa is a resident irrespective of where its place of 
effective management is. Conversely, a company which has its place of effective 
management in South Africa is a resident irrespective of where it is 
incorporated.109 If a company is deemed a resident of another country in terms of  
a double-taxation agreement which South Africa has signed with that country, the 
company is deemed not to be a resident of South Africa.110   
 
How to determine whether a company is incorporated, established or 
                                                 
107  Meyerowitz in par 7.3; Olivier & Honiball at 44; K Huxham & P Haupt Notes on South 
African Income Tax (2007) at 294. 
108  Par (b) of the definition of “resident” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act; see also A de Koker 
Silke on South African Income Tax: Being an Exposition of the Law, Practice and 
Incidence of Income Tax in South Africa Vol 1 (2006 service 29) in par 5.2E. 
109 Meyerowitz in par 5.19; see also Huxham & Haupt at 296. 
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formed in South Africa 
 
The Income Tax Act does not define the terms “incorporated”, “established”, or 
“formed”. However, in terms of section 32 of the Companies Act,111 if a company 
is formed and incorporated in the Republic, it is deemed to be a resident because 
of its formation and incorporation. Determining whether a company is 
incorporated, established or formed in the Republic does not present much 
difficulty as these are factual matters. A company’s activities and physical place 
of operation can be verified from the Registrar of Companies in terms of the 
Companies Act. In terms of sections 32, 63 and 64 of the Companies Act, a 
company comes into existence as a result of an application by the founders to 
the Registrar of Companies for its incorporation.112 In terms of section 170 of the 
Companies Act, every company shall have recorded with the Registrar a postal 
address and a registered office to which all communications and notices may be 
addressed. Legal process may be served at the registered address and also at 
the company’s principle place of business. Once the registration requirements of 
the Companies Act have been complied with, the company is deemed to be a 
South African resident and is liable to tax in South Africa on its worldwide 
income. 
 
How to determine the “place of effective management” of a company 
 
The companies considered resident in South Africa are not only those that are 
incorporated, established or formed here. A company which has its place of 
effective management in South Africa is also considered a South African resident 
and its worldwide income is liable to tax in South Africa. It is this aspect of the 
definition of “resident” in respect to persons other than natural persons that is 
likely to create uncertainty and could be manipulated for offshore tax avoidance. 
This is because there is no statutory definition of the concept “place of effective 
management” in the South African Income Tax Act, nor is there any case law 
                                                                                                                                            
110 Meyerowitz in par 5.19, see also Huxham & Haupt at 349. 
111 And also s 64(1) and (2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973; see also Cilliers et al at 67-68. 
112  In terms of these sections, requirements such as registering a name for the company and 
submitting the company’s memorandum and articles of association have to be complied 
with before a certificate of its incorporation can be issued. 
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that provides guidance on the interpretation of the term. It is submitted that an 
understanding of the concept “place of effective management” is necessary if this 
concept is to be relied on as a basis for taxing the income of companies resident 
in South Africa. 
 
The concept “place of effective management” is, however, commonly used in 
double taxation agreements as a so-called “tie-breaker” criterion that is used to 
determine the residence of an entity when it is dual resident.113 The purpose is to 
ensure that taxing authority in respect to such a company is granted to one 
country (if the two countries have entered into a double taxation agreement). In 
terms of Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention,114 such a company is 
deemed to be a resident only of the state in which its place of effective 
management is situated. This implies that if there is a treaty between South 
Africa and a certain tax-haven jurisdiction, and a company incorporated in the 
tax-haven jurisdiction also has a place of effective management in South Africa, 
the company will be considered a resident of South Africa and South Africa will 
have the right to tax the company’s income.  
 
Although the term “place of effective management” is commonly used in double 
taxation agreements as a “tie-breaker” criterion, internationally there is no 
uniform meaning of this term. In some states, the term is used in a sense similar 
to that of “central management and control”, that is management at the highest 
level, while in other states, the term is defined with reference to the day-to-day 
management of the company.115  
 
Weizman116 notes that there is a lack of international guidance as to what kind of 
activities amount to a “place of effective management”. He notes further that in 
                                                 
113 Dual residence could arise from the fact that in different countries an entity’s liability to tax 
may be based on different factors, such as domicile, residence, place of incorporation, 
place of effective management or any other criterion of a similar nature. For example a 
company is considered dual resident if it is incorporated in State A and it has its place of 
effective management in State B.  See art 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (2005 Condensed Version). 
114  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 Condensed Version). 
115  See Olivier & Honiball at 79, quoting PITStart, a CD-based training tool. 
116  L Weizmen “Taxing Remuneration form Employment aboard a Ship: Where is Place of 
Effective Management Situated?” (1996) IBFD 163. 
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non-continental jurisdictions the focus is on the location where the day-to-day 
management is carried out. The continental view appears to focus on a higher 
level of management.117 For instance, with regard to the position under German 
law, Vogel118 notes that:  
According to case law, the place of management of an enterprise is where the 
management’s important policies are actually made … What is decisive is not the place 
where the management directives take effect but rather the place where they are given.  
This will normally be the place where the top manager(s) in chief has (have) his (their) 
offices. A place from which a business is merely supervised would not qualify.  If the 
commercial and the non-commercial management are located at different places, the 
location of the commercial management will be controlling.  If the place of effective 
management cannot be determined by application of these criteria, the top manager’s 
residence will determine the residence of the company. 
 
In an attempt to provide clarity on the “place of effective management” as a tie-
breaker criterion, paragraph 24 of Commentary on article 4 of the OECD Model 
Convention was amended in 2000 to provide that: 
The place of effective management is the place where the key management and 
commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business are in 
substance made. The place of effective management will ordinarily be the place where 
the most senior person or group of persons (for example a board of directors) makes its 
decisions, the place where the actions to be taken by the entity as a whole are 
determined; however, no definitive rule can be given and all relevant facts and 
circumstances must be examined to determine the place of effective management. An 
entity may have more than one place of management, but it can have only one place of 
effective management at any one time.  
 
In effect, the OECD presupposes that the determination of the place of effective 
management is based on three dominant factors:  where the key management 
and commercial decisions are made in substance; where the most senior person 
or group of persons (eg a board of directors) makes its decisions and where the 
actions to be taken by the entity as a whole are determined. These three factors 
show that the determination of a place of effective management is a question of 
fact119 as these factors are based on identifying the place where the underlying 
policy intents of the company are formulated.120 In ordinary circumstances, this 
would be the place where the directors meet to make decisions relating to the 
management of the company.  
 
                                                 
117  Weizmen 163. 
118  K Vogel Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (1997) at 262. 
119 OECD “The Impact of the Communications Revolution on the Application of ‘Place of 
Effective Management’ As a Tie Breaker Rule” (2001) par 13. Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/daoecd/46/27/1923328.pdf<, last accessed on 17 July 2007. 
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Paragraph 24 of the OECD Model Commentary makes it clear that no rule can 
be given regarding the definition of the term “place of effective management”. All 
the relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to determine the place 
of effective management. Vogel121 for example notes that if a controlling 
shareholder interferes with the usual conduct of the business of the company, if 
he/she is constantly informed of the various transactions of the company and his 
decisions have a decisive influence on how current transactions are dealt with, 
such a shareholder can be looked at in order to determine the place of effective 
management of a company. 
 
Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention states that there can only be one 
place of effective management, but there could be more than one place of 
management. The OECD’s interpretation of the term “place of effective 
management”, which emphasises the place of senior management could 
however be manipulated for tax avoidance purposes with the current 
technological advancements.122  This is especially so when trade is conducted  
electronically (e-commerce). It is thus necessary to consider the challenges e-
commerce posses to the concept of “place of effective management”.  
 
3.7  CHALLENGES POSED BY E-COMMERCE 
 
What is e-commerce?  
 
E-commerce is a term used to describe the wide array of commercial activities 
carried out by electronic means that enable trade without the confines of 
geographical boundaries.123 This technology enables the transmission of voice, 
                                                                                                                                            
120 OECD 2001 Report on the Impact of the Communications Revolution in par 63. 
121 Vogel at 183.  
122  H Suddards E-commerce: A Guide to the Law of Electronic Business (1999) at 259. 
123 R Doernberg & L Hinnekens Electronic Commerce and International Taxation (1999) at 3. 
E-commerce has also been defined as “commercial activities which are carried on by 
means of computers interconnected by telecommunications lines” and, more simply, as 
“business transactions conducted over the Internet”. See JW Fawcett, JM Harris & M 
Bridge International Sale of Goods in the Conflict of Laws (2005) at 493. See also SARS 
Discussion Document: Electronic Commerce and South African Taxation (March 2000) at 
5; Department of Communications Green Paper on E-commerce: Making it Your Business 
(2000) at 9; RA Westin International Taxation of Electronic Commerce (2000) at 2; RL 
Doernberg, L Hinnekens, W Herrerstein & J Li Electronic Commerce and Multi-
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data, images and video information to take place in cyberspace (sometimes 
called the “information highway”) by using the Internet.124 The Internet can be 
described as a network of computers that allows people to communicate with 
other people from all over the world.125 It has also been described as “the world-
wide network of networks that are connecting each other into one single logical 
network all sharing a common addressing scheme”.126  
 
The Internet is growing faster than all communication technologies that preceded 
it.127 It has been noted that in the world today, there are very few businesses 
remaining, mostly small and locally focussed, that have no Internet component. 
These businesses are often referred to as “bricks and mortar businesses”. With 
the internet, another category of business, commonly referred to as “dot-coms”, 
has become recognised. These are businesses that are involved in e-commerce 
on the Internet and do not have a physical presence.128 The Internet provides an 
environment in which automated functions can undertake significant business 
with little or no physical activity.129 These functions can be easily and quickly 
moved from one jurisdiction to another. E-commerce can ensure fast, efficient 
and relatively cheap distribution resources.130 The nearly instantaneous 
transmission of information, the speed at which transactions are concluded and 
the increase in the bulk of transactions concluded, can encourage even the 
smallest e-commerce enterprise owned by an individual, to sell not only to 
national but also international markets.  
                                                                                                                                            
jurisdictional Taxation (2001) at 9; Suddards at 257. 
124 C Sher “Taxation of E-commerce” (2000) 39 Income Tax Reporter 172. 
125  L Edwards & C Waelde Law and the Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (1997) at 12; SP 
Melvin Cyber Law and E-commerce Regulation: An Entrepreneurial Approach (2005) at 5.  
126  J Benzine & B Gardand Accessing and Using the Internet (1995) at 26. See also C Chen 
“United States and European Union Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction and their Impact 
on E-Commerce” (2004) University of Pennsylvania J of International Economic Law 423 
at 426-427; C Schulze “Electronic Commerce and Civil Jurisdiction, with Special 
Reference to Consumer Contracts” (2006) 18 No 1 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 31. 
127  Schulze at 31; HB Stravitz “Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is 
required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce” (1998) 49 South Carolina Law Review at 
925; Westin at 2. 
128  CW Pappas “Comparative US and EU Approaches to E-Commerce Regulation” (2003) 31 
Denver J of International Law & Policy 325 at 326-327; Melvin at 13. 
129  Suddards at 27. 
130 Schulze at 33; ME Plotkin, B Wells & K Wimmer E-Commerce Law and Business Vol II 
(2003) in par 11.03A; JS Schwartz “Transfer Pricing and Electronic Commerce” (July 
1999) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 289; AW Oguttu “Transfer Pricing 
and Tax Avoidance: Is the Arm’s Length Principle Relevant in the E-commerce Era” 
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The Internet has however created a new route for the exchange of goods and 
services and the accessing of offshore facilities that has not been fully 
regulated.131 Global computer-based communications cut across territorial 
borders, creating a new realm of human activity and undermining the feasibility 
and legitimacy of laws based on geographic boundaries. Because the Internet 
ignores international boundaries, “place” has little meaning in the networked 
world.132 It is thus feared that e-commerce may change the distribution of 
taxable activities, alter the balance of taxing authority and result in the erosion 
of countries’ tax bases.133 In the South Africa, the “Green Paper on E-
commerce”134 notes that:    
Electronic commerce has, in many ways, created a marketplace without conventional 
rules; a marketplace, indeed, that challenges many of our preconceived notions and 
practices. It is also a marketplace that may seem to defy regulation yet at the same 
time requiring regulation as an enabling tool.135  
 
In addition, the highly mobile nature of e-commerce and the ability of residents to 
establish offshore companies could lead to a tax-driven migration of businesses 
to low-tax jurisdictions.136 The anonymous nature of e-commerce also brings new 
challenges to tax compliance. E-commerce creates difficulties: in the 
identification and location of taxpayers, the identification and verification of 
taxable transactions and the ability to establish a link between taxpayers and 
their taxable transactions, thus creating opportunities for tax avoidance.137 
 
In chapter 1 of this thesis, it was pointed out that a study on the effectiveness of 
                                                                                                                                            
(2006) 18 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 156. 
131 Sher at 172.   
132  DR Johnson & D Post “Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace” (1996) 48 
Stanford Law Review at 1367 and at 1370-1371; N Cox “The Residence of Cyberspace 
and the Loss of National Sovereignty” (2002) 11 Information & Communication 
Technology Law 241 at 244-245; Melvin at 52.  
133 Doernberg & Hinnekens at 341-343; Suddards at 255; JJB Hickey, R Mathew & C Rose 
E-commerce: Law Business and Tax Planning (2000) at 261. 
134  Department of Communications Green Paper on E-commerce: Making it Your Business 
(2000) at 2; At pg 18 it is noted that the Green Paper was intended to provide a platform 
from which to translate topical issues around e-commerce into government policy. 
135  For a further discussion on the Green/White paper on e-commerce see the discussion in 
chapter 4 par 4.8 under the heading “South Africa’s response to the challenges posed by 
e-commerce”. 
136  R Buys & F Cronjé Cyber law: The Law of the Internet in South Africa 2 ed (2004) at 301; 
Suddards at 255. 
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legislation intended to curb offshore tax avoidance in today’s world, will not be 
given proper justice if the challenges that e-commerce poses to the relevant 
legislation are not discussed. In the discussion below and in the chapters to 
follow, the challenges that e-commerce poses to the legislation that is used to 
prevent offshore tax avoidance, are pointed out.  
 
 
 
 
 
Challenges that e-commerce poses to determining the “place of effective 
management” 
 
Although article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention states that there can 
only be one place of effective management, the OECD’s interpretation of the 
term “place of effective management” could result in multiple places of effective 
management when trade is conducted electronically.  
 
In the past, the most senior managers of a company tended to operate from and 
meet in a single location, such as a head office of an enterprise, and so the 
determination of the place where the key management and commercial decisions 
were made was not too difficult. This is because the place where the top level 
management activities occurred would normally coincide with the place where 
the company was incorporated and had its registered office, or where the 
business activities were conducted and where the directors or senior managers 
resided.138 And as paragraph 21 of the Commentary on Article 4 of the OECD 
Model Convention provides, it was rare in practice for a company to be subject to 
tax as a resident in more than one state. However, the telecommunications and 
technological advancements that the world faces today are fundamentally 
changing the way people run their business. The increased mobility of resources 
                                                                                                                                            
137 SARS Discussion Document at 31; Hickey et al at 257; Suddards at 255; Buys & Cronjé at 
307; Doernberg et al 388-389. 
138 BA van der Merwe “Residence of a Company: The Meaning of ‘Effective Management’” 
(2002) 14 SA Merc LJ at 81-82 (“‘Van der Merwe (2002)”); OECD 2001 Report on the 
Impact of the Communications Revolution in pars 33-34. 
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that e-commerce brings about could result in the functions performed by 
enterprises being easily decentralised, leading to the erosion of the tax base. 
 
E-commerce makes it easy to manipulate the principle of “place of effective 
management”, since it is governed by national sovereignty, having been 
developed in the days of “brick and mortar” where physical presence in a 
jurisdiction was necessary to enforce tax laws and where cross-border 
transactions involved mostly tangible products.139 The Internet, on the other 
hand, provides the information and opportunities necessary to make residence a 
matter of deliberate choice rather than fate.140  
 
Buys and Cronjé141 note that although the residence basis of taxation seems 
suitable and effective in curbing tax avoidance in an e-commerce environment, e-
commerce potentially affects residence tests under domestic laws and under 
double tax treaties (such as the place off effective management) to the extent 
that reliance is placed on the location of management functions to determine a 
taxpayer’s residence.142 Commenting on the challenges of determining the 
residence of a company in the e-commerce era, it has been noted that; 
The instantaneous and global facilities provided by the Internet are expected to allow 
residents to more easily influence the operations of their offshore subsidiaries (which 
would include tax-haven entities). There is no clear guidance as to where such a 
business would be regarded as being carried on. … The possibilities of undetected, 
anonymous, or unverifiable nature of these transactions could make it even more difficult 
… to obtain evidence of these activities should a taxpayer wish to conceal or disguise 
them.143    
 
With e-commerce, it is no longer necessary for a group of persons to be 
physically located in any one place to run a business. The cost and speed of 
message transmission on the Internet is almost entirely independent of physical 
location.144 With the evolving communications technology, such as video 
                                                 
139 Suddards at 255; Westin at 2; see also the Green Paper on E-Commerce at 22. 
140 Kohl-uta “The Horror-scope for the Taxation Office: The Internet and its Impact on 
‘Residence’” (1998) 21 No 1 The University of New South Wales Law Journal at 436. 
141  Buys & Cronjé at 300. 
142  Buys & Cronjé at 300; see also Hickey et al at 257; Suddards at 259. 
143  Australian Taxation Office “Electronic Commerce Project: Tax and the Internet” (1997) in 
par 7.2.21. Available at >http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/DBGROUP?nov6_taxinte.pdf<, last 
accessed on 25 July 2007. 
144  Johnson & Post at 1367; Cox at 241. 
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conferencing or electronic discussion group applications via the Internet,145 the 
senior managers of a company may adopt conferencing through the Internet as a 
key medium for making management and commercial decisions. If those 
managers are located in various countries, it may be difficult to determine a 
single place of effective management. This scenario may become more prevalent 
in the future as more companies list on multiple stock or securities exchanges.146  
The rapid telecommunications development may also result in increased mobile 
places of effective management. This situation could occur where the managing 
director of a company is constantly on the move. In extreme situations, that 
person may consistently be making company decisions while flying over the 
ocean or while visiting various sites in different jurisdictions where the company’s 
business is conducted.147 Similarly, a board of directors may arrange to meet in 
different places throughout the year. For example, the board of a multinational 
enterprise may agree to meet at the offices of the enterprise around the globe on 
a rotational basis.148 As a result of such mobility, it may be difficult to determine 
where a company is effectively managed. Thus, with the current 
telecommunications development, the OECD interpretation of place of effective 
management cannot be relied on when determining the place of effective 
management of a company. 
 
The OECD has recognised the limitations inherent in its interpretation of the  
term “place of effective management”.   In 2003, the OECD Technical Advisory 
Group149 drafted a Discussion Paper to suggest changes to the interpretation of 
this term. The Discussion Paper is still in the proposal stage.  
 
The first proposal seeks to refine the concept “place of effective management” by 
expanding on the OECD’s Commentary as to how the concept should be 
                                                 
145 Buys & Cronjé at 300; Van der Merwe (2002) at 81-82; OECD 2001 Report on the Impact 
of the Communications Revolution in par 33-34; AW Oguttu & BA Van der Merwe 
“Electronic Commerce: Challenging the Income Tax Base” (2005) 17 SA Mercantile Law 
Journal at 311. 
146 OECD 2001 Report on the Impact of the Communications Revolution in par 40. 
147 OECD 2001 Report on the Impact of the Communications Revolution in par 43. 
148 OECD 2001 Report on the Impact of the Communications Revolution in par 44. 
149 OECD “Place of Effective Management Concept: Suggestions for Changes to the OECD 
Model Tax Convention” (May 2003). Available at 
>http://www.oecd/org/daoecd/24/17/9256428.pdf<, last accessed on 17 July 2007 
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interpreted. The suggested wording of the refined concept inter alia reads as 
follows:  
The place of effective management is the place where the key management and 
commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business are in 
substance made, i.e. the place where the actions to be taken by the entity as a whole are, 
in fact, determined. All the relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to 
determine the place of effective management. 
 
It appears that the proposal to refine the concept centres on the making of key 
management and commercial decisions, which take place “where the actions to 
be taken by the entity as a whole are, in fact, determined”. In effect, the 2003 
Discussion Paper reiterates the current OECD interpretation of the term that 
relies on the location of superior management decision making.150 As discussed 
above, the adequacy of the term “place of effective management” as a tie-
breaker test based upon these factors has been questioned.  
 
The second proposal puts forward an alternative interpretation of “place of 
effective management” by using a hierarchy of tests. This proposal includes 
three different options as possible tie-breaker tests, if the place of effective 
management cannot be determined. These options are: 
- the place where the entity’s economic relations are closer, or 
- the place in which its business activities are primarily carried on, or  
- the place in which its senior executive decisions are primarily taken. 
If these options cannot be determined then the entity shall be deemed to be a 
resident of the State from which it derives its legal status. If the state from which 
the entity derives its legal status cannot be determined, then the competent 
authorities of the contracting states shall settle the question by mutual 
agreement.151   
 
Commentators on these suggestions seem to be in favour of the second 
proposal as it takes into account the factors of production used by the company 
to derive its profits.152 This proposal considers the daily operational concerns of a 
                                                                                                                                            
(“OECD 2003 Discussion Paper”). 
150  BA van der Merwe “The Phrase ‘Place of Effective Management’ Effectively Explained?” 
(2006) 18 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 124 (“Van der Merwe (2006)”).  
151  OECD 2003 Discussion Paper in par 8. 
152 L Hinnekens “Revised OECD - Tag Definition of Place of Effective Management in Treaty 
Tie Breaker Rule” (2003) Intertax 314 at 317; OECD 2001 Report on the Impact of the 
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company which are normally dealt with at a single location, where the company 
carries on business, by its staff or directors individually, not as a board.153 
 
3.8 THE POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The term “place of effective management” appears to have been introduced in 
South Africa in response to the recommendations of the 1997 Katz Commission 
Report,154 which recommended the change of the South Africa’s tax system from 
a source-based to a residence-based system. The Report stated that:  
The current definition of a domestic company is a company incorporated in South Africa, 
or a company ‘managed and controlled‘ in South Africa. The main criticism of this 
definition is that it has proven to be subject to relatively simple, formalistic manipulation. 
This concept is also out of line with the commonly used, and much more substantial, tax 
treaty expression of ‘effective management. The Commission recommends that the 
concept of effective management as referred to in article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention be used consistently to designate the tax residence of person other than 
natural person. This may perhaps be best achieved through an appropriate definition in 
section 1 of the Income Tax Act. Again, the change will have the benefit of employing 
international and, therefore, commonly understood terminology. 
 
Currently, the concept “place of effective management” is used in section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act as one of the factors that are used to determine whether a 
person other than a natural person (for example a company) is resident in South 
Africa.155 The Income Tax Act does not however define the concept “place of 
effective management”.  
 
Since most of South Africa’s treaties follow to a large extent the OECD Mode Tax 
Convention,156 the term “place of effective management” is also used in most of 
                                                                                                                                            
Communications Revolution in par 59. See also Confédération Fiscale Européenne 
“Opinion Statement: Place of Effective Management – Suggestions for Changes to the 
OECD Model” (2003) at 5, available at >http://european-tax-adviser.com/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2007/08/2003_07.pdf<, last accessed on 1 November 2007.   
153 Van der Merwe (2002) at 81-82. 
154  Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa Fifth 
interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of 
South Africa (1997). 
155 The definition of “resident” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 62 of 1958. 
156 Although different countries use various models for drafting their double tax agreements, 
there are three commonly used models for drafting double taxation agreements. Firstly, 
there is the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, published by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development “OECD”). This model was prepared by 
developed countries of the world and embodies rules and proposed by capital exporting 
countries. Then there is the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention. This 
Model has been drafted between developed and developing countries and it attempts to 
reflect the interests of developing countries. Lastly there is the United States Model which 
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South Africa’s treaties as a tie-breaker test for dual resident entities. It is however 
important to note that this test is not used consistently in the tax treaties entered 
into by South Africa. For example, in the United States treaty, the “place of 
incorporation” is the test applied to determine the residence of a company which 
is resident in both South Africa and the United States.157  
 
A literature survey reveals that earlier efforts by South African tax commentators 
on the interpretation of the term has not been consistent.158 Meyerowitz159 states 
that the place of effective management is where the board of directors meets to 
make key decisions, and not where the company business is carried on by its 
staff (unless the board’s managerial functions have been delegated). Davis and 
others160 note that effective management takes place where the “most vital” 
management actions of decision-making and the implementation of decisions 
occur. Olivier161 is of the view that the place of effective management is where 
the day-to-day activities of an entity take place. This need not be where its 
strategic and policy decisions are made and ultimately controlled. According to 
the editors of The Taxpayer,162 the place of effective management is interpreted 
as where the day-to-day running of the business takes place, which means that 
the business is controlled where its board of directors normally meets to transact 
its business operations. However, the above view of the editors of the Taxpayer 
is noted by Van der Merwe163 to be confusing, as where a business is controlled 
is not necessarily the same as where its daily activities take place even though in 
some instances these locations may be the same.   
 
Clarity on the meaning of “place of effective management” has however been 
offered by the South African Revenue Services (SARS) in the Income Tax 
                                                                                                                                            
is followed by most treaties that the United States has signed with other countries 
including South Africa. See K Huxham & P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 
(2007) at 357; Edward Nathan and Friedland “Residence Basis of Taxation: Double 
taxation agreements” (October 2001) 
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157  Article 4(3) of the United States/South Africa Treaty. See GG No 18553 dd 1997-12-15. 
158  Olivier & Honiball at 57-58. 
159 Meyerowitz in par 5.19. 
160 D Davis, L Olivier & G Urquhart Commentary on the Income Tax Act (1999/2000) ad s 35. 
161 L Oliver ”Residence based Taxation” (2000) 1 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg at 25. 
162 (1995) 44 The Taxpayer 68.  
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Interpretation Note 6 (discussed below).164 SARS makes a distinction between 
the place where:  
- central management and control is carried out by the board of 
directors; 
- executive directors or senior management execute and implement 
policy and strategic decisions made by the board of directors, and 
where they make and implement day-to-day operational management 
and business activities; or 
- the day-to-day business activities are carried out or conducted.165    
 
Does SARS’s interpretation of the term “place of effective management” 
achieve the tie breaker purpose?  
 
SARS uses three rules to determine the place of effective management. SARS’ 
Income Tax Interpretation Note 6,166 states that the “place of effective 
management” is the place where a company is managed on a regular or day-to-
day basis by the directors or senior managers of the company. That is the place 
where the board of directors executes and implements the policy and strategic 
decisions of the company, irrespective of where the overriding control is 
exercised, or where the board of directors meets. If management functions are 
exercised at a single location, that location will be the place of effective 
management. This is the first rule in determining the “place of effective 
management” of a company.  
 
Referring to this rule, Van der Merwe167 notes that SARS’s interpretation, which 
depends on where high-level management decisions are regularly implemented, 
may be susceptible to abuse. According to Olivier and Honiball,168 the term 
“implemented” does not help in identifying or locating where particular decisions 
are implemented. What constitutes “implementation” may not be obvious in some 
                                                                                                                                            
163 Van der Merwe (2002) at 82. 
164 Income Tax Interpretation Note 6 of 26 March 2002. 
165  SARS Interpretation Note 6 in par 3.1. 
166 Income Tax Interpretation Note 6. 
167  Van der Merwe (2006) at 126. 
168  Olivier & Honiball at 56. 
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cases. Implementation may consist of several separate actions undertaken in 
various jurisdictions through virtual or mobile offices. This in turn may lead to a 
taxpayer having more than one place of effective management during a particular 
tax year.169 This is illustrated in an example by Olivier and Honiball.170  
A decision is taken locally by a company director resident in South Africa to raise finance 
from a foreign bank. A phone call is made by the South African resident director while 
based locally to arrange for the finance. However, the director flies overseas to sign the 
finance agreement.  
 
The question that arises from this example is whether the transaction was 
“implemented” locally or overseas. 
 
If the place where the board of directors execute and implement the policy and 
strategic decisions of the company does not correspond with the place where the 
day-to-day business operations are actually carried out, the Interpretation Note 
provides a second rule, which is a practical approach to eliminating multiple 
residences. In terms of this rule, if management functions are not exercised in 
one place, due to management by way of distance communication, the place of 
effective management is deemed to be “where the day-to-day operational 
management and commercial decisions taken by the senior managers are 
actually implemented”.171 In other words, that is the place where business 
operations are actually carried out. Determining the place of effective 
management in this regard will generally not be too difficult to determine if the 
company is involved in the manufacture and/or sale of tangible goods, unless 
business activities, or parts or phases of such activities are conducted across the 
globe. But if a company deals in intangible goods and services, it could be 
possible to manipulate the place of effective management by conducting 
business operations and activities from various locations.172 Referring to this rule, 
Van der Merwe173 argues that the SARS’ practical approach “will not necessarily 
result in a single place of residence, as a taxpayer may have several places 
across the world where operational and commercial decisions are implemented, 
                                                 
169  Van der Merwe (2006) at 126. 
170  Olivier & Honiball at 56. 
171  SARS Interpretation Note 6 in par 3.3. 
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namely to determine the place with the strongest economic nexus, is not adequately 
explained; SARS Interpretation Note 6 in par 3.3. 
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and where the business activities, or parts or phases of such business activities, 
are carried out or conducted”. 
The third approach that SARS uses is that where the business operations or 
activities are conducted from various locations, “one needs to determine the 
place with the strongest economic nexus”.174 Van der Merwe175 argues that this 
approach is not expressly linked to effective management, but it could be used 
as an alternative tool to determine residence and therefore its usefulness in 
determining the place of effective management is doubtful.176 It is also worth 
noting that the Interpretation Note does not explain the phrase “economic nexus”, 
and does not provide guidance in this respect.177 Although the phrase “economic 
nexus” is referred to by the OECD as a possible alternative for the replacement 
of effective management, or as one of the elements in a hierarchy of tie-breaker 
rules,178 none of these options employs “economic nexus” as a means of 
determining effective management, but it regards it as a separate rule. It is also 
worth noting that applying “economic nexus” requires the ability to find the 
strongest or the closest economic nexus. Locating an entity’s closest or strongest 
economic relations would require examining and weighing several factors, for 
example, determining the state where the entity has most employees and assets; 
carries on most activities; where it generates most of its revenue; or where it has 
its headquarters.179 Neither the OECD nor SARS Interpretation Note provide any 
guidance on the weight allocations to be given to these factors. This makes the 
“economic nexus” test quite difficult to apply. 
                                                                                                                                            
173  Van der Merwe at 128. 
174  SARS Interpretation Note 6 in par 3.3. 
175  Van der Merwe (2006) at 128. 
176  Note that in South Africa, “economic nexus” is not used as test of residence, in terms of s 
1 of the Income Tax Act; an entity is resident if it is incorporated, established or formed or 
has a place of effective management in South Africa. It is however worth noting that 
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in V Thuronyi Tax Law Design and Drafting (1998) at 279, notes that “a person is a 
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(art 4(2)(a) of the OECD Model Tax Convnetion). See OECD 2001 Discussion Paper in 
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177  Van der Merwe (2006) at 129. 
178  OECD 2003 Discussion Draft in par 8c. 
179  OECD 2003 Discussion Draft at 5. 
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SARS’s Interpretation Note 6 acknowledges that management structures, 
reporting lines and responsibilities often vary from entity to entity, depending on 
the requirements of the entity, so no hard and fast rules can be laid down.180  In 
such circumstances, SARS provides a non-exhaustive list of facts and 
circumstances that may be relevant when determining the place of effective 
management. Some of the circumstances (mentioned in Interpretation Note 6) 
that could be considered in determining the “place of effective management” are: 
- where the centre of top management is located; 
- the location of and functions performed at headquarters; 
- where the business operations are actually conducted; 
-   where the controlling shareholders make key management and 
commercial decisions for the company; 
- the place of incorporation, formation or establishment of the company 
and the location of its registered office; 
- the residence of the directors or senior managers of the company who 
are responsible for its day-to-day management; 
- the place where the company’s directors or senior managers frequently 
hold company meetings; 
- the actual activities and physical location of senior employees; and 
- the scale of onshore as opposed to offshore operations. 
 
The question that arises from the above is whether the listed factors should be 
viewed qualitatively or quantitatively. It is not clear whether they all carry the 
same weight.181 
 
In general, it is reasoned that SARS’s interpretation Note 6 may not necessarily 
result in identifying a single place of effective management, and may in some 
instance lead to the possibility of multiple places of residence.182 It is however, 
worth acknowledging that although South Africa does not have a statutory 
meaning of the term “place of effective management”, SARS Interpretation Note 
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6 may play a significant role in the determination of the meaning of the term for 
domestic law purposes. Sight should also not be lost of the fact that in South 
Africa, the words “place of effective management” as one of the tests of company 
residence, in section 1 of the Income Tax Act, replaced the previous test 
“managed and controlled” (i.e. where the board of directors meets).183 It may 
therefore be argued that in a domestic context, the words “place of effective 
management” mean something different from “where the board of directors 
meets”.184  
 
It is also important to note that SARS Interpretation Note 6 gives valuable 
guidance to taxpayers, who often approach the subject of effective management 
in a simplistic manner. For example, often taxpayers assume that a company is 
effectively managed outside the Republic merely because the directors travel 
aboard from South Africa once or twice a year to hold a board meeting, when the 
true effective management, as contemplated in the Interpretation Note, is 
actually exercised in South Africa.185 SARS has even taken practical steps to 
determine whether the place of effective management of some of these entities 
is actually in South Africa. According to a report in Finance Week of 20 July 
2004, SARS sent out questionnaires to companies asking where the activities of 
their offshore companies are based. This is clearly to find out if these companies 
are effectively managed in South Africa. 
 
The limitations of applying SARS’s interpretation of “place of effective 
management” 
 
Despite the valuable guidance that Interpretation Note 6 gives in the 
interpretation of the “place of effective management”, it is trite that SARS’s 
Interpretation Notes are not law and in a number of cases it has been argued 
that SARS is not bound by its own Practice Notes and Interpretation Notes.186 
This implies that South African courts are not bound to follow SARS’s 
                                                 
183  Olivier & Honibal at 69. 
184  Olivier & Honibal at 69. 
185 K Mitchell & L Mitchell Offshore Transactions and the World-wide Basis of Taxation (2004) 
Tax Seminar Notes at 22. 
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Section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act provides that if the National Executive of 
South Africa enters into an agreement with the government of any other country 
to regulate the taxation of income, profits, gains and donations which may be 
taxable in both countries, as soon as the double tax agreement is ratified and has 
been published in the Government Gazette, its provisions are effective as if they 
had been incorporated into the Income Tax Act.187 Most of South Africa’s treaties 
largely follow the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital,188 
although South Africa is not a member of the OECD.189 In CIR v Dowing,190 the 
court held that South Africa is bound to take cognisance of the guidelines for 
interpretation issued by the OECD in its commentaries on the concepts used in 
the OECD Model Tax Convention. Section 231 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa provides that courts are bound to apply customary international 
rules and practices. 
 
But as noted above, unlike SARS’s Interpretation Note 6, the OECD’s 
interpretation of this concept can easily be manipulated for tax avoidance 
purposes in the current e-commerce era.191  An increasing number of businesses 
are now conducted trans-nationally; company management (whether it is the 
directors, a subcommittee, or the executive directors) can theoretically meet 
                                                 
187 Meyerowitz in par 30.10; Huxham & Haupt at 356. See also s 231 of the Constitution of 
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anywhere in the world or via the Internet to decide on strategic policy issues 
concerning the company. By contrast, the daily operational concerns of a 
company are normally dealt with at a single location, where the company carries 
on business, by its staff or directors individually, not as a board.192  
 
Although the concept “place of effective management” can be manipulated by 
the emergence of e-commerce, this concept should not be replaced until a more 
feasible solution is found that provides legal certainty, accords with the actual 
economic activities of the company and is administratively practical.193  As noted 
above, the OECD has recognised the limitations inherent in its interpretation of 
the term “place of effective management”. The OECD 2003 Discussion Paper194  
suggests that the OECD interpretation of term “place of effective management 
should be refined or an alternative interpretation of “place of effective 
management” should be applied.195 As stated above, commentators on these 
proposals seem to favour the second proposal since it takes into account the 
factors of production used by the company to derive its profits.196 SARS’s 
interpretation appears to be in line with this proposal since it recognises day-to-
day management by directors and senior managers as effective management. 
Although SARS’s interpretation has some unsatisfactory details that need to be 
clarified, it is a better tie breaker test than the alternative OECD interpretation 
that recognises central control as an indicator of effective management.197  
 
It is recommended that SARS’s interpretation should be refined and be given the 
force of law by inserting a subsection in section 1 of the Income Tax Act that 
defines the term “place of effective management”. It is worth noting that in 1997 
Katz Commission Report198 recommended that an appropriate definition of this 
should be inserted in section 1 of the Income Tax Act.199 It is regrettable that this 
recommendation has not yet been followed. In this author’s view, a definition of 
                                                 
192 Van der Merwe (2002) at 81-82. 
193  Van der Merwe (2006) at 125. 
194 OECD 2003 Discussion Paper. 
195  OECD 2003 Discussion Paper in pars 7 and 8.  
196 Hinnekens at 317; Confédération Fiscale Européenne  at 5.   
197  Van der Merwe (2006) at 135. 
198  Katz Commission Report in par 6.1.2.1. 
199  For a suggestion as to how the definition of “place of effective management could read, 
see chapter 10 par 10.2.1. 
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the term “place of effective management” in the Income Tax Act would provide 
valuable guidance to taxpayers and tax authorities in determining whether a 
company is resident in South Africa by virtue of the fact that it is effectively 
managed in South Africa. 
 
3.9 JURISDICTION TO TAX INVESTMENTS FROM OFFSHORE 
COMPANIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The United Kingdom uses the residence basis of taxation200 to tax the worldwide 
income of its residents. The concept of residence is used to distinguish between 
taxpayers subject to tax on their worldwide income and non-resident taxpayers 
subject to tax only on income derived from United Kingdom sources.201 In 
Colquhoun v Brooks,202 it was held that the “Income Tax Acts impose a territorial 
limit, in that either the source from which the taxable income is derived must be 
situated in the United Kingdom, or the person whose income is to be taxed must 
be resident in the United Kingdom”. This implies that if income does not arise in 
the United Kingdom, it is not charged, unless the person to whom it accrues is 
resident in the United Kingdom.  
 
Companies resident in the United Kingdom are subject to tax on their worldwide 
income.203 Company income tax, known as corporation tax, is imposed on the 
worldwide profits (income and capital gains) of companies resident in the United 
Kingdom subject to unilateral and treaty relief provisions.  
 
 
 
Previously the test for determining company residence in the United Kingdom 
was based on the case of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe,204 where it 
was held that the test of company residence is where the central management 
                                                 
200 Spitz & Clarke at UK/4-10; R Helsby, J McMahon & B McCarthy B Trouble with the Tax 
Man? Offshore Survival 2 ed (1990) at 3. 
201  A Sumption Taxation of Overseas Income and Gains 4 ed (1982) at 1-25. 
202 (1889) 14 App Cas 493 at 503. 
203  Ss 6(1) and 8(1) Income and Corporations Tax Act 1988. 
204 [1906] AC 455; see also HJ Ault Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 
(1997) at 372.  
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and control of the company’s business actually resides. A company’s central 
management and control would normally be exercised by its directors who make 
the fundamental policy decisions that constitute the exercise of central 
management and control of the company.205 The central management and 
control test of corporate residence was intended to prevent United Kingdom 
residents from establishing tax-haven companies that were controlled from the 
United Kingdom.206 The place where the directors’ meetings were held was a 
very important factor in determining the residence of a corporation. However, 
with the developments in telecommunications, Inland Revenue realised that 
effective control of a company could be moved from place to place without 
difficulty. For instance, if a corporation was incorporated in the United Kingdom, 
but all or some of its directors were resident outside the United Kingdom and also 
board meetings took place and decisions on general and financial policy were 
made outside the United Kingdom, the corporation would have the income tax 
status of non-residence in the United Kingdom. Such non-resident companies 
would operate through branches or agencies in the United Kingdom and were 
only taxed on United Kingdom income (subject to any treaty provisions).207 
Corporate residence became both difficult to determine and easily manipulated 
for tax purposes in that it enabled taxpayers to exploit double tax treaties in order 
to reduce taxes on international investments. The globalisation of financial 
markets also meant that multinational enterprises that were spreading across the 
world could manipulate the management and control test by placing senior 
management in a particular jurisdiction or having a corporation incorporated in a 
particular jurisdiction just to offer a basis for taxation in that jurisdiction.208  
 
To curb the resultant tax avoidance, legislation was enacted to the effect that a 
company incorporated in the United Kingdom on or after 15 March 1988 is 
treated as a United Kingdom resident even if its management and control are 
exercised outside the United Kingdom.209 As a result, incorporation is at present 
                                                 
205  Helsby et al at 7.  
206  Arnold at 302. 
207  S 246(1) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970.  
208  M Gammie “International Tax Avoidance: A UK Perspective” (2000) 172 Intertax  275. 
209  S 66 and Schedule 7 Finance Act 1988; see also Spitz & Clarke at UK/4-10; see also Ault 
at 372; HJ Ault & BJ Arnold Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 2 ed 
(2003) at 350. It is worth noting that previously South Africa also relied on the United 
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the test of residency for United Kingdom companies and case law on central 
management and control is of relevance only to companies registered abroad. 
There are, however, two exceptions to the incorporation test: 
- Firstly, a company will remain non-resident if it was carrying on business 
before 15 March 1988 and had become non-resident before then, 
pursuant to a general or a specific Treasury consent obtained under 
section 765 of the 1988 Income and Corporation Taxes Act. If the 
consent was a specific consent, the company can remain non-resident 
regardless of where it is based, and it only becomes a United Kingdom 
resident if it in fact becomes resident under the central management and 
control test.210  
- Secondly, when a company is a dual resident in that it is resident in the 
United Kingdom under United Kingdom domestic law, or it is liable to tax 
in some other state (by reason of residence, domicile, or place of 
effective management) and there is a double-tax treaty between the 
United Kingdom and that other state, the company is treated as resident 
in the other state for the purposes of the treaty.211 This is in line with the 
OECD Model Treaty, which provides under the tie-breaker rule that a 
company will be resident where its place of effective management is 
situated. Thus a dual company that is registered in a treaty country and 
has a place of effective management in the United Kingdom is deemed to 
be resident in the United Kingdom.212 
 
The meaning of “place of effective management” in the United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, there is no clear distinction between the meaning of term 
“place of effective management” and the term “central management and control”. 
                                                                                                                                            
Kingdom precedent as laid down in the De Beers case, whereby the test of company 
residence was where the central management and control of the company was based. But 
because this test is prone to tax avoidance, this test of residency for companies was also 
repealed in South Africa.  
210 Summing up this exception, Ault at 372 notes that, although from 1988 companies 
incorporated in the UK are resident there, companies incorporated elsewhere were left 
liable to tax under the old UK residence status. 
211 G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 9 ed (2002) at 272. 
212 S 249 Finance Act 1994; see also Spitz & Clarke at UK/4-10. 
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In Wensleydale’s Settlement Trustees v CIR,213 it was held that:  
the place of effective management is not necessarily where a corporate body carries on 
business, but where the board of directors meets on the company’s business which may 
differ from the place where the company’s business is carried on or is managed by staff 
or directors individually and not acting as a board. 
 
Owen214 is of the view that “effective management” denotes a form of 
management lower than “central management and control”. He215 explains that 
although in practice the two forms of management often coincide, the place of 
effective management is “the place where you would expect to find the 
executives and senior staff who actually make the business tick”. That is "the 
place where one would, for example, expect to find: the financial director, the 
sales director, and the managing director. As these executives would normally be 
on the board of directors, the location of the place of effective management will 
only differ from the place where “central management and control” is exercised, if 
the term “effective management” refers to where the directors normally reside 
and not where they hold board meetings.216 
 
According to Weizman,217 the “place of effective management” is where the day-
to-day management of a company is carried on, which may not be the place 
where the highest policy decisions of the company are taken.218 This view 
appears to be rooted in the Inland Revenue Statement of practice 6/83 which 
provides in part that:   
The parent will normally influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the actions of the 
subsidiary. Where that influence is exerted by the parent exercising the powers which a 
sole or majority shareholder has in general meetings of the subsidiary, for example to 
appoint and dismiss members of the board of the subsidiary and to initiate or approve 
alterations to its financial structure, the Revenue would not seek to argue that central 
management and control of the subsidiary is located where the parent company is 
resident. However, in cases where the parent usurps the functions of the board of the 
subsidiary … or where  that board merely rubber stamps the parent company’s decision 
without giving them any independent consideration, the Revenue will draw the conclusion 
that the subsidiary has the same residence for tax purposes as its parent. 
                                                 
213  (1998) The Taxpayer 81. 
214  P Owen “Can Effective Management be Distinguished from Central Management and 
Control?” (2003) British Tax Review at 300. 
215  Owen at 300. 
216  Owen at 300. 
217  L Weizman “Taxing Remuneration for Employment aboard a Ship: Where is Place of 
Effective Management Situated?” (1996) International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation at 
163. See also Olivier & Honiball at 67. 
218 Weizman at 166. The Interpretation of the term “place of effective management” in the 
United Kingdom accords with South Africa’s interpretation of this term as set out in SARS 
Income Tax Interpretation Note 6 of 26 March 2002. 
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… [T]here may be cases where a company is a member of a group having its ultimate 
holding company in another country which will not fall readily into either of the categories 
referred to above. In considering whether the board of such a subsidiary company 
exercises central management and control of the subsidiaries business, they have regard 
to the degree of autonomy which those directors have in conducting the companies’ 
business. Matters (among others) that may be taken into account are the extent to which 
the directors of the subsidiary take decisions on their own authority as to investment, 
production, marketing and procurement. 
 
… [I]t is now considered that effective management may in some cases, be found at a 
place different from the place of central management and control. This could happen, for 
example, where a company is run by executives based abroad, but the final directing 
powers rest with non-executive directors who meet in the UK. In such circumstances the 
company’s place of effective management might well be abroad but, depending on the 
precise powers of the non-executive directors, it might be carefully managed and 
controlled (and therefore resident) in the UK. (Emphasis added). 
 
From the above, it appears that there is no clear distinction between term “place 
of effective management” and the term “central management and control” in the 
context of a group of companies. Case law is also not clear on this matter. In a 
few cases, the courts have ruled that where the board of directors of a subsidiary 
stands aside altogether so that the parent company effectively usurps the 
function of the board of directors of the subsidiary, then it cannot be said that the 
“central management and control” of the subsidiary abides where the board of 
directors of the subsidiary meets. In Unit Construction Co Ltd v Bullock,219 it was 
held that an African subsidiary whose directors met locally was nevertheless 
resident in the United Kingdom since its parent company in the United Kingdom 
had taken over the running of the subsidiary company due to difficult local 
conditions.  
 
 
The situation is however different where a subsidiary’s board of directors still 
exercises central management and control but does so under the influence of or 
with guidance from the parent company. This matter was dealt with in Wood and 
another v Holden.220 This case was concerned with a tax planning arrangement 
in the context of the sale of shares in a family business. The facts of the case 
were as follows: Mr and Mrs Wood were settlors of a number of non-resident 
settlements that were set up as a part of a scheme to avoid capital gains tax. The 
                                                 
219  [1960] AC 455. 
220  [2006] EWCA Civ 26.  
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trustee of those settlements was the sole shareholder of Copeswood 
Investments Limited (“CIL”), a company registered in the British Virgin Islands. In 
July 1996 CIL sold some shares to Eulalia Holdings BV (Eulalia), a company 
incorporated in Netherlands. The scheme assumed that CIL and Eulalia were not 
merely incorporated outside the United Kingdom but were also resident outside 
the United Kingdom. The Special Commissioners challenged the efficacy of the 
arrangements on the basis that Eulalia was a resident of the United Kingdom. 
This would render ineffective the proposed tax planning arrangements devised 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers (Mr and Mrs Wood’s Accountants). 
 
The central issue in this case was whether CIL made a chargeable gain when it 
sold its share to Eulalia in July 1996. In terms of section 13 of the Taxation of 
Capital Gains Act (TCGA) 1992, the gains that arose to CIL (on the disposal of 
shares to Eulalia) would be attributed to the non-resident trustees who were 
participators in CIL. Further, in terms of section 86 of TCGA (which deals with the 
attribution of gains to settlors with interests in non-resident settlements), those 
gains would be attributable to, and chargeable on, the settlors, Mr and Mrs 
Wood. However, section 14 of the TCGA provides that for the purposes of 
section 13 of the TCGA no gain arises on a disposal by one company to another 
provided that both companies are in a non-resident group of companies (as 
defined in section 14(4)(a) of the TCGA).  
It was not disputed that Eulalia and CIL were members of a group of companies. 
The issue was whether they were both not resident in the United Kingdom at the 
date of the disposal of the shares to Eulalia. If they were not United Kingdom 
residents, section 14 of the TCGA would apply and no gains would arise on CIL’s 
disposal to Eulalia. The Revenue was of the view that while CIL was resident 
outside the United Kingdom, Eulalia was resident in the United Kingdom. Thus 
the gains made by CIL on the disposal of the shares were attributed to the 
trustee under section 13 of the TCGA. It was argued that Eulalia was resident in 
the United Kingdom, because the decision making process was not carried on by 
the company’s Board of Directors. Its sole director was told what to do by Mr 
Wood and PriceWaterhouseCoppers and that in effect, no real decisions were 
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taken in the Netherlands. Mr and Mrs Wood were assessed to CGT in respect of 
those gains, which were treated as accruing to them under section 86 of the 
TCGA. When the matter was taken to the High Court, it was held that Eulalia was 
resident in the Netherlands and that there was no evidence that its powers had 
been usurped by PriceWaterhouseCoppers. The judge noted that although a 
board of directors may act under the influence of another person, that does not 
necessarily mean that the board of directors has ceased to exercise central 
management and control. The Revenue appealed the High Court’s judgment.  
 
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Chadwick held that the High Court had been 
correct in holding that Eulalia was resident in the Netherlands. In seeking to 
determine where the “central management and control” of a company 
incorporated outside the United Kingdom lay, it was essential to recognise the 
distinction between: 
(a)  cases where management and control of the company was exercised 
through its own constitutional organs (the board of directors or the 
general meeting); and 
(b) cases where the functions of those constitutional organs were 
“usurped”, in the sense that management and control was exercised 
independently of, or without regard to, those constitutional organs. 
 
 
In cases which fall within the first category, it is essential to recognise the 
distinction between (a) the role of an “outsider” in proposing, advising and 
influencing the decisions of the board of directors and (b) the role of an outsider 
who dictates the decisions which are to be taken. In regard to the Wood v Holden 
case, the Court of Appeal noted that the (Netherlands based) directors of Eulalia 
were not bypassed, but they signed or executed the documents relating to the 
sale and purchase of the shares. Although PriceWaterhouseCoppers set up the 
overall structure, it intended and expected the directors of Eulalia to take the 
decisions, which it in fact took. In light of the above, the High Court’s decision to 
reverse the Revenue’s findings as to the residence of Eulalia on the basis of the 
“central management and control” test was upheld.  
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Although the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to decide whether a different 
conclusion could have been reached if the “place of effective management” test 
was applied, it remarked that “it is difficult to see how, in the circumstances of 
this case, the two tests could have lead to different answers”.221 In effect, the 
Court of Appeal was of the view that the two tests were in essence one and the 
same. 
 
The significance of the Wood v Holden case in the context of an international tax 
planning structure is that if an offshore subsidiary is only required to effect limited 
tasks and its offshore directors properly apply their minds to these tasks, there is 
no reason to find that the “place of effective management” of the offshore 
subsidiary is in the jurisdiction where the parent company is located.222  
 
Another recent United Kingdom case that inter alia dealt with the meaning of 
“place of effective management” is Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP 
Morgan Chase Bank.223 The detailed facts of this case are dealt with further 
ahead in this chapter with respect to the discussion on “beneficial ownership”. In 
brief, the case revolved around the setting up of a conduit company structure. 
The parties had devised a financing structure, to benefit from the reduced 
withholding tax rate in the Indonesia/Mauritius double taxation treaty. When the 
treaty was terminated, one of the parties sought to set up a conduit company in 
the Netherlands to remedy the situation.  
 
In determining whether the proposed conduit company in the Netherlands would 
be regarded as resident in the Netherlands, the Court of Appeal referred to 
article 4 of the Netherlands/Indonesia treaty, and the Commentary to the OECD 
Model Convention, which state that "the place of effective management is the 
place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for 
                                                 
221  [2006] EWCA Civ 26 in paragraph 43. 
222  DM Davis “Place of Effective Management” 56 (May 2007) The Taxpayer at 84. See also 
M Hutton “Company Residence: Central Management and Control – Capital Tax Review” 
(June 2006). Available at >http://www.taxationweb.co.uk/articles.article.php?id=346<, last 
accessed 2 April 2007; A Nathan “Determining Company Residence after Wood v 
Holden”. Available at 
http://www.taxbar,com/documents/comoany_Residence_Wood_v_Holden_AN_000.pdf<, 
last accessed on 28 June 2007. 
223  [2006] EWCA Civ 158.  
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the conduct of the entity's business are in substance made". The Chancellor in 
the Court of Appeal did not doubt that the directors of Netherlands conduit 
company would make the decisions regarding the keeping of books, 
management of the audit, handling charges and what to do with equity capital. 
However, the Chancellor ruled that these could not be considered key decisions 
to ensure a “place of effective management” for treaty purposes. The Chancellor 
concluded that the conduit company in the Netherlands would not be considered 
a resident in the Netherlands, as the key decisions relating to its setting up would 
be taken by parent company in Indonesia. 
 
3.10 JURISDICTION TO TAX INCOME FROM INVESTMENTS IN 
OFFSHORE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
 
Corporations that are incorporated in the United States are taxed on their 
worldwide income regardless of their geographical location.224 A corporation 
incorporated under the laws of another country is treated as a foreign corporation 
for United States tax purposes. Foreign corporations, like non-resident alien 
individuals, are subject to full United States tax only on their effectively 
connected income that has its source in the United States.225  
 
In order to alleviate international double taxation that may arise as a result of the 
worldwide basis of taxation, a foreign tax credit is availed to United States 
domestic corporations which pay taxes on foreign income to other countries.226 
 
Although the OECD recommends that countries use the “place of effective 
management” as a tie-breaker test for determining the residence of a dual 
resident company for tax purposes, the United States’ observation under article 
                                                 
224 S 11 of the Internal Revenue Code as amended; see also W F O’Conner An Inquiry into 
the Foreign Tax Burdens of US Based Multinational Corporations (1980) at 24; see also 
Rappako at 46; see also Ault at 371; see also Ault & Arnold at 349 where it noted that all 
corporations organised under the laws of the United a States or one of the Federal States 
are treated as “domestic”, ie resident corporations regardless of any other connection to 
the jurisdiction. 
225 IRC s 871, 881and 882; see also Rappako at 46. 
226 IRC s 33 and s 64(a); Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies at 284 notes that the tax credit 
mechanisms are employed to ensure that the overall rate of tax imposed on those subject 
to US tax jurisdiction does not exceed the higher of the US rates or the average rate 
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4(3) of the OECD Model Convention is that it reserves the right to use the “place 
of incorporation” test to determine the residence of a corporation, failing that the 
United States denies dual resident companies certain benefits under the 
Convention. It is worth noting that while the “place of incorporation” test has the 
advantage of being easily understood and has minimal administrative and 
compliance costs, it can be argued that this test is not an effective tie-breaker 
test.227 In today’s environment, the act of incorporating an enterprise is relatively 
simple; many jurisdictions even allow online incorporation or establishment.228 As 
a result, it is possible that the only tie an enterprise may have to the jurisdiction in 
which it is incorporated or established is a formal tie. A company incorporated in 
country A may have its entire management, business operations and assets 
located in country B. Using the place of incorporation as a tie-breaker for 
companies would produce the same results as recognising the place of birth of a 
person as the sole residence test whereas a person may be born in a given 
country and yet be resident in another.229 
 
3.11 CONCLUSION  
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the test of company residence applied in South 
Africa seems to be in line with the test applied in the United Kingdom. Generally, 
in both countries the test for company residence is if the company is incorporated 
or if it has a “place of effective management” there. The United States only uses 
the place of incorporation as the test. Although it is more difficult to manipulate 
the “place of effective management” test because it is less artificial than the 
place of incorporation test, the possibility of tax avoidance even where the “place 
of effective management” test is used, is enhanced by the rise of e-commerce as 
“the Internet provides the information and opportunities necessary to make 
residence more a matter of deliberate choice rather than fate”.230 The heightened 
international competition may thus force companies to move their residences 
from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions. This may force high-tax 
                                                                                                                                            
imposed by the foreign countries in which a US taxpayer operates or invests. 
227 OECD 2001 Discussion Paper in par 51. 
228 OECD 2001 Discussion Paper in par 57. 
229 OECD 2001 Discussion Paper in par 57. 
230   Kohl-uta at 436. 
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countries to search for alternative criteria for determining entity residence.231 
 
In most jurisdictions, the residence basis of taxation has to be supplemented with 
specific anti-avoidance legislation, for example in respect of controlled foreign 
companies. This phenomenon is dealt with in the next chapter.
                                                 
231 Van der Merwe at 81-82; Doernberg & Hinnekens at 371-273. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CURBING TAX AVOIDANCE THAT RESULTS FROM INVESTING IN 
OFFSHORE COMPANIES:  SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, exchange control regulations have been used in a number of 
countries to prevent residents from investing or transferring funds abroad, but in 
the past few decades many countries have eliminated or relaxed their exchange 
control regulations. In addition to exchange controls, in many tax systems both 
statutory and judicial anti-avoidance doctrines, such as the sham and substance 
over form, have been used,1 but these have also been found to be ineffective in 
preventing offshore tax avoidance.  
 
With the growing use of international intermediaries and the development of 
preferential tax regimes, a number of countries have been prompted to enact 
specific legislation to reduce the risk of losing domestic tax revenue from 
international investment. Such legislation includes the “controlled foreign 
company” (CFC) legislation.  The basic reason for this legislation is that in its 
absence it would be easy for a resident taxpayer to defer domestic taxation on its 
foreign income by simply interposing a foreign company in a territory with a lower 
level of taxation to receive such income, instead of remitting it to the home 
country.2  CFC legislation ensures that the undistributed income of a controlled 
foreign company is not deferred, but it is taxed in the hands of its domestic 
shareholders on a current basis.3   The rationale is that as the income received by 
or accrued to a foreign company cannot be taxed directly, even if the foreign 
                                                 
1  OECD Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Controlled Foreign Company 
Legislation (2000) at 18 (“OECD 2000 Report on CFC Legislation”). 
2  OECD 2000 Report on CFC Legislation at 10. 
3  L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 358; 
B Arnold The Taxation of Foreign Controlled Corporations: An International Comparison 
(1986) at 131; R Jooste “The Imputation of Income of Controlled Foreign Entities” 118 
(2001) The South African Law Journal at 473-474; see also A de Koker Silke on South 
African Income Tax: Being an Exposition of the Law, Practice and Incidence of Income 
Tax in South Africa Vol 1 (last updated December 2006) in par 8.10.2. See also BJ Arnold 
& MJ Mclntyre International Tax Primer 2 ed (2002) at 91. 
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company is completely owned by residents of the particular state, the only 
alternative is to tax the residents controlling the foreign company on the basis 
that the income is presumed to have been distributed to them.  
 
As the state in which the foreign entity is resident will also tax the income, the 
double taxation that might arise is often resolved by providing a foreign tax credit 
(for example section 6quat of the South African Income Tax Act4). When the 
income is eventually distributed in the form of dividends, the dividends are 
usually exempt from tax (eg section 10(1)(k)(ii) of the South African Income Tax 
Act).5 
 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) supports 
the introduction of CFC regimes as a way of countering the transfer of profits to 
low-tax jurisdictions by targeting passive and low-tax income rather than the 
profits of the CFC itself. The OECD has stated that CFC rules are in line with 
articles 1, 7 and 10 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
 
The decision whether to enact CFC legislation depends in part on whether a 
country’s fiscal policy adheres to a doctrine of “capital import neutrality” or 
“capital export neutrality”.6 “Capital export neutrality” refers to the choice that an 
investor resident in a home country has between investing his/her savings at 
home or in a foreign host country. Capital export neutrality requires that all 
residents of a country should face the same marginal effective tax rate, whether 
they invest in that country or abroad. In other words, the tax system should be 
neutral with regard to decisions to invest at home or abroad. CFC legislation 
reflects a capital export neutrality doctrine.7  “Capital export neutrality” is violated 
if, for example, both the home and the host countries fail to tax income from 
                                                 
4  Act 58 of 1962, as amended. 
5 Olivier & Honiball at 358. 
6  SE Shay “Revisiting US Anti-Deferral Rules” 74 (1996) Taxes at 1042. 
7  D Sandler Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation Tax: Pushing the 
Boundaries 2 ed (1998) at 14; L Lokken “Whatever Happened To SubPart F? U.S CFC 
Legislation After the Check-the-Box Regulations” 7 (2005) Florida Tax Review at 189; RS 
Avi-Yonah “Comment on Peroni, Fleming and Shay, ’Getting Serious About Curtailing 
Deferral of US Tax on Foreign Source Income’” 52 (1999) SMU Law Review at 222 (“Avi-
Yonah 1999”); CR Sweitzer “Analysing SubPart F in the Light of Check-the Box” 20 (2005) 
Akron Tax J at 103. 
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investment in the host country, while an investment in the home country is taxed. 
This could happen when the home country grants deferral and the host country 
does not impose a tax on foreign investors. In that case, investors would prefer 
to invest in the host country rather than the home country even if the pre-tax yield 
on the domestic investment were higher.8 The recognition of a company as a 
separate entity from its shareholders gives rise to many opportunities to defer the 
payment of tax on foreign profits, leaving them in the hands of the foreign 
subsidiary that earned them. This is a breach of the capital export neutrality 
doctrine that the enactment of CFC legislation could address.9  
 
“Capital import neutrality” requires that residents of one country who invest 
abroad should obtain the same after-tax rate of return as residents of the source 
country in which they invest.10 Capital import neutrality is violated if, for example, 
foreign investors in a host country are taxed on their investment income at the 
home country rate, while the host country does not levy an income tax on 
investment income. In that case domestic (host country) investors will have a 
different net return on their investments in the host country than foreign (home 
country) investors.11 The result is that intertemporal marginal rates of substitution 
(that is, the choice between present and future consumption) will not be the 
same between countries, and the international allocation of world savings will be 
distorted.12  
 
In summary, capital import neutrality encourages deferral of taxes since it 
encourages the host country’s demand for capital. On the other hand, capital 
export neutrality ensures that deferral does not occur and so it assures efficient 
allocation of world investment.13 CFC legislation is generally seen as an 
instrument to guard against the unjustifiable erosion of the domestic tax base by 
the export of investments to non-resident corporations.14 The reason why some 
countries have not introduced CFC legislation could be that the extent of 
                                                 
8  Avi-Yonah 1999 at 532. 
9  J Tiley Revenue Law 5 ed (2005) at 1139. 
10  Sandler at 14. 
11  Avi-Yonah 1999 at 533. 
12  Avi-Yonah 1999 at 533. 
13  Avi-Yonah 1999 at 534. 
14  OECD 2000 Report on CFC Legislation at 11. 
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avoidance of domestic tax by the use of non-resident corporations is not such a 
significant problem in their particular circumstances that it justifies legislation of 
this nature. Or they may not feel strongly committed to capital export neutrality 
(that resident taxpayers should pay the same tax on their domestic and foreign 
source investment income).15  
 
Generally CFC legislation in the different countries where it has been introduced 
has followed two basic approaches: One of the approaches is the “jurisdictional 
approach”, sometimes referred to as the “entity approach”. This approach ends 
deferral for all of the income of the CFC. In effect, all of the income of the CFC is 
attributed pro rata to the domestic shareholders, but only if certain conditions are 
present.16 Possible conditions would be that the CFC is a resident of a tax haven, 
that its income is taxed below a certain rate, or that a certain percentage of its 
income is from tax-haven-type activities.17 Basically, under this approach the 
legislation and related administrative actions identify corporations that are to be 
considered tax-haven companies and shareholders are taxed on all the income 
of these corporations, regardless of its source or nature. The United Kingdom 
and Japan follow this approach.18 
 
The other approach is the “transaction approach” or “tainted income” approach, 
under which only tainted income of the CFC is attributed pro rata to domestic 
shareholders.19 The legislation identifies particular kinds of income as tax haven 
income and taxes resident shareholders on only those types of CFC income. In 
general this covers passive income and base company income. Passive income 
would include dividends, royalties and interest as well as income from 
transactions with related parties. The US, Canada and Germany use this 
approach.20   
 
                                                 
15  OECD 2000 Report on CFC Legislation at 11. 
16  Sandler at 19; see also Arnold & Mclnytyre at 94. 
17  Arnold & Mclnytyre at 94. 
18  Lokken at 194. 
19  Sandler at 19; Tiley at 1139. 
20  Lokken at 194; R J Peroni, JC Fleming and SE Shay “Getting Serious About Curtailing 
Deferral of US Tax on Foreign Source Income” 52 (1999) SMU Law Review at 494; JM 
Gannon, TJ Calianese, MP Layden, K Moreland & SS Seo “Subpart F, Hybrid Entities and 
Other Little Things” 27 (1988) Tax Notes at 473. 
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The “entity/jurisdictional” approach and the “transaction approach/tainted income 
approach” both have strengths and weaknesses. Those who favour the “tainted 
income approach” point to the fact that the income tax laws of virtually every 
country have tax-haven features. This is the case where incentives are granted 
to attract foreign investment. An approach based on a sorting of countries 
between tax-haven countries and other countries may therefore miss tax-haven 
schemes utilising entities resident in countries not generally considered to be tax 
havens. However, the tainted income approach is vulnerable to tax planners’ 
creativity in crafting schemes that effectively shelter income in tax-haven 
countries without the income falling within any of the categories of tainted 
income. Legislation based on a “tainted entity” approach may avoid this trap by 
taxing resident shareholders on all income that has been shifted to an entity 
resident in a tax-haven country, regardless of its character.21  Neither approach is 
simple.22 
 
Most countries’ CFC legislation follows the same basic pattern. Deferral of 
domestic taxation on the income of a controlled foreign company until it is 
distributed to its shareholders is eliminated by ignoring the existence of the 
foreign company. The resident shareholders of the foreign company are taxed 
directly on a pro rata share of the company’s undistributed income.23 Countries 
that have CFC legislation define a controlled foreign company in almost the same 
way. A controlled foreign company is a foreign company more than 50% of 
whose shares, voting power or value, is owned by domestic shareholders. 
Beyond this general provision, however, countries’ definitions appear to differ in 
minor ways.24  
There are generally three factors countries can apply as the basis for their CFC 
legislation, namely: 
- The geographical location of the controlled foreign company is used as a 
criterion (income from blacklisted jurisdictions).   
- The domestic shareholders must control or have a significant ownership 
                                                 
21  Lokken at 194; Peroni et al at 494. 
22  Tiley at 1139.  
23 Arnold at 131. 
24 RL Doernberg, L Hinnekens, WR Hellertein & L Jinyan Electronic Commerce and Multi-
jurisdictional Taxation (2001) at 323.  
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and interest in the foreign corporation.  
- The nature of the activities engaged in is used to distinguish between 
controlled foreign corporations engaging in bona fide business operations 
and those used primarily to defer or avoid domestic tax.25  
 
The geographical location requirement is aimed at identifying those countries that 
impose little or no tax on income generated in their territory (tax-haven 
jurisdictions). In this respect, some countries follow a “designated jurisdiction” 
approach whereby the taxing authorities issue a list of tax-haven or non tax-
haven countries to which the legislation will or will not apply. In some jurisdictions 
(such as Japan, Indonesia and New Zealand) a “black list” is compiled which 
names jurisdictions in which there is no income tax or the income tax is low 
compared with that of the home country.26 Other countries compile a “white list” 
which designates jurisdictions in which the tax rate is not significantly below the 
rate of the home country. In yet other countries the approach is to set a particular 
tax rate as the boundary of a “low tax” jurisdiction. All countries with a nominal 
rate below the designated rate automatically qualify as “tax havens” under the 
controlled foreign company provisions. In South Africa, the designated country 
approach was previously used as one of the exclusions to the CFC provisions. 
Where a CFC had income that was or would be subject to tax in a designated 
country at a statutory rate of 13,5% in the case of capital gains and 27% in the 
case of other amounts  (after taking into account the possible application of a 
double taxation agreement) and the designated country taxed such income on a 
similar basis to South Africa, the income of the CFC was not imputed to the 
South African resident. However with effect from 1 June 2004, this exemption 
has no longer been available.27   
                                                 
25 Arnold at 407. 
26 Doernberg et al at 326.   
27  The list of designated countries that applied by June 2004, when investments in 
designated countries were still exempted from CFC rules, in terms of the then s 9E(8) of 
the Income Tax Act (now deleted), comprised: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, 
the United States of America, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This list gave rise to much debate 
because of the omission of countries like Ireland and Singapore. This list was policed as a 
number of countries objected to not being on the list in circumstances where they have 
close political ties with South Africa and have concluded a double taxation agreement with 
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Even after it has been determined that a controlled foreign company exists in a 
tax-haven jurisdiction, a requirement of the CFC legislation of most countries is 
that it should be determined whether the income earned falls within the definition 
of income which is attributed to domestic shareholders on a current basis. In 
some countries, like Germany, Canada and Australia, the CFC provisions apply 
only to certain types of passive income and/or foreign company sales or service 
income.28 In other countries, no distinction is made between passive income, 
active income sales and/or service income, but all the income is attributable. The 
United Kingdom, for example, attributes all income but it excludes capital gains.29 
 When CFC legislation was first introduced in South Africa under the then section 
9C of the Income Tax Act,30 it applied only in regard to passive income. This has 
since been amended and now South Africa’s CFC legislation applies to all 
income. 
 
What follows below is a discussion of how this legislation works in South Africa. 
A comparative study of the CFC legislation in the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America is undertaken in chapter 5. Where South African legislation is 
found wanting, recommendations for reform will be made.   
 
 
 
 
4.2 SOUTH AFRICAN CFC LEGISLATION 
 
Apart from the fact that South African residents are taxed on a “residence basis 
of taxation”, which ensures that South African resident companies are taxable on 
their worldwide income, South Africa also has legislation that prevents South 
African residents from deferring South African tax on foreign income that is 
derived from offshore companies. In order to bring into the taxing net the income 
                                                                                                                                            
South Africa. The argument was that those countries that were not on the list were 
potentially blacklisted. See Olivier & Honiball at 120.  
28 Doernberg et al at 328.  
29 Doernberg et al at 328  
30  58 of 1962 as amended. 
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earned by South African-owned foreign entities (like foreign subsidiaries) and to 
counter the deferral of taxes, the worldwide taxation of South African residents is 
extended in the Income Tax Act, in order to deem income of a foreign company 
to be that of South African residents, notwithstanding the fact that the actual in-
come is received by or accrues to a foreign company.31 Through the use of CFC 
legislation, the delay or deferral of taxes is curbed by taxing the South African 
owners of foreign companies on the income earned by those foreign companies, 
as if they had repatriated their foreign income as soon as it was earned.32 
 
CFC legislation was first introduced in South Africa in 1997 under the then 
section 9D of the Income Tax Act (the Act). This initial section 9D was introduced 
as an anti-avoidance measure to prevent the avoidance of tax on investment 
income of a foreign company or trust. Investment income was defined in section 
9C(1) (now repealed) as including  any income in the form of any annuity, 
interest, rental income, royalty income or other income of a similar nature.33 
When South Africa changed to the residence basis of taxation in 2001, section 
9C was repealed, with the result that for years of assessment commencing on or 
after 1 January 2001, not only investment income but all income, including capital 
gains that have accrued to or been received by a CFC, is attributed to South 
African residents.34 Thus the current anti-avoidance measure under section 9D 
casts a wide net. For example, it covers situations where a resident invests 
capital offshore through an offshore company, thereby re-characterising taxable 
income and converting it into non-taxable income such as dividends, and also 
situations where taxation is deferred or avoided by accumulating or capitalising 
such income in a foreign company.35 
 
4.3 THE DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS USED IN THE CFC LEGISLATION 
 
In order to apply section 9D successfully, the following issues have to be 
                                                 
31 Jooste at 473-474; see also De Koker in par 8.10.2. 
32 Jooste at 474. 
33 For a critical review of s 9D before its amendment, see VJ Maren The Taxation of Foreign 
Source Investment Income in the Hands of South African Residents (1999). 
34 S 9C was repealed by s 9 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000. 
35 D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) in par 9.114; see also Jooste at 
476.  
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determined:  
- whether the entity qualifies as a foreign company 
- whether the foreign company qualifies as a CFC 
- the net income of the CFC as determined in accordance with the Act  
- what may be excluded in the determination of the net income of the CFC.  
 
The complexity of section 9D cannot be underestimated. It is therefore necessary 
to define some of the concepts used in this provision. The starting point in 
determining whether an entity is a CFC is to establish whether it is a foreign 
company. 
 
Defining a foreign company 
 
A “foreign company” is defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act (as amended) 
as any association, corporation, company, arrangement or scheme (as provided 
for in paragraph (a), (b) or (e) of the definition of “company” in section 1) that is 
not resident in South Africa, or if it is resident, it is treated as a non-resident in 
terms of an applicable double taxation treaty entered into by the Republic.36 This 
definition identifies two aspects that must be established for a foreign company 
to exist. Firstly, the foreign entity concerned has to be a company and secondly, 
it has to be non-resident. Thus the CFC legislation will not apply if the foreign 
entity is a trust.37  Income that accrues to a foreign trust will therefore not be 
attributed to South African beneficiaries. It will only be taxable in South Africa 
once it has been distributed to the beneficiaries. However, there is an exception 
to this general rule that CFC legislation does not apply to foreign trusts. The 
definition of the term ”foreign company” includes a company as defined in section 
1(e) of the definition of “company” the Income Tax Act. This definition covers 
“any arrangement or scheme carried on outside the Republic in pursuance of 
which members of the public are invited or permitted to invest in a portfolio of a 
collective investment scheme, where two or more investors contribute to and 
hold a participatory interest”. Essentially, this definition refers to a unit trust or 
                                                 
36  S 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962; see also Meyerowitz in par 9.115; De Koker in 
par 8.10.2.   
37 De Koker in par 8.7.1; Olivier & Honiball at 361. 
114 
mutual investment fund, the legal nature of which often takes the form of an 
offshore trust.38 However, for CFC legislation to apply, an offshore unit trust has 
to meet the requirements of a “controlled foreign company” in section 9D, which 
are discussed below.    
 
In general, CFC rules are not applicable foreign partnerships.39 However, it is 
arguable that CFC legislation could apply to certain incorporated partnerships 
that are considered companies in certain foreign jurisdictions. Since the definition 
of the term company in section 1(b) of the Income Tax Act covers companies 
incorporated under foreign law, the legal status of a foreign company has to be 
determined according to foreign law.40 Thus CFC legislation could potentially 
apply to “limited liability partnerships” (LLP) that are considered companies in the 
United Kingdom. Note however that for CFC legislation to apply to an LLP, the 
requirements of a controlled foreign company discussed below have to be met.41  
 
However, in jurisdictions where limited liability partnerships are not considered 
incorporated legal entities (for instance in the Cayman Islands), CFC legislation 
would not apply since such entities would be considered “flow-through” or fiscally 
transparent entities.42  
 
In South Africa, the following companies qualify as foreign companies:  
- associations, corporations, bodies corporate or companies incorporated 
or deemed to be incorporated under South African law;43 
- associations, corporations or companies or bodies corporate incorporated 
under foreign law;44  
- certain local and offshore collective investment schemes in securities 
(previously known as unit trusts)45 
                                                 
38  Olivier & Honiball at 361.  
39 Olivier & Honiball at 361. 
40 Olivier & Honiball at 361. 
41  For a detailed discussion of this issue see the discussion below in par 4.10 under the 
heading “Curbing tax avoidance that results from investing in offshore hybrid entities”. 
42  For a detailed discussion of this issue see the discussion below in par 4.10 under the 
heading “Curbing tax avoidance that results from investing in offshore hybrid entities”.  
43 Par (a) of the definition of company in s 1 of the Income Tax Act.  
44 Par (b) of the definition of company in s 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
45 Par (e) of the definition of company in s 1 of the Income Tax Act.  
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      -  a co-operative as defined in section 1 of the income Tax Act; 
      - a close corporation as defined in section 1 of the income Tax Act. 
 
Note that co-operatives and close corporations were only included in definition of 
“foreign company”, by section 9 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 8 of 2007.  
 
Defining a controlled foreign company 
 
The next step is to determine whether a foreign company is a “controlled foreign 
company”. The definition of a CFC was amended by the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act46 which was promulgated on 1 February 2006. The amendments 
are deemed to have come into operation on 8 November 2005, and they apply in 
respect of any foreign tax year that commences on or after that date. The 
amendment to the previous definition of a CFC is the reintroduction of “voting 
rights” (as was the case in 2002) as a criterion for determining whether a foreign 
company constitutes a CFC.  Before the amendment, “participation rights” was 
the criterion for determining whether a foreign company constitutes a CFC.  
 
 
Subject to the provisos contained in the legislation, in terms of section 9D(1) a 
foreign company is now classified as a CFC if:  
- one or more South African residents, directly or indirectly, hold more than 
50% of the total participation rights of the company; or  
- more than 50% of the voting rights of that foreign company are held (or 
exercisable) directly or indirectly by one or more residents. 
 
The term ”participation rights” refers to the right to participate in the share capital, 
share premium, current or accumulated profits or reserves of the foreign 
company. It is worth noting that it is not only shares that represent equity share 
capital that fall within the definition of “participation rights” but also other kinds of 
shares, such as non-participating preference shares.47  
 
                                                 
46  Act 31 of 2005. 
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The reference to the phrase “directly or indirectly” in the definition of the term 
“controlled foreign company” means that the interests of both registered and 
beneficial shareholders have to be taken into account.48 This implies that where 
for instance an individual resident in South Africa owns all the shares in a foreign 
company A, which in turn holds all the shares in another foreign company B, both 
companies A and B will be considered to be CFCs. However, a CFC will not exist 
where a foreign company A has issued 100 ordinary shares, 50 each to a South 
African company and a foreign individual, and all the shares of the South African 
company are owned by a South African individual.49 This is because not more 
than 50% of the shares are held by South African residents.  
 
An issue that could arise is whether a creditor who holds debentures or a 
mortgage bond over the CFC’s property could be considered to have 
participation rights. The view of the National Treasury is that interests’ such as 
convertible debentures and options (for example a right to obtain shares) do not 
qualify as participation rights until converted into shares.50 However, the use of 
the word “indirect” in the definition of participation rights seems to indicate that 
participation rights are not limited to interests such as shares, but include indirect 
interests in the profits or reserves of a foreign company. A similar argument 
could be raised in the case of unsecured creditors of a company. An unsecured 
creditor cannot be said to have a direct right to participate in the profits or 
reserves of the company but merely an indirect right to do so.51 Does this imply 
that section 9D also applies to such unsecured creditors? The legislature needs 
to clarify this issue and make it clear that the word “indirectly” refers to holding 
through another company and not to conditional holdings.52 It is also worth 
pointing out that although the use of the word “indirectly” means that the interests 
                                                                                                                                            
47 Olivier & Honiball at 364; De Koker in par 8.7.1. 
48 Olivier& Honiball at 363. 
49         Olivier & Honiball at 364.  
50 National Treasury “National Treasury’s Detailed Explanation of Section 9D of the Income 
Tax Act” (June 2002) Available at 
>http://www.treasury.gov.za/division/epifr/tax/legislation/Detailed%20Explanation%20to%
20Section%209D%20of%the%20Income%20Tax%20Act.pdf<, last accessed 6 November 
2007; see also Jooste at 476. 
51 Olivier & Honiball at 365. 
52 In the United Kingdom the Finance Act 1998 amended s 749B(2) of the Taxes Act 1988 in 
order to exclude loan creditors. And in the United States Tax Code “control“ is defined in 
relation to shareholders. See Olivier & Honiball at 365. 
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of both registered and beneficial shareholders have to be taken into account, 
section 82 of the Income Tax Act places the onus on the South African 
shareholder to prove such indirect involvement. In practice this may be difficult.   
 
An issue which is not clear with respect to the word “indirectly” relates to a 
situation where a foreign company’s sole shareholder is a foreign trust whose 
beneficiaries are South African residents. As stated above, CFC legislation does 
not apply to foreign trusts. What is not clear is whether the legislation would 
apply to beneficiaries with interests in such a foreign trust. Where the 
beneficiaries have discretionary rights,53 it may be argued that section 9D does 
not apply, as it cannot be said that the beneficiary has a direct or an indirect right 
to participate in the accumulated profits of the company. The rights belong to the 
trust. The beneficiary only has a right to participate in the income of the trust 
once it is distributed. Where the beneficiaries have vested rights,54 it could be 
argued that the foreign company is a CFC as it would have to declare the 
dividends of the company (distributions) to the South African beneficiaries. Clarity 
on this matter is required. It is however worth noting that in any event, section 
25B of the Income Tax Act would be applicable in the circumstances.55 
 
After the amendments introduced by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 31 of 
2005, various concerns arose regarding the inclusion of ”voting rights” in the 
determination of whether a company should be regarded as a CFC. Some of 
these concerns were recorded in the “Responses to Written Representations by 
Organisations to the Portfolio Committee on Finance on the Draft Revenue Laws 
Amendment Bill, 2005”. There were, for instance, concerns about the exact 
meaning of “voting rights”. The response from South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) was that the ”ordinary meaning of the concept” should prevail. Another 
concern expressed was that with the inclusion of “voting rights” in determining 
                                                 
53  The meaning of the term “contingent right” was described by Watermeyer CJ in Durban 
City Council v Association of Building Societies 1942 AD 27 at 33 as being “the 
conditional nature of someone’s title to the right”. In ITC 76, 3 SATC 68 at 70 the court 
defined the term “contingent right” as a mere spes - an expectation which might never be 
realised. 
54  In ITC 76, 3 SATC 68 at 69, the court defined a vested right as “something substantial; 
something which could be measured in money; something which had a present value and 
could be attached.” 
55  For a discussion of s 25B of the Income Tax Act, see the discussion in chapter 7.  
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whether a company is a CFC, income might be attributable to a resident, 
although that resident may never become entitled to that income. SARS 
submitted that the attribution of net income of a CFC using voting rights will be 
applied only where no person has any rights to the CFC’s capital, profits or other 
reserves. The method will therefore apply only as a backup to attribute practical 
control and not to legal control, and the above problem would therefore not arise.  
 
In effect, the importance of the distinction between “participation rights” and 
“voting rights” is that voting rights will only be taken into account where a 
company has no shares and only has voting rights. This often happens in certain 
hybrid companies. If a person has a right to participate in the equity of the 
company (no matter how simple) then the voting rights are disregarded.56 If a 
foreign company is a listed company, or if the voting rights in that foreign 
company are exercisable indirectly through a listed company, voting rights will 
not be taken into account. In situations where any voting rights in a foreign 
company which can be exercised directly by any other CFC in which that resident 
(together with any connected person in relation to that resident) can directly or 
indirectly exercise more than 50% of the voting rights, then those rights are 
deemed for the purposes of the definition of a CFC to be exercisable directly by 
that resident. This is a type of look-through provision. 
 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment 
Bill 2005,57 the purpose of the reintroduction of voting rights to the criteria for 
determining whether a company should be classified as a CFC is that the 
inclusion of voting rights was intended to bring these criteria closer to the 
permissible range of foreign investments in terms of the exchange control 
dispensation. It is further explained that voting rights might be a better indication 
of actual control in transactions involving preference shares and certain hybrid 
instruments.  
 
                                                 
56 K Huxham & P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax (2007) at 307. 
57  Clause 14 Sub clause (a) of the Explanatory Memorandum on Revenue Laws Amendment 
Bill, 2005. Available at 
>http://www.SARS.gov.za/legislation/Bills/%Memos/2005/legislation/explanatory%/Reven
ue/2005%.pdf<, last Accessed on 7 June 2007. 
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In terms of the definition of a CFC, when determining whether a company 
qualifies as a CFC, consideration has to be given not only to direct voting rights 
but also to indirect voting rights. The effect of this new amendment is that, where 
a shareholder can exercise more than 50% of the voting rights, that shareholder 
is regarded as effectively controlling the relevant company. Therefore, where for 
example, a resident exercises 75% of the voting rights in a foreign company that 
can in turn exercise 75% of the voting in another foreign company, the indirect 
interest of the resident in the second foreign company is 75%. 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that where a South African resident holds 
only 35% of the share capital of a foreign company, but also holds 65% of its 
voting control, such a company would be considered a CFC. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that the income of the CFC will be attributed to the 
resident, as the “participation rights” requirement also needs to be met for 
purposes of determining the net income of the company.58 The effect of this is 
that where voting rights are considered, a South African resident will have to 
keep a copy of the financial statements of the CFC for submission to the 
Commissioner, when so requested in terms of section 72A(2), even though no 
income will ever be attributed to him. This is to ensure that SARS can be able to 
review a discrepancy (if any) between the “participation rights” and the “voting 
rights” of the resident in the foreign company.59 
 
Sub-clause (c) of the definition of a CFC describes certain scenarios in which a 
person is deemed not to be a resident for the purposes of determining whether 
residents directly or indirectly hold more than 50% of the participation rights or 
voting rights in a foreign company. The definition of a CFC excludes residents 
who are connected persons, who in aggregate hold more than 50% of the 
participation rights  or voting rights in a foreign listed company60 or a foreign 
collective investment scheme or arrangement, but individually hold less than 5% 
                                                 
58  As discussed below, the net income attribution rules are set out in s 9D(2) of the Income 
Tax Act. 
59  Oliver & Honiball at 364-365. 
60  In terms of par (e)(ii) of the definition of “company” in the Income Tax Act, a listed 
company is defined as a company whose shares or depository receipts for its shares are 
listed on a stock exchange or a stock exchange in another country recognised by the 
minister. See De Koker in par 5.44.  
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of the participation rights or voting rights in the listed company or “foreign 
collective investment scheme” or arrangement61 (or a so-called “equity unit trust" 
as contemplated in paragraph (e) (ii) of the definition of a company in section 1).  
 
Paragraph (e)(ii) of the definition of a company62 refers to offshore investments in 
which members of the public (at least two) are invited or permitted to invest in a 
portfolio of a collective investment scheme. South African banks often open up 
foreign collective investment schemes or equity unit trusts overseas in order to 
accommodate South African residents who wish to utilise their exchange control 
foreign investment allowances.63 In such cases it is possible that more than 50% 
of the participation rights or voting rights in the foreign collective investment 
scheme may be held by South African residents. However, only residents who 
individually hold 5% or more of the participation rights or voting rights in such a 
scheme will be regarded as participating in a CFC for the purposes of section 9D. 
This exclusion is intended to lessen the administrative burden on tax authorities 
as it is often difficult to determine the identity of those who own shares in large-
scale entities where the interest is less than 5%.64 Furthermore, in terms of 
section 72, which requires strict reporting of the participation rights or voting 
rights of South African residents in a CFC, it is not easy to obtain information in 
respect of a shareholding of less than 5%.65 These exclusions do not apply, 
however, where connected persons collectively own more than 50% of the 
foreign company. This is intended to ensure that the provision cannot be 
circumvented by a group of economically linked parties arranging their affairs so 
as to stay clear of the 5% and 50% thresholds respectively.  
 
This matter is for instance relevant in determinig whether CFC legislation would 
apply in the context of offshore “protected cell companies” (PCCs). As discussed 
in chapter 2, a PCC is a special type of corporate body which consists of several 
companies referred to as “cells” within the same legal entity.66 The cells are not 
                                                 
61 S 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act; see also Olivier & Honiball at 364. 
62 S 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
63 Olivier & Honiball at 364.  
64 Olivier & Honiball at 364.  
65 Olivier & Honiball at 364.  
66  See chapter 2 par 3.3 the discussion under the heading “Protected cell companies”. See 
also Coddan Company Formation Worldwide “Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at > 
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legal entities. The only legal entity is the PCC.67 CFC legislation may not apply to 
the cells since they are not considered legal entities in themselves. However, 
CFC legislation can apply to the PCC itself. Where a number of South African 
residents own some of the cells in the PCC, it may be possible to avoid CFC 
legislation if each of the individual cells of the PCC holds less than 5% of the 
“participation rights” or “voting rights” in the PCC.   
 
Country of residence 
 
In relation to a CFC the country of residence means the country where the 
company has its place of effective management.68 
  
Net income 
 
In terms of section 9D(2), when it has been established that a CFC exists, the 
net income of the CFC is attributed to the South African residents. “Net income” 
is defined in section 9D(2) in relation to a CFC to mean an amount equal to the 
taxable income of the company determined in accordance with the provisions of 
the South African Income Tax Act as if the company had been a South African 
resident taxpayer.69 The net income of the CFC is calculated at the end of the 
foreign tax year of the country in which the CFC is resident and is included in the 
resident’s income at the end of the South African year of assessment.70 In 
calculating the net income of the CFC, the CFC is dealt with as if it were a South 
African resident (section 9D(2A)). The provisions of the Income Tax Act in terms 
of which a CFC is deemed to be a resident are as follows: 
- The definition of “gross income” in section 1, requires the CFC to include 
                                                                                                                                            
http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 25 
February 2007. 
67  Aamil Global Financial Services Mauritius “Protected cell Companies”. Available at > 
http://www.aaamil.com/en/services_protected_cell_companies.aspx> last accessed 25 
February 2007; Isle of Man Government, Insurance and Pensions Authority “Protected cell 
Companies”. Available at >http://www.gov.im/ipa/insurance/protectedcellcompanies.xml> 
last accessed 25 February 2007. See also Coddan Company Formation Worldwide 
“Seychelles PCC Formation”. Available at > http://wwww.coddan.co.uk/s.-95-offshore-
sycehless-ppc-formation.htm< last accessed 25 February 2007.  
68   This definition was inserted in the Act by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 20 of 2006. 
69  De Koker in par 8.10.2. 
70 Olivier & Honiball at 368-369.  
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in its gross income, its worldwide receipts and accruals. 
- In terms of section 7(8), if the CFC makes a disposition and that 
disposition causes income to accrue to a non-resident, this income is 
deemed to accrue to the CFC. 
- In terms of section 10(1)(h), the CFC will not enjoy the exemption for 
interest earned on ESKOM (and similar) stocks. 
- In terms of section 25B, the CFC will be treated as a resident “donor” or 
as a resident beneficiary in relevant circumstances. 
- In terms of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Eighth Schedule, all the assets of a 
CFC will be subject to capital gains tax. 
- In terms of paragraph 12 of the Eighth Schedule, the deemed disposal 
and deemed re-acquisition provisions will apply. 
- In terms of paragraph 24 of the Eighth Schedule, if a foreign company 
becomes a CFC after valuation date (1 October 2001), the base cost of its 
assets will be determined under the provisions of paragraph 24. 
- In terms of paragraphs 70, 71, 72 and 80 of the Eighth Schedule, the CFC 
will be treated as a resident beneficiary or as a resident donor in the 
relevant circumstances. 
 
However, the above provisions of the Income Tax Act are applied to the CFC’s 
taxable income, subject to the following conditions: 
- In terms of section 9D(2A)(a), any deductions and allowances that may be 
claimed or any amount that may be set off against  a CFC’s income in 
terms of the Income Tax Act are limited to the amount of that income. 
- In terms of section 9D(2A(b), where the  deductions of the CFC exceed its 
income and the result would be an assessed loss, the assessed loss may 
not be set off against income received by the South African resident from 
other trades outside the Republic, but must instead be carried forward to 
the immediately succeeding foreign tax year to be offset against future 
income of the CFC.71  
- In terms of section 9D(2A)(c), no deduction is allowed for interest, 
royalties, rental or income of a similar nature paid or payable by the 
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company to another CFC. This would include amounts adjusted for 
transfer pricing purposes (section 31) or any exchange difference 
determined under section 24I. These amounts are deemed not to be 
attributed to the South African resident in terms of section 9D(9)(fA). 
- There are certain capital gains tax (CGT) implications. In terms of section 
9D(2A)(e) where a foreign company becomes a CFC after 1 October 
2001 (when CGT was introduced), the valuation date for CGT purposes is 
the date the company became a CFC.  
- In terms of section 9D(2A)(f), if the controlling resident is a natural person, 
special trust or an insurer, the inclusion rate for purposes of CGT is 25%. 
Furthermore, where there has been a capital gain or loss that arose from 
the disposal by a CFC of an interest in another CFC, it has to be added to 
the base cost of the interest the resident has in the foreign company, 
minus certain foreign dividends that were exempt from tax during any tax 
year (section 9D(2A(j)).   
- For the purposes of section 31(that deals with transfer pricing and thin 
capitalisation) any transaction, operation or scheme between the CFC and 
any of its connected persons is deemed to be an international agreement 
as defined in section 31(1) and for the purposes of section 31(3)(a)(i)and 
(ii) the CFC is deemed to be a resident. 
- For the purposes of section 24I, “local currency” in relation to the 
exchange item of a CFC that is not attributed to a permanent 
establishment of the CFC means any currency used by the CFC for the 
purposes of its financial reporting. 
- For the purposes of paragraph 43 of the Eighth Schedule, “local currency” 
of a CFC other than in relation to a permanent establishment of the CFC, 
means the currency used by it for the purposes of its financial reporting 
(Proviso (k) to section 9D(2A). 
 
Generally in calculating the net income of a CFC, companies have to keep two 
sets of books, one for the country in which the CFC is a resident and one for 
South African tax purposes. This obligation places a compliance burden on 
                                                                                                                                            
71 See also Meyerowitz in par 9.115. 
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companies, as a full audit of each company is required. A form has to be 
completed and submitted to the South African Revenue Service (SARS) for each 
CFC, which is almost as burdensome as completing a tax return for each 
respective company. From an administrative point of view, it can be concluded 
that compliance with section 9D is a costly exercise.   
 
An issue that deserves clarification relates to the capital gains tax implications of 
CFCs referred to above in section 9D(2A)(e) 
 
CFCs and capital gains tax implications  
 
The Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act contains the rules for the 
determination of a person's taxable capital gain or assessed capital loss for a 
year of assessment. Any taxable capital gain so determined must, in terms of 
section 26A of the Act, be included in a person's taxable income for the relevant 
year of assessment. Capital gains and losses must be determined in respect of 
all "disposals" of "assets" that take place on or after the valuation date, namely 1 
October 2001.72  
 
The rules for determining whether a disposal has taken place for purposes of 
CGT are set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 while the rules for determining when a 
disposal is treated as having taken place are set out in paragraph 13. An asset is 
defined very widely in paragraph 1 and includes, for purposes of CGT: 
(a) property of whatever nature, whether movable or immovable, 
corporeal or incorporeal, excluding any currency, but including any 
coin made mainly from gold or platinum; and 
(b) a right or interest of whatever nature to or in such property. 
 
A disposal is any event, act, forbearance or operation of law which results in the 
creation, variation, transfer or extinction of an asset. It includes, inter alia, the 
alienation or transfer of ownership of an asset (e.g. a sale, donation, cession, 
etc.), the expiry or abandonment of an asset, the scrapping, loss or destruction of 
                                                 
72  Par 2 read with par 1 of the Eighth schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
125 
 
 
 
 
an asset, the granting, renewal, extension or exercise of an option, and the 
decrease in value of a person's interest in a company, trust or partnership as a 
result of a value shifting arrangement. In terms of paragraph 2, a resident is 
subject to CGT on the disposal of any asset as defined, whether situated in or 
outside the Republic.  
The Eighth Schedule also contains some deeming provisions in terms of which a 
person is treated as having disposed of an asset for a specific amount. For 
instance, In terms of paragraph 12(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax 
Act, where a person ceases to be a resident, that person will be deemed to have 
disposed of his assets (subject to specific exclusions) at market value. The tax 
arising from this disposal is often referred to as an “exit charge”.   
 
Until 2005, uncertainty existed whether a foreign company which ceases to be a 
CFC during the tax year also ceases to be regarded as a South African resident 
for the application of certain provisions. This uncertainty was removed by an 
amendment to paragraph 12(2) of the Eighth Schedule which makes it clear that 
the termination of the South African resident status has CGT consequences.73 
Paragraph 12(2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule provides that when a South African 
tax resident ceases to be a resident by virtue of the application of the provisions 
of a tax treaty entered into by South Africa with another jurisdiction, the resident 
must be treated as having disposed of all his/her assets. However, excluded from 
the deeming provision is immovable property situated in South Africa and assets 
that are attributable to a permanent establishment of the resident through which 
a trade is carried on in the Republic. In terms of paragraph 13(1)(g) of the Eighth 
Schedule, the deemed disposal is effective at the time when the person ceases 
to be a South African tax resident. The result of the above is that when a 
company which is incorporated in South Africa moves its “place of effective 
management” offshore (such that in terms of an applicable tax treaty, it is 
deemed to be resident in the country in which it has its effective management), a 
deemed disposal arises. It is however worth noting that in practice, it may not be 
that easy to determine exactly when a company has ceased to be a South 
African resident, in the event of it moving its place of effective management 
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offshore. 74   
 
 
The Revenue Laws Amendment Act 31 of 2005 also amended section 9D to 
provide that an exit charge would apply to a CFC that became a non-CFC by 
virtue of having been disposed of to a non-resident. The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Bill that preceded the Act sets out the following in respect of 
the amendment: 
The revised paragraph 12(2) also restates existing law concerning the treatment of 
controlled foreign companies. As under the old law (by virtue of the reference to 
paragraph 12 in section 9D(2A) of the Income Tax Act), the shift from CFC status to 
non-CFC status triggers an exit charge (for the loss of taxing jurisdiction over passive 
and other tainted assets held by the CFC).’75 
 
Where a person moves residence offshore after 1 October 2001 (the day CGT 
became effective), the base cost of assets acquired prior to this date is 
determined in terms of paragraph 25 of the Eighth Schedule. This paragraph 
provides that the base cost of an asset acquired prior to 1 October 2001 is the 
sum of the value of the asset and allowable expenditure as listed in paragraph 20 
of the Eighth Schedule, incurred after the valuation date. However, a problem 
could arise when a CFC ceases to be a CFC for purposes of section 9D of South 
Africa’s Income Tax Act. Section 9D(2A) provides that, for purposes of section 
9D, the net income of a CFC must be calculated as if the CFC had been a 
resident. This would cover paragraph 12 of the Eighth Schedule. It can thus be 
said that when the CFC ceases to be a CFC, it simultaneously ceases to be a 
resident for purposes of the net income calculation. Following this argument, 
there is a deemed disposal for CGT purposes in terms of paragraph 12 of the 
Eighth Schedule. 
 
It is worth noting that in terms of paragraph 64B of the Eighth Schedule, a capital 
gain is disregarded in circumstances where any interest in the equity share 
                                                                                                                                            
73  Olivier & Honiball at 69. 
74  Olivier & Honiball at 69. 
75       See South African Revenue Service ”Republic of South Africa Explanatory Memorandum 
on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2005” at 46. Available at 
>http://www.sars.gov.za/legislation/Bills%20Memos/Memos/2005/Legislation%20-
%20Explanatory%20Memo%20on%20the%20Revenue%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill
%20-%202005.pdf>, last accessed 18 May 2007. 
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capital of any foreign company is disposed of in certain circumstances. While this 
CGT exclusion is very wide, it is arguably not wide enough to cover the 
paragraph 12 deemed disposal. It is submitted that this anomaly requires 
legislative amendment.76 
 
Exchange rate 
 
Section 9D(6) provides that the amount to be included in the income of a resident 
must be translated to the currency of the Republic. The section provides that the 
net income of a CFC must be determined in the currency used by it for the 
purposes of its financial reporting and must, for the purposes of determining the 
amount to be included in the income of any resident during any year of 
assessment under the provisions of section 9D, be translated to the currency of 
the Republic by applying the average exchange rate for that year of assessment 
as contemplated in section 25D.77 
- Proviso (a) to this provision states that any capital gain or loss of that CFC 
must, when applying the provisions of paragraph 43(4) of the Eighth 
Schedule, be determined in the currency of the Republic and that capital 
gain or loss must be translated to the currency used by it for purposes of 
its financial reporting by applying the average exchange rate. 
- Proviso (b) to this provision states that any amount to be taken into 
account in determining the net income of that CFC for the disposal of any 
foreign equity instrument must, when applying the provisions of section 
9G, be determined in the currency of the Republic and that amount must 
be translated to the currency used by the Republic by applying the 
average exchange rate.  
 
4.4 EXEMPTIONS TO THE CFC PROVISIONS 
 
In certain instances, the net income of a CFC is excluded from the ambit of 
section 9D and will not be attributed to the residents who hold the participation 
rights in the entity concerned. 
                                                 
76  Olivier & Honiball at 71. 
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4.4.1 The foreign business establishment exemption 
 
The CFC rules do not apply when the net income of a CFC is attributable to a 
“foreign business establishment”78 (including the disposal of any assets forming 
part that business establishment) of a company in a country other than the 
Republic.79 Note that previously section 9D referred to a “business 
establishment”, but this term was deleted from the Act and replaced by the term 
“foreign business establishment” by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 20 of 
2006. In granting this exemption, the legislature attempted to create a balance 
between granting an exemption to income derived from legitimate business 
activities and that derived from illusory business undertakings (like mobile and 
diversionary business income and mobile passive income).80 In terms of section 
9D(1), a “foreign business establishment” in relation to a controlled foreign 
company refers to: 
(a) A place of business with an office, shop, factory, warehouse or other structure 
which is used or will continue to be used by that controlled foreign company for a period 
of not less than one year, whereby the business of such company is carried on, and 
where that place of business; 
(i) is suitably staffed with on-site managerial and operational employees of that 
controlled foreign company and which management and employees are required 
to render services on a full time basis for the purposes of conducting the primary 
operations of that business; 
(ii) is suitably equipped and has proper facilities for such purposes; and 
(iii) is located in any country other than the Republic and is used for bona fide 
business purposes (other than the avoidance, postponement or reduction of any 
liability for payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by this Act or by any other 
Act administered by the Commissioner). 
(b)  Any place outside the Republic where prospecting or exploration operations for 
natural resources are carried on, or any place outside the Republic where mining or 
production operations of natural resources are carried on, where that controlled foreign 
company carries on those prospecting, exploration, mining or production operations. 
(c) A site outside the Republic for the construction or installation of buildings, 
bridges, roads, pipelines, heavy machinery or other projects of a comparable magnitude 
which lasts for a period of not less than six months, where that controlled foreign 
company carries on those construction or installation activities. 
(d) Agricultural land in any country other than the Republic used for bona fide 
farming activities directly carried on by that controlled foreign company. 
(e) A vessel, vehicle, aircraft or rolling stock used for the purposes of transportation 
or fishing, or prospecting or exploration for natural resources, or mining or production of 
                                                                                                                                            
77 De Koker in par 5.48 at 5-64. 
78  S 9D(9)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
79         S 9D(9)(b) of the Income Tax Act.  
80 Olivier & Honiball at 373. 
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natural resources, where that vessel, vehicle, rolling stock or aircraft is used solely 
outside the Republic for such purposes and is operated directly by that controlled foreign 
company or by any other company that has the same country of residence as that 
controlled foreign company and that forms part of the same group of companies as that 
controlled foreign company. 
 
From the above, it appears that for a place of business to qualify as a “foreign 
business establishment” there must be an “economic substance” and “a business 
purpose”.81 For there to be “economic substance”, the foreign business must not 
exist merely on paper and not in substance. The foreign business must maintain 
a presence consisting of persons who make the day-to-day management 
decisions. In SIR v Downing,82 it was pointed out that the use of independent 
agents does not qualify a business as a business establishment.  The “business 
purpose” requirement ensures that there must be permanence and economic 
substance; the exemption will not be granted if the business activities are not 
conducted for bona fide business purposes, but to obtain a tax benefit.83 In 
determining whether the business conducted outside South Africa is being run for 
bona fide business purposes, the Commissioner does not have to prove the 
requirements under the general anti-avoidance provision under section 80A-
80Lof the Income Tax Act. It is sufficient if, on the facts, the reason for moving 
the business outside South Africa was to avoid, postpone or reduce tax.  
 
As an anti-avoidance measure, this exemption does not apply to certain 
diversionary transactions between a CFC and a connected person.84 In general, 
the rules relating to diversionary business transactions distinguish between 
transactions subject to transfer pricing provisions (section 9D(9)(b)(i)), and those 
that are not subject to transfer pricing provisions, but where the possibility of 
price manipulation still exists (section 9D(9)(b)(ii)). Where the net income falls 
within the first category, the denial of the exclusion from attribution may result in 
a transfer pricing adjustment under section 31 of the Income Tax Act. Where the 
net income falls in the second category, the so called “reversionary rules” are 
used to apply to the transaction. In that case, no transfer pricing adjustment is 
                                                 
81 Olivier & Honiball at 374. 
82 1975 (4) SA 518 at 525 (AD). 
83 Olivier & Honiball at 374.  
84  According to s 1 of the Income Tax Act, the definition of ‘‘connected person’’ in relation to 
a company (as amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 20 of 2006) includes its 
holding company as defined in s 1 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and any other 
130 
made, but the income is excluded from attribution if it meets the requirements set 
down in the relevant subsection. 
 
4.4.1.1 The rules that relate to diversionary activities  
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(b)(i), no exemption is granted where the net income of 
a “foreign business establishment” of a CFC is derived from transactions with its 
connected person (who is a resident) for to the supply of goods or services by or 
to the CFC, which do not reflect an arm’s length price in terms of section 31 of 
the Income Tax Act.85 This could for example cover transactions where income 
has been diverted to a tax haven by means of transactions that do not reflect an 
arm’s length price (ie diversionary business income where the possibility of price 
manipulation exists).86 Where this is the case, severe penalties may arise and the 
price of goods may be adjusted by the Commissioner in terms of section 31 to 
reflect an arms length price. In cases where excessive interest is charged, a 
deemed dividend distribution could arise for the purposes of secondary tax on 
companies. 
 
4.4.1.2 The reversionary rules  
 
Section 9D(9)(b)(ii) deals with the so called reversionary rules. These rules 
provide for three different scenarios:  
-    sale of goods by the CFC to South African resident connected persons 
(the so called “CFC in-bound sales” covered under section 
9D(9)(b)(ii)(aa)); 
-  sale of goods by a CFC which were bought from South Africa resident 
connected persons, to persons other than South African resident 
connected persons (the so called “CFC out-bound sales” covered under 
                                                                                                                                            
company that would be part of the same group of companies as that company.   
85 The expression “dealing at arm’s length” is used to describe a transaction between 
independent unrelated parties where each party strives to get the utmost possible benefit 
from the transaction. See South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) Practice Note No 7 
Determination of Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International Taxation: Transfer 
Pricing (s 31 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962) 6 August 1999 in par 7.1; art 9 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 condensed version). 
86 S 31 and s 9D(9)(b)(i) of the Income Tax Act.  
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section 9D(b)(ii)(bb)); 
-  services performed by the CFC to South African resident connected 
persons (the so called “CFC South African connected services” covered 
under section 9D(b)(ii)(cc)). 
 
Net income falling within these categories is exempt from CFC rules if a higher 
business activity standard than the standard laid down for the purpose of a 
“foreign business establishment” is present. This higher business standard is 
intended to ensure that income is exempt from attribution only if the transaction 
has a non-tax economic nexus within the country in which the CFC is a resident, 
or the transaction is unlikely to contain elements of transfer pricing. The reason 
for laying down a higher standard above the foreign business establishment test 
is to ensure that where transactions take place between a CFC and a connected 
South African resident, the offshore business is of substance.87 However, in 
terms of section 9D(10), the Minister of Finance has a discretion to waive the 
higher business standard. By notice in the Gazette, Minister may also exercise 
his discretion to treat a number of foreign countries as one, if the foreign 
countries comprise a single economic market, provided this treatment will not 
lead to an unacceptable erosion of the tax base.88 He may also, in consultation 
with the Commissioner, grant exemption to any person from the application of 
this provision to the extent that this does not unreasonably prejudice national 
economic policies or South African international trade, and the exemption does 
not lead to an unacceptable erosion of the tax base.89 For example, the Minister 
may exercise his discretion and treat the European Union as a single economic 
market to the extent that the countries impose a comparable income tax rate. 
Thus a CFC in the European Union could satisfy the higher business activity test 
when on behalf of a connected South African resident, it acts as a distributor of 
goods to customers located within several European countries.90   
 
The following is a discussion of the three above mentioned scenarios in respect 
to the reversionary rules under section 9D(9)(b)(ii)  
                                                 
87 Olivier & Honiball at 376.  
88  S 9D(10)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
89  S 9D(10)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
132 
 
CFC in-bound sales 
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(b)(ii)(aa), a “CFC in-bound sale” occurs when a CFC 
sells goods to a connected South African resident. The general rule is that 
income arising from a CFC in-bound sell does not qualify for the “foreign 
business establishment” exemption unless the sale falls into one of the following 
four categories: 
-    Local purchases in the country where the CFC has its place of effective 
management from an unconnected person.  
-   Local production of goods that involve more than minor assembly or  
adjustment, packaging, repackaging, and labeling.  
-    Sales of significant quantities of comparable goods to unconnected 
persons, ie where the goods sold to a connected South African resident 
are of the same, or similar nature, to goods sold to unconnected persons 
at comparable prices after taking into account whether the sales are 
wholesale or retail, volume discounts, and other geographical 
differences such as costs of delivery to different locations. 
-  The same or similar goods are purchased by the CFC mainly within the 
state in which the CFC has its place of effective management from 
persons who are not connected persons in relation to the CFC.  
 
In general, it appears that the qualifying business activities are not artificial. The 
reason for granting an exemption to local purchases and the production of goods 
is that if the local country is in position to produce goods, it probably has 
sufficiently good infrastructure. Countries with such infrastructure do not tax their 
local sales at artificially low tax haven rates. It is assumed that the CFC is 
situated in the foreign country not for tax reasons, but for non-tax business 
reasons.  In situations where comparable sales are involved, it is assumed that 
transfer pricing does not occur because outside pricing is fully available. In 
addition, sales to unconnected persons by the CFC demonstrate viable business 
                                                                                                                                            
90 Olivier & Honiball at 376. 
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operations outside South Africa.91 
 
CFC out-bound sale of goods 
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(b)(ii)(bb), a “CFC out-bound sale of goods” exists when 
a CFC sells goods to foreign residents or unconnected South African residents, 
in circumstances where those goods were initially purchased from connected 
South African residents. The general rule is that income arising from a CFC out-
bound sale of goods does not qualify for the “foreign business establishment” 
exemption unless the sale falls into one of the following four categories. 
- the goods or tangible intermediary inputs purchased from its 
connected persons who are residents amount to an insignificant 
portion of the total tangible intermediary inputs of the goods (ie 
insignificant South African purchases); 
- the creation, extraction, production, assembly, repair or improvement 
of goods undertaken by the CFC amount to more than minor assembly 
or adjustment, packaging, re-packing and re-labeling (ie local 
production) or; 
- the products are sold by the CFC to persons who are not its 
connected persons for delivery within its country of residence (ie local 
sales); or 
- the products of the same or similar nature are sold by the CFC mainly 
to persons who are not its connected persons for delivery within its 
country of residence (ie the CFC is selling its products mainly to local 
customers). 
 
 
It appears that the reason for this exemption is that the business activities that 
give rise to the income are in all likelihood not artificial. The rationale behind 
granting an exemption to local purchasers and the production of goods is that if 
the local country produces the goods it is likely that it has a good infrastructure. 
Such a country would not normally tax its local sales at artificially low tax-haven 
                                                 
91  Oliver & Honiball at 378. 
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rates. Thus a CFC situated in such a foreign country would probably be there not 
for tax reasons but for business reasons.92  Where insignificant amounts of 
intangible goods are purchased from connected South African residents, 
independent value is added. As a result, it is assumed that the business was 
established for non-tax purposes. 
 
CFC connected services 
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(b)(ii)(cc), a “CFC connected service” exists where the 
CFC performs services for a connected South African resident. The general rule 
is that income arising from CFC connected services does not qualify for the 
“foreign business establishment” exemption unless the service falls into the 
following two categories: 
- the service relates to the creation, extraction, production, assembly, 
repair or improvement of goods used in countries outside the 
Republic; or 
- the services relate directly to the sale or marketing of goods belonging 
to its connected person who is a resident and the goods are sold to 
persons who are not its connected person in the country of residence 
of the CFC. 
 
In terms of this exemption, it can be deduced that income derived from services 
of a general nature, such as management fees, internal accounting fees, and 
fees to guarantee loans, never qualifies for this exemption as the possibility of 
manipulating prices is high and such services rendered by a company outside 
South Africa will most likely have no business reason for their existence other 
than to reduce tax liability. Where the services are not connected to South Africa, 
the possibility of price manipulation is diminished. Although the goods are 
delivered within South Africa, the income will be exempt, as shipping the 
products offshore for foreign servicing and then repatriating them to South Africa 
does not make commercial sense.93 The income derived from the sale of related 
services is exempt on the basis that the country in which the CFC is resident has 
                                                 
92 Olivier & Honiball at 378. 
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an economic connection to the consumer’s market. 
 
4.4.1.3 Mobile passive income  
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(b)(iii) the “foreign business establishment” exemption 
will not apply to net income that is attributed to any amounts derived from mobile 
passive income of an enterprise. This includes income such as dividends, 
interest, royalties, rental, annuities, insurance premiums, capital gains and 
foreign currency gains under section 24I. The reason why such mobile passive 
income does not qualify for the exemption is that no active business activities are 
performed and no direct competitiveness concerns are at stake.94 The provision 
will, however, not apply where the income and capital gain attributed to those 
amounts do not exceed 10% of the income and capital gain of the CFC attributed 
to that foreign business establishment (other than income or capital gains to 
which any of the provisions of section 9D(9)(e) to (fB) apply). The reason for this 
exception is most likely to alleviate the administrative burden of complying with 
the CFC rules.95 This provision will also not apply when the amounts arising from 
the principle trading activities of the CFC are banking or financial services, 
insurance or rental businesses. The reason for this exclusion is to ensure that 
these entities remain internationally competitive.96 It however worth noting that 
the terms “banking business” and “insurance business” are not defined in the 
Act. This omission is a shortcoming that may result in litigation.97 
  
In terms of section 9D(9)(b)(iii), the passive receipts and accruals of a CFC that 
conducts banking or financial services, and any insurance or rental business in a 
“foreign business establishment” will however, be subject to section 9D if these 
receipts and accruals are derived by a company that is a “foreign financial 
instrument holding company” (“FFIHC”) at the time they were so derived. In 
terms of section 41 of the Act, a FFIHC “means any foreign company as defined 
in section 9D, where more than the prescribed proportion of all the assets of that 
                                                                                                                                            
93 Olivier & Honiball at 379. 
94 Olivier & Honiball at 379; De Koker inpar 8.10.3. 
95 Olivier & Honiball at 379. 
96 Olivier & Honiball at 381; De Koker in par 8.10.3. 
97  Olivier & Honiball at 381. 
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company, together with the assets of all influenced companies in relation to that 
company, consist of financial instruments”.98 This proviso acts as an anti-
avoidance provision in that the exclusion from the “foreign business 
establishment” exemption of a FFIHC would cover foreign financial holding 
companies that are located in tax havens.99 It is worth noting that the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Act 31 of 2005 amended the licensing and registration 
requirements of an FFIHC and replaced them with a requirement that the FFIHC 
should ”mainly conduct business in the country of residence of that company” for 
it to qualify as an FFIHC. This amendment will certainly affect the criteria for 
determining which companies qualify as FFIHCs and therefore in which 
situations income such as; interest and royalties, will be excluded from the 
                                                 
98  S 41 of the Income Tax Act as amended by s 37(1)(d) of the Revenue Laws Amendment 
Act 31 of 2005 . A financial instrument is defined in s 1 of the Act as to  include: 
(a) a loan, advance, debt, stock, bond, debenture, bill, share, promissory note, 
banker’s acceptance, negotiable certificate of deposit, deposit with a financial 
institution, a participatory interest in a portfolio of a collective investment scheme, 
or a similar instrument;  
(b)      any repurchase or resale agreement, forward purchase arrangement, forward 
sale arrangement, futures contract, option contract or swap contract; 
(c)      any other contractual right or obligation, the value of which is determined directly 
or indirectly with reference to- 
(i)       a debt security or equity; 
(ii)       any commodity, as quoted on an exchange; or 
(iii)      a rate index or a specified index; 
(d)     any interest-bearing arrangement; and 
(e)     any financial arrangement based on or determined with reference to the time 
value of money or cash flow or the exchange or transfer of an asset; 
  However, the following financial instruments should not be taken into account: 
(1) Financial instruments that consist of debts due to the foreign company, or to any 
controlled group of company in relation to the foreign company, in respect of foods sold or 
services rendered by that foreign company or the controlled group company, as the case 
may be, where;  
(a) the amount of the debt is or was included in either the foreign company or the 
controlled group company; and 
(b) the debt is an integral part of a business conducted as a going concern by the foreign 
company or controlled group company. 
(2) Any financial instrument arising from the principal trading activities of the foreign 
company or of the controlled group company in relation to the foreign company which is a 
bank, insurer, dealer or broker with a license or registration that allows the foreign 
company or controlled group company to operate in the same manner as a company that 
mainly conducts business with clients who are residents in the same country of residence 
as the foreign company. To qualify for the exemption, the foreign company or controlled 
group company has to: 
- Either regularly accept deposits or premiums for the general public or effect transactions 
with the general public; or 
- Derive more than 50% of its income or gains from principal trading activities with persons 
who are not connected persons to the foreign company. 
(3) Any financial instrument held by a controlled group company in relation to the foreign 
company if the foreign company is a specified regulated controlled group company. 
99 See Olivier & Honiball at 382; See also De Koker in par 8.8.3. 
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calculation of the net income of the CFC. 
 
An overview of the foreign business establishment exemption clearly shows that 
it incorporates many exceptions to the granting of exemption. It is evident that 
these will be cumbersome to interpret and apply in practice. In fact the provisions 
are so complicated that the cost of compliance is likely to be very high.   
 
4.4.2 The insurance policy exemption 
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(c), the CFC provision will not apply to income which is 
attributed in respect of any policy issued by a company licensed to issue any 
long-term policy as defined in the Long-term Insurance Act.100 
 
4.4.3 Exemption of South African taxable income 
 
CFC rules do not apply to the net income of a CFC where it is included in the 
taxable income of the company in the Republic and has not or will not be exempt 
or taxed at a reduced rate in the Republic as a result of the application of any 
double taxation agreements.101 An example would be where the income of the 
company is derived from a source in or deemed to be in the Republic. This 
prevents the possibility of tax becoming payable in the Republic by both the CFC 
and the resident on the same amount of net income. This provision is intended to 
prevent double taxation.102 
  
4.4.4 Exemption of foreign dividends 
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(f), CFC rules do not apply to the extent that the net 
income of a CFC is attributed to any foreign divided declared or deemed to have 
been declared to that CFC by any other company from an amount which relates 
to an amount of income that has been or will be included in the income of a 
                                                 
100  No 52 of 1998. 
101  S 9D(9)(e) of the Income Tax Act; see also De Koker par 5.47 at 5-60.  
102 Huxham & Haupt at 317; see also Olivier & Honiball at 382-383. 
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resident in terms of section 9D.103 For example, if a foreign dividend is declared 
to a CFC (A) by another company (B) and a portion of the net income of B is 
attributed to a resident, section 9D will not apply to the portion of the net income 
of A which relates to the dividend distributed by B. The rationale for exempting 
dividends declared by a company to a CFC is that the profits out of which the 
dividend is declared have already been attributed to the South African resident or 
qualify for exemption under section 9D(9). The aim of this exemption is to avoid 
double taxation. 
 
4.4.5 Exemption of income from interest, royalties, rentals and similar 
amounts  
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(fA), CFC rules do not apply in relation to the net income 
of a CFC where it is attributed to interest, royalties, rental or income of a similar 
nature paid or payable or deemed to be paid or payable to it by another foreign 
company.104 The reason for this exemption is that such amounts, including 
similar amounts that are adjusted for transfer pricing purposes (section 31) and 
exchange differences under section 24I, which are paid or deemed to be paid by 
a CFC to another CFC are not allowed as a deduction in terms of section 
9D(2A)(c), and will not be attributed to the South African resident provided that 
both CFCs belong to the same group of companies.105 This means that a 
resident holding participatory rights in a CFC that derives any interest, royalties, 
rentals, or other income of a similar nature and any exchange differences in 
terms of section 24I from a “related” foreign company will not be taxed on his 
proportionate amount of the interest, royalties or rentals or other income of a 
                                                 
103  De Koker par 5.47 at 5-61; see also Huxham & Haupt at 317; Olivier & Honiball at 383. 
104  S 9D(9) (fA) of the Income Tax Act; De Koker par 5.47 at 5-62; see also Huxham & Haupt 
at 312; Olivier & Honiball at 383.  
105 The term “group of companies” as defined in s 1 of the Act  
“means two or more companies in which one company (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘controlling group company’) directly or indirectly holds shares in at least one other 
company (hereinafter referred to as the ‘controlled group company’), to the extent that - 
a)     at least 75 per cent of the equity shares of each controlled group company are 
directly held by the controlling group company, one or more other controlled group 
companies or any combination thereof; and 
b) the controlling group company directly holds 75 per cent or more of the equity 
shares in at least one controlled group company.”   
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similar nature and any exchange differences in terms of section 24I.106 
 
4.4.5 Capital gains 
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(fB), the provisions of section 9D will not apply to the net 
income of a CFC that is attributable to any capital gain of the CFC that is 
determined for the disposal of any asset as defined in the Eighth Schedule (other 
than any financial instrument or intangible asset as defined in paragraph 16 of 
the Eighth Schedule107), when the asset was attributable to a business 
establishment of the controlled foreign company or any other foreign company 
that forms part of the same group of companies.108  
 
It is important to note that previously section 9D did not apply to the receipts and 
accruals (other than those of a capital nature) or capital gains of a CFC if the 
receipts or accruals would be subject to tax on income in a “designated country”. 
However, with effect from 1 June 2004, this exemption is no longer available.  
  
 
 
4.5 ELECTIONS 
 
In terms of section 9D(12), a resident who, together with his connected persons, 
holds at least 10% but not more that 25% of the participation rights and voting 
rights of a CFC may elect that all the provisions of section 9D(9) will not apply to 
the net income determined for a relevant foreign tax year of any CFC in which he 
holds participation rights. In other words, the South African shareholder who 
holds from 10% to 25% in a CFC can elect to treat his entire pro rata share of 
CFC income as taxable under section 9D, even if he would have been granted 
an exemption under section 9D(9).  
                                                 
106 K Mitchell & L Mitchell Offshore Transactions and the Worldwide Basis of Taxation (2004) 
Tax Seminar at 32. 
107 The term ‘financial instrument’ bears the same meaning as in footnote 83 above.  
The term “Intangible asset” (excluded from the exemption) is defined as including 
goodwill, patents designs, trademarks, copyrights, models, plans, formulae, or any 
intellectual property right or property of a similar nature. 
108 The term “same group of companies” bears the same meaning as in footnote 90 above. 
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This section allows the South African shareholder to be taxed currently on foreign 
income so as to receive the benefit of section 6quat rebates (but no excess 
rebates can be granted as a result of his election by virtue of section 6quat(1B). 
This election may be made annually. The 10% to 25% threshold takes into 
account the interests of connected persons, regardless of whether these 
connected persons choose to make use of the election contained in this 
provision.109  
 
Section 9D(13) provides that any resident who, together with his connected 
persons, holds at least 10% but not more than 25% of the participation rights of a 
foreign company may elect that this foreign company be deemed to be a CFC in 
relation to him for any of its foreign tax years. The 10% to 25% threshold takes 
into account the interests of connected persons, even if these connected persons 
do not choose to use the election under this provision. The effect of this election 
is to allow South African shareholders to be taxed on the distribution of the profits 
of the foreign company in the form of a foreign dividend. This enables the 
resident to avoid the economic double taxation of profits distributed and taxed as 
a foreign dividend when no underlying foreign tax credits may be claimed.110 This 
election should not, however, be used to bring foreign tax credits in excess of the 
South African tax liability into the tax system in a manner that would shield other 
sources of low-taxed foreign income. Therefore, in this instance the excess 
foreign tax credits would be forfeited. This election, like the one above, may be 
made yearly.111 
 
Where the foreign entity becomes a CFC during the foreign tax year,112 or where 
the CFC ceases to be a CFC at any time during the foreign tax year,113 the South 
African resident’s proportionate share of the CFC’s income can be dealt with in 
                                                 
109 For examples of how this election works, see The Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 2003 at 45; see also De Koker in par 5.51; see also 
Mitchell & Mitchell at 32. 
110 De Koker par 5.51; see also Mitchell & Mitchell at 33. 
111 For examples of how this election works, see The Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 2003 at 45-46; Mitchell & Mitchell at 33. 
112 S 9D(2)(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. 
113 S 9D(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
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two ways.  Either the income that accrued to or was received by the CFC during 
the days of the foreign tax year when the company was a CFC114 can be 
included or an amount proportionate to the number of days the company was a 
CFC can be included.115 The choice depends, however, on whether the relevant 
financial records were kept in terms of section 72 of the Income Tax Act (dealt 
with below). 
 
4.6 DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Section 72A(1) of the Income Tax Act imposes a duty on every South African 
resident who has shares in a CFC to submit to the Commissioner together with 
the return contemplated in section 66 such information as may be prescribed by 
the Commissioner. According to section 72A(2), the information that has to be 
disclosed in relation to the CFC includes the following: 
- its name, address and country of residence, and the description of the 
various classes of participation rights, 
- the percentage and class of its participation rights held by the resident 
whether directly or indirectly with connected persons, 
- the percentage and class of participation rights held by other connected 
South African residents who directly or indirectly hold 10% or more of the 
participation rights of the CFC,  
- a description of the receipts and accruals of the CFC  that are included in 
or are exempt from the income of the South African resident under section 
9D and  
- a description of any amount of tax that the CFC paid to any other country 
and the underlying profits to which the foreign tax relates.   
In addition to the above information, where an amount has to be included in the 
income of the South African resident, a copy of the CFC’s financial statements 
for the foreign tax year, prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting practice (GAAP), but not necessarily in Rands, has to be submitted to 
SARS. 
 
                                                 
114 S 9D(2)(a)(ii)(aa) of the Income Tax Act. 
142 
In terms of section 72A(3), where a person fails to comply with the above 
reporting requirements, the proportional amount to be included in the person’s 
taxable income pursuant to section 9D will be with reference only to the receipts 
and accruals of the CFC. Accordingly, the exemptions provided for in sub-
sections 9D(9)(b)-(h) will not be taken into account in the determination of the net 
income of the CFC and this may also result in penalties under section 75 for 
failing to furnish the required documentation. In addition, the rebates that would 
be granted in terms of section 6quat will not apply to amounts already taxed in 
any other country. 
 
4.7 THE COMPATIBILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CFC LEGISLATION AND 
ITS TAX TREATIES 
 
Whereas South Africa’s CFC legislation can be viewed as an important tool in 
curbing offshore tax avoidance, it is worth pointing out that the applicability of this 
legislation can be challenged on the basis of being in conflict with South Africa’s 
double taxation agreements. A number of commentators have questioned the 
validity of CFC legislation in so far as it contradicts some of the basic principles 
of double taxation treaties based on the OECD Model Tax Convention.116 As 
most of South Africa’s treaties largely follow the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital,117 it is important to point out the aspects of tax treaties 
that are considered to be in conflict with CFC legislation.  
 
Aspects of double tax treaties that are considered to be in conflict with 
CFC legislation  
 
Tax treaties generally deal with four main issues, the allocation of the jurisdiction 
to tax various types of income, the elimination of double taxation, administrative 
issues and non-discrimination.118 Some of these issues entail certain 
                                                                                                                                            
115 S 9D(2)(a)(ii)(bb) of the Income Tax Act. 
116  Sandler at 112-118; T Rosembuj “Controlled Foreign Corporations – Critical Aspects” 
(1998) 26 Intertax at 335; B J Arnold “Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 
Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model” (2004) 58 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation at 252. 
117 Olivier & Honiball at 17. See also Huxham & Haupt at 341.  
118  See par 7 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention 
143 
 
 
 
 
fundamental principles of tax treaties that could be in conflict with CFC 
legislation.  
 
Bilateral tax treaties based on the OECD Model Tax Convention uphold the 
principle that a corporation is treated as a separate taxpayer from its 
shareholders. Thus, a foreign corporation is only subject to tax in the resident 
country of its shareholders, if it derives income that has a source in that country. 
Any foreign source income of the foreign company is excluded from tax. This 
principle, is clearly brought out in article 5(7) of the OECD Model Convention 
which provides as follows:  
The fact that a company that is a resident of a contracting State controls or is controlled 
by a company which is a resident of the other contracting State, or which carries on 
business in that State (whether through a permanent establishment or otherwise), shall 
not of itself constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other. 
 
In effect, in a cross-border environment, a parent corporation and its wholly 
owned subsidiary constitute separate legal and taxable entities, notwithstanding 
that one may manage the business of the other. Thus, the profits of a subsidiary 
company in one treaty country, in which it is resident, are not subject to tax in the 
other treaty country.  It can only be taxed in the hands of its shareholders in the 
other treaty country when dividends are distributed.119 It is however contended 
that CFC legislation ignores this fundamental principle that a foreign company is 
a different legal person separate from its  parent company, as resident 
shareholders of a CFC are subject to tax on their pro rata share of the income of 
the CFC, when it arises rather than when it is distributed.120 CFC legislation 
effectively consolidates the profits of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary.121 
The consolidation approach that is entailed in the CFC legislation, in effect, 
contradicts the basic structure of tax treaties.122 Vann notes: 
Under CFC legislation a parent corporation is effectively taxed on the profits of a 
subsidiary resident, and deriving profits in another country. The OECD recognises the 
separate existence of subsidiaries and … assumes the separate taxation of corporations 
in a group… CFC legislation is effectively a consolidation of corporation [sic] accounts in 
accounting terms. In this case the domestic legislation is seeking to bring tax treatment  
back into line with accounting treatment, but the effect is to render the associated 
enterprises article, and for that matter the dividend article, in the Model treaty 
                                                 
119  Arnold & McIntyre at 87. 
120  Rosembuj at 335. 
121  Sandler at 96. 
122  Sandler at 2. 
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irrelevant.123 
 
As mentioned above, double taxation treaties also have as one of their 
objectives, the prevention of double taxation.124 Double taxation results when two 
or more countries tax the same entity or the same income. It could either be 
juridical or economic double taxation.125 The term “juridical double taxation” is 
generally defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) 
countries on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for 
identical periods.126 Juridical double taxation arises when the same income is 
subject to tax in both the source country of the income and the resident country 
of the taxpayer. Juridical double taxation can also arise if two countries treat the 
same entity as resident therein, for example, a company incorporated in one 
country with its central management and control located in another country, or if 
the country taxes the worldwide income of its citizens even if resident in another 
country.127 
 
Economic double taxation arises when the same economic transaction, item, or 
income is taxed in two or more jurisdictions during the same period, but in the 
hands of different taxpayers.128 For example, economic double taxation arises if, 
the law of one country taxes by reference to the legal owner of capital, while 
another country taxes by reference to the person in possession, or control of the 
capital. Economic double taxation also arises where one country taxes a legal 
entity and attributes its income, or capital for tax purposes, to a resident who has 
an interest in the entity.129 The taxation of a company’s profits by one country, 
and its distributed profits (ie dividends) by another country, is generally 
considered to be a form of economic double taxation, regardless of the length of 
time that separates the taxation of the profits and the payment of the dividend. 
CFC provisions could give rise to economic double taxation in that, while the 
                                                 
123  RJ Vann “A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?” (1991) 45 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 99.  
124  Arnold & McIntyre at 105. 
125  N Boldman “International Tax Avoidance” (1981) 35 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation at 443; M Hampton The Offshore Interface: Tax Havens in the Global 
Economy (1996) at 12. 
126  Arnold & McIntyre at 29; R Rohatgi Basic International Taxation (2002) at 12. 
127  Sandler at 15-16.  
128  Arnold & McIntyre at 29; Rohatgi at 12. 
129  Sandler at 16. 
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resident country of the shareholders does not necessarily disregard the foreign 
company, its CFC legislation allocates the company’s income pro rata amongst 
the resident shareholders.130   Vann notes: 
The increasing use of more and more extensive legislation in the CFC area will also 
inevitably lead to economic double taxation of the same income.131 
 
There is, however, the view that the OECD Model Tax Convention is only 
concerned about “juridical double taxation” and not “economic double taxation” 
(which could be potentially caused by the CFC rules).132  Therefore, that where a 
non-resident company is taxed in one state, while the resident shareholders are 
taxed in the other state there is no compatibility problem with the OECD Model 
Convention. However, this makes little sense in the “real world” where economic 
double taxation is of concern to taxpayers.133 Paragraph 7 of the Commentary on 
article 1 of the OECD Model Convention provides in part that 
the purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international 
double taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and 
person; they should not, however help tax avoidance or evasion. 
 
This paragraph does not explicitly say that it does not cover economic double 
taxation.134 The argument that the OECD Model Convention does not deal with 
economic double taxation, flies in the face of the fact that the OECD Model 
contains certain provisions for the relief of economic double taxation, if the profits 
of one enterprise are simultaneously subject to tax in the hands of another 
enterprise.135 An example is article 9 of the OECD Model, which is generally a 
transfer pricing provision. In assessing transactions between related enterprises, 
this article, allows a country to include in the profits of a resident enterprise, such 
profits as would have been included had the enterprises dealt with each other at 
arm’s length. Thus, if one country increases the profits of its resident enterprise, 
and no compensating adjustment is made by the other country, then economic 
double taxation would result because the same profits would be taxed in both 
                                                 
130  Sandler at 16. 
131  Vann at 99.  
132  M Lang, HJ Aigner, U Scheurerle & M Stefaner CFC Legislation Tax Treaties and EC Law 
(2004) at 631. 
133  Lang et al 624. 
134  Sandler 99-100. 
135  AJM Jimënez “The 2003 Revision of the OECD Commentary on the Improper Use of 
Tax treaties: A Case for the Declining Effect of the OECD Commentaries?” (2004) 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 24. 
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countries. Article 9(2) provides that, where double taxation occurs because one 
country makes an adjustment under article 9(1) to the profits a resident 
enterprise, the other state, assuming it agrees to the alteration shall make 
appropriate adjustments to the amount of tax charged on  
those profits. The gist of this article shows that the OECD also deals with 
economic double taxation. 136  
 
It is further reasoned that the methods that a country uses to eliminate double 
taxation conflict with CFC legislation. Article 23A and 23B of the OECD Model 
Convention provide two methods by which double taxation can be eliminated. 
These are the so called: “credit method” and the “exemption method”. Under the 
credit method, a resident taxpayer is entitled to a tax credit for the foreign tax 
paid or payable on foreign source income.137 The credit is generally limited to the 
amount of domestic tax otherwise payable in respect of that income.138 Under the 
exemption method, income from foreign sources is not subject to tax in the 
resident country (although it may be relevant in determining the rate of tax 
payable on domestic income in a progressive rate structure).139 
 
In those countries that apply a credit method, CFC legislation prevents the 
deferral of domestic taxation. In those countries that apply the exemption 
methods, CFC legislation is necessary in order to prevent the outright exclusion 
from domestic tax of certain foreign-source income.140 Thus, CFC legislation 
operates as an exception to the exemption in particular circumstances. Within a 
purely domestic context, the CFC legislation forms a rational and defensible part 
of the overall tax regime. However, difficulties can arise because of the operation 
of tax treaty provisions that are designed to eliminate double taxation, and are 
not necessarily compatible with the operation of the CFC legislation.141  An 
exemption provision in a treaty can undermine the efficacy of a country’s CFC 
legislation, if the distributive rules in a tax treaty exempt certain income from tax 
in a particular country. The imposition of tax on that income by that country would 
                                                 
136  Jimënez 2004 at 24; Sandler at 100. 
137  For example s 6quat in the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended. 
138  Sandler at 17. 
139  Sandler at 17. 
140  Sandler at 17. 
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be considered a breach of the tax treaty.142  
 
It is also argued that CFC legislation conflicts with the rules that deal with the 
allocation of the jurisdiction to tax certain types of income, in terms of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention.143 The existence and the extent of the conflict may 
depend on the characteristics of the particular CFC legislation. As pointed out 
above,144 there are two broad approaches that countries use: On the one hand 
there is the “entity approach”, under which all of the income of the CFC is 
attributed pro rata to domestic shareholders.145  Then, on the other hand there is 
the “transaction approach”, under which only tainted income (eg passive income) 
of the CFC is attributed pro rata to domestic shareholders.146 It is argued that 
CFC legislation that utilises an entity approach may be contrary to the “business 
profits” article (article 7(1)) of a double tax treaty between the country imposing 
the CFC regime and the CFC’s country of residence. Article 7(1) of the OECD 
Model Convention states the following: 
The profits of an enterprise of a contracting State shall be taxable only in that State 
unless the enterprise carries on business in the other contacting State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as 
aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other state but only so much of 
them as is attributable to that permanent establishment. 
 
In summary, article 7(1) stipulates that a country cannot tax the profits of an 
enterprise which is not resident in that country unless the profits are derived from 
a permanent establishment situated therein. It is argued that this is precisely 
what CFC legislation does when the entity approach is applied. It taxes the 
resident shareholders on their pro rata share of the profits of a non-resident 
enterprise. Thus, where in accordance with article 7 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, a tax treaty between a shareholder’s country of residence and the 
CFC’s  country of residence gives the latter the exclusive jurisdiction to tax the  
CFC’s income, or to limit the jurisdiction of the former to tax such income, this 
may result in conflicts between the CFC legislation and the tax treaty.147 
                                                                                                                                            
141  Sandler at 17. 
142  Sandler at 19. 
143  Sandler at 39. 
144  See par 4.1 above. 
145  Sandler at 19. 
146  Sandler at 19. 
147  Arnold (2004) at 252; Jimënez (2004) at 24. 
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There are, however, some arguments that CFC legislation is not contrary to 
article 7(1). It is claimed that the main function of article 7(1) is to limit the 
jurisdiction of the source country, to the taxation of the profits of a non-resident 
enterprise’s permanent establishment located therein. CFC legislation on the 
other hand, has nothing to do with taxation in the source country, but rather 
imposes a tax based on the nationality or residence of the shareholder.148  
 
It is also argued that CFC legislation that employs the entity approach, conflicts 
with article 10(5) of the OECD Model Convention. This article provides as 
follows:  
Where a company which is a resident of a contracting State derives profits or income 
from the other contracting state, that other state may not, … subject the company’s 
undisturbed profits to a tax on the company’s undistributed profits, even if … the 
undistributed profits consist wholly or partly profits or income arising in such other state. 
 
In summary, article 10(5) stipulates that the source country cannot tax the 
undistributed profits of a corporation resident in the other country even if the 
undistributed profits consist wholly, or partly, of profits, or income arising from the 
source country. It is argued that this is precisely the result when a country uses 
its CFC legislation to tax the profits of the CFC that are sourced in that 
country.149 Some commentators however argue that article 10(5) does not 
conflict with CFC legislation, because this article precludes the source country 
from imposing a tax on the CFC itself and yet under CFC legislation, the tax is 
imposed on the resident shareholders of the CFC, not on the CFC’s undistributed 
profits.150 
 
For those countries that apply CFC legislation that follows the “transaction 
approach”, there are arguments that the conflict between CFC legislation and 
articles 7(1) and 10(5) may be more limited.151 If the tainted income of the CFC 
can be characterised as profits under article 7(1), or undistributed profits under 
article 10(5), then the same arguments made with respect to the “entity-
                                                 
148  Jimënez (2004) at 23; Arnold (2004) at 252-253. 
149  Sandler at 103; K Vogel Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 3 ed (1997) at 260; 
M Lang “CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties” (2003) 57 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation at 56. 
150  Arnold (2004) at 253.  
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approach” CFC legislation may preclude the application of the “transaction-
approach” CFC legislation. However, article 7(7) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention provides that “where profits include items of income which are dealt 
with separately in other articles of this Convention, then the provisions of those 
Articles shall not be affected by the provisions of this Article”. As article 7(1) 
refers to “the profits of an enterprise”, if the tainted income of the CFC retains its 
original character as passive income such as, interest, dividends, rent, royalties 
or capital gains, that do not fall within article 7(1) or 10(5), but are dealt with in 
separate treaty provisions, then neither article 7(1) or article 10(5) wholly 
precludes the application of the CFC legislation. The reason why these articles 
cannot apply is that it is not “profits” or “undistributed profits” of the CFC that are 
subject to tax.152 
 
Generally, countries that are against the contentions that CFC legislation 
conflicts with articles 7(1) and 10(5) of the OECD Model Convention, hold the 
view that neither article 7(1) nor article 10(5) precludes a country from taxing its 
residents on their income, even if the income is measured by reference to their 
share of undistributed profits of an entity resident in the other country.153 It is 
further reasoned that CFC rules are anti-avoidance rules, and taxpayers should 
not be able to rely on the provisions of tax treaties, such as article 7(1) and 10(5), 
to prevent a country from protecting its domestic tax base.154 Furthermore, that 
tax treaties are not intended to harmonise competing tax systems, rather they 
deal with particular aspects of cross-border income flows. In addition to the 
prevention of double taxation, tax treaties are also directed at the elimination of 
fiscal evasion and tax avoidance.155 CFC legislation may in this respect not be 
considered in breach of international tax treaties. This legislation is generally 
designed to preserve equity within a domestic tax regime. As an anti-avoidance 
legislative mechanism, it cannot be said to breach the spirit of bilateral tax 
treaties as both serve the same purpose.156  
 
                                                                                                                                            
151  Sandler at 20. 
152  Sandler at 20. 
153  Arnold (2004) at 253 
154  Arnold (2004) at 253. 
155  Par 7 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention. 
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The OECD’s views on the conflict between CFC legislation and tax treaties  
 
The OECD recognises implicitly that controlled foreign corporations do not raise 
treaty problems.157 The Commentaries on the OECD Model Tax Convention that 
deal with the conflict between CFC legislation and tax treaties, were incorporated 
in 1992, and were based on the 1987 OECD Report on base companies.158 
Paragraph 43 of this Report states:  
Under existing counteracting measures (subpart F type measures), the country imposes 
a tax on residents who are shareholders in the foreign base company. The foreign 
company as such is not taxed; generally the income which gives rise to the taxation does 
not originate in the country of the base company but in the taxing country itself or in a 
third country. A tax treaty between the country using the counteracting legislation and the 
country of the base country usually protects, however, income flows only between these 
two countries. The first-mentioned country may therefore claim that the tax imposed 
under the counteracting legislation does not come under the scope of the said tax treaty. 
 
Paragraph 45 of the Report articulates the arguments against the suggestion that 
CFC legislation constituted a breach of the general structure and spirit of tax 
treaties. The paragraph states the following:  
(a) On the technical level, counteracting measures can attribute the activities – and thus 
income – to a shareholder, which is not contrary to tax treaties. If the counteracting 
measures have the effect of taxing a deemed dividend of the base company, this is 
well within the taxing rights conferred on the taxpayer’s country of residence under 
the rules of tax treaties regarding taxation of dividends (cf. Articles 10, 23A and 23B 
of the OECD Model). 
(b) On the tax policy level, counteracting measures pierce only the “umbrella effect” of 
the taxpayers’ arrangement. This effect and the consequent possibilities for an 
independent deferral are not guaranteed by tax treaties which were never intended to 
prohibit national safeguards for the equity and neutrality of a country’s tax law; 
(c) On the international level, as long as some countries regard it as a sovereign right to 
shape their fiscal systems in a way which might negatively affect other countries, tax 
authorities in these other countries must safeguard their sovereign right to preserve 
the equity and neutrality of their tax systems. It has never been intended that tax 
treaties would replace national sovereign rights with international co-operation to 
safeguard the integrity of tax systems. 
 
The 1987 OECD Report shows that the majority of the OECD member countries 
do not consider CFC rules to be contrary to the underlying principles of the 
OECD Model Convention.159 However, paragraph 46 of the Report points out that 
                                                                                                                                            
156  Sandler at 221. 
157  Par 23 of the Commentary on art 1 and par 37 of the Commentary on art 10 of the OECD 
Model Convention.  
158  OECD “Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies” in International 
Tax Avoidance and Evasion – Four Related Studies (1987).  
159  Switzerland was the only country to register an observation on the 1987 OECD Report on 
Base Companies. According to Switzerland, certain domestic anti-avoidance rules (e.g 
transfer pricing and substance-over-form rules) were contrary to the spirit of tax treaties 
because they result in the extra-territorial application of domestic legislation. Switzerland 
151 
 
 
 
 
[w]hile counteracting measures as described above are not inconsistent with the spirit of 
tax treaties, there is agreement that member countries should carefully observe the 
specific obligations clearly evidenced in tax treaties, as long as there is no clear evidence 
that the treaties are being improperly used. Furthermore, it seems desirable that 
counteracting measures comply with the spirit of tax treaties with a view to avoiding 
double taxation. Where the taxpayer complies with such counteracting measures, it might 
furthermore be adequate to grant him the protection which the treaty network would have 
provided if the taxpayer had not used the base the company. . 
 
 In this respect it can be argued that the rationale of the 1987 Report is rather 
confusing. On the one hand the Report suggests that the CFC legislation does 
not breach the spirit of tax treaties. On the other hand the Report adds that there 
should be limits on counteracting measures in order to avoid conflicts with certain 
basic principles of international taxation evidenced in tax treaties.160  
 
The findings of the 1987 OECD Report were incorporated in the 1992 
Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention.161 Paragraph 23 of the 1992 
Commentary on article 1 stated that CFC rules “are not addressed in tax treaties 
and are therefore not affected by them”. Paragraph 24 of the Commentary on 
article 1 provided that CFC rules “do not have to be confirmed in the text of the 
convention to be applicable”. The 1992 Commentary, however, was unclear in 
respect of the conflict between CFC legislation and tax treaties. For instance, the 
Commentary on article 1 dealt collectively with CFC rules and substance-over-
form rules.162 Although paragraph 25 of the Commentary on article 1 
acknowledged that CFC rules “are not inconsistent with the spirit of tax treaties”, 
it went on to indicate that “it seems desirable that counteracting measures 
comply with the spirit of tax treaties with a view to avoiding double taxation”. The 
Commentary attempted to make it clear that most OECD member countries 
consider domestic anti-abuse rules to be consistent with the provisions of tax 
treaties. However, it also seemed to recognise the views of the minority of OECD 
                                                                                                                                            
noted that, such domestic anti-avoidance rules should be applied only after consultation 
with a country’s treaty partner, and after taking the treaty partner’s interests into 
consideration.  Although this observation did not refer to specifically to CFC legislation, 
the concerns raised apply equally to CFC legislation. See par 95 and 96 of the 1987 
OECD Report on Base Companies. 
160  Sandler at 91; AJM Jimënez “Domestic Anti-Abuse Rules and Double Taxation Treaties: A 
Spanish Perspective – Part II” (2002) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 
624.  
161  AJM Jimënez “Domestic Anti-Abuse Rules and Double Taxation Treaties: A Spanish 
Perspective – Part I” (2002) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 548.  
162  Arnold (2004) at 252. 
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member countries, and to emphasise the limits imposed by tax treaties on the 
application of domestic ant-avoidance rules in order for them to be consistent 
with treaties.163 On the whole, the 1992 Commentary on article 1 was confusing. 
 
 
 
In the 1998 OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition,164 the OECD 
acknowledged that: 
[i]n several reports, the conclusions of which have been incorporated into different parts 
of the Commentaries to the OECD Model, the Committee has discussed the interaction of 
internal anti-abuse measures (e.g thin capitalisation, CFC, general anti-abuse norms) 
with double taxation conventions and has concluded in general that these measures are 
compatible with double taxation conventions.165 
 
The 1998 Report conceded, however, that these conclusions are sometimes not 
clear or are expressed in a mitigated form. It recommended that “the 
Commentary on the Model Tax Convention be clarified to remove any uncertainty 
or ambiguity regarding the compatibility of domestic anti-abuse measures with 
the Model Tax Convention”.166 
 
In 2003 changes were made to the Commentary on the Model Tax Convention. 
The Commentary on article 1, clarifies the relationship between CFC rules and 
tax treaties. Paragraph 23 of the Commentary on article 1 asserts that CFC rules 
have been adopted by a significant number of OECD member and non-member 
countries and that they “are now internationally recognised as a legitimate 
instrument to protect the domestic tax base”. Furthermore, that CFC rules are not 
addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them.167  
 
In response to the arguments that CFC legislation contradicts article 7(1) and 
article 10(5) of the OECD Model Convention, paragraph 23 of the Commentary 
on article 1 states that these articles are not being read in context. Paragraph 
10(1) of the Commentary on article 7(1) explains that, the purpose of this article  
is to provide limits to the right of one contracting state to tax the business profits of 
                                                 
163  Arnold (2004) at 246. 
164  OECD Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998).  
165  Par 123 of the Harmful Tax Competition Report. 
166  Par 48-49 of the 1998 OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition. 
167  This position was not changed from the pre-2003 Commentary. 
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enterprises that are residents of the other contracting state. The paragraph does not limit 
the right of a contracting state to tax its own residents under controlled foreign company 
provisions found in its domestic law even though such tax imposed on these residents 
may be computed by reference to the part of the profits of an enterprise that is resident of 
the other contracting state that is attributable to these residents’ participation in that 
enterprise. Tax so levied by a state on its own resident does not reduce the profits of the 
enterprise of the other state and may not, therefore be said to have been levied on such 
profits. 
 
 
Paragraph 37 of the commentary on article 10 explains that 
it might be argued that where the taxpayer’s country of residence, pursuant to its 
controlled foreign companies legislation or other rules with similar effect seeks to tax 
profits which have not been distributed, it is acting contrary to the provisions of paragraph 
5. However, it should be noted that the paragraph is confined to taxation at source and, 
thus, has no bearing on the taxation at residence under such legislation or rules. In 
addition, the paragraph concerns only the taxation of the company and not that of the 
shareholder”.  
 
Paragraph 23 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Convention 
further provides that  
whilst some countries have felt it useful to expressly clarify, in their conventions, that 
controlled foreign companies legislation did not conflict with the Convention, such 
clarification is not necessary. It is recognised that controlled foreign companies legislation 
structured in this way is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention.  
 
The only caveat to applying CFC rules in the context of tax treaties is found in 
paragraph 26 of the Commentary on article 1, which provides that CFC rules “as 
general rule … should not be applied, where the relevant income has been 
subject to taxation that is comparable to that in the country of residence of the 
taxpayer.”168  
 
                                                 
168  Arnold (2004) at 254. Five countries (Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland) made observations on the statement in the commentary that, there is no 
conflict between CFC rules and tax treaties. Portugal entered a general observation that, it 
will not adhere to the Commentary concerning the relationship between tax treaties and 
domestic anti-avoidance rules, “whenever, the prevailing hierarchy of tax conventions 
regarding internal law, is not respected”. Belgium holds the view that, CFC rules are 
contrary to art 5(7), 7(1) and 10(5) of the OECD Model Convention because, they 
disregard the legal personality of foreign corporations. Luxemburg’s position is similar 
although, it applies to all domestic anti-avoidance rules, including CFC rules. According to 
Luxemburg, unless a treaty includes an explicit provision, authorising the application of 
domestic anti-avoidance rules, such rules can be applied only after recourse to the mutual 
agreement procedure. Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland take the position that, 
there might be a conflict between CFC rules and tax treaties depending on the particular 
countries’ CFC rules, and the relationship between tax treaties and domestic law in the 
particular country. See pars 27.4, 27.5, 27.6 27.7 and 27.9 of the Commentary on art 1 of 
the OECD Model Convention. 
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The changes brought about by the 2003 Commentary on the OECD Model 
Convention removed the ambiguity of the previous versions on the issue of the 
interaction between CFC rules and tax treaties.169 However, these changes have 
been criticised, in that, by removing the ambiguities, the OECD got rid of the 
minority view that CFC rules are not compatible with tax treaties.170  Despite the 
2003 changes, it is still arguable that CFC rules are subject to the general 
provisions tax treaties, especially where the treaty itself contains provisions 
aimed at countering its improper use. Although CFC legislation can be used to 
prevent tax avoidance, international law requires that such measures do not 
breach international obligations included in treaties. For example, article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention to the Law of Treaties 1969 provides that every treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. 
Article 27 of the Convention furthermore provides that a party may not invoke the 
provisions of domestic law as justification for its failure to comply with the 
conditions of a treaty. More importantly, in as far as efficacy is concerned; the 
legislation cannot breach rules of international law that take precedence in the 
event of a conflict between the two.171 
 
The OECD’s reasoning in paragraph 24 of the Commentary on the 2003 Model 
Tax that anti-abuse rules such as CFC legislation are part of domestic tax laws 
for determining the taxable event, and therefore these rules are not affected by 
treaties, has also been criticised.172 Jiménez 173 argues that the link between anti-
abuse rules and taxable events is not a powerful argument for concluding that 
because anti-abuse rules and tax treaties operate in two different spheres, one 
does not affect the other. Furthermore, that in some instances, “tax treaties  
do affect taxable events”. Jimënez174 is of the view that “general anti-abuse 
clauses simply seek to ensure the correct application of a legislative measure or 
                                                 
169  Jimënez (2004) at 23. 
170  Jimënez (2004) at 23. 
171  Sandler at 222. 
172  This reasoning seems to rest on the basic proposition that domestic anti-avoidance rules 
(such as CFC rules) establish the facts to which tax treaties apply. Domestic anti-
avoidance rules may be applied determine the character of amounts or transactions for 
domestic tax purposes. The provisions of the tax treaty then apply to the amounts or 
transactions as characterised pursuant to such domestic anti-avoidance rules. See Arnold 
(2004) at 249-250. 
173  Jimënez (2004) at 23.  
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a treaty, by giving the tax administration the power to take into account elusive 
elements in the process of assessing tax. In contrast, specific anti-abuse clauses 
(eg CFC rules, domestic rules on imputing image rights, etc) do extend the 
taxable event (or the range of conduct that gives rise to tax liability), and this 
extension may be affected by tax treaties”. It is notable that in the 2005 version 
of the Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention, paragraph 24 and 25 of 
the Commentary on article 1 were deleted.  
 
Whether CFC legislation constitutes a breach of countries tax treaties is not free 
from doubt. The interaction between CFC legislation and treaties is an unsettled 
issue and there have been a few cases internationally that have challenged this 
state of affairs.175 Jimënez176 notes that, from an international perspective, 
virtually every state that has CFC legislation is confronted with this problem and 
the solution to it cannot be found by referring only to international law, which 
permits a “non-literal” interpretation of treaties, but is not helpful in establishing 
an international anti-abuse standard. As long as anti-abuse standards differ from 
country to country, and treaties do not have the same status in all countries, the 
problem of the compatibility of CFC legislation with treaties has to be solved in 
the national arena.177 Vogel178 notes that in order to determine the authority and 
relationship between domestic law (eg CFC legislation) and double taxation 
agreement, the specific legal framework of the relevant country has to be 
considered. Vann179 also notes the following:  
It necessarily follows that the priority of the treaty rules over other domestic tax rules 
derives from and is itself subject to domestic law. It may be that the treaty has some 
special status in domestic law which automatically prevails over other domestic law. More 
often than not the treaty has the same status as other domestic tax law and it is possible 
that a treaty could have a status which is inferior to other domestic tax law …   
 
The position in South Africa  
 
As explained above, when calculating the net income of a CFC, the proportionate 
net income to be included in the resident’s income is the net income of the CFC 
                                                                                                                                            
174  Jimënez (2004) at 23.  
175  These cases are referred to in chapter 5 fn 63. 
176  Jimënez Part II at 626. 
177  Jimënez Part II at 626. 
178  Vogel in the Introduction in par 30. 
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as determined in accordance with the Income Tax Act.180 Accordingly, the 
amount is the product of an artificial calculation and not a proportion of the CFC’s 
actual profits. In essence, the effect of this provision is that on a notional basis, a 
portion of the net income of the CFC will be deemed to constitute income in the 
hands of a resident and will thus be taxed as part of the resident’s taxable 
income. The concept “notional amount” is one of the complex and artificial 
aspects of this legislation that is quite difficult to understand.  
 
This notion was borrowed from the United Kingdom after the decision in Bricom 
Holdings Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners.181 Briefly,182 the facts of the case 
were that Bricom Holdings as sole shareholder in a Dutch subsidiary, Spinneys 
International BCV (the CFC), was potentially liable for a portion of the interest 
income of the CFC which accrued to the CFC from moneys lent to the Bricom 
Group Ltd, a company which was resident in the United Kingdom. The 
Commissioner calculated the “chargeable profits” (in South African terms, the 
“net income”) of the CFC on a wholly notional amount, arguing that the tax levied 
is not a corporation tax but a fiscal tax sui generis introduced to cover a specific 
form of tax avoidance. Bricom Holdings Ltd, however, relied on a provision of the 
Netherlands/United Kingdom double tax treaty which provided that interest 
arising in one of the states which is derived and beneficially owned by a resident 
of the other state shall be taxable only in the other state, thus preventing the 
Commissioner from taxing Bricom Holdings Ltd on income which included 
exempt United Kingdom source interest. By implication, this required an answer 
as to whether CFC provisions contravene double taxation agreements. The court 
held that the treaty did not apply, because the interest had lost its character as 
interest, and that what was actually taxed was a notional amount derived from a 
hypothetical calculation. It was held further that the double tax agreement 
pertained to ”interest” only, but  that the amount included in the calculation of the 
net income of the CFC was only “similar” to interest. The Bricom Holdings Ltd 
case is discussed in detail in chapter 5.  
                                                                                                                                            
179  Vann at 6. 
180  See par 4.3 above under the heading “Net Income”. 
181  1977 STC 1179. 
182  The facts of this case are discussed in detail in chapter 5 where the United Kingdom 
provisions are dealt with. 
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As a result of the decision in Bricom Holdings Ltd, section 9D in South Africa’s 
Income Tax Act was amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 30 of 
2000. Before the amendment section 9D provided inter alia that there shall be 
included in the income of any resident contemplated in the definition of a CFC, a 
“proportional amount of any investment income received by or accrued to such 
entity …”. These amendments resulted in the inclusion of the wording “an 
amount equal to the proportional amount of the net income of such entity for the 
foreign tax year”. It may thus be argued that before the amendment of section 9D 
the actual foreign investment income itself and not an amount calculated with 
reference to that foreign investment income would be included in the income of 
the South African resident.183 After the amendment the wording of the section 
now refers to “net income” as an amount equal to the taxable income of such 
entity determined in accordance with the Act. This implies that it is not the actual 
income but an amount equal or similar to such which is included in the income of 
a controlling resident as if it had been a resident for certain specified sections of 
the Act. This would accord with the United Kingdom decision in Bricom Holdings 
Ltd. 
 
As South Africa’s legislators have amended the CFC provisions to suit the 
decision in the Bricom Holdings case, South African residents are now taxed on 
notional amounts. It may thus be argued that it is unlikely that a South African 
court will hold that a South African resident will be entitled to rely on a double 
taxation agreement on the basis that the same amounts are effectively being 
taxed twice.184  
 
Olivier & Honiball185 however note that even after the amendment of section 9D, 
the issue of the conflict between CFC legislation and tax treaties is still unclear. It 
is reasoned that it is not clear whether the income attributed to the South African 
residents retains its nature as business profits or whether it is merely a notional 
amount. If it is a notional amount, the applicability of article 23 of the OECD 
                                                 
183  Olivier & Honiball at 389-390. 
184  Olivier & Honiball at 396-397. 
185  Olivier & Honiball at 397. 
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Model Convention, to the attributed income is confusing. As discussed above,186 
article 23 of the OECD Model Convention deals with the exemption and credit 
methods as means of eliminating double taxation. A literal interpretation of article 
23 to the attributed income does not lead one to the conclusion that there is a 
clear treaty override.187 
 
It is also argued that as the amendments to section 9D were as a result of the 
United Kingdom Bricom Holdings case, it is arguable whether section 9D can 
override a tax treaty as this case is a foreign court case that does not have 
binding force. It only serves as persuasive authority.188 Meyerowitz189 notes that 
although foreign cases such as English cases have influenced the development 
of the South African income tax jurisprudence to a considerable extent, these 
decisions cannot be followed without qualification. If the wording of the statutory 
provision with which the case deals is not similar to the South African one, the 
decision cannot be applied.190 Oliver and Honiball191 also note that if a foreign 
court decision is from a constitutional environment that is different from the one 
in South Africa,192 for instance where tax treaties have a privileged status, it 
would not be directly relevant to the debate on treaty/CFC conflict in South 
Africa, but would merely be persuasive.   
 
It can thus be said that despite the amendment of section 9D as explained 
above, an interpretation of this section in the context of a tax treaty shows the 
issue of the conflict of CFC legislation and tax treaties is not a settled matter in 
South Africa. In order to resolve this matter, it is important to note that tax 
treaties are international agreements and they must be considered both within 
their international context, as well as within the domestic legal framework of the 
relevant countries.193 It has indeed been argued that the manner in which a 
domestic court will resolve the conflict between CFC legislation and a tax treaty, 
                                                 
186  See discussion with reference to fn 122 and 123 above. 
187  Olivier & Honiball at 397. 
188  Olivier & Honiball at 396-397. See also CIR v Simpson 1949 (4) SA 678 (A) at 700. 
189  Meyerowitz in par 3.26 and 3.30. 
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proceeding paragraphs.   
193  Olivier & Honiball at 29. 
159 
 
 
 
 
depends on whether it is the CFC legislation or the tax treaty that takes 
precedence.194 In order to determine the status and domestic application of 
treaties in South African law, the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa195 and the Income Tax Act must be considered. Section 2 of the 
Constitution provides that the Constitution is the “supreme law of the land”. This 
implies that South African law, which includes statute law, common law, 
international customary law and international law, are subject to the Constitution. 
Section 231(4) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.  
 
In effect, an international agreement or treaty does not become part of domestic 
law until it is enacted into law by national legislation.196 There are three principle 
methods employed by the legislature to transform treaties into municipal law. 
Firstly, the provisions of a treaty may be embodied in the text of an Act of 
Parliament; secondly, the treaty may be included as a schedule to a statute; and 
thirdly, an enabling Act of Parliament may give the executive the power to bring a 
treaty into effect in municipal law by means of proclamation or notice in the 
Government Gazette.197 
 
Section 108(1) of the Income Tax Act read with section 231 of the Constitution 
provide inter alia that the national executive of South Africa may enter into an 
agreement with the government of any other country to regulate the taxation of 
income, profits, gains and donations which may be taxable in both countries. As 
soon as the double tax agreement is ratified and has been published in the 
Government Gazette, its provisions are effective as if they had been incorporated 
into the Income Tax Act.198 This implies that treaty provisions and any other 
provision in the Income Tax Act (eg section 9D) have equal status under South 
                                                 
194  Sandler at 99. 
195  Of 1996. 
196  J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 61; GE Devenish 
The South African Constitution (2005) at 416. 
197  Dugart at 61. 
198 Olivier & Honiball at 395; Meyerowitz in par 30.11; Huxham & Haupt at 356. See also AW 
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African law, even if the Income Tax Act contains a provision that is inconsistent 
with the treaty.199 Indeed, in a number of cases, although decided in a different 
context, it has been held that tax treaties do not have a special or privileged 
status under South African law.200 Thus, a court may not automatically assume 
that a treaty overrides domestic legislation.201  It is however worth noting that in 
2003, the Supreme Court of Appeal in AM Moola Group Ltd and Others v 
CSARS and Others202 held as follows: 
If there were to be an apparent conflict between general provisions of the statute and 
particular provisions of an agreement, difficulties of interpretation might arise. The Act 
must, of course, prevail in such a case: the agreement once promulgated is by definition 
part of the Act. It must follow that where words which are defined in the Act occur in the 
agreement; they must be given the meaning assigned to them by the Act unless the 
context indicates the contrary.203  
 
This case dealt with a conflict between a trade agreement and the Customs and 
Excise Act 91 of 1964. Section 49 of this Act provides that a trade agreement is 
deemed to be enacted into law when it is published in the Government Gazette. 
Note however that this case dealt with the interpretation of a conflict between a 
trade agreement and the general provisions of the Customs and Excise Act, as 
well as the words defined in the Act. Reference to this case may therefore not be 
relevant in resolving a conflict between a tax treaty and the specific CFC 
legislation in the Income Tax Act. 
   
From the above, it can thus be said that the Constitution sets out the procedure 
for the incorporation of treaties into the Income Tax Act, but the Act does not 
provide a solution where there is a conflict between a treaty and a particular 
provision of the Act.204 In order to resolve the conflict between treaties and CFC 
legislation a court will have to consider the object the purpose of the relevant 
provisions. In this regard, a court would consider South African common law 
                                                 
199  Olivier & Honball at 30. 
200  Pan American World Airways Inc v SA Fire and Accident Insurance Co Ltd 1965(3) SA 
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rules of interpretation of statues as well as international interpretation rules in so 
far as they are relevant.205 
 
South African rules of interpreting statues  
 
Since tax treaties have the same status as any other provision in the Income Tax 
Act, tax treaties have to be interpreted in terms of the normal rules regarding the 
interpretation of statutes in order to make sense of any conflicts.206 In ITC 
1544207 the following was held: 
The terms of a double tax Convention to which statutory status has been conferred are to 
be considered as any other statutory provisions to determine the extent to which these 
conflict with the provisions of another statute and whether such provisions have been 
modified thereby.208  
 
In South Africa, common law rules for the interpreting of statues require that the 
actual words of the relevant provision have to be interpreted in context.209  This 
rule was pointed out in Norden & Another NNO v Bhanki & Others 210 where the 
court held the following: 
 However sophisticated the methods of construction of a statue employed by any court, the 
object of interpretation must ever be the ascertainment of the meaning of the language in 
its context.  
 
In terms of this rule, the purpose or object of the legislation is the prevailing 
factor in interpretation.211 It may thus be argued that as the object of a treaty in 
general is to avoid the same income being taxed twice, any domestic legislation 
which has the effect that the same income is taxed twice, will be subordinate to 
the treaty provisions.212 It is reasoned that support for this view is found in 
section 108(1) of the Income Tax Act which inter alia provides that  
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205  Olivier & Honiball at 33. 
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The National Executive may enter into an agreement with the agreement of any other 
country, whereby arrangements are made with such government with a view to the 
prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of the levying, under the laws of the Republic 
and of such other country, of tax in respect of the same income, profits or gains … under 
the said laws of the Republic and of such country.  
 
The wording of this section makes it clear that the aim of tax treaties from a 
South African point of view is to prevent economic and juridical double 
taxation.213  Olivier and Honiball214 note the following:  
In terms of this view, even if tax is payable in respect of particular income, profits or gains 
under South African domestic law, if in terms of the provisions of a treaty the relevant tax 
is not payable in South Africa, or only a part of that tax is payable, then the treaty 
automatically takes precedence and overrides the relevant domestic law in terms of the 
tax is payable. This view holds that s 108(1) presupposes a liability for tax under the laws 
of laws of South Africa and provides for the conclusion of a treaty to prevent, mitigate or 
discontinue that liability. Under this view it would be absurd to interpret s 108 as meaning 
that a treaty cannot or does not apply where the Income Tax Act imposes a liability for 
tax, or cannot override the provisions of the Income Tax Act, as such an interpretation 
would have the result that provisions in a treaty providing for the prevention, mitigation or 
discontinuance of a liability for tax would be meaningless and would serve no purpose.  
 
 
Support for the view that a treaty overrides domestic law is also found in some 
court cases. For example, in ITC 1544 215 the court held the following:  
The effect of section 108(2) of the Act is to grant statutory relief in certain circumstances 
where the South African imposes a tax, where the provisions of a double-tax Convention 
grant an immunity or exemption from such tax to persons governed by the Convention. 
Tax is not payable to the extent to which an immunity or exemption from tax is granted in 
terms of a binding tax Convention which has been proclaimed and thus has statutory 
effect. 
 
It should be noted that these court decisions were made before the 1996 
Constitution. Therefore, their interpretative relevance is uncertain in light of the 
fact that currently a treaty ranks equally with domestic law.216 A counter 
argument to above views is that a treaty only eliminates double taxation in 
circumstances specifically mentioned in the treaty. It is therefore doubtful 
whether the mere existence of a treaty leads to the conclusion that an amount 
may not be taxed under domestic legislation, if under the provisions of the 
relevant treaty the same amount is taxed in the other contracting State.217  
A rule of interpretation that is internationally accepted and could be relevant in 
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resolving the conflict between CFC legislation and tax treaties is lex posterior 
derogate legi priori (“later in time” rule). In terms of this rule, a statute that was 
promulgated last in time will prevail. The later statute is deemed to have impliedly 
repealed the earlier one.218 In applying this rule, a court would look at the 
respective dates that the treaties came into force and the date that domestic 
legislation was introduced. In respect to the use of this rule, the OECD219 
explains that  
If treaty obligations are considered as having … at the most … the same rank as 
domestic law, they may, within some national legal systems be subject to the rules “lex 
posterior derogate legi priori” (ie later law override prior law). However, the situation is 
less simple to determine in practice since this principle applies only when inconsistencies 
arise between the new law and the prior law and it is well known that courts are reluctant 
to construe treaties as inconsistent with domestic law (and vice versa). 
 
If a country does not grant special status to treaties and it applies the “lex 
posterior derogate legi priori” rule, the provisions of a treaty may be overridden 
by domestic legislation subsequently enacted.220 South Africa does not grant 
special status to treaties and it applies the lex posterior derogate legi priori 
rule.221 One argument against applying the lex posterior derogate legi priori rule 
is that using domestic law to override a treaty provision creates problems as a 
treaty represents a binding contract between the two contracting states. It may  
thus be argued that domestic law cannot subsequently be enacted to override a 
treaty provision as such legislation may be in conflict with a State’s international 
obligations.222 
 
It is also worth noting that it is not clear as to what weight the courts will attach to 
the lex posterior derogate legi priori rule in the light of the other interpretation 
rules. For instance, there is the generalia specialibus non derogant rule which is 
applicable to the resolution of conflicts between general and special laws.223 In 
terms of this rule, a general statue should not be interpreted in such a way as to 
alter specific provisions of an earlier statute or of the common law.224 This rule 
                                                 
218  Du Plessis at 34; Devenish (1992) at 283. 
219  OECD Report on Tax Treaty Override at 8-9. 
220  Olivier & Honiball at 40. 
221  Olivier & Honiball at 41; Steyn at 188.   
222  Olivier & Honiball at 41. 
223  Du Plessis at 41; Devenish (1992) at 280. 
224  Devenish (1992) at 280. 
164 
may justify a departure from the lex posterior derogate legi priori rule.225 In R v 
Gwantshu it was held: 
When the legislature has given attention to a separate subject and made provision for it 
the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with 
a special provision, unless it manifests that intention very clearly. … Where general 
words in a later Act are capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending 
them to subjects specifically dealt with by earlier legislation, that earlier and special 
legislation is not to be … altered … merely by force of such general words, without any 
indication of a particular intention to do so.226   
 
In terms of the generalia specialibus non derogant rule, it could be said that a 
treaty entered into after the introduction of domestic legislation is a subsequent 
general enactment not intended to interfere with the specific domestic 
legislation.227 It could however be reasoned that as tax treaties are international 
agreements, they should be interpreted much more widely than domestic 
legislation. This may require taking international interpretation rules into 
consideration. This reasoning could influence the courts to apply the lex posterior 
derogate legi priori rule (discussed above) since it is an international 
interpretation rule for tax treaties as is evident in the above quotation from the 
OECD Report on treaty override. 
 
International interpretation rules  
 
When interpreting domestic legislation, South African courts are constitutionally 
bound to follow an interpretation consistent with international law. Section 232 of 
the Constitution of South Africa provides that “[c]ustomary international law is law 
in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament”. Section 233 of the Constitution states that  
“[w]hen interpreting legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law”.  
 
Internationally, treaties are classified as international agreements, which have to 
be interpreted by customary international law interpretation rules.228 In 
interpreting tax treaties, a South African court would have to take into 
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consideration, two particular aspects of customary international law: firstly, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969 and secondly, the 
Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention.229  
 
Although South Africa is not a party to the Vienna Convention, South African 
courts are guided by this Convention in respect to South Africa’s treaty relations. 
The Vienna Convention is largely a codification of customary international law; it 
applies to all treaties and not only to countries that have signed the 
convention.230 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides inter alia that 
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
given of the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objects and purposes.  
 
This implies that a treaty should be interpreted in a way that will prevent double 
taxation or avoid inappropriate double exemption of tax.231 In light of this article, it 
may be argued that if a tax treaty between South Africa and a country in which a 
CFC is situated, gives the latter the exclusive jurisdiction to tax the CFC’s 
income, the application of South Africa’s CFC legislation to tax the distributed 
profits of the CFC, may be viewed as a from of double taxation that could be in 
conflict with the tax treaty. However, some of the principles in the Vienna 
Convention may not be applicable in respect to tax treaties. An example is article 
27 of this Convention which provides that a party may not invoke the provisions 
of its national law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This is because 
there could be domestic legislation (for example CFC rules) that could be in 
conflict with the provisions of a tax treaty.232  
 
 
 
As most of South Africa’s tax treaties are based on the OECD Model Convention, 
the Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention can be applied in 
interpreting treaty provisions in South Africa. The OECD Commentary on the 
application and interpretation of the Model Tax Convention has become widely 
accepted and is generally followed by countries which use the OECD Model Tax 
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Convention as a basis for their treaties and as an interpretational aid in applying 
their tax treaties. Although South African is not an OECD member country and 
although the Commentary is not legally binding, South African courts have 
recognised and applied the OECD Commentary.233 In ITC 1503234 it was held 
that a treaty must be interpreted according to the common law rules pertaining to 
the interpretation of statues as well as the OECD Commentary.  
 
The OECD Commentary provides as follows: 
The principle purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating 
international double taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of 
capital and persons. It is also a purpose of tax conventions to prevent tax avoidance and 
evasion.235  
 
Where taxpayers are tempted to abuse the tax laws of a State by exploiting the 
differences between various countries’ laws the OECD provides that  
Such attempts may be countered by provisions or jurisprudential rules that are part of the 
domestic law of the State concerned.  Such a State will then wish, in their bilateral double 
taxation conventions, to preserve the application of provisions of this kind contained in 
their domestic laws.236  
 
The potential application of general anti-abuse provisions does not mean that there is no 
need for the inclusion, in tax conventions, of specific provisions aimed at preventing 
particular forms of tax avoidance. Where specific avoidance techniques have been 
identified or where the use of such techniques is especially problematic, it will be useful to 
add to the Convention provisions that focus directly on the relevant avoidance 
strategy.237    
 
The implication of the above statements is that if an anti-avoidance domestic 
legislation conflicts with a treaty, the conflict must be resolved in the terms of, or 
in the provisions of a treaty. Thus, if a treaty was concluded before the 
introduction of the domestic legislation, it would have to be re-negotiated to allow 
for the operation of such legislation if there was a conflict.238 
 
 
It is however worth noting as discussed above, that the Commentary on the 
OECD Model Convention holds the view that CFC legislation is not in conflict 
with tax treaties. Note however, that not all OECD member countries ascribe to 
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this view.239 Olivier and Honiball240 also note that the OECD Commentaries are 
not always decisive. If other arguments are more persuasive, an interpretation 
deviating from the view in the Commentaries can be followed. Since the 
compatibility of CFC legislation and tax treaties is still a debatable matter 
internationally,241 the OECD Commentary on this matter may not be so helpful in 
finding a solution to a potential conflict in South Africa.  
 
From the above, it has been made clear that CFC legislation and tax treaties 
have equal status in South Africa. In case of a conflict between the two, the 
Income Tax Act does not provide any solution. In order to solve this problem, a 
South African court could attempt to interpret the relevant provisions in order to 
resolve the conflict. A court would thus have to consider domestic rules of 
interpreting statues and international interpretation rules (in so far as they are 
relevant). However, as explained above, an attempt to interpret the treaty 
provisions using the various interpretation rules may not be effective in resolving 
the conflict between CFC rules and tax treaties as some of these interpretation 
rules may not be helpful in resolving this conflict.  
 
Since CFC legislation and tax treaties have equal status in South Africa, it has 
been recommended that potential conflicts could be resolved if South Africa 
comes up with a safeguarding clause that authorises its CFC legislation to 
override its tax treaties.242 Alternatively, South Africa could insert a specific CFC 
clause in the new treaties it negotiates as is recommended by the OECD 
Commentary.243 The problem in the exiting and older treaties could be resolved 
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by re-negotiation.  
 
The issue of the compatibility of tax treaties and CFC legislation is discussed 
further in chapter 5 where reference is given to other jurisdictions244  which have 
dealt with the conflict between CFC rules and tax treaties.  
 
4.8 CHALLENGES E-COMMERCE POSES TO SOUTH AFRICA’S CFC 
LEGISLATION  
 
In chapter 3,245 it was discussed that the development of e-commerce has 
opened up a new route of accessing offshore facilities that challenges current 
jurisdictional requirements that are based on geographical location. E-commerce 
also poses to challenges to the effectiveness of the CFC legislation that is used 
to curb the deferral of taxes. In order to determine how e-commerce challenges  
CFC legislation, it is necessary to reconsider the aspects of South Africa’s CFC 
legislation and consider whether they are affected by e-commerce.  
 
Challenges in determining the geographical location of the controlled 
foreign company 
 
In order to attribute the income of a CFC to South African residents, the starting 
point is to determine whether a foreign company exists in a given situation. 
Traditionally, proof of the existence and the location of a foreign company can be 
verified from the documents that relate to its incorporation in the foreign country.  
 
Although the growth of electronic commerce may not pose major problems with 
regard to companies which are classified as controlled foreign companies,246 e-
commerce may make it difficult to prove the existence and location of a foreign 
company. Unlike traditional companies, often referred to as “bricks and mortar 
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businesses” in that they are located at a certain location, businesses that are 
involved in e-commerce on the Internet do not have a physical presence.247 With 
e-commerce, significant business activities can be undertaken with little or no 
physical activity,248 and electronic functions can be easily and quickly moved 
from one jurisdiction to another without detection.249 An Internet address (domain 
name) does not necessarily prove that a given business is located in a certain 
jurisdiction.250 Although the domain name initially assigned to a given computer 
may be associated with an Internet address that corresponds to that machine’s 
physical location, (for example, a “.za” domain name), the machine may be 
physically moved without affecting its domain name. The owner of a domain 
name may also have it associated with an entirely different computer, in a 
different location. A server with a “.za” domain name need not be located in 
South Africa; and a server with a “.com” domain name may be anywhere.251 The 
fact that electronic addresses do not necessary signify a geographical 
connection, makes it difficult to localise a business to any transaction in any 
single country.252 This implies that many e-commerce enterprises can avoid the 
CFC rules if they take care not to create any taxable presence in any country. 
The mobility of e-commerce may also result in the setting up of more CFC 
arrangements that circumvent the legislation.253  
 
Challenges in determining the domestic shareholders control or interest in 
the foreign company 
 
Even where it may be possible to ascertain that a foreign company exists in a 
given situation, for that foreign company to qualify as a CFC in terms of section 
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9D of the Income Tax Act, one or more South African residents should directly or 
indirectly hold more than 50% of the total participation rights or voting rights of 
that foreign company.  
 
In traditional commerce, determining the percentage of participation rights or 
voting rights may not be very difficult, as this can be proved from the legal 
documents of the company. Paper trail of the necessary records can be 
consulted and these are normally reliable and cannot easily be altered without 
detection. Sometimes, however, relevant information may not be easily 
accessible, or it may be difficult to interpret. Some of the information may not 
even be easily obtainable because of confidentiality concerns, or geographical 
reasons, or it may simply not exist.254 In the e-commerce era these matters are  
made more complicated as there is usually no paper trail of e-commerce 
transactions. The available information may not be as reliable, as it can easily be 
altered without leaving a trace if the object is tax avoidance. Taxpayers could for 
instance alter information regarding participation or voting rights in a CFC and 
their percentage holding in a CFC so as to avoid being caught by the CFC 
rules.255  
The reference to “indirect” participate rights, or voting rights in a foreign 
company, is another aspect that can be manipulate in e-commerce to avoid this 
legislation. Currently, there is lack of clarity as regards the ambit of indirect 
participation rights. As explained above, it is not clear whether the word 
“indirectly” refers to holding through another company, and not to conditional 
holdings, such as those of unsecured creditors.256 With the anonymous nature of 
e-commerce, taxpayers could manipulate the lack of clarity in this aspect of the 
legislation to avoid the CFC rules. This is even made worse by the fact that 
section 82 of the Income Tax Act places the onus of proof on the South African 
shareholder to prove such indirect involvement.  
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Challenges to the exclusions to the CFC rules 
 
In terms of sub-clause (c) of the definition of a CFC, residents who are 
connected persons, who in aggregate hold more than 50% of the participation 
rights or voting rights in a foreign listed company, or a foreign collective 
investment scheme or arrangement, but individually hold less than 5% of the 
participation rights or voting rights in the listed company, or a foreign collective 
investment scheme, or arrangement (equity unit trust), are excluded from CFC 
rules. As mentioned above, the purpose of this exclusion is to lessen the 
administrative burden on tax authorities, as it is often difficult to determine the 
identity of those who own shares in large-scale entities where the interest is less 
than 5%.257 However, even in traditional commerce, it is not easy to obtain 
information in respect of a shareholding of less than 5%.258 With e-commerce, 
these problems are magnified, thus making it possible to manipulate this 
provision so as to avoid the CFC rules. E-commerce also makes it possible to 
manipulate this provision so as not to comply with the strict reporting 
requirements of South African residents with the participation rights or voting 
rights in a CFC, in terms of section 72 of the Act.  
 
Apart from the challenges of determining the percentage of participation rights as 
explained above, e-commerce makes it difficult to determine whether for 
purposes of this exclusion, the relevant residents are connected persons. Section 
1 of the Income Tax Act defines the term “connected person” in relation to a 
company to include: its holding company, its subsidiary and any other company 
where both such companies are subsidiaries of the same holding company. 
Determining whether residents are connected to each other may not pose major 
challenges in traditional trade. In e-commerce, if a CFC is resident in a tax-haven 
jurisdiction where banks have strict secrecy provisions, it may be difficult to 
determine whether a resident has a connection to a particular CFC.259 This may 
be manipulated to take advantage of the CFC rules.  
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Currently, it is not easy to link activities on the Internet to the parties associated 
with such activities. Indeed, as one of the benefits of trading electronically is the 
ability to reach global markets, traders are often not interested in knowing their 
customer’s physical location. Determining, or verifying a party’s identity online is 
not an easy task, especially, if the parties wish to conceal certain information.260 
An Internet address only indicates who is responsible for maintaining that 
address; it provides no links to the computer, its user who is corresponding on 
that address, or even to the place where the computer is located.261 Internet 
users often have no control over, and no interest in, the specific paths their data 
travels in reaching other computers connected to the Internet, or in the physical 
location of the computer or computers from which they retrieve information.262 
Although users may connect to the Internet through phone lines, they also may 
do so using cable systems and wireless forms of communication. Moreover, 
connecting computers to, or disconnecting then from the Internet are tasks that 
are easily accomplished, as is moving a website from a server in one physical 
location to a server in another, without any appreciable effect on online 
service.263 With the anonymous nature of e-commerce, it may be difficult for tax 
administrators to prove that certain parties to an e-commerce transaction are 
connected and are involved in diversion activities. In this way e-commerce can 
be used to take advantage of the “foreign business establishment” exemption to 
the FC rules in order to avoid the CFC rules.  
 
Challenges of determining the net income of a CFC 
 
In terms of the CFC provisions, the net income of the CFC is attributed to the 
South African residents. The net income is an amount equal to the taxable 
income of the foreign company determined in accordance with the provisions of 
the Act as if the company had been a South African resident taxpayer.264 The net 
income of the CFC is calculated at the end of the foreign tax year of the country 
in which the CFC is resident and is included in the resident’s income at the end 
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of the South African year of assessment.265 This implies that in calculating the 
net income of a CFC, companies have to keep two sets of books,  one for the 
country in which the CFC is a resident and one for South African tax purposes. A 
full audit of each company is thus required and a form will have to be completed 
and submitted to SARS for each CFC.266 As explained above, in traditional 
commerce, reliable paper audit trails can be consulted to determine a company’s 
net income. In the e-commerce determining the net income of a company may 
be difficult because there is usually no paper trail of e-commerce transactions. 
Electronic records can easily be altered without trace, or may be encrypted in 
order not to reveal transaction information if the object is tax avoidance. 
 
Challenges e-commerce poses to the some of the exemptions to CFC rules  
 
As discussed above, there are certain exemptions to the CFC rules where 
taxpayers engage in certain activities. Of particular importance to this discussion 
is the “foreign business establishment exemption” to the CFC rules. The 
workings of this exemption face challenges in the e-commerce era that can be 
manipulated to avoid taxes.  
 
As explained above, in terms of section 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act, a “foreign 
business establishment” inter alia refers to a place of business with an office, 
shop, factory, warehouse or other structure which is used by a controlled foreign 
company. This is in line with the definition of the term “permanent establishment” 
as set out in article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital.267 Thus, the understanding of the concept “foreign business 
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establishment” requires one to refer to the interpretation of the term “business 
establishment” as it is used in the OECD Model Convention. In CIR v Dowing,268 
the court held that South Africa is bound to take cognisance of the guidelines for 
interpretation issued by the OECD in its commentaries on the concepts used in 
the OECD Model Tax Convention. Although article 5 of the OECD Convention 
refers to a “fixed place of business”, or “agency presence” in a given jurisdiction, 
to establish a permanent establishment, it is the definition that relates to a “fixed 
place of business” that is of relevance in discussing the challenges that e-
commerce poses to the “foreign business establishment” exemption to the CFC 
rules.  
 
One of the reasons why e-commerce poses challenges to this exemption is 
because the rules used to establish whether a foreign business establishment 
exists are based on geographical location, whereas e-commerce takes place in 
cyberspace.269 Take the example of a CFC that sells software through a website 
that is hosted on a server located in a tax-haven jurisdiction. The parent 
company that created the CFC is resident in South Africa. Customers can 
purchase the software by accessing the CFC’s website and downloading the 
software on their own computers. Setting up a server in a tax-haven jurisdiction 
where customers can download the parent company’s software may be much 
easier than incorporating a more traditional business establishment in the tax 
haven.270 The question that arises is whether the website or the server located in 
the tax-haven jurisdiction qualifies as a “foreign business establishment”271 for it 
to be exempted form the CFC rules.  
 
An Internet website consists of the software and the electronic data that are 
stored on a server. The website is what appears on the computer screen and 
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allows an enterprise to interact with its customers. However, it is not like a “brick 
and mortar office” and so it has been referred to as a “virtual office”.272 Through 
the website, an enterprise can have direct access to any customer who has 
access to the Internet. By logging onto the website customers can select 
products for purchase from an online catalogue and buy them by filling out a form 
and charging the purchase on their personal credit card.273 Since a website  
is a virtual office, it is intangible property. It is not physical and therefore it cannot 
be deemed to be a “foreign business establishment” for purposes of the CFC 
rules.274 
On the other hand, a server is an automated equipment on which an Internet 
website is stored and through which the website is accessible. Since a server is a 
piece of equipment, it has a physical location.275 Often the website through which 
the enterprise carries on its business may be hosted on the server of an Internet 
Service Provider.276 This hosting arrangement usually takes the form of the 
provision of an amount of disk space for the website for the storage of its 
software and data.277 The issue then is whether the server creates a business 
establishment for an enterprise by virtue of the hosting arrangement. In other 
words, can the server be considered to be at the disposal of the enterprise?  
 
When an enterprise conducts its business through a website that is hosted on a 
                                                 
272 Arnold & McIntyre at 153; AW Oguttu & B Van der Merwe ”Electronic Commerce: 
Challenging the Income Tax Base” (2005)17 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 85-86. WJ 
Craig ”E-commerce: Where to Go with Taxation” in A Schulz Legal Aspects of an E-
Commerce Transaction: International Conference in The Hague 26 and 27 October 2004 
(2006) at 231.  
273 Arnold & McIntyre at 153. 
274  OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs “Clarification on the Application of the Permanent 
Establishment Definition in E-commerce: Changes to the Commentary on the Model Tax 
Convention on Article 5” (22 December 2000) at 5. Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/32/1923380.pdf<, last accessed 26 June 2007. 
Simmons & Simmons Communication Practice E-commerce Law: Doing Business Online 
(2001) at 165; C Gringras The Laws of the Internet 2 ed (2003) at 406; ME Plotkin, B 
Wells & K Wimmer E-commerce Law and Business (2003) in par 15.06. 
275  Oguttu & Van der Merwe at 318. 
276  OECD 2000 Report on the Application of the Permanent Establishment Definition in E-
commerce at 5; Schulze at 31, notes that, each internet user must access the internet by 
way of an Internet Service Provider (ISP), which itself is a network. The ISP connects to 
larger regional networks, which, in turn, connect to high capacity networks called 
“backbones”. This network of networks links computers and users worldwide. See also C 
Chen “United States and European Union Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction and their 
Impact on E-Commerce” (2004) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law at 426-427; Plotkin et al in par 15.06.  
277  Oguttu & Van der Merwe at 318; Suddards at 262. 
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server, such hosting arrangements do not necessarily result in the server and its 
location being at the disposal of the enterprise. This is because the enterprise 
does not have a physical presence at the location of the server since the website 
through which it operates is not tangible.278 However, if the enterprise carrying on 
business through a website has the server at its own disposal, for instance if it 
owns (or leases) and operates the server on which the website is stored and 
used, then the place where that server is located could constitute a permanent 
establishment of the enterprise. This is however still subject to three conditions. 
Firstly, the server must be “fixed” at some location for a sufficient period of time 
in order to constitute a permanent establishment. 279 Secondly, the meaning of 
permanent establishment still requires that the business of the enterprise should 
be wholly or partly carried on through the place where the server is located.280 
Thirdly, a server will only be considered a permanent establishment of the 
enterprise, if the specific exclusions stated in article 5(4) of the OECD Model 
Convention do not apply. In terms of this article, no permanent establishment 
may be considered to exist where the e-commerce activities carried on through a 
server in a given location are restricted to preparatory or auxiliary activities.281 
However, where such functions in themselves are the core functions of the 
enterprise, or they are an essential and significant part of its business activities, 
these would go beyond preparatory or auxiliary activities and so a permanent 
establishment would be deemed to exist. For example, some internet service 
providers are in the business of operating their own servers for the purpose of 
                                                 
278 Par 42.2 of the 2005 Commentary on art 5 of the OECD Model Convention; see also Buys 
& Cronjé at 303; Suddards at 262; Oguttu & Van der Merwe at 318; Simmons & Simmons 
at 165; Plotkin et al in par 15.06.  
279  The fact that equipment might be moved around within a general location such as an 
office is not relevant, nor is it relevant that the equipment moved to some other location 
unless it is actually moved. See par 42.4 of the Commentary on art 5 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention; Arnold & Mclntyre at 153. 
280 However the fact that the enterprise does not require personnel at the location for the 
operation of the equipment does not in itself mean there is no permanent establishment. 
See par 42.6 of the Commentary on art 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention; Buys & 
Cronjé at 303. 
281 Such activities would include, the providing of a communication link between supplier and 
customer, advertising of goods or services (such as the display of a catalogue of certain 
products), relaying of information  through a mirror server for security and efficiency 
purposes, gathering market dates for the enterprise and supplying such information. See 
OECD 2000 Report on the Application of the Permanent Establishment Definition in E-
commerce at 5; see also Arnold & Mclntyre at 155; Simmons & Simmons at 165; 
Suddards at 263. 
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hosting websites or other applications for other enterprises.282  
 
From the above, it can be concluded that a physical permanent establishment 
will only be deemed to exist when the enterprise carries on business through a 
website that has a server at its own disposal, in a fixed location and the business 
of the enterprise is not of a preparatory or auxiliary nature. Where that is the 
case, an e-commerce business could claim that it has a foreign business 
establishment, and if the exceptions to the foreign business establishment 
exemption do not apply to that particular situation, it could be exempted from the 
CFC provisions. 
 
 
It is, however, worth noting that in terms of the “foreign business establishment” 
exemption to the CFC rules, the “foreign business establishment” must be run for 
bona fide business purposes. Where a server is maintained in a tax haven 
jurisdiction, from which software or interactive customer service programmes can 
be downloaded by customers, it may be difficult to determine whether these 
online activities are sufficient to meet the test of a bone fide “foreign business 
establishment” and are not a mere tax avoidance scheme designed to escape 
CFC rules.283   
 
In term of the CFC rules, the “foreign business establishment” exemption cannot 
be granted, if the CFC is involved in diversionary activities. This implies that, if 
the net income of a “foreign business establishment” of a CFC is derived from 
transactions with its connected person (who is a resident), and if the supply of 
goods or services by or to the CFC does not reflect an arm’s length price in 
terms of section 31 of the Act,284 this exemption will not be granted. In the e-
                                                 
282 Pars 42.8 - 42.9 of the Commentary on art 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention; see 
also Buys & Cronjé at 303; Gingras at 406. 
283  JS Hiller & R Cohen Internet Law and Policy (2002) at 265. 
284  An arm’s length price is a price set in the marketplace for transfers of goods and services 
between unrelated persons where each party strives to get the utmost possible benefit 
from the transaction. See South African Revenue Service (SARS) Practice Note: No. 7 - 6 
August 1999 s 31 of the Income Tax Act 1962 (the Act): Determination of Taxable Income 
of Certain Persons from International Taxation: Transfer Pricing at 7.1; See also D Hay, F 
Horner, J Owens ”Past and Present Work in the OECD on Transfer Pricing and Selected 
Issues” (1994) 10 Intertax 424; VH Miesel, HH Higinbotham, and CW Yi “International 
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commerce, the difficulties of determining whether the relevant parties are 
connected parties have already been discussed above. In respect to this 
particular exemption to the CFC rules, the anonymous nature of e-commerce,285 
may make it difficult for tax administrators to prove that certain parties to an e-
commerce transaction are connected and are involved in diversion activities. In 
this way e-commerce can be used to take advantage of the “foreign business 
establishment” exemption, in order to avoid the CFC rules. Likewise, e-
commerce makes it difficult to determine whether the price charged between the 
connected parties is a non-arm’s length price.286 Finding the prices set between 
connected parties that deal with each other, is not as problematic in traditional 
commerce, as the parties concerned often keep paper records of the 
transactions they are involved in. The anonymous nature of e-commerce may 
make makes it difficult to determine whether the prices charged in a given 
transaction are arm’s length prices.287 Finding the price of goods or services is 
further complicated by the electronic money or digital cash which is used to effect 
payment.288 Electronic tokens289 can be downloaded from an on-line bank, and 
purchases can be made leaving no paper or electronic trace as to the date and 
value of the transaction.290 The anonymous nature of electronic money also 
makes it easy for CFCs and residents to instantaneously and secretly engage in 
diversionary activities that cannot be caught by the CFC provisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Transfer Pricing: Practical Solutions for Inter-Company Pricing - Part 11” (2003) 29 
International Tax Journal 1. OECD Report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs ”Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators” (1994) 172 
Intertax 318 in par 12. 
285  Doernberg et al at 390; Buys at 248. 
286  A non-arm’s length price is a price set by a taxpayer when selling to, buying from, or 
sharing resources with a related or connected person. It is usually contrasted with a 
market price, which is the price set in the marketplace for transfers of goods and services 
between unrelated persons where each party strives to get the utmost possible benefit 
from the transaction. SARS’ Practice Note No 7 in par 7.1; art 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 condensed version). 
287 Buys & Cronjé at 306; AW Oguttu “Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance: Is the Arm’s-
Length Principle Still Relevant in the E-Commerce Era” (2006)18 SA Mercantile Law 
Journal at 154. 
288 Hardesty at par10.01-10.4; JJB Hickey, R Mathew & C Rose E-commerce: Law Business 
and Tax Planning (2000) at 257. Electronic money constitutes an electronic mechanism 
for the transfer of funds without, the use of a deposit taking institution (like a bank) or a 
third party, the process being characterised by the transfer of value as such. See Buys at 
301. 
289 Electronic coins are in the form of digitally signed numbers which are used in exchange 
for money from the user’s bank account. See Buys at 300. 
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Challenges to the character of income  
 
In jurisdictions where CFC legislation is applied only to specific types of income 
(eg passive income), e-commerce may make it possible to manipulate the 
character of that income so that it falls outside the ambit of the CFC 
legislation.291 In the past South Africa’s CFC rules applied to passive income, but 
not to active income.292 Through e-commerce, a CFC may modify its electronic 
products, so that the character of income that arises from the transaction is 
viewed as active income, not passive income which is caught by the CFC 
rules.293  
 
Although South Africa’s CFC rules were amended not only to cover passive 
income but all income, some of the exceptions to the foreign business 
establishment exemption may create situations that encourage the manipulation 
of the character of the income concerned so that the particular exception is 
rendered inapplicable.294 For example, section 9D(9)(b)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 
provides that the “foreign business establishment” exemption will not apply to net 
income that is attributed to any amounts derived from mobile passive income of 
an enterprise. This includes income such as dividends, interest, royalties, rental, 
annuities, insurance premiums, capital gains, and foreign currency gains under 
section 24I. For example, if a CFC resident in a tax-haven jurisdiction licences 
software (created by its parent company in South Africa) to customers in other 
countries in exchange for a royalty, the transfer of the software could be 
characterised as a sale of goods or the licensing of an intangible. If the latter 
view is adopted, income received from the transaction would be royalty income 
that does not qualify for the foreign business establishment exemption to the 
CFC rules. E-commerce may however allow the CFC to modify the software 
before licensing it, so that the royalties constitute active business income that 
could possibly qualify for the foreign business establishment exemption to the 
                                                                                                                                            
290 Buys at 247 and 297; Oguttu at 154. 
291 Doernberg et al at 331. 
292  See the discussion above about the former s 9C and s 9D that were repealed when the 
residence basis of taxation was introduced in 2001. 
293 Buys & Cronjé at 313. 
294  Doernberg et al at 331. 
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CFC rules.295 
 
Similarly, a CFC could maintain an investment information database and charge 
fees to customers in other countries for accessing the database. The employees 
providing the information found on the database, could for example, be located in 
South Africa where the parent company is located. Since the CFC is rendering 
services for the parent company, it has to be determined whether the income 
received is for the right to access the information on the database (i.e. for 
services rendered), or for the information contained on the database (i.e. for a 
licence).296 If the income is considered royalty income, the foreign business 
establishment exemption to the CFC rules may not be granted, but if it is 
considered to be income from services rendered, it may be possible to claim the 
foreign business exemption to CFC rules.   
 
It is, however, worth noting that the exemptions to the CFC rules are granted to 
South African residents, if the extensive disclosure requirements in terms of 
section 72(A) of the Income Tax Act are complied with. If financial statements, or 
information regarding the percentage holding in participation rights, are not 
submitted, all the receipts and accruals of the CFC will be attributed to the South 
African resident, irrespective of actual shareholding. In order to comply with 
these information requirements, the taxpayers need to keep pertinent records of 
their transactions. Where taxpayers are involved in e-commerce, there may be 
practical difficulties in obtaining information regarding this legal provision. This 
provision may prevent taxpayers involved in e-commerce from manipulating the 
exemptions to CFC rules to avoid taxes.   
 
It should also be noted that even if e-commerce poses challenges to CFC 
legislation it only provides the controlling South African residents with a deferral 
of taxes, as any dividends repatriated from offshore e-commerce will be subject 
to taxation in South Africa. Where e-commerce income generated in a tax haven 
is reinvested into the business, or is kept outside South Africa, a permanent 
deferral can be achieved. Ultimately, however, any e-commerce profit that is 
                                                 
295 Buys & Cronjé at 313. 
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repatriated to South Africa will be subject to tax here.297   
 
On the whole, it can be concluded that the ability of taxpayers to sell electronic 
goods and services, and the ability to manipulate the character of the ensuing 
income for tax avoidance purposes, may make it necessary to re-examine 
controlled foreign company provisions to ensure that they are sufficient in their 
current form to achieve their intended purpose. If CFCs can engage in extensive 
e-commerce through websites or computer networks located in a tax haven, it 
may become increasingly difficult to enforce existing CFC legislation, partly 
because of the difficulty of detection.298  
 
South Africa’s response to the challenges posed by e-commerce 
 
The Katz Commission299 recognised the need to protect South Africa’s tax base 
and noted that e-commerce impacts on the basic methods of today’s 
international taxation, making irrelevant the concept of physical presence in order 
to trade.300 It was noted that current legislation can be manipulated through 
hyper-mobility of an entire office or management capacity. It was further noted 
that, the manner in which goods and services can be contracted for, advertised 
and even delivered via electronic means, can lead to the erosion of South 
Africa’s tax base. However, the Commission recommended, that South Africa 
should not seek to pioneer a whole new tax regime to cope with the changes 
brought about by e-commerce, but that it should internationalise its laws affecting 
international trade and investment.301  
 
In devising an e-commerce policy for South Africa, a green/white paper process 
                                                                                                                                            
296 Doernberg et al at 336. 
297 Buys & Cronjé at 314. 
298 Doernberg et al at 336. 
299 Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa The Fifth 
Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of 
South Africa (1997) at 31 (“Katz Commission Report (1997”). 
300 Katz Commission Report (1997) at 31. 
301 Katz Commission Report (1997) at 31. 
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was developed that would culminate into legislation.302 In the Green Paper on E-
commerce,303 a consultative document on the government policy formulation 
process on e-commerce, it was pointed out that the legal framework in South 
Africa is currently insufficient to deal with e-commerce issues. The current 
legislation was basically tailored for paper-based commercial transactions and 
there was therefore a need to formulate a new legal framework that includes 
electronically concluded transactions. In order to resolve some of the challenges 
posed by e-commerce, the Green Paper304 suggested that policy 
recommendations be formulated and the necessary action be taken to ensure 
that the e-commerce environment in South Africa is fair and equitable for all 
stakeholders. With respect to resolving some of the challenges e-commerce 
poses to the administration of legislation, the Green Paper noted that accurate 
identification of the party responsible for paying a particular tax is a fundamental 
requirement of any taxation system. Tracing the physical owner of a website 
inadequately identified can be a time-consuming process often with reliance 
having to be placed upon a third party.305  The Green Paper suggested that since 
there is a blurring of the actual trading capabilities of electronic enterprises, 
attention should to be given to drafting a minimum standard in respect of 
identification requirements of websites. Furthermore, that a minimum standard of 
on-line contact information must be required of enterprises using a website. Such 
information would include: the trading name of the business; the physical as well 
as the postal address of the business; an e-mail address; telephone or other 
contact information and the statutory registration number of the enterprise. The 
Green Paper noted that many tax administrations consider such information as 
the only means of identifying businesses engaged in e-commerce. 306  
 
As regards the use of “Electronic Money”, the Green Paper suggested that 
principles governing access to the records of electronic money issuers need to 
                                                 
302  M Groenewald & D Lehlokoe “Towards an Electronic Commerce Policy for South Africa”. 
Available at >http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/1g/1g_4.htm< last accessed on 1 
October 2007.  
303 Department of Communications’ Green Paper on E-commerce Making it your Business 
(November 2000) at 10-14. 
304 Department of Communications’ Green Paper on E-commerce at 37. 
305 Department of Communications’ Green Paper on E-commerce at 37. 
306 Department of Communications’ Green Paper on E-commerce at 37. 
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be developed. 307 With respect to the development of efficient tax collection 
mechanisms, the Green Paper noted that most tax collection mechanisms 
usually make use of a leverage point. A common example is PAYE where 
employers collect the taxes on behalf of SARS from the taxpayers. However, e-
commerce tends to eliminate the “middleman”, so tax collection efficiency is 
reduced. To ensure efficient collection of taxes, the Green Paper suggested that 
a greater degree of international co-operation in revenue collection is required.308 
 
As a result of the green/white paper process that forged an e-commerce policy 
for South Africa,309 in 2002, the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act310 was enacted. This Act repealed the Computer Evidence Act of 1983.311  In 
2003, section 74(1) of the Income Tax Act was amended, to allow for electronic 
record keeping.312 However, the Income Tax Act does not contain provisions that 
can be used to verify whether a particular electronic document or information is 
linked to a particular taxpayer. Thus electronic records can easily be altered 
without trace, or maybe encrypted, in order not to reveal transaction 
information.313  
 
The preamble to the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act314 inter 
alia states that it was enacted to provide for the facilitation and regulation of 
electronic communications and transactions. This Act contains certain provisions 
which, if complied with and effectively enforced, may alleviate some of the 
identification problems posed by e-commerce. For instance, section 23 requires 
a disclosure of the time and place of communication, despatch, and receipt of 
information. Section 24 deals with the expression of intent between the originator 
and the addressee, and section 25 deals with the attribution of data messages to 
                                                 
307 Department of Communications’ Green Paper on E-commerce at 38. 
308 Department of Communications’ Green Paper on E-commerce at 37-38. 
309  M Groenewald & D Lehlokoe “Towards an Electronic Commerce Policy for South Africa”. 
Available at >http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/1g/1g_4.htm< last accessed on 1 
October 2007.  
310 Act 25 of 2002. 
311  57 of 1983. 
312  S 67 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 45 of 2003 amended s 74(1) of the Income tax 
Act to provide that a “document” includes any printout of information generated, sent, 
received, stored, displayed or processed by electronic means. And that “information” 
includes electronic representations of information in any form. 
313  Oguttu & Van der Merwe at 321; see also Doernberg et al at 390, Buys & Cronje at 308. 
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the originator. Section 38 provides that the authentication of the products or 
services of service providers will only be accredited, if the electronic signature to 
which the authentication products or service relates, is uniquely linked to the user 
and can be used to identify the user. The electronic signature should be created 
using means that can be maintained under the sole control of that user, and will 
be linked to the data message to which it relates, so that any change of the data 
can be detected. Sections 27 and 30 contain provisions relating to cryptography 
so as to ensure the authenticity, integrity and reliability of Internet data. Sections 
42 and 43 provide that a supplier of electronic good and services must display 
certain information on the website where the goods are offered. Sections 80 and 
81 deal with the appointment of cyber inspectors, who have the power to inspect 
any website activity, and information in the public domain. Then sections 85 and 
86 deal with the penalties of cyber crime. On the whole, however, the Act does 
not provide for taxation issues in respect of e-commerce transactions.  
 
The South African government encourages the development of e-commerce and 
it is of the view that access to the Internet and information technology is crucial to 
the upliftment of its people, especially those in rural areas and those involved in 
small or medium sized enterprises.315 It is, however, important to realise that 
while the upliftment of the people is undoubtedly important, e-commerce provides 
a means for not only big enterprises, but also for small companies and 
individuals to engage in international trade, with the possibility of circumventing 
CFC legislation. If e-commerce is not regulated and taxed, the loss of revenue 
could be tremendous. Therefore, there is a need for government polices to strike 
a balance between development and the taxation of e-commerce. Since the 
challenges brought about by e-commerce affect the international community,316 
                                                                                                                                            
314 Act 25 of 2002. 
315 Green Paper on E-commerce at 67-68. 
316  For further discussion on how the international community has responded to the 
challenges of e-commerce, refer to chapter 5 where reference is given to reports such as: 
OECD Ministerial on Electronic Commerce: Ottawa Canada (October 1998) “A Borderless 
World”. Available at >http://www.ottawaoecdconference.org/English/conference-
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Aspects of E-commerce: Addressing the Challenges and Opportunities” (September 
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“Clarification on the Application of the Permanent Establishment Definition in E-
commerce: Changes to the Commentary on the Model Tax Convention on Article 5” (22 
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South Africa should work hand-in-hand with developed and developing nations, 
in order to come up with a feasible way of taxing e-commerce transactions, so 
that the tax avoidance loopholes that e-commerce has created in legislation such 
as the CFC legislation can be curbed.  
 
It should however be acknowledged that e-commerce is growing at a fast rate, 
and as a result, countries tax bases could be depleted in absence of 
counteracting measures. Since most of the challenges that e-commerce poses to 
CFC legislation relate to difficulties of identifying the location of taxpayers and 
their business transaction, it is recommended that, while awaiting international 
consensus on how e-commerce should be taxed, South Africa should come up 
with means of resolving some of these identification problems. Since the Income 
Tax Act has been amended to provide for electronic record keeping, it is 
recommended that this Act be further amended to provide that the provisions of 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act be taken into account for 
detection and identification purposes, so as to ensure tax compliance for 
taxpayers involved in e-commerce. 
 
4.9 HOW THE COMPLEXITY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CFC LEGISLATION 
AFFECTS ITS EFFECTIVENESS    
 
The analysis of South Africa’s CFC legislation shows that this legislation is quite 
difficult to understand, comply with, and administer. However, not much has 
been written on how the complexities in this legislation can be resolved. A 
mention of CFC legislation gets most tax practitioners commenting on its 
complexity and wondering when simplicity in this legislation will happen. The 
simplicity of taxes is one of principles of a good tax system.317 In regard to this 
principle, Adam Smith noted that318  
the tax which each individual is bond to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The 
                                                                                                                                            
December 2000). Available at >http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/32/1923380.pdf<, last 
accessed 26 June 2007.  
317  A good tax system should entail the principles such as equity, efficiency, certainty and 
simplicity. See RM Sommerfeld, SA Madeo, KE Anderson & BR Jackson Concepts of 
Taxation (1993) at 10; WA Raabe & JE Parker Taxation Concepts for Decision Making 
(1985) at 14. 
318  A Smith An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations (1976) 350-
351, Vol.2 edited by RH Campbell, AS Skinner & WB Todd. 
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time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and 
plain to the contributor…..  
 
 
Simplicity of tax is required in three aspects: policy simplicity, form simplicity and 
action simplicity.319 “Policy simplicity” requires simplicity of the type of tax sought 
to be implemented, and its incidence. “Form simplicity” requires simplicity in the 
manner in which government policies appear in statue form.320 This requires that 
taxpayers, tax advisers and tax administrators understand the intentions of 
government as expressed in the statue books. “Action simplicity” requires that 
the actions which are required of taxpayers in complying with a tax statute, and 
the actions required of the administration in administering the statute, are as 
simple as possible and do not place excessive burdens upon all parties 
involved.321  
 
South Africa’s CFC legislation appears to be generally lacking in the three 
aspects of simplicity described above, that are required for a good tax system.  
An analysis of South Africa’s CFC legislation shows that the complexities in the 
legislation derive mainly from the following. 
 
There are difficulties of comprehending the various terms used in the legislation. 
Some of these terms are ambiguous and they create certain interpretation 
difficulties.322 An example is the term “Country of residence”, that was introduced 
in 2006, under the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 20 of 2006. In terms of the 
Taxation laws Amendment Act 8 of 2007, “Country of residence in relation to a 
foreign company means the country whether it has its place of effective 
management”. Note however that, when this term was introduced in 2006, it 
referred to the definition of a “country of residence” in relation to a controlled 
foreign company. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Bill of 2006, it was important to come up with a definition of a 
“country of residence”, as most of the anti-diversionary rules in the CFC rules 
                                                 
319  PA Harris Corporate/Shareholder Income Taxation and Allocating Taxing Rights between 
Countries: A Comparison of Imputation Systems (1996) at 8. 
320  Harris at 8. 
321  Harris at 8; Raabe & Parker at 15. 
322  Olivier and Honiball at 228; Buys & Cronjé at 314. 
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depend on whether a CFC operates within that CFC’s country of residence. It 
was explained that potential problems would arise where more than one country 
has a claim on the tax residence of a CFC and each of the countries has a 
different meaning for a CFC’s country of residence. It was proposed that the 
definition of “country of residence” should refer to where the CFC is effectively 
managed as opposed to the country of incorporation, as the effective 
management test is the one often utilised as a final tie breaker for treaty 
purposes. The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to provide that as far the 
meaning of the term “place of effective management”, the South African tax law 
interpretation of the term prevails. Now, this is quite confusing because, as 
explained in chapter 3, there is no statutory definition of the concept “place of 
effective management” in the South African Income Tax Act, nor is there any 
case law that provides guidance on the interpretation of the term. Needless to 
say, this is bound to cause interpretation problems. Considering that South Africa 
is bound to take cognisance of the interpretation of this term as used in  
the OECD Model Convention, which (as explained in chapter 3) is different from 
SARS’s interpretation of the term.323   
 
Another complex aspect of the CFC legislation concerns the determination of the 
net income of a CFC. In calculating the net income of the CFC, the CFC is dealt 
with as if it is a South African resident.324 Thus, various sections of the Income 
Tax Act have got to be taken into consideration when calculating the net income 
of a CFC. For tax administrators, calculating the net income of a CFC can be 
quite cumbersome, as one is expected to consider various applicable and non-
applicable provisions of the Act. The numerous provisions that have to be 
referred to, create a large number of boundaries and legal uncertainties. In 
addition to the above, generally in calculating the net income of a CFC, two sets 
of books have to be kept, one for the country in which the CFC is a resident and 
one for South African tax purposes. This obligation places a compliance burden 
on companies, as a full audit of each company is required. A form will have to be 
completed and submitted to SARS for each CFC, which is almost as 
                                                 
323  See discussion in chapter 3 par 3.7 under the heading “SARS’s Interpretation of “Place of 
Effective Management”. 
324  S 9D(2A) of the Income Tax Act. 
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burdensome as completing a tax return for each respective company. From an 
administrative point of view, it can be concluded that complying with the 
requirements of the CFC legislation is a costly exercise.   
 
Apart from the above, another complex issue about calculating of the net income 
of a CFC is that, the amount is the product of an artificial calculation, and not a 
proportion of the CFC’s actual profits. In essence, the effect of this provision is 
that on a notional basis, a portion of the net income of the CFC will be deemed to 
constitute income in the hands of a resident and thus taxed as part of the 
resident’s taxable income. The concept of “notional amounts” is one of the 
complex, and artificial aspects of this legislation, that is quite difficult to 
understand and to reconcile with income tax.  It is difficult to reconcile the idea 
that the net income of a CFC is a manufactured or purely notional sum, and yet 
on the other hand have the same distinctive meaning for South African income 
tax purposes.   
 
Another difficult aspect of the CFC legislation is that, in terms of section 9D(6), 
the amount to be included in the income of a resident, must be translated to the  
currency of the Republic by applying the average exchange rate for that year of 
assessment as contemplated in section 25D of the Income Tax Act.325 Proviso 
(a) to section 9D(6) states that any capital gain or loss of that CFC must, when 
applying the provisions of paragraph 43(4) of the Eighth Schedule, be 
determined in the currency of the Republic and that capital gain or loss must be 
translated to the currency used by it for purposes of its financial reporting by 
applying the average exchange rate. Proviso (b) to section 9D(6) states that any 
amount to be taken into account in determining the net income of that CFC for 
the disposal of any foreign equity instrument must, when applying the provisions 
of section 9G, be determined in the currency of the Republic and that amount 
must be translated to the currency so used by it by applying the average 
exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
325  In terms of s 1 of the Income Tax Act, “average exchange rate” in relation to a year of 
assessment means the average determined by using the closing spot rates at the end of 
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Applying the average exchange rate rules in terms of section 25D, may create 
some problems of interpretation. Section 25D provides in part that persons other 
than natural persons (this covers companies) must convert all income and 
expenditure and losses in foreign currency) to rands by using the spot rate,326 on 
the date that the income is received, or accrued or the expenditure or loss is 
incurred. The section also provides that, income or expenditure of a permanent 
establishment (of a South African resident) outside the Republic must be 
determined in the currency used by the permanent establishment (for financial 
reporting). The rules contained in this section only apply in absence of a specific 
section containing its own currency rules. In practice, it may be difficult to 
determine how the provisos to the specific exchange rate provisions in the CFC 
fit into the general currency conversion provisions in section 25D. Olivier and 
Honiball327 note that “many aspects of the tax treatment of amounts incurred and 
derived in foreign currency as well as foreign exchange gains and losses are 
shrouded in uncertainty. The impression is often gained that the legislature itself 
did not have clarity before its thoughts were given legislative effect.”  
 
The exemptions to the CFC legislation are another aspect of this legislation that 
complicates it further. For example, “foreign business establishment exemption” 
to the CFC rules is one of the lengthy and complicated parts of the CFC rules. 
This exemption is rifle with various exclusions which are also difficult to interpret 
and apply. Take, for example, section 9D(9)(b)(iii), that exempts a “foreign 
financial instrument holding company” from CFC rules. An understanding of this 
exemption requires one to understand the term “foreign financial instrument 
holding company”. A reading of this term requires one to have an understanding 
of the terms “group of companies”, and “controlled group company”, that are 
referred to in the definition of the first term. It is also necessary to have an 
understanding of term  “financial instrument”,  which is defined  in section  24J 
which deals with the taxation of interest. After these terms have been 
understood, one then has to deal with the exclusions to this exemption which are 
                                                                                                                                            
daily, weekly or monthly intervals during that year of assessment which must be 
consistently applied within that year of assessment.   
326  In terms of s 1 of the Income Tax Act, the “sport rate” means the appropriate quoted 
exchange rate at a specific time by an authorised dealer in foreign exchange for the 
delivery of currency.  
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quite difficult to understand.  
 
The “foreign business establishment” exemption to the CFC rules is also 
complicated by the fact that its application brings into play various other sections 
of the Income Tax Act. A clear understanding of their applicability is necessary in 
order to interpret how they fit into section 9D. Of particular importance are the 
transfer pricing provisions in section 31(2) of the Act, that are necessary in order 
to prevent diversionary transactions between a CFC and a connected person. 
Now, “transfer pricing” provisions and the rules the Commissioner uses to adjust 
an amount in order to arrive at an arm’s length price are another contentious and 
rather complicated provision of the Income Tax Act, for which SARS had to come 
up with an Interpretation Note.328 The inter-play between section 31(2) and the 
CFC provisions can be quite difficult in practice. The costs of complying with this 
exemption are likely to be very high. 
 
In general, the complexities of the “foreign business establishment” exemption to 
the CFC rules derive from both provisions that favour taxpayers and those that 
are designed to restrict tax benefits. Where the exemption appears to favour 
taxpayers involved in a particular category of income, an additional rule is set up 
to police the boundaries of the favoured category of income. The number and 
scope of these “preferential” rules makes this exemption difficult to understand.  
 
The elections in the CFC rules are another aspect of the CFC legislation that 
makes these rules complicated. A South African shareholder who together with 
connected persons holds 10% to 25% of the participation rights or voting rights in 
a CFC can elect to treat all his pro rata share of CFC income as taxable under 
section 9D, even if he would have been granted an exemption under section 
9D(9). Alternatively, under section 9D(13), any resident who, together with 
connected persons, holds 10% up to 25% of the participation rights or voting 
rights of a foreign company may elect that this foreign company be deemed to be 
a CFC in relation to him for any of its foreign tax years. These elections 
complicate the CFC rules because they bring into play the applicability of section 
                                                                                                                                            
327  Olivier & Honiball at 228. 
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6quat of the Income Tax Act, which allows a rebate against South African tax, 
any foreign tax in respect of foreign income included in South African taxable 
income. Section 6quat has got its own rules of applicability. These rules describe 
the type of income that will give rise to a rebate (section 6quat (1), how the 
rebate is determined (section 6quat (1A), and also certain limitations as to how 
much of the rebate can be granted (section 6quat (1B). It is necessary for a 
taxpayer to understand the ambit of these rules in order to determine how they 
will be applied in relation to the CFC rules. For instance, the CFC rules specify 
that no excess rebates in terms of section 6quat (1B) can be granted where an 
election is made in terms of section 9D. It can thus be said that, although the 
elections are potentially advantageous to taxpayers, they also increase the 
complexity of the CFC legislation. 
 
It is worth noting that internationally, CFC legislation has been introduced by 
countries with more advanced tax systems, like the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America.329 South Africa is the only Southern African 
Development Community state and also the only African country which has to 
date introduced CFC legislation.330 CFC legislation was introduced in South 
Africa in 1997, under the then sections 9C and 9D (now deleted as discussed 
above). This was long before the introduction of the “residence-based taxation” 
system in 2001. Since it was only after the democratic elections of 1994 that 
South Africa returned to the international arena the introduction of CFC 
legislation in 1997 was rather too soon.  When South Africa was barred from 
international affairs, her international trade dwindled. As a result, South Africa’s 
international tax principles had not developed to the same extent as those of its 
trading partners.331 Expatriates from abroad had to be called in to draft this 
legislation. Thus the legislation was largely tailored around the way it worked in 
these developed countries, and possibility minimal consideration was given to the 
conditions prevailing in South Africa. For instance, the initial sections 9C and 9D 
                                                                                                                                            
328  SARS Interpretation Note No. 7. 
329 Olivier & Honiball at 359. 
330  Olivier & Honiball at 359. 
331 Katz Commission Report (1997) at 4. 
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were designed to curb deferral of taxes only in respect to investment income.332 
The provisions were found to cover too wide a scope, they were poorly 
drafted,333 and open to many tax planning schemes.334 This required complex 
amendments to the rules to cover the loopholes. However, it appears that most 
of the amendments that are adopted since then, are versions imported from 
various developed countries in an endeavour to find what will work well for South 
Africa. The legislators have also acknowledged that “since the introduction of the 
CFC regime in 1997, a number of adjustments have taken place to account for 
practical realities. However, it appears that some anomalies remain”.335 For 
example, there have been various amendments to certain concepts used in the 
rules; new concepts have been introduced, some of which are then later deleted 
only to be reintroduced into the legislation. This is the case with the concept of 
“voting rights” which was re-introduced by the Revenue Laws Amendment 31 of 
2005, as was the case in 2002. The exclusions to the CFC legislation have also 
seen some changes. Previously, one of the exclusions to the CFC rules related 
to receipts and accruals (other than those of a capital nature) from a “designated 
country”. This exclusion was deleted by Revenue Laws Amendment Act 45 of 
2003 with effect from 1 June 2004.  In almost all the Revenue laws Amendment 
Acts that have been enacted since the inception of this legislation, there is an 
amendment to section 9D. The lack of reasonable stability in this legislation is 
one of the factors that make taxpayers and practitioners alike, unsure about the 
scope of this legislation. As they get acquainted with the working of a current 
provision, a new complicated provision is introduced.  
 
This work does not favour over-emphasising simplicity in the design of the CFC 
legislation. Although CFC rules should be drafted simply, this may not always be 
adequate to address complex situations, as simple rules might undermine 
administratability. Simplicity should not be an end in itself and it should not come 
                                                 
332  The provisions appear to have been a replica of how the United States Subpart F regime 
works (for the discussion of the United States Subpart F rules, see chapter 5). 
333  Editorial “Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2000” (2000) 49 The Taxpayer at 181. 
334  Maren at 28.  
335  Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill of 2006 at 52. 
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at an unacceptable cost in relation to other policy objectives.336 A balance must 
be struck. Care should be taken to note that simplicity is not easily taken 
advantage of by sophisticated taxpayers. Indeed, one of the reasons for the 
complexity of CFC legislation is because of the ingenuity of taxpayers and their 
advisers, who always find ways of circumventing these provisions so as to avoid 
taxes. The complexity of the legislation is thus necessary to achieve favourable 
results in the case of sophisticated planning.337 However, although the weight of 
the technical complexity and the administrative burden of CFC rules fall primarily, 
on the largest and most sophisticated taxpayers in the country, the costs of 
compliance may be a substantial deterrent to the international operations of 
smaller corporations.338 Generally, simpler tax rules facilitate taxpayer’s 
compliance. The more complicated a tax legislation is, the more time consuming 
the process of attempting to comply with it.339 Complex rules may also create 
traps for the unwary taxpayers, and penalise poorly advised taxpayers.340 To the 
extent that a tax system avoids penalising poorly advised taxpayers or rewarding 
those who engage in sophisticated tax planning techniques, the overall tax 
burden is apportioned more fairly among taxpayers.  
 
The complexity of CFC legislation has also turned out as a night mare for tax 
administrators, who continuously find it harder to trap the well advised taxpayers 
who have a foot ahead of them. The OECD has also noted that, CFC legislation 
imposes considerable costs on tax administration.341 It has to be acknowledged 
that although the costs of raising revenue for government services are productive 
expenditures, these costs, both direct and indirect by reason of the distortion of 
taxpayer behaviour, become unproductive when they are disproportional to the 
benefit achieved. Thus in designing CFC rules, not only tax revenue but also 
compliance costs should be considered. The compliance costs that flow from 
over complicated legislation should be weighed up against the revenue derived 
                                                 
336  Report of the Task Force “International Tax Reform” 59 Tax Lawyer (2006) at 662. Also 
available at >http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubs/taskforceintltaxreform.pdf<, last accessed 15 
September 2006. 
337  Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform at 663. 
338  OECD 2000 Report on CFC Legislation at 94. 
339  Payne et al at 168; Ernst & Young Business Day Issue No. 1755 of 31 January 2007. 
340  Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform at 662. 
341  OECD 2000 Report on CFC legislation at 94. 
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from taxing foreign entities.342 In attempting to counter the avoidance or deferral 
of taxes, South Africa needs to strike a balance. Although on one hand it has to 
protect its tax base against erosion, on the other hand, it is important not to 
overlook the fact that complicated tax laws may make it difficult for taxpayers to 
compete internationally, and this may encourage them to give up their residence 
status, in favour of residence in a jurisdiction with more favourable tax rules.343 
The challenge for South Africa is to come up with a CFC regime that does not 
stifle foreign investment.  
 
Needless to say, the complexity of this legislation creates numerous anomalies 
and tax ambiguities that SARS needs to resolve.344 It is recommended that 
SARS issues an Interpretation Note on section 9D. Although the National 
Treasury has issued a detailed explanation of the section, it is unclear to what 
extent, if any, SARS considers itself bound by this explanation.345   
 
4.10  CURBING TAX AVOIDANCE THAT RESULTS FROM INVESTING IN 
OFFSHORE HYBRID ENTITIES  
 
The term “hybrid entity” generally refers to a legal relationship that is treated as a 
corporation in one jurisdiction and as a transparent (non-taxable) entity in 
another.346 However, the term “hybrid entity” should not be confused with the 
term “hybrid instrument”, which refers to a situation where a financial instrument 
may be treated as debt instrument in one country but as a preferred share in 
another.347 Although hybrid instruments are also widely used for tax planning,348 
for purposes of this work, only hybrid entities are discussed. It should be noted 
that hybrid entities can be located in a high tax or in a tax-haven jurisdiction.349  
                                                 
342  Olivier & Honiball at 358. 
343  Olivier & Honiball at 359. 
344 Buys & Cronjé at 314. 
345  Oliver & Honiball at 228. 
346  BJ Arnold & MJ Mclntyre International Tax Premier 2 ed (2002) at 144; Olivier & Honiball 
at 464-465. 
347  See Arnold & Mclyntre at 144. 
348  See Arnold & Mclyntre at 144. 
349  Olivier & Honiball at 465. 
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Discussing the taxation of hybrid entities, Essers and Meussen350 note that “the 
taxation of hybrid entities in cross-border transactions has proved to be 
exceptionally complicated and is perhaps one of the most difficult issues in the 
application of rules on international tax law”. Whether or not a particular entity is 
a hybrid entity depends on the domestic laws of the countries involved that 
classify the entities for tax purposes.351 The difficulties of dealing with hybrid 
entities arise from the fact that different countries may classify an entity 
differently in their domestic law.352 
 
The classification of an entity for income tax purposes is need by the source 
state in which another state’s entity is doing business in order to determine 
whether to tax the entity or its members, the rate of tax and the taxable income. 
Classification is required by the residence state of the participators in an entity 
formed in another state so as determine the nature of the taxable income, the 
timing of taxation, and whether a foreign tax credit is available on the distributed 
income.353 In the context of a tax treaty, the classification of an entity is important 
to determine whether the entity is a resident of the other contracting state. This is 
necessary for instance to ensure that the treaty rates of withholding tax on 
dividends, interest and royalties apply.354  
 
Generally, states have rules for classifying entities in the body of their general 
law. Thus classification problems do not often arise internally. Dealings with other 
states’ entities have to be fitted into the internal law classifications. Often this is 
done by examining the characteristics of the entity under the general law 
governing them, and determining the closest equivalent internal law.355 However, 
this approach fails to deal with the fact that the other states’ entities may be 
inherently different from one’s own. Hybrid entities usually take the form of trusts 
                                                 
350  P Essers & GTK Meussen “Taxation of Partnerships/Hybrid Entities” in JA McCahery, T 
Raaijmakers & EPM Vermeulen The Governance of Close Corporations and Partnerships 
US and European Perspectives (2004) 415. 
351  See Arnold & Mclyntre at 144. 
352  Arnold & Mclyntre at 144. 
353  A Jones “Characterisation of other States’ Partnerships” (2000) 56 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation at 288. 
354  Jones at 288. 
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or partnership structures 356 In this thesis, only partnership structures are dealt 
with. 
 
Partnership/corporate hybrid entities 
 
Most countries recognise the concept of “company” and of “partnerships” for tax 
purposes, although the definitions of these two concepts may vary. There are 
however, there are certain entities that may not be uniformly classified in one of 
these categories. For example, one country may treat the entity as a partnership 
or   “pass-through”357 entity, while the other country may treat the entity as a 
company.358 The differences in classification may lead to completely different tax 
results in the countries involved. In countries where an entity is classified as a 
partnership, it is treated as transparent for tax purposes (not taxable).359 In the 
countries where the entity is classified as a company, it is normally treated as 
                                                                                                                                            
355  FA Engelen & FPG Potgens ”Report on ’The Application of The OECD Model Tax 
Convention to Partnerships’ and the Interpretation of Tax Treaties” (2000) 4 European 
Taxation at 250; Jones at 288; Essers & Meussen at 415. 
356  See Arnold & Mclyntre at 144 for other examples of hybrid entities. For instance, they 
explain that under the laws of France a société en nom collectif (SNC) has separate legal 
personality although the partners are jointly and severally liable for its debts. However, 
under French tax laws, a SNC can elect to be taxed as a corporation. If another country 
treats the French SNC as a partnership, then residents of that country with interests in the 
SNC would be treated as partners. Thus, if a French SNC borrows funds for use in its 
business, the interest will be deductible in computing the SNC’s income. If the owners of 
the SNC are residents of a country that treats the SNC as transparent, the interest 
deduction will also be avoidable to those owners in their country of residence. In effect, 
the SNC can be used to obtain an interest deduction in both countries, thereby reducing 
the after-tax cost of financing significantly. This type of planning is an example of a 
double-dip financing structure through the use of a hybrid entity. The other example of a 
hybrid entity that Arnold & Mclyntre point out is the “silent partnerships” that are 
recognised in some jurisdictions like German. For details on “silent partnerships” see the 
discussion of the Memec Plc v IRC [1998] STC 754 in chapter 5 par 5.1.11. 
357  H J Ault & B J Arnold Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 2ed (2004) at 
336.  
358  P Lassard, C Kyres & C Gagnon “Treaty Benefit Entitlements of Trusts, Partnerships and 
Hybrid Entities” (1997) 49 Tax Conference Report of the Canadian Tax Foundation, 
Chapter 33; R Tremlay & K Wharram “Partnerships, Trusts, and Other Entities: Treaty 
Benefits” in B Arnold & J Sasseville Special Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy 
and Practice (2000) chapter 11; A Eason “Entity Entitlement to Treaty Benefits: A 
Conceptual Approach to Some Practical Problems” in B Arnold & J Sasseville Special 
Seminar on Canadian Tax Treaties: Policy and Practice (2000) chapter 12; R Critchfield, 
N Honson & M Mendelowitz “Pass-through Entities, Income Tax Treaties and Treaty 
Overrides” (1999) Tax Notes International  at 587; Essers & Meussen at 416; Jones at 
289. 
359  Par 3 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention. See also Arnold & 
Mclyntre at 144. 
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non-transparent for tax purposes (taxable).360 There is no uniform global 
treatment of foreign partnerships for tax purposes.361 
 
At the 1995 Congress of the International Fiscal Association, it was noted that 
“there are almost no laws, rulings or authoritative statements on most of the 
issues concerning the taxation of partnerships”.362 It is submitted that this 
statement remains largely true even today. Although in 1999 the OECD issued a 
Report on Partnerships,363 problems still arise if a partnership is situated in one 
state (the source state), while the partners are resident in another state 
(residence state). The reason is that in certain circumstances, the legal status of 
the partnership may be alien to the residence state.364 Since domestic laws differ 
in the treatment of partnerships, this creates difficulties when applying tax 
treaties to partnerships.365 These difficulties are analysed below.  
 
Are partnerships entitled to treaty benefits? 
 
Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention provides that “[t]his Convention shall 
apply to persons who are resident of one or both of the contracting states”. Thus, 
only persons who are residents of the contracting states are entitled to the 
benefits of the treaty. With respect to partnerships, the following questions arise 
from this article: 
(a) Is a partnership a “person” for treaty purposes?  
(b) Is a partnership a “resident” of a contracting state? 
In terms of article 3(1)(a) of the OECD Model Convention, the term “person” is 
said to include an individual, a company, and any other body of persons.  In 
paragraph 2 of the OECD Commentary on article 3(1)(a), it is stated that, “this 
definition is not exhaustive and it should be used in a very wide sense”. Thus, a 
                                                 
360  Par 3 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention. See also Arnold & 
Mclyntre at 144; F Engelen “International Double Taxation Resulting from Differences in 
Entity Characterization: A Dutch Perspective” (1998) Intertax 38. 
361  Essers & Meussen at 415. 
362  I Otsuka “International Income Tax Problems of Partnerships” (1995) LXXXa Cahiers de 
Droit Fiscal International at 332; see also Y Masui “Taxation of Partnerships in Japan” 54 
(2000) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 150. 
363  OECD The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships (1999). 
(“OECD  Report of Partnerships”). 
364  Essers & Meussen at 415. 
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partnership (being an association of persons for the purpose of sharing benefits 
from a joint undertaking) can be designated as a body of persons.366 The term 
“body of persons” can be interpreted as meaning a unified group or association 
of individuals and/or bodies corporate.367 In the United Kingdom case Padmore v 
Inland Revenue,368 the High Court held that the term “body of persons” includes 
a partnership, because a partnership is a body of persons within the ordinary 
meaning of the expression. 
 
The definition of the word “company” in article 3(1)(b) of the OECD Model 
Convention also has certain implications for partnerships. In terms of this article, 
the term “company” is defined as any body corporate or any entity that is treated 
as a body corporate for tax purposes. Paragraph 2 of the commentary on article 
1 provides that “partnerships will also be considered to be “persons” either 
because they fall within the definition of “company”, or because they constitute 
other bodies of persons.” However, paragraph 3 of the commentary on article 3 
states that the term “company”, in addition, “covers any other taxable unit that is 
treated as a body corporate according to the tax laws of the contracting state in 
which it is organized”. The definition of the term “company” in article 3(1)(b) and 
the commentary on this article in paragraph 3 appear to be ambiguous. On the 
one hand, any legal entity appears to be a company, whether or not the legal 
                                                                                                                                            
365  Par 2 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention. 
366  J Schaffner “The OECD Report on the Application of Tax Treaties to Partnerships” (2001) 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 220; M Clayson “OECD Partnerships 
Report: Reshaping Treaty Interpretation?” (2000) British Tax Review 75; D Tillinghast 
“Tax Treaty Issues” (1996) 50 University of Miami Law Review 483 at 468; See also R 
Loengard “Tax Treaties, Partnerships and Partners: Exploration of a Relationship” (1975) 
29 Tax Lawyer 36. P Baker “The Application of the Convention to Partnerships, Trusts 
and Other, Non-corporate Entities”. Available at 
>http://www.taxbar.com/documents/application_convention_pb_000.pdf<, last accessed 
21 April 2007.  
367  AHM Daniels Issues in International Partnership Taxation (1991) at 141. 
368  1987 STC 36. See also Swiss decision of the Conseil d’Etat in SA Quartz d’Alsace 
Decision of 6th May 1996, No 154 217, reported at RJF 6/96 No 731, Droit Fiscal 1996 No 
30 comm.988. The case concerned a Swiss partnership – originally formed as a société 
en commandite, but later becoming a société en nom collectif, which owned 54% of a 
French company. Under Swiss law the partnership had no legal personality. The Swiss 
partnership sought repayment of the avoir fiscal on dividends under article 11(3) of the 
France-Switzerland Convention of 9th September 1966. This paragraph extended the 
avoir fiscal to physical persons and to companies (sociétés) owning less than 20% of 
French companies. The Conseil d’Etat held that the Swiss partnership was a person 
within the terms of the Convention since it constituted a body of persons. However, it was 
not a physical person for the purposes of article 11(3) and could not benefit from the 
repayment of the avoir fiscal.  
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entity is a taxable unit. On the other hand, the reference in the commentary to 
“any other taxable unit” indicates that a body corporate can only be classified as 
a company when it is treated as a taxable unit. From the foregone, it can be 
concluded that a literal reading of the term “company” implies that any body 
corporate is a company. However, according to an interpretation based on 
paragraph 3 of the commentary on article 3, a partnership would only be a 
company for treaty purposes if it is treated as a taxable unit “according to the tax 
laws of the contracting state in which it is organised”.369  
 
In a treaty context, an entity will only be liable to tax if it is a “resident” of one of 
the contracting states. Article 4(1) provides that the term “resident of a 
contracting state” means any person who, under the law of that state, is liable for 
tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of effective management, 
or any other criterion of a similar nature.  
 
From the foregone, it can be concluded that although the inclusion of a 
partnership as a “body of persons” makes it a “person” for treaty purposes,370 this 
inclusion does not necessarily make a partnership a “resident of a contracting 
state”, though it may be an “enterprise” of a contracting state if it is carried on by 
residents of that state.371 A partnership can only be considered a resident of a 
contacting state if it is liable to tax therein.372 Generally speaking, a partnership is 
liable to tax in a contracting state if it is treated as a legal person (a company), 
that is a resident of that state. In that respect, it is entitled to treaty benefits in 
terms of article 4(1) of the OECD Model Convention. However, when a 
partnership is treated as fiscally transparent in a state, it is not “liable to tax” in 
                                                                                                                                            
 
369  Par 4 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention. See also Daniels at 
141. 
370  A Easson “Taxation of Partnerships in Canada” (2000) 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation at 169. 
371  Easson at 169.  
372  In this respect, the French Supreme Court (Conseil d’État) in a decision of 13 October 
1999, SA Diebold Courtage, ruled that a Netherlands closed limited partnership (besloten 
commanditaire vennootschap) because of its fiscal transparency and its lack of legal 
personality, could not be considered a resident within the meaning of article 4 of the tax 
treaty between France and Netherlands. The Supreme Court however held that the limited 
partners were residents of the Netherlands within the meaning of the tax treaty and were 
therefore entitled to the treaty benefits. For details on the discussion of this case see 
Engelen & Potgens at 251.  
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that state within the meaning of article 4(1) and so it cannot be a resident thereof 
for purposes of the Convention. In such a case, the provisions of the treaty 
cannot apply to the partnership unless a special rule covering partnerships is 
provided for in the particular treaty.373 It should be noted that the phrase “liable to 
tax” does not mean that the person must be actually paying tax in the state; 
entities which enjoy a complete exemption from tax are still residents of a state 
so long as that state could assert jurisdiction to tax the entity.374 
 
However, that does not mean that the actual tax treatment in the state of 
residence is completely irrelevant. On the contrary, claiming treaty benefits in the 
state of residence requires being treated as a taxable entity there. Therefore, one 
has to distinguish between the tax treaty treatment in the state of residence and 
in the state of source. Claiming treaty benefits in the state of source, such as 
applying a withholding tax reduction there, requires treatment as a taxable entity 
there. Claiming treaty benefits in the state of residence, such as exempting 
foreign income or crediting foreign taxes, requires treatment as a taxable entity in 
that state. 375 
 
The OECD376 has however admitted that it is not that simple to qualify a 
partnership as transparent or non transparent. There is a range of different tax 
treatments applicable to partnerships. In a number of jurisdictions, partnerships 
are not treated in the same way as taxable entities, buy on the other hand are 
not completely treated as transparent.377   
 
The taxation of partners in a treaty context 
 
As stated above, the domestic laws differ in the treatment of partnerships. 
                                                 
373  M Lang The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships: A Critical 
Analysis of the OECD Report Prepared by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (2000) 
at 35. 
374  K Vodel Vogel on Double Taxation Convention (1997); Lang at 38; Baker “The Application 
of the Convention to Partnerships, Trusts and Other, Non-corporate Entities”. Available at 
>http://www.taxbar.com/documents/application_convention_pb_000.pdf<, last accessed 
21 April 2007.   
375  Lang at 38-39. 
376  OECD Report on Partnerships in par 70. See also Lang at 37. 
377  Lang at 38. 
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Although some states treat partnerships as legal entities that are liable to tax, 
other states treat partnerships as fiscally transparent (not liable to tax) and thus 
not entitled to treaty benefits within the meaning of article 4(1) of the OECD 
Model Convention. In that case, the partners are entitled to the treaty benefits to 
the extent that the partnership’s income is allocated to them for the purposes of 
taxation in their state of residence.378 Where a partnership is treated as resident 
of a contracting state, the provisions of the treaty that restrict the other 
contracting state’s right to tax the partnership on its income do not apply to 
restrict that other state’s right to tax the partners who are its own residents on 
their share of the income of the partnership.379  
 
When taxing a partner’s share of the partnership’s profits, article 7 of the OECD 
Model Convention is applicable. This article provides that the profits of an 
enterprise of a contracting state are taxable only in that contracting state, unless 
the enterprise carries on business in the other contracting state through a 
permanent establishment situated therein. An enterprise of a contracting state is 
defined in article 3(1)(d) as an enterprise carried on by a resident of a contracting 
state. Since the partnership itself is not considered a resident, each participant in 
the enterprise is considered as a separate enterprise. In terms of article 3(1)(c), 
an enterprise “refers to the carrying on of a business”; thus each partner in a 
partnership is considered as carrying on the business of the partnership. The 
imputation of the partnership’s business to the partnership implies the imputation 
of the permanent establishment of the partnership to the partners.380  
                                                 
378  Par 5 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention; see also Engelen & 
Potgens at 251. 
379  Par 6.1 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention. 
380  Daniels at 145. See also the Dutch decision of the Hoge Raad of 10th March 1993, BNB 
1993/227. This case concerned a partnership - commanditaire vennootschap (CV) – 
formed between a Swedish company and two Dutch companies. The Swedish company 
was a limited or silent partner; one of the Dutch companies was the general partner. The 
CV was a closed CV which is treated as fully transparent under Dutch fiscal law; the 
general and limited partners are taxed directly on their share of the profits. The Swedish 
company argued that its share of the income was exempt from tax in the Netherlands 
under the business profits article of the Netherlands-Sweden double taxation convention 
of 12th March 1968. The Hoge Raad noted that the Swedish company held its 
participation in the CV as part of its worldwide business, and concluded that the income 
was derived through a permanent establishment in the Netherlands: the income was not, 
therefore, exempt under the convention. For a commentary on this S van Weeghel 
“Recent Case Law” (1994) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 637-644. 
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Despite the above, the tax treatment of partnerships (as corporate structures) 
and the taxation of partners creates the possibility of tax avoidance, double 
taxation and non-taxation of income. 
 
The possibility of avoiding “controlled foreign company” legislation  
 
Arnold and Mclyntre381 explain that where one country classifies an entity as a 
partnership for tax purposes (with the result the members or partners are taxable 
on their share of the entity’s income) and yet another classifies the entity as a 
legal person (with the result that the entity itself is subject to tax on its income), 
the different treatment of the entity in the two countries creates many tax 
planning opportunities.382 Taxes can be avoided by exploiting the differences 
between the tax treatment of taxpayers or transactions in the two countries.383  
 
When an entity is classified as a corporation, the taxation of income may be 
deferred if the company does not distribute dividends to its shareholders. The 
deferral of taxes occurs when a country has controlled foreign company (CFC) 
legislation. Where the foreign entity is classified as a partnership, CFC legislation 
may not be applied to the entity. Instead, the partners are taxed on their share of 
the profits of the partnership.384 The different tax treatment of the entities in the 
relevant countries can be manipulated to avoid taxes.  
 
The differences with respect to the entitlement to treaty benefits may also 
be manipulated to avoid taxes  
 
Where the entitlement to treaty benefits is different for the partnership and for the 
partners, this can be manipulated to avoid taxes. Davis385 gives the following 
example: EP is a partnership organised under the laws of state E. EP is treated 
as a taxable corporation under the laws of state E. EP carries on a business and 
                                                 
381  See Arnold & Mclyntre at 144. 
382  Arnold & Mclntyre at 144.    
383  See R Edmonds, International Tax Planning Association “Limited Partnerships”. Available 
at http://www.itpa.org/open/summaries/cannes2003s.html< last accessed on 20 March 
2007. 
384  Daniels at 50. 
385  Daniels at 50. 
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receives income sourced from state S. Under the classification rules of state S, 
EP is classified as a transparent partnership, with the result that state S regards 
the partners of EP as taxpayers. In terms of the treaty between state S and state 
E, EP is considered a resident of state E. Consequently, EP will be entitled to the 
benefits of the tax treaty for its income from state S. For instance, interest arising 
in state S and paid to EP would be subject to the reduced 10% of withholding tax 
under article 11(2), provided EP is the beneficial owner of the interest and the 
interest is not effectively connected with a permanent establishment of EP in 
state S. The perspective of state S under its domestic tax laws will, however, be 
completely different. Under the income attribution rules of state S, the business 
profits are attributed to the partners of EP and not to EP itself. Likewise, interest 
income arising in state S will be attributed to the partners of EP. The differences 
in the treaty benefits in the above scenarios can be manipulated to avoid taxes.  
 
Clarifying on how tax avoidance could arise in these circumstances, the 
Commentary on article 1 also points out that where the state of source treats a 
partnership as fiscally transparent, a partner that is resident in a state that treats 
the partnership as a company would not be able to claim the benefits of the 
treaty between the two states with respect to his share of the partnership’s 
income that the state of source taxes in his hands. Although this income is 
allocated to the person claiming the benefits of the treaty under the laws of the 
source state, that income is not similarly allocated for purposes of determining 
the liability to tax on that item of income in the state of residence of that 
person.386 The differences in the way the income is allocated my be manipulated 
to avoid taxes. 
 
These are also differences in the entitlement to treaty benefits where partnership 
cases involve three states. These differences can also be manipulated to avoid 
taxes. This often happens where a partner is a resident of one state, the 
partnership is established in another state and the partners share in partnership 
income arising in a third state. In such cases, the Commentary on article 1 of the 
OECD Model Convention provides that a partner may claim the benefits of the 
                                                 
386  Par 6.2 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention. 
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treaty between his state of residence and the state of source of the income to the 
extent that the partnership’s income is allocated to him for the purposes of 
taxation in his state of residence. If the partnership is taxed as a resident of the 
state in which it is established, then the partnership may also claim the benefits 
of the treaty between the state in which it is established and the state of source. 
In such a case of “double benefits”, it is possible to take advantage of the 
different tax rates provided in the two treaties to avoid taxes.387 
 
The possibility of double taxation of income 
 
Classification conflicts can also result in the double taxation of income. When 
partners reside in a different state from that in which the partnership has been 
established, partners may face being liable for tax both in the residence state and 
in the source state.388 Take the example above where EP set up in state E and it 
is recognised as a company, whereas in state S, it is recognized as a 
partnership. Since the taxation of business profits is governed by article 7, from 
the perspective of state S, business profits may be taxed by state S to the extent 
that they can be attributed to a permanent establishment of the participators in 
state S. According to article 23, state E will provide double taxation relief to the 
entity for the income which, under article 7, may be taxed by S. Where there is a 
permanent establishment in state S, and state E does not provide for double 
taxation relief at the level of EP, the participants in the entity in state S could be 
subjected to double taxation because the income of EP would not be subject to 
tax in state S in the hands of the entity itself, but instead in the hands of the 
participators.389  
                                                 
387  Par 6.5 of the Commentary on art 1 of the OECD Model Convention. 
388  Essers & Meussen at 416. 
389  Daniels at 155. An example of a case where the possibility of double taxation arose is the 
Dutch decision of the Hoge Raad of 23rd March 1994 BNB 1994/192; (1994) VN 1442. 
The case concerned a Belgian resident individual who was a limited partner in a Dutch 
closed partnership –commanditaire vennootschap. The Belgian resident was entitled to a 
share of the profits and to interest on his capital and current accounts; he contended 
these were exempt from tax in the Netherlands. The Belgian-Netherlands double taxation 
convention of 19th October 1970 contained an express provision stating that limited 
partnerships formed under Netherlands law, whose place of management is in the 
Netherlands, are regarded as residents of the Netherlands. Reasoning from this, the 
Hoge Raad concluded that the Netherlands could tax the profit share and interest on the 
capital of the silent partner since these were profits of an enterprise carried on by a 
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The possibility of non-taxation of income  
 
Classification conflicts can also result in the non-taxation of income.390 From the 
above example, non-taxation of income could for instance arise if state E applies 
the exemption method to provide for double taxation relief.391 Under this method, 
the country of residence taxes its residents on their domestic source income and 
exempts them from domestic tax on their foreign source income. In effect the 
jurisdiction to tax rests exclusively with the country of source.392 If EP carries on 
a business in state S through a permanent establishment, the profits allocatable 
to such permanent establishment may be taxed in state S and state E will 
provide double taxation relief. If EP for instance, finances the business carried on 
in its S permanent establishment, with loans taken from the participators, it is 
likely that state S will allow the interest expense as a deduction in computing the 
profits allocatable to S permanent establishment. From the perspective of state 
E, the interest income of the E resident participators could, however, be treated 
as interest income effectively connected with the S permanent establishment. 
Consequently, while interest would not be subject to taxation in state S, it could 
still be exempt from taxation in the hands of the E resident participators.393  
 
To resolve problems of double non-taxation of income, the OECD Partnership 
Report394 suggested that a provision be added to article 23A of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention to read as follows: 
The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to income derived or capital owned by a 
resident of a contracting state where the other contracting state applies the provisions of 
the convention to exempt such income or capital from tax applies the provision of 
paragraph 2 of article 10 or 11 to such income.395 
 
Solutions to resolve some of the classification problems 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Netherlands resident. 
390  Engelen & Potgens at 252. 
391  See article 23A of the OECD Model Convention.  
392  Arnold & McIntyre at 33. 
393  Daniels at 156. 
394  Par 113 of the OECD Partnership Report. 
395  This provision now appears in article 23A(4) of the OECD Model Convention. 
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Commentators396 on this topic have pointed out three possible solutions to 
reduce the problems of classifying entities. First, the partner’s residence state 
should follow the partnership state’s tax classification.397 This implies that the 
partner’s residence state should accept to treat the partnership the way it is 
treated in the state in which it is resident. It is reasoned that if this suggestion is 
followed, no significant difficulties arise in applying the treaty.398 Furthermore, 
that CFC rules would prevent tax avoidance, if the choice to be treated as non-
transparent would lead to no or a nominal corporate income tax.399 Following this 
approach is in line with the 1999 OECD Report on Partnerships, which states 
that in case of classification conflicts (due to differences in the domestic law 
between the state of source and the state of residence), the classification under 
the law of the source state should be binding upon the residence state.400 This 
solution appears to be based on the wording of article 23 of the OECD Model 
Convention which requires that where an item of income may be taxed, “in 
accordance with the provisions of the convention”, the state of residence has the 
treaty obligation to relieve double taxation either through the exemption or credit 
methods.401 The OECD Report states that the meaning of the phrase “in 
accordance with the provisions of this convention” implies that  
[w]here due to differences in the domestic law between the state of source and the state 
of residence, the former applies, with respect to a particular item of income, provisions of 
the convention that are different from those that the state of residence would have 
applied to the same item of income, the income is still being taxed in accordance with the 
provisions of the convention, in this case as interpreted by the state of source. In such a 
case, therefore, article 23 requires that relief from double taxation be granted by the state 
of residence notwithstanding the conflict of qualification resulting from these differences 
in domestic law.402 
 
Engelen and Potgens403 are however of the view that the effectiveness of this 
approach can only be achieved if a specific provision to that effect is included in 
                                                 
396   Jones at 288; Engelen & Potgens at 253; Daniels at 169. 
397  Daniels at 169; Engelen & Potgens at 253. 
398  Daniels at 169. 
399   Jones at 314. 
400  OECD Partnership Report in par 105; see also par 32.2 of the Commentary on article 23 
of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
401  Lang at 40. Under the exemption method, the country of residence taxes its residents on 
their domestic-source income and exempts them from domestic tax on their foreign-
source income. In effect the jurisdiction to tax rests exclusively with the country of source. 
Under the credit method, foreign taxes paid by a resident taxpayer on foreign-source 
income generally reduce domestic taxes payable by the amount of the foreign tax. See 
Arnold & McIntyre at 33 and at 36. 
402  OECD Partnership Report in par 105. 
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a tax treaty. The Netherlands also subscribes to this view. Its Observation to the 
OECD Report on Partnerships in respect to this solution is that it can only be 
applicable to the extent that it is explicitly stated in a specific tax treaty.404    
 
The second solution that some commentators suggest is to rely on the tax treaty 
to provide for the classification of the partnership.405 This suggestion would 
however require amending the OECD Model Tax Convention in order to make a 
clear distinction between companies (non-transparent) and partnerships 
(transparent). It is argued that this approach may not be feasible, as treaty 
classification needs to be sufficiently flexible towards changes in national tax 
laws.406    
 
The third solution is the acceptance of the source state’s classification, but also 
to include in the treaty specific provisions that require the source state to follow 
the classification of the partner’s residence state.407 This is in line with 
paragraphs 6.3 and 6.4 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, which provides that regardless of the source state’s internal law 
classification, the source states should apply the classification of the partner’s 
residence state if that state treats the partnership as transparent.408 
 
Of the three solutions mentioned above, the first one appears to be the most 
feasible in resolving partnership classification problems. Under this approach, the 
country where the partnership is situated is determinative.409 In support of this 
approach, Essers & Meussen410 state that the country where the partnership is 
situated has the strongest position in determining the tax position of the 
partnership. Although part of the tax authority of the country of residence of the 
partners would be removed (since it has to follow the classification of the state of 
                                                                                                                                            
403  Engelen & Potgens at 252. 
404  See Engelen & Potgens at 252. 
405  Jones at 316. 
406  Essers & Meussen at 424. 
407   Jones at 316. 
408  According to the Netherlands, this solution is only applicable to the extent that it has been 
explicitly laid down in a specific tax treaty provision or in an internal rule of policy. If this is 
not the case, then reliance has to be placed on the mutual agreement procedure. 
409  Essers & Meussen at 425. 
410  Essers & Meussen at 425. 
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residence of the partnership), this may be appropriate in light of the goal of 
preventing double taxation or double non-taxation of income.411  
 
Curbing tax avoidance that results from investing in partnership/corporate 
hybrid entities: South Africa  
 
Generally, the foreign structures in which South African residents invest are 
largely driven by commercial considerations, or by the tax interests of non-
resident foreign investors (for example in the case of a minority stake in a joint 
venture). South African taxpayers often have little choice as to the legal form of 
the entity in which they invest.412 Many jurisdictions, especially tax havens, have 
legislation which provides for flexible corporate structures, for example structures 
which combine a partnership with corporate characteristics which may not be 
fiscally transparent. 413  
 
In South African law, a partnership is not a legal person distinct from the 
individual partners who comprise the partnership.414 A partnership is also not a 
taxable person for the purposes of the Income Tax Act.415 The general rule 
regarding the taxation of partnerships (whether local or foreign) is that where a 
South African resident has an interest in a tax-transparent foreign partnership, he 
or she is taxed in South Africa on his or her share of the partnership income. 
Section 24H(5) of the Income Tax Act provides that the income of the partnership 
is taxed in the hands of the individual partners at the time it accrues to or is 
received by the partnership. In terms of section 66(15) of the Income Tax Act, 
each partner is separately and individually liable for rendering the joint return. In 
terms of section 77(7), the partners are liable to tax in their separate individual 
capacities, and separate assessments are made upon each partner.  
 
Classification of partnership/corporate hybrid entities in the Income Tax 
                                                 
411  Essers & Meussen at 425. 
412  Olivier & Honiball at 464-465. 
413  J Freedman “Limited Liability Partnerships in the United Kingdom: Do They Have a Role 
for Small Firms?” in JA McCahery, T Raaijmakers & EPM Vermeulen The Governance of 
Close Corporations and Partnerships US and European Perspectives (2004) at 293. 
414  R v Levy 1929 AD 312;  Muller en Andere v Pienaar 1968 (3) SA 195 (A). 
415  Meyerowitz in par 16.61. 
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Act: Anomalies created by the definition of “company” 
 
The definition of the word “company” in section 1 of the Income Tax Act causes 
certain anomalies with respect to the taxation of foreign incorporated 
partnerships. This definition covers both companies incorporated in South Africa 
and those incorporated outside South Africa. In terms of section 1(b) of the 
Income Tax Act, a company is defined to include “any association, corporation or 
company incorporated under the law of any country other than the Republic, or 
any body corporate formed or established under such law”. From the wording of 
this definition, it appears that the legislature could have intended to establish 
consistent treatment for entities that would otherwise be recognised as corporate 
entities under South African law by virtue of them being recognised as separate 
legal personalities under foreign law. However this definition is so wide, that is 
gives rise to interpretation problems in relation to foreign entities which fall within 
the South African tax definition of a company. This is the case with respect to 
certain partnerships with corporate personality that are incorporated under the 
company law of certain jurisdictions. An example is the “limited liability 
partnership” (LLP), which originated in the United States,416 and which is 
becoming internationally popular but is foreign to South African law.417 The LLP 
structure also exists in the United Kingdom and it has been noted that several 
South African tax residents have interests in United Kingdom LLPs.418 It is 
necessary to briefly describe the nature of the United Kingdom LLP, in order to 
effectively discuss how this structure can be used to avoid South African taxes.  
 
In terms of section 1(2) of the United Kingdom’s Limited Liability Partnership Act 
2000 (LLPA), “a limited liability partnership is a body corporate (with legal 
personality separate from that if its members”). Explaining the intricacies of the 
United Kingdom LLP, Morse419 states the following:  
In essence it is a body corporate with limited liability in the sense that its members are not 
personally liable for its debts beyond their financial interests in the LLP itself, but with 
unlimited capacity. It is incorporated by registration with an incorporation document thus 
                                                 
416  Freedman at 293. 
417  Olivier & Honiball at 464. 
418  Olivier & Honiball at 464. 
419  G Morse “Limited Liability Partnerships Law Reform in the United Kingdom” in JA 
McCahery, T Raaijmakers & EPM Vermeulen The Governance of Close Corporations 
and Partnerships US and European Perspectives (2004) 317 at 324. 
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fulfilling the role of memorandum of association and subject to many of the accounting 
and disclosure requirements and other controls applicable to companies. But it has no 
shareholders or share capital, no directors, and no specific requirements as to meetings 
or resolutions.   
 
Since the definition of “company” in section 1(b) of South Africa’s Income Tax Act 
covers companies incorporated under foreign law, the legal status of a foreign 
entity has to be determined according to foreign law. It is irrelevant whether or 
not the foreign entity qualifies as a company under South African law.420 For 
example, the issue whether a particular LLP may be incorporated in the foreign 
jurisdiction or not, must be determined under the relevant law of that foreign 
jurisdiction. The result of the application of section 1(b) of the Income Tax Act is 
that a United Kingdom LLP qualifies as a company in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
Challenges of applying South Africa’s CFC legislation to 
partnership/corporate hybrid entities   
 
If a South African resident and a United Kingdom resident decide to incorporate 
an LLP in the United Kingdom, can South African CFC rules be applied to tax the 
South African shareholder? The answer to this question is not clear. It may be 
argued that since section 1(b) of the definition of “company” in section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act covers foreign companies, CFC rules could potentially apply to 
the LLP. It is however worth noting that for the CFC legislation to apply it is 
required that South African residents hold more than 50% of the total 
participation or voting rights in the foreign company.421 The unique nature of the 
United Kingdom LLP makes this aspect of the South African CFC legislation 
difficult to apply. Although the LLP comes into existence upon incorporation,422 
the participants in an LLP are referred to as members.423 It has no shareholders 
                                                 
420  Olivier & Honiball at 434. 
421  S 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
422  Freedman at 304; Jones et al at 292; D Armour Tolley’s Limited Liability Partnerships: The 
New Legislation (2001) at 2. 
423  Freedman at 304. 
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or share capital.424 In this respect, it is doubtful whether CFC legislation can be 
applied to the members of a United Kingdom LLP.425 It is submitted that this 
anomalous situation could be manipulated to avoid taxes. 
 
It should however be noted that there are other jurisdictions that have LLPs that 
are not incorporated. An example is the Cayman Islands.426 In terms of the 
definition of company in section 1(b) of the Income Tax Act, the Cayman Islands’ 
LLP cannot be considered a company but a transparent partnership.427  
 
Another example of an offshore hybrid entity is the United States “limited liability 
company” (LLC). The United States’ LLC has been described as a hybrid form of 
business organisation that has some attributes of a partnership and other 
attributes of a corporation. LLCs are recognised as corporate entities in the 
United States, but they are treated as partnerships for tax purposes.428 This tax 
treatment implies that the taxable income of the LLC passes through to owners, 
thereby avoiding corporate tax.429 It is worth noting that although under the 
United States Check-the Box Regulations of 1996,430 a partnership may elect to 
be taxed as a company for United States tax purposes, most entities elect to be 
taxed as partnerships.  
 
It is important to note that even though the LLC is disregarded for United States 
tax purposes, it is still regarded as a company for South Africa tax purposes. In 
South Africa, there is no specific law that characterises a hybrid entity on the 
basis of its tax treatment in another country.431 Since the definition of “company” 
in section 1(b) of the Income Tax Act recognises foreign companies, the relevant 
                                                 
424  Morse at 324. 
425  Olivier & Honiball at 434. 
426  Olivier & Honiball at 434. 
427  Olivier & Honiball at 434. 
428  G Whittenburg & M Altus-Buller Income Tax Fundamentals (2007) in par 10.8. 
429  Whittenburg & Altus-Buller in par 10.8. 
430  L Lokken “What Happened to Subpart F? US CFC Legislation after the Check-The-Box 
Regulation” (2005) 7 Florida Tax Review at 194; RS Avi-Yonah “To End Deferral As We 
Know It: Simplification Potential Of Check-The-Box” (1997) 74 Tax Notes at 219; CR 
Sweitzer “Analysing Subpart F in Light of Check-The- Box” (2005) 20 Akron Tax Journal at 
7-8. 
431  Olivier & Honiball at 465. 
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United States law that has to be considered is company law and not tax law.432 
As the LLC qualifies as a foreign company in South African law, it is arguable 
that CFC legislation can potentially be applied to South African residents who 
hold more than 50% of the total participation or voting rights of the LLC. 
 
Although a United States LLC is regarded as a company for South Africa tax 
purposes, this domestic law interpretation is overridden by the application of the 
United States tax treaty, which specifically provides that for purposes of the 
application of the tax treaty, the United States tax treatment of the entity must 
determine the tax treatment in South Africa.433    
 
 
 
 
Challenges in determining the residence status of partnership/corporate 
hybrid entities 
 
In terms of section 1 of the income Tax Act, a person other than a natural person 
(for example a company) is considered a “resident” of South Africa, if it is 
incorporated, established or formed in the Republic South Africa, or if it has a 
place of effective management in South Africa. This means for example that a 
company which is incorporated in South Africa is a resident irrespective of where 
its place of effective management is. Conversely, a company which has its place 
of effective management in South Africa is a resident irrespective of where it is 
incorporated.434  
 
When an entity such as the United Kingdom LLP is considered a company in 
South Africa in terms of section 1(b) of the of the definition of “Company” in the 
Income Tax Act, it is not clear whether LLP can be considered a South African 
resident if it is effectively managed in South Africa. The reason is that the LLP 
concept is foreign to South African law. It is submitted that this anomalous 
                                                 
432  Olivier & Honiball at 465. 
433  The United StatesTtechnical Memorandum issued by the IRS at the time of concluding the 
treaty. See also Olivier & Honiball at 434. 
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situation requires the amendment of the definition of the term “company” in the 
Income Tax Act.435  
 
It is worth noting that in South Africa, there are hardly any cases that have dealt 
with the hybrid entity problem. One case that comes close to explaining how this 
situation could arise is the case ITC 1819.436 Although the case was based on 
the implications of the double taxation agreement, and not specifically hybrid 
entities, the facts of the case are an example of how the different tax treatment of 
entities in two countries can be manipulated to avoid taxes. The appellant in the 
case was a partner in a firm of attorneys which was registered as a partnership in 
Lesotho and which did business from a permanent establishment in Lesotho. The 
firm was registered in Lesotho as a tax entity and was required to file a 
partnership return, but the profits of the partnership were taxed in Lesotho in the 
hands of the individual partners. SARS however included those profits in the 
appellant’s taxable income for the years 2002 and 2003, but credited him with the 
amounts of tax paid thereon in Lesotho. The appellant contended that his share 
of the profits from the Lesotho firm was taxable only in Lesotho and exempt from 
tax in South Africa in terms of article 7.1 of the tax treaty between the two 
countries. The said article provides that:  
The profits of an enterprise of a contracting state shall be taxable only in that state unless 
the enterprise carries on business in the other contracting state through a permanent 
establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the 
profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other state but only so much of them as is 
attributed to that permanent establishment. 
 
It was held that the appellant’s reliance on article 7.1 to claim that the profits of 
the Lesotho firm were taxable only in Lesotho was unacceptable. Further that a 
proper application of article 7.1 leads to a different conclusion from the 
appellant’s contention. The court held that this article specifically deals with the 
profits of an enterprise. An enterprise of a contracting state means an enterprise 
carried on by a resident of a contracting state. Further that a resident of a 
contracting state in Lesotho is a person who is liable to tax in Lesotho. The 
question therefore was whether the firm was liable to tax in Lesotho. The facts 
                                                                                                                                            
434 Meyerowitz in par 5.19; see also Huxham & Haupt at 296. 
435  Olivier & Honiball at 434 
436  69 SATC 159. 
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showed that although the firm was registered as a tax entity, it was not liable to 
tax in Lesotho. The court pointed out that the position in respect to the taxation of 
partnerships in Lesotho appears to be similar to the position of partners in the 
South Africa Income tax Act.   
 
In terms of article 7.1 of the tax treaty, the appellant carried on an enterprise in 
respect of a firm in Lesotho, together with others. Section 24H(2) of South 
Africa’s  Income Tax Act provides that where any trade or business is carried on 
in the form of a  partnership, each member of such partnership shall be deemed 
to be carrying on the trade or business of the partnership. Since the appellant 
was resident in South Africa, his involvement in the firm was considered as an 
enterprise of South Africa that carried on business in Lesotho through a 
permanent establishment therein. Therefore in terms of article 7.1, the profits of 
the enterprise carried on by the appellant may be taxed in Lesotho, but taxes so 
paid should be deducted from taxes due by the appellant in South Africa, in 
terms of article 23 of the tax treaty. It was thus held that the assessments in 
question cannot be deducted. The appeal was dismissed and the assessments 
were confirmed.    
 
Although this case deals mainly with tax treaty implications, the facts portray the 
difficulties that arise out of the different classification and tax treatment of entities 
in two different countries.  
 
In summary, it can be said that there are a number of uncertainties about the 
taxation of hybrid entities in South Africa. In order to create legal certainty, it is 
recommended that South Africa’s tax legislation be amended to specifically 
provide for the treatment of hybrid entities as tax transparent limited partnerships 
under the Act.437 However, this proposal should not be implemented without 
careful consideration and analysis. Specific mechanisms exit in other jurisdictions 
(such as the United Kingdom and the United States), which ensure the equitable 
                                                 
437   S Zaaiman “Paragraph (b) of the Definition of Company: Anomalies Arising in Respect of 
Certain Foreign Incorporated Entities” (February 2007, Issue 12) KPMG International Tax 
Newsletter at 4. 
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tax treatment of the partners of these entities.438 This is currently not the case 
under South Africa’s tax law.  
 
4.11 CURBING TAX AVOIDANCE THAT RESULTS FROM INVESTING IN 
CONDUIT COMPANY STRUCTURES (TREATY SHOPPING)  
 
Countries often enter into bilateral tax treaties439 with their trading partners in 
order to alleviate double taxation.440 Although the network of tax treaties that 
countries enter into encourages international trade and investment, it also opens 
up opportunities of exploiting the treaties for tax avoidance purposes.441 The tax 
avoidance scheme which is employed in respect to tax treaties is commonly 
referred to as “treaty shopping”, a term which refers to the use of double tax 
treaties by the residents of a non-treaty country in order to obtain treaty benefits 
that are not supposed to be available to them.442 This is mainly done by 
interposing or organising a “conduit company”443 in one of the contracting states 
so as to shift profits out of those states.444 When a conduit company is set up in a 
                                                 
438   Zaaiman at 4. 
439 R L Reinhold “What is Tax Treaty Abuse? (Is Treaty Shopping an Out Dated Concept?)” 
(2000) 53 The Taxpayer at 673 where it is noted that a tax treaty is an agreement 
between two countries that sets out rules for the taxation for transactions and 
relationships between persons resident in the two countries.   
440 N Boldman “International Tax Avoidance” (1981) 35 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation  at  443; M Hampton The Offshore Interface: Tax Havens in the Global 
Economy (1996) at 12; B J Arnold & M J McIntyre International Tax Primer (1995) at 29 
where it is noted that double taxation may be economic or juridical. Economic double 
taxation refers to a double tax on the same income in the hands of different persons. 
Juridical double taxation is the imposition if the same comparable taxes by two or more 
states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical 
periods. See also R Rohatgi Basic International Taxation (2002) at 12.  
441 C Wolman “Computer Guide to Tax avoidance” (1985) 10 Financial Times at 113. 
442 H Becker & F J Wurm Treaty Shopping: An Emerging Tax Issue and its Present Status in 
Various Countries (1988) at 1; S van Weeghel The Improper Use of Tax Treaties with 
Particular Reference to the Netherlands and The United States (1998) at 119 notes that 
treaty shopping means that a taxpayer “shops” into the benefits of a treaty which normally 
are not available to him and to this end he generally incorporates a corporation in a 
country that has an advantageous tax treaty.  J Ware & P Roper Offshore Insight (2001) 
at 179 notes that as the name indicates, “treaty shopping” is a technique used to choose 
tax treaties which best suit the person to enable structuring international transactions in 
such a way as to take advantage of (shop for) certain tax treaties; C Doggart “Tax 
Havens and Their Uses” The Economist Publication (1990) Special Report No. 1191 at 
91.  
443 Defined below. 
444 After setting up the conduit company structure, other “stepping stone” strategies can also 
be applied to shift income from the contracting countries. This could be done by changing 
the nature of the income to appear as tax deductible expenses such as commission of 
service fees. See F J Wurm Treaty Shopping in the 1992 OECD Model Convention 
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tax-haven jurisdiction, this can result in tremendous loss of revenue for the 
countries that have signed the treaty .445 It should however be noted that even for 
those countries that have no treaties with tax-haven jurisdictions, the same result 
can occur if the tax rates of the country where the conduit is situated are 
relatively low.  
 
 
 
 
 
The definition of a conduit company and a description of a conduit 
company structure 
 
The term “conduit company” refers to an intermediary company with very narrow 
powers, which is used for holding assets or rights as an agent or nominee on 
behalf of another company.446 If a third country resident sets up a conduit 
company in one of two treaty countries that has an advantageous tax treaty,447  
income can be shifted from the treaty countries by taking advantage of the tax 
concessions that the treaty offers.448  
 
For example, countries A and B enter into a tax treaty that entitles their residents 
to benefit from income derived from either country. The treaty also creates a 
favourable tax environment for the two countries that encourages foreign 
investment. Country C has no or a less favourable treaty with country A, but does 
have a favourable treaty with country B. When a resident of country C forms a 
conduit company in country B, this conduit company being a resident of country 
                                                                                                                                            
Intertax (1992) at 658; S M Haug “The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-treaty 
shopping Provisions: A Comparative Analysis” (1996) 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Trans-
national law at 196; E Tomsett Tax planning for Multinational companies (1989) at 149; 
Arnold and McIntyre at 114-115. 
445 See OECD Issues in International Taxation No. 1 International Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion (1987) at 20; see also Anthony Ginsberg International Tax Havens 2nd edition  
(1997) at 5-6; P Roper & J Ware Offshore Pitfalls (2000)at 5. 
446 Weeghel at 72-73. 
447 Wurm at 658; A Rappako Base Company Taxation (1989) at 16. 
448 Rappako at 16. 
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B449 is entitled to benefits under the bilateral treaty between countries A and B.450 
The benefits may include treaty concessions that could be granted to the conduit 
company by virtue of the treaty between counties A and B.451  
 
Factors which encourage “conduit company treaty shopping” and why It 
should be curbed 
 
“Conduit company treaty shopping” is encouraged by the fact that not all states 
maintain treaty relationships with each other. An investor whose country of 
residence does not have a treaty with the country in which the investor wants to 
do business, can get involved in schemes whereby he/she uses that other 
country’s treaty to obtain the benefits of that treaty.452 It is not only the absence 
of a tax treaty that promotes treaty shopping, but also differences in tax relief 
offered by other countries’ tax treaties.453 Such differences among tax treaties 
provide an incentive for international investors to use the most beneficial treaty 
for their transactions. 
 
A conduit company may for instance enable an international investor to qualify 
for reduced rates of withholding taxes offered by the treaty countries.454 A 
withholding tax is a tax which the payer of interest, dividends or royalty payment 
must withhold from such payment and pay over to the tax authorities.455 The 
majority of countries in the world impose significant withholding taxes on interest, 
dividends and royalties paid to non-residents.456 For multinational companies 
                                                 
449 A company incorporated in a given jurisdiction is a separate juridical entity recognised as 
such in that jurisdiction. HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ Du Plessis, PA Delport, 
L De Koker & JT Pretorius Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) at 3. 
450 Example adopted form OECD Issues in International Taxation No. 1 at 88; see also Haug 
at 205; Ginsberg at 39; see also A Ogley Tolley’s Tax Havens A Practical Guide to the 
Leading Tax Havens of the World (1990) at 32 and 42. 
451 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit 
Companies (1987) at pars 4(2) and 5(d). See also Haug at 206; Ginsberg at 40; Rohatgi 
at 230. 
452 Haug at 201; Tomsett at 149. 
453 D Williams Trends in International Taxation (1991) at 3; AW Oguttu “Curbing ‘Treaty 
Shopping’: The ‘Beneficial Ownership’ Provision Analysed from a South African 
Perspective (2007) XL The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
at 241. 
454 B Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service (March 2002) Issue 66 at LEX/26. 
455 Spitz & Clark at LEX/26 
456 United Nation Ad hoc group of Experts on International Co-operation in Tax matters: 
Guidelines for International Co-operation against the Evasion and Avoidance of Taxes 
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involved in cross-border investments, withholding taxes can cause a major loss 
of revenue.457 The payment of high withholding taxes is usually relieved when a 
double taxation agreement has been signed between two countries. By virtue of 
such an agreement, the investors in the treaty countries can benefit from the 
reduced rates of withholding taxes.458 If a taxpayer’s income is reduced by high 
withholding taxes in a particular country and that country has no treaty with his 
home country, it may be possible for the taxpayer to work through conduit 
company in a third country which has a treaty with his/her home country and take 
advantage of the reduced withholding taxes.459  
Treaty shopping is however undesirable because it frustrates the spirit of a 
treaty.460 When treaties are concluded, the assumption is that a certain amount 
of income will accrue to both countries involved in the treaty. The anticipated 
capital flows are distorted if the treaty is used by third country residents. 
Furthermore, the underlying principle of all bilateral tax treaties is the principle of 
reciprocity 461which is impeded when third country residents derive benefits from 
a treaty intended to serve only the interests of residents of the contracting states. 
Also when unintended beneficiaries are free to choose the location of their 
businesses, then treaties designed to eliminate double taxation end up being 
used to eliminate taxation altogether.462 Rohatgi463 notes that treaty shopping 
makes a bilateral treaty function largely as a “treaty with the world” that may 
result in tremendous loss of revenue for the contracting states.464 Treaty 
shopping is also undesirable because no effective exchange of information can 
                                                                                                                                            
(with specific reference to Taxes on Income, Profits, Capital and Capital gains) (1984) at 
37; M W E Glautier & F W Bassinger A Reference Guide to International Taxation: 
Profiting from your International Operations  (1987) at 263. 
457 Rohatgi at 206. 
458 Spitz & Clarke at LEX/26; United Nations Ad hoc group of Experts on International Co-
operation in Tax Matters at 37; Glautier & Bassinger at 263. 
459 R A Westin International Taxation of Electronic Commerce (2000) at 184. See also AJM 
Jimenez “Domestic Anti- Abuse Rules and Double Taxation Treaties: A Spanish 
Perspective - Part 1” (Nov. 2002) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 543. 
United Nations Ad hoc group of Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters at 
37; Glautier & Bassinger at 263. 
460 OECD 1987 Report.  
461 Haug at 216; Weeghel at 121; Oguttu at 241. 
462 Weeghel at 121. 
463 Rohatgi at 363. 
464 Haug at 218; Weeghel at 121 states that treaty shopping also results in the state of 
residence of the treaty shopper having no or little incentive to enter into a treaty with the 
state of source because the residents of the state of residence can indirectly receive 
treaty benefits from the state of source without the state of residence having to provide 
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take place between the countries that have signed the treaty.465  
 
Use of general anti-avoidance provisions to curb treaty shopping 
 
Paragraph 7.1 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Convention 
provides that where taxpayers are tempted to abuse the tax laws of a State by 
exploiting the differences between various countries’ laws, such attempts may be 
countered by jurisprudential rules that are part of the domestic law of the state 
concerned. In other words, the onus is placed on countries to adopt domestic 
anti-avoidance legislation to prevent the exploitation of their tax base and then to 
preserve the application of these rules in their treaties.466  
 
There have however been controversies about the use of domestic anti-
avoidance rules in a treaty context. The pre-2003 Commentary on article 1 was 
quite unclear about the relationship of tax treaties and domestic anti-avoidance 
rules and the OECD Member countries were not in agreement on this matter. 
Some of the reasons for the disagreements were that in some cases, tax treaties 
may impose limits on the application of domestic anti-avoidance thus making the 
domestic rules inconsistent with treaties.467 
 
To resolve these controversies, the 1998 OECD Report on Harmful Tax 
Competition468 recommended that the Commentary on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention be clarified to remove any uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the 
compatibility of domestic anti-abuse measures with the Model Tax Convention.469 
In 2003, changes were made in paragraph 22 of Commentary on article 1 which 
make it explicitly clear that when base companies are used to abuse tax treaties 
domestic anti-avoidance rules such as “substance over form”,470 the “sham 
                                                                                                                                            
reciprocal benefits; Oguttu at 242.  
465  Olivier and Honiball at 352. 
466  Arnold at 245. 
467 Arnold at 246. 
468 OECD Harmful Tax Competition - An emerging Global issue (April 1998). 
469 Recommendation 10 of the 1998 OECD report on Harmful Tax Competition’; See also 
International Fiscal Association The OECD Model Convention - 1998 and Beyond; The 
Concept of Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties (2000) at 25; See also Jimenez at 549.   
470 Ware & Roper at 77 where the “substance over form” doctrine is described as a doctrine 
which permits the tax authorities to ignore the legal form of a tax arrangement and look at 
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principle”471 and “economic substance”472 can be applied to prevent the abuse of 
tax treaties.473 Paragraph 22.2 of the Commentary on article 1 provides that 
domestic anti-avoidance rules do not conflict with tax conventions, as the 
domestic anti-avoidance rules merely establish the facts to which tax treaties 
apply.474 
Apart from using domestic general anti-avoidance rules to curb treaty shopping, 
the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention suggests 
specific clauses that can be inserted in tax treaties to curb conduit company 
treaty shopping. 
 
Specific treaty provisions suggested by the OECD to curb “conduit 
company treaty shopping” 
 
The OECD suggests a range of specific provisions that countries could opt to 
inserted in their tax treaties in order to curb conduit company treaty shopping. 
However, it is not within the scope of this work to discuss all these methods in 
detail. In brief the methods are:  The “look through” method in terms of which, 
treaty benefits are not allowed where a company is not owned, directly or 
indirectly, by residents of the state in which the company is a resident.475 Then 
there is the “subject-to-tax” provision that provides that treaty benefits in the state 
of source can be granted only if the income in question is subject to tax in the 
state of residence.476 There is also the “channel approach”, in terms of which a 
provision is inserted in the treaty that singles out cases of improper use of the 
treaty through the employment of conduit arrangements.477 There is also the 
“limitation-of-benefits” provision, which is aimed at preventing persons who are 
                                                                                                                                            
the actual substance of the relevant transaction.  
471  In terms of this principle, the true nature of a transaction is disguised for purposes of tax 
avoidance thus it is referred to as a “sham”. See Olivier & Honiball at 235. 
472  This principle requires that a business exists in substance and not merely on paper. See 
Olivier & Honiball at 374.  
473 This position seems to be based on the 1987 OECD Report on the Use of Base 
Companies which states in par 38 that anti-abuse rules or rules on “substance over form” 
can be used to conclude that a base company  is not the beneficial owner of an item of 
income.  
474  Arnold at 260. 
475 Para 13 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Convention. See also 
Jimenez at 21; Oguttu at 242. 
476 Para 15 and 16 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Convention. 
477  Par 17 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Convention. 
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not residents of the contracting states from accessing the benefits of a treaty 
through the use of an entity that would qualify as a resident of one of the 
States.478 The OECD also suggests the use of the “beneficial ownership” 
provision, which is discussed in detail below. The relative importance of the other 
clauses suggested by the OECD is somehow reduced by the fact that the OECD 
has shaped the “beneficial ownership” provision in such a way that it is 
considered the most effective provision that can be used to exclude conduits 
from treaty benefits.479  
 
The “beneficial ownership” provision 
 
Paragraph 10 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Convention 
suggests the use of a “beneficial ownership” provision as one of the anti-abuse 
provisions that can be used to deal with source taxation of specific types of 
income set out in articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Convention. For 
instance article 10(2) provides that 
... dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which the company paying the 
dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner 
of the dividends is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not 
exceed...480 
 
This provision has the effect of denying treaty benefits to a conduit company, 
unless the beneficial owner is a resident of one of the contracting states.481 In 
order to determine the effectiveness of such a provision in curbing “conduit 
company treaty shopping”, it is necessary to have an understanding of the 
concept “beneficial ownership”. 
 
The meaning of the “beneficial ownership” concept  
 
The use of the “beneficial ownership” provision to curb treaty shopping has been 
a source of major controversy among OECD member countries. This is because 
the term “beneficial ownership” is not explicitly defined in OECD Model Tax 
                                                 
478 Par 20 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Convention. 
479 Jimenez at 21; Oguttu at 243. 
480 Article 10(2) of the OECD Model Convention  
481  Par 12.2 of the Commentary on article 10 of the OECD Model Convention. 
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Convention or its Commentary.482 The first use of this term in article 10, 11 and 
12 was in the 1977 OECD Model Tax Convention.483 But ever since then, there is 
limited  information as to the intended use of the term and reasons why it was 
decided to incorporate the term “beneficial ownership”, as opposed to some 
other notion. However, the term seems to have been earlier in use, as evidenced 
from article III of the 1945 United Kingdom/United States treaty on the estates of 
deceased persons.484  
 
It is worth noting that the OECD Model Commentary provides two guidelines for 
the determining meaning of the term. These guidelines can be gleaned from 
paragraph 12.1 of the OECD Commentary on article 10 in respect to dividends, 
par 10 of the Commentary on article 11 in respect to interest and paragraph 4.1 
of the Commentary on article 12 in respect to royalties, all worded in a similar 
language. The first guideline provided in the above mentioned paragraphs is that:  
where an item of income is received by a resident of a contracting state acting in the 
capacity of agent or nominee, it would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
Convention for the state of source to grant relief or exemption merely on account of the 
status of the immediate recipient of the income as a resident of the other contracting 
state.485 
 
The implication is that a nominee or agent who is a treaty country resident may 
not claim benefits, if the person who has all the economic interest in, and all the 
control over, property (the beneficial owner), is not also a resident. On the other 
hand, if the beneficial owner is a resident of the contracting State, then treaty 
benefits are available even if the agent or nominee who holds title to the property 
and is legally entitled to collect the income from the property resides 
elsewhere.486 It is worth noting that although the Commentary uses the terms 
                                                 
482 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Condensed version) (2005). For 
the remark see International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of 
Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties at 15. 
483 J D B Oliver, J B Libin, S van Weeghel & C Du Toit “Beneficial Ownership and the OECD 
Model” (2000) 1 British Tax Review at 27-28.   
484 Evidence of earlier use of the term also appears in the 1968 UK/Netherlands treaty, the 
1969 Australia/Japan treaty, the 1975 UK/Spain treaty and the 1968 Ireland/France 
treaties and the 1968 protocol amending the 1947 UK/Antigua treaty. See Oliver & 
Honiball at 29.  
485 Par 12.1 of the OECD Commentary on article 10 in respect to dividends, par 10 of the 
Commentary on article 11 in respect to interest and par 4.1 of the Commentary on article 
12 in respect to royalties. 
486 The International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership in Tax Treaties at 22. 
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“nominee” or “agent” to explain the term “beneficial ownership”, it does not set 
out the features of a nominee or agent that could make it possible to differentiate 
someone who is just nominee or agent from technical nominees or agents, 
where the technical ownership is nonetheless disregard in favour of a beneficial 
owner.487  
 
The second guideline to the meaning of the term “beneficial ownership” that is 
provided in above mentioned paragraphs of the OECD Model Commentary is 
that  
it would be equally inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention for the 
state of source to grant relief or exemption where a resident of a contracting state, 
otherwise than through an agency or nominee relationship, simply acts as a conduit for 
another person who in fact receives the benefit of the income concerned.  
 
Explaining this guideline, the OECD Report on Conduit companies488 states that 
a conduit company cannot normally be regarded as a beneficial owner if, through 
the formal owner, it has as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it 
in relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on 
account of the interested parties (such as the shareholders of the conduit 
company).489 It is however worth noting that not every conduit company can be 
denied the ability to be a beneficial owner on those grounds. In certain instances, 
conduit companies are usually more than mere legal owners and they usually 
have full power over the underlying asset that produces dividends royalties or 
interest. So it may not be evident that they are not the beneficial owner of income 
received. Paragraph 23 of the OECD Report on Conduit companies points out 
that “legal ownership” is not enough to constitute beneficial ownership. This is 
because in some cases the conduit company’s connection in legal terms with the 
income in issue may no be so clear. This Report explains that the fact that the 
conduit company’s main function is to hold assets or rights, is not itself sufficient 
to categorise it as a mere intermediary. This indicates that further examination of 
                                                 
487 The International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership in Tax Treaties at 22. 
488 OECD 1987 Report on the Use of Base Companies in par 14(b); see also par 12.1 of the 
OECD Commentary on article 10 in respect to dividends, par 10 of the Commentary on 
article 11 in respect to interest and par 4.1 of the Commentary on Article 12 in respect to 
royalties.  
489 OECD 1987 Report on the Use of Base Companies in par 14(b). 
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the matter may be necessary.490 For instance, a holding company that simply 
owns investment assets on behalf of its shareholders may not be the beneficial 
owner of the income received by it. It is however unlikely that sufficient 
information would be available in most cases to deny treaty benefits to a holding 
company. For this reason, the OECD Commentary suggests that countries may 
include specific provisions in their treaties to deal with such holding 
companies.491 
 
From the above, and also from what was noted in the 2002 OECD Report 
entitled “Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits”,492 it appears that the 
concept of beneficial ownership is difficult to interpret. What transpires is that the 
OECD Committee on fiscal affairs considers a conduit company, which has very 
narrow powers, as a nominee or agent and thus not as a beneficial owner to 
which treaty benefits should be granted. Apart from the exclusion of agents and 
the nominees, it has been argued that the term “beneficial ownership” has not 
been fully defined.493 Furthermore, there are remarkably few court cases on the 
tax treaty meaning of the term and few statements from governments about the 
international meaning of the term.494  
 
Commentators also hold differing views on the meaning of the term. For 
instance, Vogel495 holds the view that a “beneficial owner” is the person who is 
free to decide whether or not the capital or assets of an entity should be used or 
made available for use by others. Du Toit496 states that the term is only known in 
common law states. He497 is however of the view that in interpreting bilateral tax 
treaties in the context of royalties, “the beneficial owner is the person whose 
ownership attributes outweigh that of any other person”.498 Eyanatten499 points 
                                                 
490 Oliver et al at 58. 
491  Par 22, 8 and 7 of the OECD Commentaries on articles 10, 11, and 12 respectively. 
492 OECD 2002 Report: Issues in International Taxation No.8 in par 23.  
493 Oliver et al at 20. 
494 Oliver et al at 31-32. 
495  K Vogel Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (1997) at 562. 
496  C Du Toit “Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties” (1999) Internal 
Bureau for Fiscal Documentation at 243. 
497  Du Toit at 247. 
498  Du Toit at 247. 
499  W Eynatten “The Concept of ‘Beneficial Ownership’ under Belgian Tax Law: Legal 
Interpretation is Maintained” (2003) Intertax Kluwer Law International at 523. 
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out that the term “beneficial ownership” is a well-known concept in the domestic 
systems of common-law countries, but that it is foreign to civil law countries. 
He500 however holds the view that the term “beneficial ownership” refers to the 
right a person has to the benefits arising from certain assets. Further that 
“beneficial ownership” of asses is different from “legal ownership”, which is 
characterised by control over those assets. Although there seem to be various 
opinions to the meaning of the term, Olivier & Honiball501 argue that managers, 
representatives, or nominees cannot be regarded as beneficial owners of assets. 
According to Eyanatten,502 this conclusion should be extended to every 
intermediary who acts in the name of and on account of a third party.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, the term “beneficial ownership” has a meaning in the 
domestic legislation of some countries.503 There has thus been an inclination by 
some of those countries to apply their domestic meaning of the term in a treaty 
context.504 The reason for this is based on article 3(2) of the OECD Model 
Convention, which provides that where a term is not defined in the Convention, 
unless the context otherwise requires, a contracting state can make use of the 
meaning of the term under its laws that are used for the purposes of the taxes to 
which the Convention applies.505  
 
What is the scope of using the domestic meaning of the term? 
 
As noted above, article 3(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, permits 
countries to apply the domestic meaning of a term that is not fully defined in the 
OECD Model Tax Convention and its Commentary. For this to be done it is 
necessary to determine the scope for the application of article 3(2). In other 
                                                 
500  Eynatten  at 526. 
501  Olivier & Honiball at 476. 
502  Eynatten at 539. 
503  See the discussion in respect to the United Kingdom in chapter 5 par par 5.2. In the 
United States case of in Montana Catholic Missions v Missoula Country 200 US 118 
(1906), at 128, it was held that beneficial ownership in property means a right to 
enjoyment of property that exists where the legal title is in one person and the right to the 
beneficial interests in the property is in another. Such a right to beneficial interest in 
property is recognised by law, can be enforced by the courts. 
504 In this regard see the position in the United States as discussed below under the heading 
“Reasons against the use of the domestic meaning of the term”. 
505 See also the International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of 
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words, it is necessary to determine the relevant law of the contracting state that 
must be used in interpreting the term. Is it tax law, commercial law in general, or 
is it the domestic law on which the treaty application arises?  
 
Article 3(2) makes it clear that the meaning of any term not defined in the 
Convention may be ascertained by reference to the meaning it has for the 
purpose of the relevant provisions of the domestic law of a contracting state. 
Furthermore, the meaning under the applicable tax laws of that state should 
prevail over a meaning given to the term under the other laws of that state. 
Further clarity is provided in paragraph 13(1) of the Commentary on article 3(2) 
which states that reference to the meaning of a term may be derived from any 
relevant provision of the domestic law of the contracting state, even if it is not a 
tax law. But where the meaning of the term is defined differently for the purposes 
of the different laws of a contracting state, the meaning given to that term for 
purposes of the laws imposing the taxes to which the Convention applies shall 
prevail over all others, including those given for the purposes of other tax laws.506  
 
Reasons against the use of the domestic meaning of the term 
 
In coming up with an international meaning of the term “beneficial ownership”, 
countries should not unilaterally relying on article 3(2) and apply the domestic 
meaning of the term. The reason is that this would result in the loss of the 
international uniformity in the interpretation of the term and it would also result in 
uncertainty and loss of reliability for taxpayers.507 
 
Sight should not be lost of the fact that in some states, there may not be any 
meaning of the term at all.508 It appears to be internationally accepted that article 
                                                                                                                                            
Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties at 15.   
506 Oliver et al at 43; Vogel at 10; see also JFA Jones “The 1992 Model Tax Treaty: Article 
3(2) of the Convention and the Commentary to it: Treaty Interpretation” (1993) European 
Taxation at 253.  
507 Oliver et al at 45. 
508 For example, Oliver et al  at 49 note that Japanese internal tax law or non tax law does 
not have a meaning of beneficial ownership. It however has meaning for the concept 
beneficiary in the context of a trust. On page 51 it is stated that in Sweden the notion 
“beneficial ownership” has neither been discussed or analysed in the Swedish legal 
doctrine. On page 50 it is stated that Switzerland does not have a coherent beneficial 
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3(2) cannot apply where the source state does not use the term in its domestic 
law.509 There could also be a situation where even if there is a meaning in the 
domestic law of the two contracting states, the meaning could be different in 
each of the two states. Disputes would then arise as to whether someone is a 
beneficial owner under the law of the source state or under the law of the state of 
residence.  
 
The problem of using the domestic meaning of the term is evidenced by the 
United States’ controversial anti-conduit regulations which are defended by the 
theory that it is merely exercising its prerogative as the source state in terms of 
article 3(2) to define the term beneficial ownership.510 For instance, in the treaty 
with Switzerland, the United States combined general anti-abuse provisions, 
such as the “substance over form”511 principle, with the beneficial ownership 
provision to curb conduit company treaty shopping.512 It is argued that using the 
beneficial ownership provision together with other anti-abuse provisions is not the 
solution.513 Commentators on how the United States applies the “beneficial 
ownership” provision are of the view that the use of this provision was never 
intended to open a very wide door to unilateral domestic anti-abuse measures.514 
 
A suggestion for the way forward in finding an international meaning of 
“beneficial ownership”  
 
The original drafters of the “beneficial ownership” provision (in the 1977 OECD 
                                                                                                                                            
ownership policy.  
509  JFA Jones “The ‘One True Meaning’ of a Tax Treaty” (2001) Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation at 221.  
510 The International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership in Tax Treaties at 17 and 27. 
511 The “substance over form” doctrine permits tax authorities to ignore the legal form of a tax 
arrangement and look at the actual substance of the relevant transaction. See Ware & 
Roper at 77.  
512 The International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership in Tax Treaties at 17 where it is noted that in the technical explanation of the 
United States treaty with Switzerland that the OECD authorizes member countries to 
deny benefits, in the way the US does under the anti-conduit rules, to mere nominees 
under “substance over form” principles.    
513 The International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership in Tax Treaties at 20.   
514 The International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership in Tax Treaties at 16-17.   
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Model Convention) had a specific meaning in mind, which seems to be a treaty-
based definition that prevails over the domestic meaning of the term.515 
Commentators on this issue are also of the view that it is better to develop an 
international meaning to the term that would be understood and used by all 
countries that adopt the OECD Model Convention.516 For example, Baker517 
points out that the term is not intended to be employed in the OECD Model 
Convention in a limited, technical sense that it may have in the domestic context 
of a particular jurisdiction. Vogel518 argues that the term should be interpreted 
with reference to the context of the treaty, and particularly with a view to the 
purpose pursued by the relevant restriction. Du Toit519 is of the opinion that the 
term can properly be classified as international tax language.   
 
It is however notable that since its inception, in the OECD Model Convention in 
1977, 29 years later, the OECD has not offered a meaningful interpretation of the 
term. Sight should not be lost of the fact that double taxation agreements are 
generally governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.520 Article 
31(1) thereof provides that treaties should be interpreted in good faith, in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty read in their 
context, and in light of the purpose of the treaty (which is to prevent tax 
avoidance). If countries apply article 3(2) of the OECD Model Convention 
unilaterally in interpreting the term “beneficial ownership”, this may defeat the 
treaty purpose of preventing tax avoidance. 
 
In finding an international meaning to the term “beneficial ownership”, it should 
be noted that the OECD has at least offered some guidance that countries may 
rely on. The guidelines in the Commentaries on articles 10, 11, and 12 indicate 
that a recipient of interest, dividends or royalties could be a mere intermediary 
acting as an agent or nominee for some other party. Such an intermediary 
                                                 
515  The International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the OECD Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership in Tax Treaties at 16-17. 
516 Oliver & Honiball 42 at 46; The International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on the 
OECD Concept of Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties at 20. 
517  P Baker Double Taxation Conventions and International Law (2005) in par 10B-13.  
518  Vogel at 562. 
519  Du Toit at 243. 
520 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 signed in Vienna on 23 
May 1969.  
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cannot be a “beneficial owner” and is not entitled to treaty benefits. When relying 
on article 3(2) to interpret the term, these guidelines should serve as a guide 
towards establishing the meaning of the term.521 By providing such guidance, the 
OECD made it clear that throwing the interpretation of the term to a variety of 
domestic law interpretations would not be fruitful.522 It should further be noted 
that the OECD Commentary specifically provides that the term “beneficial 
ownership” is not to be used in a narrow technical sense; rather, it should be 
understood in its context and in light of the object and purposes of the 
Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion and avoidance.523 It appears that the OECD’s intention in making this 
statement is to persuade the tax authorities and courts of a given country, which 
have a narrow domestic meaning of “beneficial owner”, to prefer a broad treaty 
meaning.524 It can thus be concluded that where the domestic interpretation of 
the term is not in line with the guidelines offered by the OECD, that interpretation 
cannot be relied on, as it would go against international consensus.  
 
Curbing conduit company treaty shopping: The “beneficial ownership” 
provision from the South African perspective 
 
Although most of South Africa’s treaties follow to a large extent the OECD Model 
Convention,525 South Africa is not a member of the OECD.526 South Africa uses 
the “beneficial ownership” provision in most of its tax treaties to curb conduit 
company treaty shopping. However, in the treaty with the United States, the 
“limitation of benefits” provision is applied, as the United States chooses to use 
this provision in its double taxation agreements.  
 
 
As mentioned above, the term “beneficial ownership” was taken from the 
                                                 
521 D Ward Ward’s Tax Treaties (1994-1995) at 26; Oguttu 250. 
522 Oliver et al at 47.  
523 The Commentary on article 10 par 2(12), Commentary on article 11 par 9, and the 
Commentary on article 12 par 4.  
524 B J Arnold “Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to 
the OECD Model” (2004) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 258. 
525 Huxham & Haupt at 357.   
526 Huxham & Haupt at 357 in par 16.9.4; Olivier & Honiball at 8. 
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common law states and incorporated into the OECD Model Convention.527 
Although South Africa is a member of the Commonwealth and formerly a 
Dominion Territory of the British Empire, it is not generally regarded as a 
common law state, since its legal system is based on the Roman-Dutch legal 
system.528 There are however significant English law influences, for example in 
the law of trust and in company law.529 The term “beneficial ownership” as found 
in the English-influenced common law states, namely the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, is unknown in South African 
law.530 In CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd and Others,531 the court held that the 
term “beneficial owner” does not constitute a clearly defined juristic concept, but 
that the term is appropriate in the context of a situation where it is alleged that 
someone who is the ostensible owner of property is in fact not its real owner.532 
 
It is however worth noting that the term “beneficial ownership” is used in South 
African company law in respect of the ownership of shares. In order to 
understand the use of this term, it is necessary to provide some further 
explanation. In South African company law, a person becomes a member of a 
company only when his name is entered in the register of members. Once a 
member, the person acquires rights attached to his shares, but not every holder 
of shares registered as such in a company’s share register is the true holder of 
the rights attached to the share.533 A member could for instance sell or cede the 
rights attached to the shares by passing “the property” in them to a purchaser 
who may not be registered as a member of the company.534 The purchaser owns 
                                                 
527  Du Toit at 20. 
528  Olivier & Honiball at 413. 
529  Olivier & Honiball at 413. 
530  Olivier & Honiball at 413. 
531 66 SATC 346. 
532 See also Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) 
SA 441 (AD) at 453A-B. 
533 HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ Du Plessis, PA Delport, L De Koker & JT 
Pretorius Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) at 242. Note that in terms of section 1 of the Income 
Tax Act, a shareholder is in relation to a company inter alia means the registered 
shareholder in respect of any share, except that where some person than the registered 
shareholder is entitled, whether by virtue of any provision in the memorandum or articles 
of association of the company or under the terms of any agreement or contract, or 
otherwise, to all or part of the benefit of the rights of participation in the profits, income or 
capital attaching to the share so registered, that other person shall, to the extent that 
such other person is entitled to such benefit, also be deemed to be a shareholder. 
534 Cillers et al at 242. 
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the shares whereas the seller is the member of the company in respect of the 
shares and he alone (the seller) can enforce the rights attached to the shares 
against the company (but this he does in the interest of the purchaser). In such a 
situation, the purchaser is usually described as the “beneficial owner”535 of the 
shares and the registered member is referred to as the beneficial owner’s 
nominee.536 The term “nominee” is not defined in the Companies Act.537 However 
in Samuel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd, 538 it was held to mean a 
person nominated or appointed by another to hold shares in his name on that 
other’s behalf. In Dadabhay v Dadabhay,539 it was held that the expression 
“nominee” is a commercial rather than a legal one, and that it denotes that the 
registered shareholder holds the shares subject to the instructions of the 
beneficial owner of the shares.540 In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean 
Commodities Inc,541 it was held that a registered member of a company who sells 
or cedes his shares to another (who is not a registered member) is considered a 
nominee or agent of the purchaser who is actually the beneficial owner of the 
shares. 
 
By referring to terms like “nominee or agent”, the South African company law 
interpretation of the term “beneficial ownership” seems to be in line with the 
guidelines offered by the OECD in interpreting the term.  
It appears that there is a vague reference to the term “beneficial ownership” with 
regard to the definition of “shareholder” in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
                                                 
535 Cillers et al at 242. See also Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment 
Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (AD) at 453A-B. 
536 MS Blackman, RD Jooste & GK Everingham Commentary on the Companies Act Vol 1 
(2002) in par 98. See also Moosa v Lallo 1956 (2) SA 237 (D) at 239. Cilliers et al at 243 
it is stated that the purpose of the system of nominee shareholders in our company is to 
recognise the legitimate purposes of setting up nominee shareholders but it also covers 
situations which call for greater transparency. This enables a company to effectively 
communicate with its real shareholders so that it is not ignorant of a build-up of 
shareholding towards a takeover control. In that regard, s 140A of the Companies Act, 
inter alia requires a registered holder of securities who is not the holder of the “beneficial 
interest” to disclose to the company at the end of every quarter of the year the identity of 
the person on whose behalf the securities are held.   
537 Act 61 of 1973. 
538 1969 (3) SA 629(A) 668. 
539  1981 (3) SA 1039 (AD) at 1047. 
540 Unlike in English Law, in South African company law there is no distinction between legal 
ownership and beneficial or equitable ownership. The rights attached to the shares vest 
in the “beneficial owner” and in him alone. See Cillers et al at 243. 
541  1983 (1) SA 276 (AD) at 289. 
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Paragraph (a) of this provision reads: 
In relation to any company referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c), or (d) of the definition of 
“company” in this section, means the registered shareholder is in respect of any shares, 
except that where some person other than the registered shareholder is entitled, whether 
by virtue of any provision in the memorandum or articles of association of the company or 
under the terms of an agreement or contract, or otherwise, to all or part of the benefits of 
the rights of participation in the profits, income or capital attaching to the share so 
registered, that other person shall, to the extent that such other person is entitled to such 
benefit, also be deemed to be a shareholder. (Emphasis added.) 
 
The words “the benefits of the rights of participation in the profits, income or 
capital attaching to the equity share” are also used in section 41 of the Income 
Tax Act, with respect to the meaning of “shareholder” in the group restructuring 
relief provisions. 
 
Apart from the above vague references to the term in the Income Act, the Act 
does not provide a meaning to the term “beneficial ownership”. In terms of 
section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act,542 read together with section 231 of the 
Constitution of South Africa,543 when the national executive of South Africa 
enters into a double tax agreement with the government of any other country, 
and the agreement is ratified and published in the Government Gazette, its 
provisions are as effective as if they had been incorporated into the Income Tax 
Act. This implies that constitutionally, tax treaties rank equally with domestic 
legislation. In order to interpret the meaning of the term “beneficial ownership”, 
section 233 of the Constitution states that  
[w]hen interpreting legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.  
 
Internationally treaties are classified as international agreements, which have to 
be interpreted by customary international law rules of interpretation544 In 
interpreting tax treaties, a South African court would have to take into 
consideration, two particular aspects of customary international law: firstly, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969 and secondly, the 
Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention.545  
                                                 
542 Act 58 of 1962. 
543 Of 1996. 
544  K Vogel Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions 3 ed (1997) in par 28 of the 
introduction. 
545  Olivier & Honiball at 395. 
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Although no South Africa court has to date specifically decided whether a tax 
treaty must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of international law or 
domestic law, the Appellate division in SIR V Downing546 held the following:  
The Model Convention for the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has served as the basis for a veritable network of double 
taxation Conventions existing between the Republic of South Arica and other countries 
and between many other countries. 
 
The South African courts have also referred to foreign international tax courts 
cases and academic authors with approval to support their conclusions. In ITC 
1473,547 the court referred with approval to German case law in order to 
determine the intention of the contracting states when interpreting the double 
taxation agreement between South Africa and Germany. In ITC 1503548  which 
dealt with the question of whether interest income was part of income from an 
international airline business, the court relied on the OECD Commentary in 
reaching its findings. Although international law can be applied to interpret the 
“beneficial ownership”, the problem as discussed above is that the OECD 
Commentary provides little guidance on what the term means. Even among 
those authors who are of the view that beneficial ownership should be given its 
international meaning, there is no agreement as to what it means.  
 
It is worth pointing out also that when interpreting terms in used in a tax treaty; 
courts are obliged to consider domestic interpretive rules. Such include reference 
to the ordinary meaning of the term “beneficial ownership” both in the context of 
the term itself and in the context of the tax treaty. The context of inserting the 
term beneficial ownership in a tax treaty is to prevent tax avoidance (“treaty 
shopping”).549 Thus the term is to be interpreted in accordance with its purposes 
and the mischief against which it is directed.550 This is in line with article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention which provides inter alia that:  
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
given of      the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objects and purposes. 
 
                                                 
546  1975 (4) SA 518 (A) at 525. 
547  52 SATC 128. 
548  53 SATC 342(T). 
549  J Schwartz Tax Treaties: United Kingdom and Practice (2002) par 11.23. 
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Although South Africa is not a party to the Vienna Convention, South African 
courts are guided by this Convention in respect to South Africa’s treaty relations. 
The Vienna Convention is largely a codification of customary international law; it 
applies to all treaties and not only to countries that have signed the convention.551 
 
Olivier and Honiball552 submit that by concluding tax treaties which contain the 
concept “beneficial ownership”, knowing that it does not have a domestic tax law 
meaning of the concept, South Africa has intended that an internationally 
accepted meaning of the concept must apply.553 It is this author’s submission that 
although there is no clear international meaning for this term, any attempt to 
define it in a treaty context should be in line with the guidelines offered by the 
OECD.  
 
As explained above, the South African company law meaning of the term 
“beneficial ownership” seems to be in line with the guidelines offered by the 
OECD. It is recommended that our legislators should take cognise of the 
meaning in company law, refine it, and come up with a meaning of the term in 
the Income Tax Act which can be more readily applied in the context of our tax 
treaties. Care should however be taken to ensure that the meaning is not limited 
to a narrow South African interpretation, but that it should carry a wide 
international meaning that is in line with the guidelines offered by the OECD. 
 
 
 
Some queries about the effectiveness of the “beneficial ownership” 
provision in curbing treaty shopping in South Africa 
 
Despite the fact that the concept “beneficial ownership” has not been given a 
clear treaty meaning, South Africa has made use of “beneficial ownership” 
clauses in its recent treaties to curb treaty shopping (see discussion above). 
Such a clause usually provides that the exemptions pertaining to interest, 
                                                                                                                                            
550  Olivier & Honiball at 417. 
551  Olivier & Honiball at 28. 
552  Olivier & Honiball at 350. 
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royalties and dividends would apply only to the extent that the recipient in the 
other country is in fact the “beneficial owner” thereof.554 For instance, article 
11(1) of the South Africa/United States treaty provides that interest derived and 
beneficially owned by a resident of a contracting State shall only be taxed in that 
State.555 This implies that if the interest is not beneficially owned by a resident of 
the United States, South Africa would be entitled to tax it.  
 
In the South Africa/Cyprus treaty,556 article 10(1) provides that “dividends paid by 
a company which is a resident of a contracting state to a resident of the other 
contracting state shall be taxable only in that other state provided such resident 
is the beneficial owner of such dividends.” Note however that the South 
Africa/Cyprus treaty uses the words "shall be taxable only" in the residence state, 
whereas the OECD Model uses the words "may be taxed" in the residence state 
and then continues in article 10(2) to limit the source state's taxing rights, 
provided the recipient is the beneficial owner. Hence, in terms of the Cyprus 
treaty the source state may not charge withholding or other taxes in respect of 
dividends if the recipient is the beneficial owner, whereas in terms of the OECD 
Model the source state may charge these taxes, but only to a limited extent. The 
limitation does not apply if the recipient is not the beneficial owner. This provision 
is intended to prevent the use of Cyprus as a conduit for treaty shopping 
purposes.557  
There have been concerns that the “beneficial ownership” provision in South 
Africa’s double taxation treaties does not benefit South Africa in preventing the 
use of conduit company treaty shopping. This concern is based on the fact that 
South Africa does not impose withholding tax on dividends and interest earned 
                                                                                                                                            
553  Olivier & Honiball at 350. 
554 Olivier & Honiball at 246. 
555 Treaty published in Government Gazette No 18553 of 15-12-1997. 
556 Published in Government Gazette No 19638 of 22-12-1998. 
557 Examples of other treaties where the beneficial ownership provision is applied is in article 
12(1) of the South Africa /Mauritius and also article 12(1) of the South Africa/UK treaties 
both refer to the payment of interest to a resident of the other Contacting state if he is the 
beneficial owner of the interest (the treaties are published in Government Gazette No 
18111 of 2-7-1997 and Government Gazette No 24335 of 31-1-2003 respectively). Then 
the South Africa/Australia treaty, in articles 10(1), 11(1) and 12(2) dealing with dividends, 
interest and royalties respectively provide that the relevant income arising in a 
Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxed only 
in the other State if such resident is the beneficial owner of the relevant income (the 
treaty is published in Government Gazette No. 20761 of 24-12-1999). 
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by non-residents from a South African source.558 South Africa only has a formal 
withholding tax in regard to royalties. Section 35 of the Income Tax Act provides 
that a withholding tax on royalties is levied on non residents for the right of use in 
South Africa of any patent, design or trademark or copy right. The lack of 
withholding taxes on interest and dividend earned by non-residents from a South 
African source could thus be viewed as a loophole in our law that can be 
exploited for treaty shopping purposes. 
 
It has been suggested that in order to tax dividends and interest earned by non-
residents from a South African source, South Africa has to phrase the articles in 
its treaties in such a way that they do not specifically refer to a withholding tax, 
but to the fact that the state of source will be entitled to tax up to a limited 
extent.559 This suggestion is based on the fact that articles 10 and 11 (which 
relate to dividends and interest respectively) of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
do not specifically refer to withholding taxes, but only to the fact that the state of 
source will be entitled to tax up to a limited extent. On this basis, dividends or 
interest could be potentially taxable in South Africa even though South Africa 
does not levy withholding taxes on dividends or interest. An example of a treaty 
where this approach is applied is the South Africa/Netherlands treaty which 
provides in article 10(2)(a) and article 11(2) that dividends and interest 
(respectively) may also be taxed in South Africa subject to a maximum 
percentage.560 
It is also worth noting that although South Africa does not levy a withholding tax 
on dividends, this seeming loophole in the law is covered by the fact that South 
Africa presently still charges Secondary Tax on Companies (STC) which 
effectively results in a withholding tax being applicable in the context of dividends 
even though STC is not formally considered a tax on dividends.561 Basically STC 
is a tax payable by companies separate from and in addition to normal tax on 
companies. In terms of section 64(C) of the Income Tax Act, STC is charged 
                                                 
558 Olivier & Honiball at 294; Oguttu at 254. 
559 Olivier & Honiball at 298-299. 
560 Published in Government Gazette No 3153 of 18-6-1971. See also Nathan & Friedman at 
4. 
561 Olivier & Honiball at 147; Oguttu at 255. 
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when a company declares a dividend.562 Section 64C(2) is an anti-avoidance 
provision which deems certain transactions or distributions as dividends declared 
for purposes of STC. For example in terms of section 64(2)(c), any amount which 
in terms of section 31(3) of the Income tax Act is disallowed as being excessive 
interest is deemed to be a dividend distributed and so STC is payable. In a 
nutshell, although non-resident companies that derive dividends and interest in 
South Africa are not liable to withholding taxes in South Africa, South Africa does 
not necessarily lose this tax base as the imposition of STC ensures that 
dividends declared by such companies are taxed in South Africa.  
 
It is however worth noting that it was announced in the 2007 National Budget563 
that dividend withholding tax at a rate of 10% would be introduced with effect 
from 1 October 2008, which would be applicable to both resident and non-
resident companies. This proposed dividend withholding tax will replace STC.  It 
is however important to point out that some of South Africa’s treaties do not allow 
the residence state to impose any dividend withholding tax. Examples are the 
treaties with Cyprus564 and Ireland.565 Article 10(1) of the treaty with Cyprus and 
the treaty with Ireland that is worded in a similar manner states:   
Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a contracting state to a resident of 
the other contracting state shall be taxable only in that other state, provided such resident 
is the beneficial owner of such dividends.566 
 
In these treaties, the exclusive taxing rights are given to the state that receives 
the dividends.567  
 
Other tax treaties allow the residence state to impose a withholding tax, but the 
percentage is not consistent and varies considerably. For example, article 10(2) 
of the treaty with Belarus states that: 
…if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so 
                                                 
562 STC is however not deducible from the dividend declared and it is not payable by a 
shareholder. A company wishing to declare a dividend would therefore have to allow for 
STC in determining the amount to be paid as a dividend. See Huxham & Haupt at 236.  
563  TA Manuel (Minister of Finance) “Budget Speech 2007”. Available at 
http://www.sars.gove.za/home.asp?pid=4346<, last accessed February 2007. 
564  See Government Gazette No 19638 dd 1998-12-22. 
565  See Government Gazette No 18552 dd 1997-12-15. 
566  See the treaty with Cyprus, Government Gazette No 19638 dd 1998-12-22 and the treaty 
with Ireland, Government Gazette No 18552 dd 1997-12-15. 
567  Olivier & Honiball at 168. 
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charged shall not exceed: 
(a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a 
company which holds at least 25 per cent of the capital of the company paying 
the dividends; or 
  (b) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.568 
 
Article 10(2) of the treaty with Uganda states that:  
 … if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the dividends, the tax so charged shall not 
exceed: 
(a)  10 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a 
company which holds at least 25 per cent of the capital of the company 
paying the dividends; or 
(b)  15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.569 
 
It is submitted that these variations can be manipulated for treaty shopping 
purposes. It is however worth noting that pursuant to the introduction of the 
proposed new dividend withholding tax of 10%, South Africa is in the process of 
re-negotiating those tax treaties where the withholding tax is eliminated 
completely, to 5%.570 
 
The seeming loophole in the law due to fact that South Africa does not levy 
withholding taxes on interest income is also covered by section 31(3) of the 
Income Tax Act, which is essentially a “thin capitalization” provision.571 The 
section applies where any a non-resident investor has directly or indirectly 
granted financial assistance to a South African connected person. By virtue of 
such financial assistance, the non-resident is entitled to participate in not less 
than 25 per cent of the dividends, profits or capital of the recipient, or is entitled 
to directly or indirectly exercise not less than 25 per cent of the votes of the 
recipient. If the Commissioner is of the opinion that the aggregate value of all the 
financial assistance is excessive in relation to the fixed capital of the South 
African connected person, the cost of the financial assistance (any interest, 
finance charge or other consideration payable in respect of the financial 
assistance), which is considered excessive, is not allowed as a deduction in the 
hands of the South African connected person. In terms of SARS Practice Note 
                                                 
568  Government Gazette No 25914 dd 2004-01-15. 
569  Government Gazette No 22313 dd 2001-05-24.   
570  Olivier & Honiball at 168. 
571  This term is used to describe the use of unusual proportions of loan to equity capital in 
order to gain a tax advantages. See The Second Interim Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax Structures of South Africa Thin Capitalisation Rules 
(1995) at par 1.1; M Van Blerck “Transfer Pricing and Thin Capitalisation” (1995) 8 SA 
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2572 the Commissioner can apply the thin capitalization provision when the 
financial assistance/fixed capital exceeds a 3:1 ratio.  
 
4.12 CONCLUSION 
  
In order for South Africa’s CFC legislation to be an effective measure in curbing 
offshore tax avoidance, it is important for the legislators to take South Africa’s 
unique circumstances into consideration. South Africa’s economy portrays 
aspects of both a developing and a developed economy.573 The developed 
aspect of the economy makes it necessary for South Africa’s legislation to be in 
line with the trends in international taxation practices that are applied by major 
developed countries to curb offshore tax avoidance. This is necessitated by the 
fact that international interest in South Africa has grown, and this has 
encouraged South Africans to actively participate in the global economy. The 
heightened global trade competition and the mobility of capital in this modern 
world have also encouraged South African residents – both individuals and 
corporations – to make considerable investments offshore, and to also look for 
ways of minimising their global tax exposure.574 However, the developing aspect 
of the economy is reflected in the general lack of administrative capacity to 
handle complex legislation.575 This has required South Africa to recruit 
specialised tax experts from developed countries to administer the legislation.576 
Coupled with this, there is the challenge of having to retain such foreign experts, 
and also that of employing and retaining South African professionals capable of 
administering the legislation. Indeed the OECD noted that the effective 
administration of the CFC legislation is hampered in most countries by 
                                                                                                                                            
Tax Review at 44; Oguttu at 257. 
572  GN 584 GG 17194 of 24 May 1996 as amended by GN 746 GG 23407 of 17 May 2002.  
573  SARS “Discussion Paper on a Proposed System for Advance Tax Rulings” (2003) at 7. 
Available at 
>http://sars.gove.za/legislation/Discussion20%Papers/Discussion%20proposed%20 
sytem20%Advance20%Tax20%Rulings.pdf<, last accessed 7 November 2007. See also 
AW Oguttu “Resolving Transfer-pricing Disputes: Are ‘Advance Pricing Agreements’ the 
Way Forward for South Africa?” (2006) 18 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 473. 
574 Katz Commission Report (1997) at 4. 
575  Olivier & Honiball at 359. 
576  Olivier & Honiball at 359. See also USAID/South Africa ”Annual Report” (16 June 2005) at 
5. Available at >http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-
saharan_africa/countries/southafrica/<, last accessed on 6 July 2007.   
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insufficient staff and a possible lack of expertise in international tax.577   
 
The issue of the compatibility of CFC legislation and tax treaties has not received 
much attention in South Africa. Even though, under the CFC legislation, South 
African residents taxed on notional amounts, in line with Bricom Holdings 
case,578 the question of the compatibility of South Africa’s CFC legislation with 
tax treaties is not a settled matter. If this conflict is not resolved, South Africa 
may be faced with a litany of court cases that challenge the applicability of its 
CFC legislation in a particular treaty situation.  
 
The effectiveness of South Africa’s CFC legislation also faces challenges in the 
e-commerce era. If e-commerce is not regulated and taxed, the loss of revenue 
could be tremendous. Therefore, there is a need for government polices to strike 
a balance between development and the taxation of e-commerce. South Africa 
should work hand-in-hand with developed and developing nations, in order to 
come up with a feasible way of taxing e-commerce transactions; so that the tax 
avoidance loopholes that e-commerce has created in the CFC legislation can be 
curbed.  
 
 
The problems that complexity of the CFC poses need to be addressed, if this 
legislation is to be effective as an offshore anti-tax avoidance measure. Although 
this legislation is important in the sphere of corporate financial transactions 
involving foreign companies, its complexity may hinder its objective of curbing 
offshore tax and instead, lead to an increase in specialised tax structuring that 
circumvents its application. 
 
With regard to the use of partnership/corporate hybrid structures to avoid taxes, it 
has been pointed out that there are a number of uncertainties about the taxation 
of hybrid entities in South Africa. In order to create legal certainty, it is 
recommended that South Africa’s tax legislation be amended to specifically 
provide for the taxation of these entities.  
                                                 
577  OECD 2000 Report on CFC Legislation at 95. 
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With regard to the use of the “beneficial ownership” provision is curbing conduit 
company treaty shopping, it has been explained that there is no clear 
international meaning of the term “beneficial ownership”. The OECD has 
however provided some guidelines for interpreting the term. If South Africa is to 
effectively apply the term “beneficial ownership” to curb conduit company treaty 
shopping, it is recommended that our legislators should make use of the 
guidelines provided by the OECD and come up with a meaning of the term in the 
Income Tax Act. Since the company law meaning of the term “beneficial 
ownership” is in line with the OECD guidelines, this meaning should be refined 
and set out in the Income Tax Act.   
                                                                                                                                            
578  See discussion in par 4.7 under the heading “The position in South Africa”. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CURBING TAX AVOIDANCE THAT RESULTS FROM INVESTING IN 
OFFSHORE COMPANIES: THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
5.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM CFC LEGISLATION 
 
In the United Kingdom, section 482 of the Income and Corporations Taxes Act 
(“ICTA”) of 19701 had for years been the main weapon used by the Inland 
Revenue of the United Kingdom to counter international tax avoidance in the 
corporate sector.2 This was reinforced by exchange controls, which imposed 
constraints on international transfers. With the abolition of exchange controls in 
1979,3 section 482 became insufficient to counter the increasing accumulation of 
profits and income of United Kingdom companies in tax-haven subsidiaries.4   
 
In 1981, the United Kingdom government issued a consultative document entitled 
“Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector”.5  This was the first stage of the attempt 
to combat tax avoidance by the use of foreign companies controlled by United 
Kingdom residents.6 In 1982 another document entitled “Taxation of International 
Business”7 was issued in which the government identified a number of 
arrangements that were being used to avoid tax liability in the United Kingdom.8 
                                                 
1  Repealed by the Income and Corporations Taxes Act of 1988. See Office of Public Sector 
Information “Income and Corporations Taxes Act of 1970”. Available at 
>http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1988/Ukpga_19880001_en_102.htm#sdiv31<, last 
accessed 14 June 2007. 
2  IFG Baxter “The United Kingdom and Tax Havens: A Comparative Comment” (1985) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law at 709. S 482 provided that a resident company 
can not cease to be so, or transfer trade or business to a non-resident without treasury 
consent.  
3  Great Britain: Board of Inland Revenue Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector: A 
Consultative Document (1981) at 1. 
4  Baxter at 709; Great Britain: Board of Inland Revenue Tax Havens and the Corporate 
Sector: A Consultative Document (1981) at 1. 
5  Great Britain: Board of Inland Revenue (1981) at 1. 
6  A  Brown, CCH British Tax Reporter Taxation of Companies Vol 7 (updated 30 July 2006) 
at 646,101.    
7  Great Britain: Board of Inland Revenue Taxation of International Business (1982) at 13. 
8  These arrangements are: firstly, the ”money-box” companies which are companies set up 
in tax havens in which in United Kingdom companies invest funds that yield tax-free 
returns or the income is taxed at a low rate. Secondly, the ”dividend trap” companies 
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This culminated in the enactment of controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation 
under the Finance Act (“FA”) 1984.9 The provisions were later consolidated and 
are now located in sections 747-756 and Schedules 24-26 to ICTA 1988 (all 
further references to the ICTA are references to this statute). The legislation was 
subsequently tightened up by the FA of 1994 and again by the FA of 1996. Then, 
in 1999, the CFC rules were brought into line with the regime for self-assessment 
for companies that will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.10 
 
5.1.2 THE MEANING OF A CFC IN THE UNITED KINGDOM LEGISLATION 
 
In terms of section 747(1) and (2) of the ICTA, a CFC is defined as a company 
that is resident outside the United Kingdom, is controlled (or deemed to be 
controlled) by persons resident in the United Kingdom and is subject to a lower 
level of taxation in the territory in which it is resident. 
 
If a company is a dual resident (in that it is deemed to be a resident of both the 
United Kingdom and another treaty country), the United Kingdom uses the so-
called “tie-breaker” rules which are enshrined in the OECD Model Tax 
Convention to determine in which country the company will be resident for 
purposes of the treaty. In terms of section 249 of the FA 1994, a company which 
is treated as non-resident by virtue of a treaty is deemed to be non-resident in 
the United Kingdom for all corporation tax purposes. Legislation was introduced 
in 2002, however, to limit the effect of this rule in the context of CFCs.11 Thus, a 
company treated as non-resident for corporation tax purposes is disregarded for 
                                                                                                                                            
which are holding companies resident in tax havens which receive and invest dividends 
from overseas trading subsidiaries of United Kingdom companies. Thirdly, the ”offshore 
captive insurance” companies, which are companies established in a tax haven to insure 
the risks of other members in the same group. Fourthly, there are the ”sales distribution or 
service” companies, which are companies established in tax havens to enable the selling, 
distribution or service by its United Kingdom parent company to be attributed to them 
although in practice they make little contribution to the business of the parent companies. 
Fifthly, there are the ”patent holding companies”, which are companies established in tax 
havens to  hold patent rights originally established by United Kingdom companies, thereby 
preventing the incidence of United Kingdom tax on royalties. See Great Britain: Board of 
Inland Revenue (1982) at 13; see also Brown at 646,101. 
9  M Lang, HJ Aigner, U Scheurerle & M Stefaner CFC Legislation Tax Treaties and EC Law 
(2004) at 609; JS Schwarz “Controlled Foreign Companies and Tax Treaties” Dec (1997) 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation at 554. 
10  Par 5.1.6 below. 
11  S 90 of FA 2002. 
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CFC purposes.12 The purpose of this provision was to bring section 249 of the 
FA 1994 in line with the CFC legislation.   
 
Section 747(4) of the ICTA provides that, in order to qualify as a CFC, a non-
resident company should be controlled by United Kingdom shareholders who 
hold at least a 25% interest in the foreign company. Section 749(5) of the ICTA 
provides that persons who are deemed to have an interest in a CFC include 
shareholders with the capacity directly or indirectly to ensure that the company’s 
assets are dealt with for their benefit and any other person who, alone or with 
others, has control of the company.  
 
In determining the meaning of “control”, it should be noted that previously this 
term carried the meaning of “control” for close companies as set out in section 
416 of the ITCA.  These rules provided broadly that “control” of a company was 
obtained through the ability to secure general control of the company itself, or 
half of its shares, income or assets. However, an amendment was introduced by 
the FA 2000 Schedule 31 that tightened the definition of “control” and also 
introduced a definition of “control” peculiar to CFCs. Thus, in terms of section 
755D(1) of the ICTA,  a person is said to have control of a company if he has the 
power to ensure that its affairs are conducted according to his wishes and that 
power may be exercised in relation to either the company under review or 
another company. This includes the possibility of a company being treated as a 
CFC, notwithstanding the fact that one or two persons who exercise control are 
not actually resident in the United Kingdom. For example, if one of the persons, 
who exercises control is from the United Kingdom and the other is a non-
resident, but they each hold 40% of the interests by which they control the 
company, the company will be a CFC. However, the company will not be 
considered a CFC where the non-resident holds more than 55% of those 
interests.13 Thus, in addition to defining ”control” in a manner which largely 
follows the previous position, the new test targets international joint venture 
companies  where, typically, neither of the two main parties to the venture has 
                                                 
12  Brown at 646,023; J Tiley Revenue Law 5 ed (2005) at 1140; CCH International Tax 
Planning Manual – Corporations vol 2 (2005) at 92,104. 
13  See ss 747(IA) and 755D(3) of ICTA 1988.  
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outright control.14 Under the previous rules, a United Kingdom company 
shareholder in a non-resident joint venture company of this kind would escape a 
CFC charge at the “control” stage.15  
 
Once it has been determined that a company is resident outside the United 
Kingdom and that it is controlled by United Kingdom residents, the next step is to 
ascertain whether it is benefiting from a “lower level of taxation”. In terms of 
section 750(1) of the ICTA, “a lower level of taxation” means an amount of tax 
paid under the law of the foreign territory in respect of the profits of the company 
(the local tax) which is less than 75% of the corresponding United Kingdom tax 
on those profits.  There were, however, cases where some well-known tax 
havens did not invariably qualify as “low-tax territories” for the purposes of the 
CFC legislation.16 This was arranged by enabling companies to pay just the right 
amount of tax to satisfy the requirement that the CFC is paying at least 75% of 
the equivalent United Kingdom tax. Such schemes resulted in the avoidance of a 
CFC charge on a United Kingdom company shareholder as these arrangements 
allowed companies to effectively choose their rate of tax.17  In October 1999, the 
Inland Revenue came up with the so-called “designer rate tax provisions” to bring 
these schemes within the CFC legislation even if they are taxed at 75% or more 
of the United Kingdom rate. Section 750A of the ICTA  inserted by FA 2000, sets 
aside the normal requirement that a company is only within the CFC rules if it has 
paid tax at a level of  less than 75% of that which it would have paid if it had been 
resident in the United Kingdom. Thus if a company is resident outside the United 
Kingdom and is taxed at a rate of 75% or more of the United  
Kingdom equivalent tax on its profits, it will be subject to a lower level of taxation 
for CFC purposes in the accounting period concerned. 
                                                 
14  Brown at 646,303; CCH International at 92,104; see also A Flint Tolley’s Tax Planning 
(2003-2004) at 220; G Antczak & K Walton Tolley’s Corporation Tax (2005-2006) at 345; 
Hugh J Ault and Brian J Arnold Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 2 ed 
(2003) at 383; R Chidell & S Laing Tax Planning: Business (2005-2006) at 736-737; S 
Brandon Taxation of Non-United Kingdom Resident Companies and their Shareholders 
(2002) at 152; J Dixon & M Finney International Corporate Tax Planning (2002) at 1-15; S 
Whiting Corporate Tax (2005-2006) in par 7.9.1.       
15  Brown at 646, 402. 
16  For example, Guernsey bodies with international tax status, Jersey international business 
companies, Isle of Man international companies, Gibraltar income tax qualifying 
companies, and Irish companies. See CCH International in par 1.020; see also Flint at 
222-223; Antczak & Walton at 347-348; Tilley at 1143. 
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For the accounting periods of non-resident companies which began after 
December 2004, further anti-avoidance measures were introduced in order to 
prevent companies artificially inflating their local tax by either loading local profits 
with income which would not be taxable in the United Kingdom, but is taxable in 
the non-resident territory, or taking advantage of regimes which allow tax 
repayments to be made to companies other than those entitled to the 
repayment.18 For such cases, in terms of section 705(1B) of the ICTA, the 
amount of local tax is treated as reduced where 
- income and expenditure is taken into account in determining tax paid 
locally and that income and expenditure would not have been included in 
arriving at United Kingdom chargeable profits; in this case, the local tax is 
reduced to the amount it would have been had that income or expenditure 
not been included; 
- a repayment is made (including a payment in respect of a credit for tax) to 
a person other than the company and that payment relates to the 
company’s payment of tax. In that case the local tax is reduced by the 
amount of the repayment or credit made to the other person.   
 
In essence, the effect of the above provision is that for accounting periods 
beginning after 1 December 2004, where any income or expenditure is taken into 
account in computing taxable profits in the foreign country, but would not have 
been taken into account when computing profits chargeable to United Kingdom 
corporation tax, the foreign tax paid for the purposes of this test is deemed to be 
that which would have been payable had the income or expenditure not been 
taken into account in the foreign country.  
5.1.3 EXCLUSION FROM CFC LEGISLATION  
 
The United Kingdom has a list of countries which are excluded from the 
application of the CFC legislation.19 These regulations are used as an anti-
                                                                                                                                            
17  Lang et al at 616; Chidell & Laing at 739; Dixon & Finney at 1-16. 
18  Whiting in par 7.9.2. 
19 Controlled Foreign Companies (Excluded Countries) Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/3081). 
These regulations replaced the former statutory white list. The regulations consist of two 
lists; one of territories where all companies are excluded and one of territories where 
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avoidance measure whereby certain countries are identified and “black listed” as 
tax havens. A company resident in one of the listed territories will only be 
excluded if it is carrying on business in that territory and at least 90% of its 
income or profits are locally generated.20  
 
5.1.4  EXEMPTIONS FROM THE CFC CHARGE   
 
There are five exemptions from the CFC rules as set out in section 748 of the 
ICTA. 
 
The acceptable distribution policy exemption 
 
In terms of paragraph 2 of Schedule 25 of the ICTA, an exemption is granted 
where a CFC distributes at least 90% of its net chargeable profits for the 
accounting period to its United Kingdom shareholders if the dividends are taxable 
in their hands. The acceptable distribution test will, however, not be met if the 
dividends are paid out of specific profits. This is to prevent a CFC meeting the 
distribution test by specifying that dividends are paid out of profits which have 
been subjected to a high rate of foreign tax, thereby qualifying for double tax 
relief in the United Kingdom yet leaving untaxed or low taxed profits abroad. 
Dividends must generally be paid within 18 months of the end of the accounting 
period. A dividend paid to a dual resident company (and hence not accessible to  
                                                                                                                                            
companies are excluded save for certain specific exemptions. If a company is resident in 
an excluded territory it does not qualify for exemption if its non-local source income 
exceeds 50 000 pounds or (if greater) 10% of its commercial quantified income; see also 
B Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service (March 2002) Issue 66 at UK/23; see also Ault & 
Arnold at 383. See also P Cussons “Finance Act Notes: Controlled Foreign Companies – 
ss 89 and 90” (2002) British Tax Review at 318; Chidell & Laing at 739. 
20  CCH International at 92,104; Flint at 224; Tilley at 1152; Dixon & Finney at 1-17. 
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United Kingdom tax) does not satisfy the distribution test. Furthermore, the 
exemption does not apply if it is used as part of a tax avoidance scheme.21  
 
The exempt activities test 
 
To satisfy this test, a company must fulfil three conditions: 
(i) Throughout the accounting period in question, the CFC is required to have a 
business establishment in the territory in which it is resident. This condition 
presupposes that the company genuinely operates where it is resident.22 
(ii) Throughout the accounting period in question, its business affairs in that 
territory should be effectively managed there. This ensures that bona fide foreign 
trading companies are kept outside the ambit of the CFC legislation.23 
(ii) One of the following should apply: 
-  The CFC’s main business does not consist of investment business, or 
dealing in goods for delivery to or from the United Kingdom or 
connected or associated persons; and, in the case of a company 
mainly engaged in wholesale, distributive or financial business, less 
than 50% of its gross trading receipts come from connected or 
associated persons.24  
-  The CFC should be a “local holding company” that derives at least 
90% of its gross income during that period from non-holding 
companies which are resident in the same territory and engaged in 
exempt activities.25 
-  The CFC should be a “non-local holding company” that derives at 
least 90% of its gross income during that period from local holding 
companies or non-holding companies engaged in exempt activities.26 
                                                 
21  CCH International at 92,122; Tiley at 1148; Spitz & Clarke at UK23; see also Ault & 
Arnold at 383; Chidell & Laing at 741; Dixon & Finney at 1-21; Whiting in par 7.9.4(A).  
22 According to par 7 of schedule 25, the term “business establishment” means the same as 
when applied in double tax treaties. There must be premises; these can be a mine, or 
long- term building site, a shop, office, or factory. The premises must be reasonably 
permanent and the company’s business in the territory must be conducted from them.  
23 According to par 8, schedule 25, a company is effectively managed in a territory if it 
employs sufficient personnel there to conduct its business and if services performed for 
residents outside the territory are not in fact performed in the United Kingdom. 
24  Par 6(2) and 12 of Sch. 25. 
25  Par 6(3) and 12 of Sch. 25. 
26  Pars 6(4) and 12 of Sch. 25. 
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-  The CFC should be a “superior holding company” that derives at least 
90% of its gross income during that period from companies which it 
controls, each of which is engaged in exempt activities or is itself a 
superior holding company.27  
 
The public quotation test 
 
In terms of the ICTA, paragraph 13-15 of Schedule 25, an exemption applies if 
the CFC is listed on a recognised stock exchange in the country in which it is 
resident. At least 35% of the voting share capital must be held by the public. 
 
The motive test 
 
Section 748(3) and paragraphs 16-19 of Schedule 25 to the ICTA provide that an 
exemption will be granted if the reduction of United Kingdom tax by diverting 
profits from the United Kingdom was not one of the main purposes of the 
company’s existence. A company resident in a country on the “excluded 
countries list” automatically passes this test.28   
 
The low profit exemption test 
 
In terms of section 748(1)(d) of the ICTA, a CFC charge does not arise if the 
chargeable profits of the CFC are below ₤50 000 in any accounting period (the 
de minimis rule).29 The purpose of the de minimis rule is to ensure that rules will 
not apply unless a certain threshold of profits has been exceeded. Such a 
provision alleviates the administrative burden on tax authorities so that resources 
are allocated to investigating CFCs with larger profit bases.30   
To enhance the effectiveness of the United Kingdom CFC legislation, section 
748A of the ICTA was introduced by section 89 of FA 2002. This section has the 
                                                 
27  Par 12A(1) of Sch 25. See also CHH International at 92,122; Flint at 226-227; Antczak & 
Walton at 363-367; Tiley at 1150-1151. 
28 See also Ault & Arnold at 383; Chidell & Laing at 756; Brandon at 156; Whiting in par 
7.9.4(F). 
29 S 748(1) (d) ITCA 1988. 
30  G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 9 ed (2002) at 391. 
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effect of removing the application of the exempt activities and also all the other 
exceptions, if the CFC is incorporated in or liable to tax in a territory designated 
by the Treasury.31 The purpose of section 748A is to give United Kingdom tax 
authorities a weapon against offshore tax avoidance that is in line with the OECD 
fight against harmful tax competition. The OECD policy is that if a tax haven is 
uncooperative, OECD members should make use of fiscal and other 
countermeasures.32 Section 748A enables the Treasury to tighten the CFC 
regime in respect to CFCs incorporated in a non-compliant territory. The 
designation of such a territory is, however, subject by statutory instrument to 
affirmative resolution procedures.33 
 
5.1.5 RELIEF IN RESPECT OF IMPUTED PROFITS 
 
Where a United Kingdom company is chargeable on profits imputed from a CFC 
because the CFC fails to satisfy any of the above exemptions, relief is available 
to the United Kingdom company in terms of Schedule 26 of the ICTA. Such relief 
may take the following forms: 
- The imputed profits may be reduced by loss relief, non-trading deficits on 
loan relationships, charges on income, management expenses, capital 
allowances or group reliefs to which the United Kingdom company is 
entitled.  
- If the company disposes of shares in a CFC in respect of which it has paid 
tax following a CFC charge, the tax so paid may be deducted in 
computing the United Kingdom company’s chargeable gain.  
- Double tax relief is granted if the CFC pays a dividend in the same period 
in which a charge applies, but imputed profits are not relievable under the 
terms of any double tax treaty which would apply to income of the type 
received  by the  CFC  had it  been  received in that form by the United  
Kingdom company, rather than being imputed. Thus the charge loses the 
character of the original income in the CFC.34   
 
                                                 
31 G Clark Offshore Tax Planning 9 ed (2002) at 391-392. 
32 OECD Harmful Tax Competition - An emerging Global Issue (April 1998) par 5 
33 S 748A(5) ICTA 1988. 
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The result of all the above is that if in any accounting period a company is a CFC 
and none of the exemptions described above applies, then the apportionment is 
made among United Kingdom residents who have interests in the CFC. Where 
chargeable profits are apportioned to a United Kingdom resident company, in 
terms of section 747(4) of the ICTA, an amount equal to corporation tax on the 
apportioned profits is charged on the company. And in terms of section 747(4A), 
if the CFC’s profits are computed in a foreign currency, the amount apportioned 
is converted to sterling at the prevailing rate at the end of the CFC’s accounting 
period.  The tax charged is the corporate tax at the principal rate. The tax so 
charged is regarded as tax for the accounting period of the United Kingdom 
company in which the CFC’s accounting period ends and is reduced by so much 
of the CFC’s creditable tax as is apportioned to the United Kingdom company 
concerned.  No CFC charge is, however, charged on a United Kingdom company 
if less than 25% of the CFC’s profits are apportioned to it and to connected or 
associated companies. 
 
5.1.6  SELF-ASSESSMENT PROVISIONS  
 
In 1998, sections 112-113 and Schedule 17 of the ICTA were introduced to bring 
CFC provisions into line with the United Kingdom corporation tax self-
assessment regime, which became effective from 1 July 1999. Consequently, 
any company which has an interest in a CFC must complete a supplementary 
page to the self-assessment return unless the CFC falls within the “Excluded 
Countries Regulations” or the interest of the United Kingdom company and 
persons connected or associated with it is less than 25%.35 Prior to the self-
assessment rules, there was no obligation on a United Kingdom company to 
include details of its interest in a CFC in its tax return but now the onus rests on 
the United Kingdom resident to disclose the details of its interests in foreign 
subsidiaries and associated companies.36 For instance, United Kingdom 
                                                                                                                                            
34  Brown at 646,103. 
35 D Whitecross & J Pearse “Controlled Foreign Companies and Self Assessment” (1998) 
British Tax Review at 9-10; Whiting in par 7.9.3.  
36   With the self assessment regime the need for a discretion from the Board before the 
provisions apply is removed and the provisions apply automatically if the necessary 
conditions are met. This approach as opposed to a “policing” approach by the Inland 
Revenue is progressive and effective as the CFC rules apply automatically. This is unlike 
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residents have to sign a return whereby they identify a particular exemption and 
then certify that to the best of their knowledge and belief each of their overseas 
subsidiaries satisfies the particular exemption claimed. Penalties are not imposed 
where a United Kingdom resident demonstrates that it has made reasonable 
efforts to self-assess its CFC’s liabilities.  
 
5.1.7 OTHER UNITED KINGDOM ANTI-INCOME TAX DEFERRAL 
PROVISIONS 
 
Provisions relating to the transfer of income to persons abroad 
 
Leaving the CFC legislation aside, it is worth briefly noting that since 1936 the 
United Kingdom has also made use of the provisions of section 739, now 
embodied in the ICTA, to prevent United Kingdom residents from transferring 
assets abroad where income becomes payable to a non-United Kingdom 
resident, which results in the avoidance of taxes. Many transactions liable to tax 
under the CFC rules will also fall within the ambit of section 739. It should be 
noted, however, that section 739 results in income tax at a top rate of 40% 
compared with the CFC’s corporation tax at the top rate of 30%.37 The main 
target of the CFC legislation is CFCs that are widely owned by United Kingdom 
persons (not just companies), which fall outside the ambit of section 739 that 
covers only limited individual ownership.38 Thus section 739 takes care of 
transactions that would fall outside the CFC rules. For instance, in cases where 
all the shares of a foreign company are owned by individuals, the foreign 
company will not be a CFC, but its profits can be assessed in the hands of the 
individuals under section 739.  Since section 739 relates in general to the 
taxation of assets that are transferred abroad, it applies as much to companies 
as to trusts. The section will be discussed in detail in chapter 8 of this work in 
relation to offshore trusts. It will therefore not be discussed any further in this 
chapter.39 
                                                                                                                                            
the previous situation where an assessment triggered a liability which could only occur at 
a latter stage. See Clarke at 395; Whiting in par 7.9.3. 
37  CCH International at 92.123; Antczak & Walton at 372. 
38  Tiley at 1140. 
39  Suffice it to note that, in relation to companies s 739 applies where assets are transferred, 
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Provisions relating to capital gains accruing to non-resident companies 
 
Apart from the CFC legislation and section 739 of the ICTA, the United Kingdom 
also has provisions designed to curb the avoidance of tax that occurs when 
capital gains accrue to non-resident companies. In brief, section 13 of the 
Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act (“TCGA”) 1992 taxes United Kingdom 
residents on capital gains accruing to non-United Kingdom companies that would 
be classified as close companies if they were United Kingdom resident, subject 
to certain exceptions.40 Where foreign capital gains are paid in relation to the 
capital gain, a credit is allowed against United Kingdom capital gains tax due 
under section 13. 
 
5.1.8 THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CFC LEGISLATION 
AND ITS TAX TREATIES 
 
In chapter 4, it was pointed out that the applicability of CFC legislation may be 
challenged for being in conflict with a countries tax treaties. It is indeed 
contended that the United Kingdom CFC legislation constitutes a breach of its 
                                                                                                                                            
or rights are created, and as a result, a United Kingdom ordinary resident individual 
(and/or his or her spouse) has the power to enjoy the income of a non-United Kingdom 
resident (including a company). A United Kingdom ordinary resident individual has the 
“power to enjoy” the income of a non-United Kingdom company, if he/she is a shareholder 
of a United Kingdom company which owns shares in the non-United Kingdom company, if 
he/she is a beneficiary of a trust which directly or indirectly owns shares in the non-United 
Kingdom company, or if he/she settles shares in the non-United Kingdom company in a 
discretionary trust. When the section applies, its effect is that the individual is taxable on 
his or her pro rata share of the income accruing to the non-resident, irrespective of 
whether he/she receives a distribution out of the income. Credit is given for foreign taxes 
arising on the income.  The section does not apply where avoiding liability for United 
Kingdom taxes was not one of the main motives of the transfer of assets.  See CCH 
International at 92,123. 
40  The exceptions to this provision are:  
-  where the amount apportioned to the United Kingdom resident and connected 
persons is 10% and less of the gain. 
-  where the gains arise from the disposal of a tangible asset used for the foreign 
company’s business. 
-  where the gain arises on the disposal of foreign currency or a debt representing 
money used for the non-United Kingdom company’s business. 
-  where the gain arises as a result of a disposal of assets to a member of the foreign 
company’s own foreign group, in which case the 75% ownership rules apply. 
 -      where Revenue agrees that a tax treaty can prevent it from taxing a gain that would 
normally fall within the section. 
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double tax treaties, but there has been only one United Kingdom case that has 
challenged this state of affairs.  
 
In Bricom Holdings Ltd v IRC41 (which is briefly discussed in chapter 4, but now 
discussed in greater detail for purposes of clarifying the United Kingdom 
position), the taxpayer, Bricom Holdings Ltd, was resident in the United Kingdom 
and was the sole shareholder of Spinneys International BV (“Spinneys”), a 
company incorporated and resident in the Netherlands. Bricom Holdings Ltd 
borrowed substantial sums of money from Spinneys and paid interest on this 
money. For the taxation years in issue, the interest represented a substantial 
portion of Spinneys’ profits. In 1994, all the United Kingdom companies were 
assessed under the CFC regime. There was no dispute about the fact that 
Spinneys was a CFC, nor was it disputed that Bricom Holdings, as the sole 
shareholder of Spinneys, was potentially under the CFC regime.  
 
Bricom Holdings appealed the assessments on the basis that the assessments 
included amounts that were excluded from tax in the United Kingdom under the 
1980 United Kingdom-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention.42 Article 11(1) 
of the Convention provides that interest arising in one of the states which is 
derived and beneficially owned by a resident of the other state shall be taxable 
only in that other state. Bricom Holdings argued that by virtue of this article, the 
amounts were exempt from tax in the United Kingdom.  
 
Inland Revenue contended that while the tax under section 747(6)(a) was a tax, it 
was not corporation tax, but a sum “equal to” corporation tax to be assessed on 
the United Kingdom resident company “as if” it were an amount of corporation 
tax chargeable on that company. It was therefore not a tax within the meaning of 
article 2(1) of the Netherlands/United Kingdom treaty (that set out the taxes 
covered by the treaty). Since section 747(6)(a) did not impose a corporation tax, 
the nature of the CFC charge was thus a sui generis charge on a notional sum 
                                                 
41  [1996] STC (SCD) 228. 
42  Incorporated into United Kingdom domestic law by SI 1980/1961. 
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equal to corporation tax.43   
 
The court held that the taxpayer could not rely on article 11 of the treaty, as the 
“chargeable profits” as defined by section 747(6)(a) of ICTA are a purely notional 
sum that do not represent any profits of Spinneys on which United Kingdom tax 
is chargeable, nor do they represent any actual payments or receipts of 
Spinneys, whether of interest or of anything else. They were merely the product 
of a mathematical calculation made on a hypothetical basis. The “chargeable 
profits” which are defined by section 747(6)(a), exist only as a measure of 
imputation. Thus what is apportioned to the taxpayer company and subject to tax 
was not Spinneys’ actual profits, but a notional sum which was the product of an 
artificial calculation.44   Finding in favour of Inland Revenue, the House of Lords 
held that the CFC regime was not a corporation tax or substantially similar tax 
and so it did not qualify for relief under the treaty.45 
 
It is worth pointing out that contrary to the court’s conclusions in the Bricom 
Holdings case, it has been contended by some commentators on the case that 
“chargeable profits” are not a “purely notional sum”. The purpose and effect of 
the United Kingdom CFC legislation is that the “chargeable profits” of a CFC are, 
in fact, the profits of the CFC (excluding chargeable gains) calculated in 
accordance with United Kingdom tax laws. This amount is no more a notional 
amount than the profits of a United Kingdom corporation computed in 
accordance with the provisions of the ICTA. The only difference would be the 
person or persons subject to tax in respect to the CFC’s profits.46  
 
Lang and his co-authors47 also point out that it is difficult to reconcile the idea 
that the chargeable profits are on the one hand a manufactured or purely 
notional sum, and yet on the other hand have the same distinctive meaning for 
                                                 
43  M Clayson “The Impact of European Law and Treaty Relief on the United Kingdom 
Controlled Foreign Company Rules” (1998) 26 Intertax at 326. 
44  [1997] STC 1179, at p 1194; Lang et al at 619-620 note that the chargeable profits are 
purely a notional sum and no part of those profits can be identified as constituting a 
particular source of income.  
45  [1997] STC at 1195. 
46  D Sandler “Case Notes: Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation” British 
Tax Review No 1 (1998) at 207. 
47  Lang et al at 620. 
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corporation tax purposes. Clayson48 also argues that the court’s conclusion is not 
entirely convincing as it is arguable that the tax imposed by the CFC charging 
provisions is corporation tax. Although section 747(4)(a) of the United Kingdom’s 
ICTA 1988 uses the expression “equal to” and “as if”, it merely calculates the 
amount of corporation tax payable in addition to any other sums payable by the 
company being assessed. 
 
As the court in the Bricom Holdings case held that the treaty did not apply, 
because the interest in issue had lost its character as interest, and that what was 
actually taxed was a notional amount, this implied that the CFC legislation did not 
contravene the double taxation agreement. It is however argued that, 
notwithstanding this decision, the United Kingdom CFC legislation contravenes 
its double taxation agreements. However, the  court in the Bricom Holdings case 
did not discuss the relevant treaty provisions at length, but instead based its 
decision on the supremacy of United Kingdom domestic law (ie a treaty can only 
have effect to the extent that it is enabled by domestic law).49 This may have 
precluded the court from considering broader issues that are relevant to tax 
treaties.  
 
United Kingdom double taxation agreements are based on the OECD Model 
Convention on Income and on Capital,50 which upholds the principle that each 
corporation is treated as a separate entity distinct from its shareholders. When 
countries sign a double tax agreement, a company is generally regarded as 
resident for tax purposes in its country of incorporation, and its profits in one 
treaty country in which it is resident are not subject to tax in the other treaty 
country.  The profits of a foreign corporation can only be taxed in the hands of its 
shareholders when dividends are distributed. However, CFC legislation ignores 
the notion that the foreign non-resident company is a different legal person 
separate from its  parent company, as resident shareholders of a CFC are 
subject to tax on their pro rata share of the income of the CFC when it arises 
                                                 
48  Clayson at 327. 
49  Lang et al at 629. 
50  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 Condensed version). See 
also Lang et al at 629; Sandler at 2. 
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rather than when it is distributed.51 This consolidation approach that is entailed in 
the CFC legislation, does in effect, contradict the basic structure of tax treaties.52  
 
Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention further provides in part that the 
profits of an enterprise of a contracting state shall be taxed only in that state, 
unless the enterprise carries on business in the other contracting state through a 
permanent establishment situated there. A number of commentators have 
questioned the validity of CFC legislation in certain jurisdictions, as far as this 
legislation is in conflict with tax treaties entered into by the country concerned. 
Where, in accordance with article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, a tax 
treaty between a shareholder’s country of residence and the CFC’s country of 
residence gives the latter the exclusive jurisdiction to tax the CFC’s income, or to 
limit the jurisdiction of the former to tax such income, this may result in conflicts 
between the CFC legislation and the tax treaty. In the Bricom Holdings case, had 
the taxpayer relied on article 7 rather than on article 11 of the United Kingdom-
Netherlands Double Taxation Convention, it could be argued that the profits of 
Spinneys could only be taxable in the Netherlands, unless Spinneys carries on 
business in the United Kingdom through a permanent establishment.53  
 
Lang and his co-authors54 also point out that the court in the Bricom Holdings 
case did not consider the potential relevance of the Vienna Convention to the 
Law of Treaties 1969. Article 26 thereof provides that every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. And 
article 31 states that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose. The effect of these provisions should have 
been the focus of the United Kingdom courts on the significance of the treaty 
agreed between the two States. Otherwise, the application of CFC legislation 
could result in unilateral modification of the treaty without the other party’s 
                                                 
51  T Rosembuj “Controlled Foreign Corporations – Critical Aspects” (1998) 26 Intertax at 
335. 
52  Sandler at 2. 
53  Sandler at 206. 
54  Lang et al at 629. 
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abandoning their right or competence on identical matters.55  
 
It has however been argued that the manner in which a domestic court will 
resolve the conflict between CFC legislation and a tax treaty depends on whether 
it is the CFC legislation, or the tax treaty that takes precedence.56 Thus where a 
country’s treaties are considered paramount to domestic legislation in the event 
of a conflict, the domestic law cannot override the treaty, in the absence of 
specific treaty-override provisions.57 The CFC legislation may also not be 
applied, if the respective tax treaty does not contain a safeguarding clause that 
expressly and explicitly authorises that the CFC legislation may be applied.58   
 
In the United Kingdom, section 788(3) of the ICTA provides that the 
arrangements specified in the treaty shall “notwithstanding anything in any 
enactment” have effect in relation to income tax and corporation tax in so far as 
they provide relief from income tax in respect of income or chargeable gains. 
Upon entry into force in the United Kingdom, the provisions of the treaty are 
recognised as having the authority of statute law. Where there is a conflict 
between existing law and the treaty provisions, the treaty will prevail,59 but where 
there is a conflict between the treaty as adopted in United Kingdom law and a 
subsequent legislative enactment, the subsequent enactment prevails. However, 
the use  of the phrase “not  withstanding anything in any enactment” in section  
788(3) suggests that treaty provisions would supersede subsequent domestic 
legislation.60   
 
Notwithstanding the above provisions, the United Kingdom maintains the view 
that its CFC legislation is compatible with the provisions of any double tax 
treaty.61 This is based on the premise that the United Kingdom CFC legislation 
calculates the notional corporate tax payable by the CFC as if the CFC were 
                                                 
55  Rosembuj at 333.  
56  Sandler at 54 and at 99.  
57  See International Fiscal Association (IFA), proceedings of a seminar held in Toronto, 
Canada, in 1994 during the 48th Congress of the IFA How Domestic Anti-Avoidance 
Rules Affect Double Taxation Conventions (1995) at 24; Sandler at 54. 
58  Sandler at 99. 
59  Ostime v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1995) 38 TC 492 at 514. 
60  Sandler at 51; see also Lang et al at 625. 
61  Tolley’s International Tax Planning (1999) at 2-17. 
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resident in the United Kingdom; the tax would then be apportioned among all the 
company’s shareholders and collected from the United Kingdom resident 
corporate shareholders, who hold 10 per cent or more of the shares of the CFC. 
In effect, the legislation employs the attribution-of-tax approach rather than the 
attribution-of-income approach, which it is reasoned is not in breach of existing 
bilateral tax treaties. The attribution-of-income approach would result in a breach 
of article 7, because the tax would then be calculated as if the foreign company 
were resident in the United Kingdom, and then merely allocated pro rata to its 
shareholders and collected from United Kingdom corporate shareholders. 
Despite this reasoning, it is still arguable that United Kingdom CFC legislation 
breaches its tax treaties as long as the treaties do not contain specific treaty-
override provisions.62 The compatibility of CFC legislation and tax treaties has 
also been challenged in other jurisdictions.63 
                                                 
62  Sandler at 158-160. 
63  In France certain French companies that had created subsidiaries in Switzerland 
challenged the compatibility of s 209B of the French Tax Code (which is similar to the 
CFC legislation) with the 1996 France-Switzerland tax treaty. The first case to be decided 
in 1995 was Schneider SDA v DVNI and TA Strasbourg Decision of 21 November 1995, 
Lower Administrative Court of Paris, No. 207093/1 (as read from Sandler at 213). The 
case concerned a French corporation, Paramer. Paramer had paid 0.02 per cent of its 
profits in Swiss tax in 1981 and 22 per cent in 1992 to its French subsidiary, Schneider, 
which was assessed under s 209. The court found that the Swiss corporation benefited 
from a privileged tax regime since the amount of tax it had paid was substantially lower 
than the rate applied in France. Furthermore, it was not carrying on an industrial or 
commercial activity in Switzerland apart from its foreign financial investment activities. 
Accordingly, all the preconditions for the operation of s 209B existed. The taxpayer argued 
that the application of the CFC regime was contrary to art 9 of the 1996 France-
Switzerland Tax treaty.  The court held that art 9 was not applicable. See E Milhac & J 
Saiac “French Courts Render Conflicting Decisions on CFC Rules” (1997) 14 Tax Notes 
International at 739; see also Rosembuj at 352. 
 
In another French case which also concerned a French corporation, the courts reached a 
different decision. In Strafor Facom SA v DG, Decision of 12 December 1996, Lower 
Administrative Court of Strasbourg, No. 9158, Strafor Facom SA had created a wholly 
owned subsidiary in Switzerland. The subsidiary was subject to a privileged tax regime so 
the French tax administration taxed Strafor Facom SA on the income of its Swiss 
subsidiary under s 209. Strafor claimed that art 7 of the France-Switzerland tax treaty 
prohibits taxation in France of its Swiss subsidiary. Art 7 of the treaty provides that the 
profits of an enterprise of a contracting state shall be taxable only in that state unless the 
enterprise carries on business in the other contracting states through a permanent 
establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the 
profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other state, but only so much of them as are 
attributable to the permanent establishment. The court held that s 209B was contrary to 
art 7, because this article excluded from tax in France the profits of a corporation that had 
its head office in Switzerland, if the corporation did not have a permanent establishment in 
France. In effect, the court acknowledged that s 209B was a tax on profits of the Swiss 
corporation that was not permitted under the treaty. See Sandler at 214. 
 
The Schneider case referred to above went on appeal to the Administrative Court in Paris 
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It is also worth noting that as a result of Bricom Holdings case, there is now an 
anomalous situation in United Kingdom domestic law. Where a particular 
provision makes a “direct”’ attribution of profits to a United Kingdom resident, it 
appears that treaty relief is available, but where a provision like a CFC charge 
makes an attribution of a “fictional sum”, treaty relief is unavailable.64 Lang65  
points out that the distinction between the differing treatments of direct and 
indirect attributions is very difficult to support and can lead to arbitrary results. 
 
5.1.9 CHALLENGES E-COMMERCE POSES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM 
CFC LEGISLATION  
 
As explained above, CFC legislation prevents United Kingdom residents from 
avoiding taxes by diverting profits to CFCs. Gringras66 points out that the United 
Kingdom CFC provisions that apply where a non-resident company, controlled by 
United Kingdom residents is subject to a lower level of taxation (ie less than 75% 
of the corresponding United Kingdom tax), can be easily manipulated by e-
commerce to avoid taxes. Unlike companies that conduct business in the 
traditional way, companies trading over the Internet are considerably more 
mobile and so centres of activity can be easily relocated to any convenient 
                                                                                                                                            
and the court decided in 2001 that the treaty did override the CFC rules. The court ruled 
that s 209B of the French tax code was not compatible with the provisions of the treaty 
signed between France and Switzerland. In conclusion, the position in France appears to 
confirm that a treaty overrides the CFC rules except in cases where a specific treaty 
provides otherwise.  Subsequent to this decision, the French tax authorities have insisted 
on including a clause allowing for the application of CFC legislation in all new treaties 
negotiated. See L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: A South African Perspective 3 ed 
(2005) at 392; MN Mbwa-Mboma “France-Switzerland Treaty Overrides CFC Regime, 
French Tax Court Rules” (2002) 27 Tax Notes International at 143. 
 
It is however worth pointing out that in 2002, the Supreme Court of Finland reached a 
decision similar to that in the Bricom case where it held that Finland’s CFC regulations 
could be applied if the wholly owned subsidiary of a Finish company was resident in 
Belgium. See A Oyj Abp, KHO:2002:26, (2002) 4 International Tax Law Reports at 1009. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the large majority of OECD countries 
regard CFC regulations as compatible with tax treaties. It is however argued that this is 
not necessarily correct, as in most OECD countries this issue is far from settled. He 
further argues that the mere fact that the contracting states knew of the existence of CFC 
regulations before the countries entered into a treaty does not imply that the regulations 
will apply despite the existence of the treaty. The very essence of entering into a treaty is 
that its provisions will affect national legislation. See M Lang “CFC Regulations and 
Double Taxation Treaties” (2003) International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation at 56. 
64  Lang et al at 629. 
65  Lang et al at 630. 
66  C Gringras The Laws of the Internet 2 ed (2003) at 409. 
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jurisdiction. A CFC may conveniently be located in a jurisdiction where tax is 
charged at a lower rate than in the United Kingdom. If the amount of the tax paid 
in that territory is at least 75 per cent of the amount of tax that would be paid in 
the United Kingdom, then the CFC provisions do not apply.67  
 
The exemptions to the United Kingdom CFC provisions can also be manipulated 
by e-commerce to avoid taxes. In terms of the “exempt-activities-test”,68 an 
exemption applies where the CFC has a business establishment in the territory in 
which it is resident.69 Its business affairs in that territory should be effectively 
managed there.70 It was discussed in chapter 4 that e-commerce poses 
challenges to the “business establishment” concept, in that it can be manipulated 
to avoid taxes.71 These challenges also apply in the case of the United Kingdom. 
Inland Revenue is however of the view that in certain circumstances, it may be 
difficult for e-commerce to satisfy the “business establishment” exemption to the 
CFC rules. For example, where a CFC in a low-tax territory sells goods or 
services via the Internet, a taxpayer may not be able to claim this exemption, if 
the CFC does not maintain stock or locally employed staff in the low-tax territory 
to sufficiently manage the business.72 Thus, CFCs which are little more than a 
brass-plate company may not gain this exemption to the CFC Legislation. In 
these circumstances, the CFC rules may be applied to prevent United Kingdom 
companies from avoiding taxes when trade is conducted electronically.73 
 
Inland Revenue however acknowledges that CFC legislation was introduced in 
                                                 
67  S 750 of the ICTA. 
68  See par 5.1.4 above under the heading “exempt activities test”. 
69 Par 7 of schedule 25 to the ICTA.  
70 Par 8 of schedule 25 to the ICTA. 
71  The “business establishment” concept as used in the United Kingdom legislation carries 
the same meaning as set out in art 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (2005 Condensed Version). The challenges that e-commerce poses to the 
“business establishment” concept were pointed out by the OECD. See OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs “Clarification on the Application of the Permanent Establishment 
Definition in E-commerce: Changes to the Commentary on the Model Tax Convention on 
art 5” (22 December 2000). Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/32/1923380.pdf<, last accessed 26 June 2007. These 
challenges were discussed in chapter 4 par 4.8. See also H Suddards E-commerce: A 
Guide to the Law of Electronic Business (1999) at 261-263. 
72  Suddards at 269. 
73  Inland Revenue “Electronic Commerce: The UK’s Taxation Agenda” (1999) at 54. 
Available at >http://www.irwa.org.uk/e-commerce/resource/ecom.pdf<, last accessed on 
16 July 2007 
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1984 and largely reflects the world before e-commerce. This legislation may not 
be adequate to deal with new technological developments. The increasing 
possibility for electronic goods and services to be offered to the international 
community from a company in a tax-haven country contrasts with the use of tax 
havens for intra-group arrangements, for which CFC rules were largely written.74 
It is possible therefore that other exemptions to the CFC rules could be 
manipulated for tax avoidance purposes and that the CFC exemptions may need 
to be changed at some point in order to ensure that the United Kingdom tax base 
continues to be adequately protected.75  
 
Inland Revenue also noted that it is not only the scope of the CFC legislation that 
faces e-commerce challenges but also its administration. Inland Revenue pointed 
out that for any tax system to work; there are a number of requirements that have 
to be fulfilled. These requirements are however challenged by e-commerce as 
discussed below. 
 
 
 
Tax administrators should be able to identify who is doing business, whether a 
taxable transaction has taken place, who are the parties to the transaction, and 
their location. However, e-commerce has the potential to make it more difficult to 
satisfy this requirement, since it allows taxpayers to exploit the anonymity 
afforded by the internet to conceal their identify, location and/or particular 
transactions, income or gains.  
 
To ensure tax compliance, the records of taxpayer’s business transactions 
should be available to auditors. Encryption of records of financial transactions 
and electronic documents is legitimate and proper for reasons of commercial 
confidentiality.76 However, encryption of software could be deliberately exploited 
by taxpayers to make it difficult for tax authorities to access their accounting 
                                                 
74  Inland Revenue 1999 at 54. 
75  Inland Revenue 1999 at 54. 
76  Inland Revenue 1999 at 52. The term “encryption” refers to the coding of a text message 
by a transmitting unit so as to prevent unauthorised eavesdropping along the transmission 
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records.77 The global nature of the Internet may also encourage taxpayers to 
store their accounting records and documents on computers located offshore 
where they cannot be easily accessed by tax administrators. Where accounting 
records are available, the data ought to be verified as to its integrity, source, 
competence and accuracy. The integrity and authenticity of electronic data 
provides a challenge for tax administrators. They have traditionally relied on audit 
trails based on paper. Data held in electronic format can be corrupted and 
manipulate before presentation.78  
 
Inland Revenue also pointed out that knowledge of the taxable sector is 
important in coming up with compliance strategies. E-commerce is essentially a 
new means of trading. It may be used to take advantage of preferential tax 
regimes and thus increase harmful tax competition. The transient nature of the 
Internet together with the low start-up costs may encourage businesses to trade 
for some time without notifying tax authorities. The technology of smartcards as a 
means of electronic payment (e-cash) is continuously evolving and it ensures 
anonymity of cash and may result in unaccounted cash with out physical 
restrictions.79 
  
The United Kingdom government monitors the developments of e-commerce.80 
Although the government recognises that e-commerce poses risks to tax 
administration and compliance, it is committed to ensure that taxation is not a 
barrier to the growth of e-commerce. 81 In 1998,82 the government set out its 
policy on the taxation of e-commerce, in which it pointed out that tax rules and 
tax compliance should be neutral between e-commerce and more traditional 
forms of commerce. Furthermore, that the taxation principles of neutrality, 
certainty and transparency, effectiveness and efficiency should also apply to the 
taxation of e-commerce. The government took the view that at that stage, it was 
                                                                                                                                            
line. See R Buys & F Conje Cyber law: The Law of the Internet in South Africa (2004) at 
131.  
77  RA Westin International Taxation of Electronic Commerce (2000) at 4. 
78  Inland Revenue 1999 at 52. 
79  Inland Revenue 1999 at 53.  
80  Inland Revenue 1999 at 54. 
81  Inland Revenue 1999 at 8. 
82  Inland Revenue “Electronic Commerce: UK Taxation Policy” (6 October 1998). Available 
at >http://www.inlandrevnue,gov.uk<, last accessed on 16 July 2007. 
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not necessary to make any major changes to existing tax legislation and 
regulations, or to introduce new taxes in regard to e-commerce. But as 
technology developed, changes may become necessary to existing domestic 
rules in order to ensure that they continue to work efficiently.83 
 
The government also acknowledged that e-commerce would increase 
international trading transactions to an unprecedented level. International 
cooperation and the exchange of information between tax administrations is thus 
essential to detect those that are intent on avoiding taxes.84 The United Kingdom 
government has been working hand in hand with the OECD and the European 
Union in developing internationally acceptable guidelines for the taxation of e-
commerce.85 In 1999,86 the governments of the United Kingdom and the United 
States committed themselves to co-operate on a wide range of issues to support 
the development of global e-commerce. They agreed that in principle any 
taxation of e-commerce should be clear, consistent, neutral and non-
discriminatory. They also agreed to actively participate within the OECD in de- 
veloping a framework for the taxation of e-commerce that would ensure effective 
tax administration and prevent tax evasion and avoidance.87 
 
5.1.10   HOW THE COMPLEXITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S CFC 
LEGISLATION AFFECTS ITS EFFECTIVENESS    
 
Commenting generally on the United Kingdom’s tax system, the 2006 Report of 
the Tax Reform Commission88 noted that the last decade has seen an increase 
in United Kingdom tax complexity, and instability which has had the effect of 
damaging the United Kingdom’s economic growth and international 
competitiveness.  
 
                                                 
83  Inland Revenue 1999 at 23. 
84  Inland Revenue 1999 at 55. 
85  Inland Revenue 1999 at 11 and at 55. 
86  The Information Warfare Site “US-UK Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce” (30 
January 1999). Available at >http://www.iwar.org.uk/e-
commerce/resources/usukecommerce.htm<, last accessed on 16 July 2007. 
87  The Information Warfare Site at 2. 
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The Commission noted that the United Kingdom’s CFC legislation has been 
complicated by repeated amendments.89 As each amendment to the CFC 
legislation is introduced, tax advisers seek to exploit loopholes created 
unintentionally by the new amendment, then tax authorities respond with more 
amendments (often at short notice need to ”iron out many of the problems that 
arise in practice”) thus creating more unforeseen loopholes. The Commission 
noted that this cycle can be hard to break, and it in turn makes planning harder, 
and investment less attractive. The complexity of the legislation also increases 
administrative burdens and adds to the cost of tax.90  
 
The United Kingdom Law Society has noted that, the “United Kingdom’s CFC 
regime is one of the most restrictive of any major foreign jurisdictions as it fails to 
reflect modern commercial realities and results in a significant compliance 
burdens”.91 In order to improve the United Kingdom’s international 
competitiveness, and also improve on the simplicity of this legislation, it was 
recommended that “participation exemptions” should be introduced for all income 
from qualifying foreign shareholdings.92 A participation exemption implies that a 
holder of a qualifying shareholding in a non-resident company does not pay tax 
on dividends received on the shares. It is suggested that, with the introduction of 
participation exemptions, a big part of the United Kingdom’s CFC legislation 
could be substantially simplified.93 This is because, with a participation 
exemption, there would be no incentive for companies to keep profits offshore 
and therefore outside the United Kingdom’s tax net. It is argued that this would 
encourage offshore earnings to be repatriated to the United Kingdom. It is also 
reasoned that the introduction of participation exemptions would remove most of 
the complexities in the CFC legislation, as most of the complicated rules for 
calculating underlying tax credits would become redundant. The result would be 
to enhance greatly the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as a location for 
                                                                                                                                            
88  United Kingdom Tax Reform Commission “Tax Matters: Reforming the Tax System” 
(October 2006) at 7. Available at >http://www.taxreformcommission.com/report.php<, last 
accessed 10 September 2007). 
89  UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 53. 
90  UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 22. 
91  UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 82. 
92  UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 82. 
93  UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 82. 
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controlling international business.94  
 
The Tax Reform Commission recommended that, the United Kingdom should 
follow the example of some countries that have simplified their CFC legislation, 
as they have come to realise that simpler tax systems are less distorting to the 
economy, fairer, cheaper to manage, and easier understand.95 
 
 
 
 
5.1.11  CURBING TAX AVOIDANCE THAT RESULTS FROM 
INVESTING IN OFFSHORE PARTNERSHIP/CORPORATE 
HYBRID ENTITIES: THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 
In the United Kingdom partnerships are governed in terms of the Partnership Act 
1890. In terms of this Act, partners in a firm are jointly and severally liable for all 
the debts and obligations of the partnership. The problem with partnerships is 
that an individual partner’s personal assets are at risk from claims arising out of 
actions of partners which may exceed not only the firm’s  insurance cover, but 
also the ability of the firm to meet the quantum of the claim from its own 
resources.96 To counteract the disadvantages of partnerships, the “limited liability 
partnership” (LLP) structure was created. The United Kingdom LLP comes into 
existence upon incorporation.97 In terms of section 1(2) of the Limited Liability 
                                                 
94  UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 82-83. 
95  The Tax Reform Commission Report quoted the example of the Australian Government 
which in its 2003-2004 Budget speech introduced a package of reforms to its international 
tax laws.  Among the reforms was the reduction of the costs of complying with CFC rules. 
This would be achieved by simplifying the application of the CFC rules for Australian 
companies operating in countries where tax arrangements are comparable to those in 
Australia and easing these rules for certain services provided in international markets. The 
Australian government was of the view that such reforms would encourage the 
establishment in Australia of regional headquarters for foreign groups, and improve 
Australia's attractiveness as a continuing base for multinational companies. See 
Australian Government “Budget 2003-04 Paper 1”. Available at 
>http://www.budget.gov.au/2003-04/bp1/html/bstl-03.htm<, last accessed on 10 
September 2007).  
96  D Armour Tolley’s Limited Liability Partnerships: The New Legislation (2001) at 2. 
97  J Freedman “Limited Liability Partnerships in the United Kingdom: Do They Have a Role 
for Small Firms?” in JA McCahery, T Raaijmakers & EPM Vermeulen The Governance of 
Close Corporations and Partnerships US and European Perspectives (2004) at 304. 
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Partnerships Act 2000 (LLPA), the LLP is a body corporate with legal personality 
separate from that of its members. The LLP combines the organisation flexibility 
and taxation treatment of a partnership but with limited liability for its members.98 
The United Kingdom LLP is thus seen as a “hybrid creature” that is based 
substantially on the corporate model.99   
 
In general, the United Kingdom partnership law does not apply to a limited 
liability partnership, but the arrangements between the partners may closely 
follow a traditional partnership agreement.100 For example, LLPs are run like 
general partnerships and they have a similar degree of management flexibility.101 
However, the LLP’s existence as a corporate entity means that the effect of the 
general law is different in comparison with a partnership. Members of an LLP 
benefit from the limited liability and so their own personal assets will be protected 
whist those of the LLP will be at risk, as is the case with a limited company.102 
But unlike a limited company, in an LLP there is no distinction between the 
owners of the company (its shareholders) and its managers (directors).103  The 
participators in an LLP are referred to as members,104 who are free to regulate 
their internal affairs as they see fit.105  
 
For purposes of taxation, the LLP is not treated as a corporation but as a 
partnership. Sections 10 of the LLPA 2000 inserts section 118ZA to 118ZD in the 
Income and Corporations Act 1988 (ICTA) and sections 59A and 156A in the 
Taxation of Capital Gains Act 1992 (TCGA). The effect of these provisions is to 
                                                 
98  Armour at 295. 
99  G Morse “Limited Liability Partnerships Law Reform in the United Kingdom” in JA 
McCahery, T Raaijmakers & EPM Vermeulen The Governance of Close Corporations 
and Partnerships US and European Perspectives (2004) 317 at 325. 
100  Lawywer.com “Limited Liability Partnerships”. Available at >http://www.lawyers.com/< last 
accessed 29 February 2007; G Morse “Limited Liability Partnerships Law Reform in the 
United Kingdom” in JA McCahery, T Raaijmakers & EPM Vermeulen The Governance of 
Close Corporations and Partnerships US and European Perspectives (2004) 317 at 323. 
101  Lawywer.com ‘Limited Liability Partnerships”. Available at >http://www.lawyers.com/< last 
accessed 29 February 2007. 
102  A Jones “Characterisation of other States’ Partnerships” (2000) 56 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation at at 292. 
103  Armour at 2. 
104  Freedman at 304. 
105  Armour at 2. 
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treat an LLP as if it were a partnership for purposes of these two Acts.106 Thus, 
unlike corporate bodies, the profits or gains made by an LLP are not subject to 
corporations tax assessed on the LLP. Since the LLP is transparent for tax 
purposes, each member is assessed on his shares of the income or gain of the 
LLP in accordance with section 111 of the Income and Corporations Taxes Act 
1988 (ICTA 1988), and corporate members of the LLP (such as clubs and 
societies)107 are liable to corporations tax in accordance with section 114 of ICTA 
1988. The tax treatment of the LLP creates opportunities for tax avoidance. 
 
In United Kingdom, a partnership is not regarded as a resident for treaty 
purposes as it is not liable to tax in the UK.108 It is however worth noting that in 
the approach in the United Kingdom to partnerships and double taxation 
conventions changed as a result of the decision in Padmore v IRC.109 In that 
case a United Kingdom resident partner of a partnership managed and controlled 
in Jersey sought exemption from his share of the partnership profits under the 
terms of the 1952 double taxation treaty between the United Kingdom and 
Jersey. The High Court held that a partnership was a “body of persons” so as to 
be capable of satisfying the definition of “resident” and benefit from the treaty. 
The court however pointed out that the phrase “body of persons” did not have the 
above meaning for purposes of the Taxes Act.110 It was held that the partnership 
                                                 
106  S 118ZA of the ICTA 1988 provides that for purposes of the Tax Acts, a trade,[profession 
or business carried on by a limited Liability partnership with a view to profit shall be treated 
as carried on in partnership by its members (and not by the Limited Liability partnership as 
such); and, accordingly, the property of the limited liability partnership shall be treated for 
those purposes as partnership property. Then s 59A of the TCGA 1992 provides that 
where a limited liability partnership carries on a trade or business with a view to profit – 
 (a)  assets held by the  limited liability partnership shall be treated for purposes of tax 
in respect of changeable gains as held by its members as partners, and 
 (b) any dealings by the limited liability partnership shall be treated for those purposes 
as dealings by its members in partnership (and not by the limited Liability partnership as 
such),  
 any tax in respect of chargeable gains accruing to the members of the limited liability 
partnership on the disposal of any of its assets shall be assessed and chargeable on them 
separately.  
107  Freedman at 304. 
108  P Baker “The Application of the Convention to Partnerships, Trusts and Other, Non-
corporate Entities”. Available at 
>http://www.taxbar.com/documents/application_convention_pb_000.pdf<, last accessed 
21 April 2007. 
109  [1987] STC 36.  
110  S 526(5) ICTA 1970, now s 832(1) ICTA 1988, indicates that “body of persons” does not 
include a partnership. 
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income was exempt under the treaty and that the profits were similarly exempt in 
the hands of the individual partners. This decision was upheld on appeal.111 The 
decision in Padmore has now been reversed by section 112(4) and (5) ICTA 
1988.112 Those sub-sections provide that, where a partnership resident outside 
the United Kingdom is relieved from United Kingdom tax on income or capital 
gains by virtue of a double taxation convention, a resident partner shall be taxed 
without regard to such convention. Thus these sub-sections reverse the specific 
impact of the Padmore decision without overruling the general holding that a 
partnership may be a body of persons.  
 
 
 
As a result of the Padmore case, the United Kingdom has begun to include 
specific references to partnerships in the treaties it has recently negotiated.113 
Where neither state regards a partnership as a taxable entity separate from its 
partners, partnerships are excluded from the definition of a person.114 Where, 
however, the other treaty state recognises a partnership as a separate entity, 
such a partnership is regarded as a person but a specific provision similar to the 
following is included:115  
                                                 
111  [1989] STC 493.  
112  Similar legislation was also enacted in Canada to ensure that the Padmore result could 
not arise in Canada. For details see P Baker “The Application of the Convention to 
Partnerships, Trusts and Other, Non-corporate Entities”. Available at 
>http://www.taxbar.com/documents/application_convention_pb_000.pdf<, last accessed 
21 April 2007 
113  See art 3(1)(h) of the 1974 Convention with Cyprus, art 3(1)(e) of the 1987 Convention 
with Bulgaria which expressly exclude partnerships from the scope of the treaty.  Article 
3(1)(c) of the 1975 Convention with the United States includes partnerships. Article 
2(1)(g) of the 1973 Convention with Malaysia originally excluded partnerships; this was 
amended by Protocol in 1987. For details see P Baker “The Application of the Convention 
to Partnerships, Trusts and Other, Non-corporate Entities”. Available at 
>http://www.taxbar.com/documents/application_convention_pb_000.pdf<, last accessed 
21 April 2007. 
114  For example, art 3(1)(e) of the 1993 convention with Ghana Convention provides: “the 
term ‘person’ comprises an individual, a company and any other body of persons, but 
does not include a partnership”. For details see P Baker “The Application of the 
Convention to Partnerships, Trusts and Other, Non-corporate Entities”. Available at 
>http://www.taxbar.com/documents/application_convention_pb_000.pdf<, last accessed 
21 April 2007. 
115  See art 25(1) of the 1993 Convention with India. See also art 24 of the 1993 Convnetion 
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Where, under any provision of this Convention, a partnership is entitled, as a 
resident of …, to exemption from tax in the United Kingdom on any income or 
capital gains, that provision shall not be construed as restricting the right of the 
United Kingdom to tax any member of the partnership who is a resident of the 
United Kingdom on his share of the income and capital gains of the partnership; but 
any such income or gains shall be treated for the purposes of the article … of this 
Convention as income or gains from sources in …  
 
An attempt to use a hybrid entity structure to avoid United Kingdom taxes can be 
illustrated by the case Memec PLC v IRC.116 This case dealt with “silent 
partnerships” which are generally arrangements that are contractual in nature. 
Silent partnerships are not recognised in the United Kingdom but they are 
recognised in some countries, for example Germany.117 In terms of these 
arrangements, the silent partners contribute assets to a managing partner in 
consideration for a share of the profits from the business. Silent partnerships are 
not treated as entities. The managing partner owns the assets transferred by the 
silent partners. The payments made to the silent partners are usually deductible 
when computing the income of the managing partner, although they may be 
subject to withholding tax. If the country in which the silent partner is resident 
treats the silent partnership as a partnership and if it taxes business income on a 
territorial basis, then there will be no tax, except possibly withholding tax, in 
either country.118  
 
In Memec PLC v IRC,119 Memec, a United Kingdom company, owned shares in a 
Germany company, which in turn owned shares in two Germany operating 
companies. The operating companies paid German trade taxes that were not 
creditable against United Kingdom tax when Memec received dividends from its 
two-tier German subsidiary. Therefore, Memec entered into a silent partnership 
with the German corporation and then claimed that it had received dividends as a 
partner directly from the operating companies and that it was entitled to a credit 
                                                                                                                                            
with Ukraine. For details see P Baker “The Application of the Convention to Partnerships, 
Trusts and Other, Non-corporate Entities”. Available at 
>http://www.taxbar.com/documents/application_convention_pb_000.pdf<, last accessed 
21 April 2007. 
116  [1998] STC 754.  
117  Arnold & Mclyntre at 146. 
118  Arnold & Mclyntre at 146. 
119  [1998] STC 754.  
271 
 
 
 
for the taxes payable.120 The United Kingdom Court of Appeal held that the 
German silent partnership was not a partnership under United Kingdom law and 
that the source of the income was the contractual agreements. Therefore, the 
taxes were not creditable. 
 
5.1.12  CURBING TAX AVOIDANCE THAT RESULTS FROM 
INVESTEING IN CONDUIT COMPANY STRUCTURES: THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Generally the United Kingdom does not have a general statutory anti-avoidance 
rule in respect to treaty shopping.121 It also prefers not to insert general anti-
abuse provisions in its double taxation treaties.122 The concern of the United 
Kingdom is the uncertainty such provisions generate especially with respect to 
distinguishing between abusive and non abusive cases.123 The United Kingdom 
has instead included specific anti-abuse clauses in its treaties. 
 
In line with the OECD recommendations, the United Kingdom uses the 
“beneficial ownership” provision in its tax treaties to curb conduit company treaty 
shopping. However, the United Kingdom does not have a meaning of the term 
“beneficial ownership” in a treaty context.124 In the domestic context, the term 
beneficial ownership has a different meaning for Common Law and Equity.125 
The common-law position is that ownership is indivisible and consequently this 
law only recognises legal ownership. Equity on the other hand, allows divided 
ownership, with legal title being in one person and beneficial ownership in 
another. In J Sainsbury plc v O’Conner (Inspector of Taxes)126 it was held that 
the term “beneficial ownership” means ownership for your own benefit as 
opposed to ownership as trustee for another. Further that, beneficial ownership 
exists where there is no division of legal and beneficial ownership or where legal 
                                                 
120  For a detailed discussion on “silent partnerships” see J Dixon & M Finney Tolley’s 
International Corporate Tax Planning (2002) par 4.4 - 4.9  
121 Rohatgi at 371. 
122 Tomsett at 107. 
123 H J Ault & B J Arnold Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 2nd edition 
(2003) at 433. 
124  Olivier & Honiball at 349. 
125 Oliver et al at 41. 
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ownership is vested in one person and the beneficial ownership in another.127 In 
Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior (Inspector of Taxes)128 the court considered the 
meaning of “beneficial ownership” in the context of shares. The court pointed out 
that “beneficial ownership” has nothing to do with control of a company and that 
the beneficial enjoyment of dividends is an important feature of the beneficial 
ownership of shares. It was held that the term “beneficial ownership” means 
ownership which is not merely legal ownership by the mere fact of being on the 
company register, but it is the right to deal with property as your own. 
 
Perhaps one case that provides some guidance in regard to the interpretation of 
the term in a treaty context, is Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan 
Chase Bank NA, London Branch.129 In this case the Court of Appeal expanded 
on the United Kingdom's traditionally narrow interpretation of “beneficial 
ownership”.  A key point is that this was not a tax case, but it was litigation on the 
basis of a contract between Indofood International Finance Ltd (“Indofood”) and 
the bank “JPMorgan” in its capacity as trustee for some public bondholders. The 
facts of the case were that PT Indofood Sukses Makmur TBK was a company 
incorporated in Indonesia, wished to raise capital by issuing loan notes on the 
international market. Under Indonesian law, it would have been obliged to 
withhold tax at 20% on interest payments to the note holders. To circumvent this, 
a wholly-owned subsidiary was incorporated in Mauritius to take advantage of the 
tax treaty between Mauritius and Indonesia, which provided a reduced 
withholding tax of 10% on interest payments. The terms of the loan notes allowed 
early redemption of the loan loans if a change in Indonesian law increased the 
withholding tax to more than 10%. However, the loan notes also provided that 
before such redemption can take place, reasonable steps should be taken to 
remedy the situation.  
 
In 2004, Indonesia gave notice to Mauritius of the termination of the tax treaty. 
As a result, the 20% withholding tax in terms of Indonesian law would apply. The 
parent company, Indofood, gave notice to the trustee (JP Morgan) of the early 
                                                                                                                                            
126 [1999] STC 318, CA at 330. 
127  For further comments on this case, see Olivier & Honiball at 349. 
128 (1968) 45 TC 112, CA, at 133. 
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redemption of the loan notes. However, the trustee refused to proceed with the 
redemption of the loan notes on the basis that Indofood had not pursued all 
avenues to avoid the increased liability for withholding tax. JP Morgan's 
argument was that Indofood was able to take reasonable measures to mitigate 
the increased withholding tax by setting up a conduit company in the 
Netherlands. As the loan notes were subject to United Kingdom law, it fell to the 
United Kingdom courts to consider the dispute. 
 
The High Court ruled in favour of JP Morgan, on the basis that the increased 
withholding tax could have been avoided by the insertion of the Netherlands 
conduit company. On appeal, one of the issues was whether the Netherlands 
conduit company would be the beneficial owner of the interest payable by 
Indofood within the meaning of article 11 of the Netherlands/Indonesia treaty.   
The Chancellor in the Court of Appeal, referred to the Commentary to OECD 
Model Convention which provides that a conduit company cannot be regarded as 
a beneficial owner if, through the formal owner, it has as a practical matter, very 
narrow powers which render it in relation to the income concerned, a mere 
fiduciary or administrator acting on account of the interested parties. In respect to 
the facts of the case, the Chancellor pointed out that in order for the conduit 
company to be a beneficial owner, it would need to directly benefit from the 
income. The facts showed that since the Netherlands conduit company was 
bound to pay on what it received from Indofood, it was impossible to see how this 
company "could derive any ’direct benefit’ from the interest payable". Its role was 
therefore equated to that of an "administrator of the income" that could not be 
regarded as the beneficial owner of the interest.130  
 
The Chancellor ruled that in the context of tax treaties, the term “beneficial 
ownership” should be accorded an international fiscal meaning, taking into 
                                                                                                                                            
129  [2006] EWCA CV 158 
130  See also H Smith “UK: HMRC Publishes Draft Guidance on Indofood”. Available at 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/?Page=10&PUBID=35&ISS=23172&SID=66...< 
last accessed 7 March 2007; M Oliver & I Toth “A Review of Indoffo International Finance 
Ltd V JP Morgan Chase Bank NA London Branch [2006]STC 1195 and Draft Guidelines 
Issued by HM Revenue & Customs”. Available at 
http://www.birdandbird.com/English/publications/articles/Review_Indofood_HMRC_...>, 
last accessed 7March 2007.  
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account the OECD literature and that the meaning should not be restricted to the 
domestic law of the contracting states. Some commentators have however 
argued the court’s ruling that advocates for an expanded international meaning 
“is undoubtedly a new departure” that has expanded the United Kingdom’s 
traditionally narrow interpretation of beneficial ownership.131 It is however 
arguable that in a treaty context, the term has had such a meaning all along.  
 
The decision in this case, while clearly influenced by the underlying facts, should 
serve as a reminder that the use of “conduit” companies in tax-planning 
structures, requires very careful planning.132  
5.2 CURBING TAX AVOIDANCE THAT RESULTS FROM INVESTING IN 
OFFSHORE COMPANIES: THE UNITED STATES  
 
The United States was the first country to enact legislation that prevents deferral 
of taxation by its residents when foreign companies are established in tax-haven 
jurisdictions.133 The first means devised by taxpayers to achieve deferral was the 
establishment of so-called “foreign personal holding companies”. An individual 
would transfer income-producing assets to a wholly-owned corporation in a low-
tax foreign jurisdiction, so they would attract no current income tax. The 
government responded by adopting the “foreign personal holding companies” 
(“FPHC”)134 provisions in 1937, which were codified in sections 551-558 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”) of 1954.135 These rules aimed rather 
narrowly at what has been called “incorporated pocket books”, which are foreign 
                                                 
131  M T McGowan “Indofood court Expands Interpretation of Beneficial Ownership” 42 Tax 
Notes International (June 2006) at 1091. 
132  Ernest & Young Tax Services “Dutch Conduits not on Indofood Menu” Tax Newsletter 
Issue 3 (June 2006). Available at >http://www.tecbrand.com/taxwatch3-
dublin/case_further_03.html<, last accessed 28 March 2007. 
133  Westin at 181; Sandler at 24; see also BJ Arnold The Taxation of Controlled Foreign 
Corporations: An International Comparison (1986) at 130; see also C Doggart “Tax 
Havens and Their Uses” The Economist Publication (1990) Special Report No 1191 at 92; 
40th Congress of the International Fiscal Association, Taxation of Domestic Shareholders 
on Undistributed Income of Foreign Affiliates: Objectives, Techniques and Consequence 
(1986) at 7; WH Diamond & DB Diamond Tax Havens of the World (Release No 108 Jan 
2002) Vol 1 at INTRO.1; E Tomsett Tax Planning for Multinational Companies (1989) at 
90; see also A Ogley The Principle of International Taxation (1993) at 15. 
134  OECD Issues in International Taxation No 1 International Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
(1987) at 20; Doggart note 23 at 92. 
135   J Isenbergh “Perspectives on the Deferral of United States Taxation of the Earnings of 
Foreign Corporations” (1988) 66 Taxes at 1063; OECD Issues in International Taxation 
No 1 at 20; Doggart at 92. 
275 
 
 
 
investment entities owned and controlled by a small number of individuals.136 As 
a result of these rules, a United States shareholder in a “foreign personal holding 
company” was taxed directly on the undistributed income of the company.137 The 
FPHC provisions only affected closely held foreign corporations that are 
controlled by five or fewer United States shareholders. There was thus a need to 
enact provisions that would deal with widely held foreign corporations or widely 
held parent companies with foreign subsidiaries that have investment income.138 
 
In 1962, new provisions that are referred to as “subpart F provisions” were 
enacted to deal with CFCs.139 The subpart F provisions were the first 
comprehensive provisions to deal with CFCs. These provisions went beyond the 
FPHC provisions by eliminating the deferral of United States tax not only for 
passive income earned by a CFC, but also for certain foreign source business 
income.140 As the FPHC provisions overlapped with the subpart F provisions, 
Congress repealed the FPHC provisions in 2004. 141  
 
In 1961, before the subpart F legislation was adopted, the Kennedy 
Administration proposed doing away with deferral for all foreign corporations 
controlled by United States residents by requiring immediate taxation of all 
foreign business income.142 The reason for this proposal was that deferral 
created a bias in favour of overseas investment against domestic investment. 
                                                 
136  Sandler at 24; Arnold at 130. 
137 A company qualified as a FPHC when it was incorporated outside the United States and 
more than 50% of the total voting power or the value of the outstanding stock was directly 
or indirectly owned by five or fewer United States citizens or United States residents. 
FPHC income was generally passive income such as dividends, interest, annuities, 
royalties, rents and gains on the sale of or exchange of securities, which must make up 
60% or more of the foreign corporation’s gross annual income for it to be considered a 
FPHC. Doggart at 92; Spitz & Clarke at US/32; JE Bischel, R Feinschreiber Fundamentals 
of International Taxation 2 ed (1985) at 106. 
138 Bischel & Feinschreiber at 105. 
139 Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies International Tax Avoidance Vol A (1979) at 272. 
140  Arnold at 130; ET Laity “The United States’ Response to Tax Havens: The Foreign Base 
Company Service Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations” (1997) 18 North Western 
Journal of International Law and Business at 3.   
141   This was in terms of s 413 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. 
142   PR McDaniel, HJ Ault & JR Repetti Introduction to United States International Taxation 5 
ed (2005) at 113. Note that the appropriateness of the deferral of United States tax has 
been seriously questioned since 1962. Legislation was proposed at that time which would 
have eliminated deferral for all United States controlled foreign corporations and taxed the 
foreign profits directly to the United States shareholders on a current basis. After lengthy 
and complex legislative process, general elimination of deferral was rejected. 
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The Kennedy Administration’s view was that current United States taxation of 
controlled foreign corporations across the board would restore a measure of 
neutrality to investment decisions across national boundaries.143 However, the 
United States business community rejected this proposal, arguing that it would 
devastate the competitiveness of United States businesses abroad if they were 
taxed more heavily than their competitors from other countries.144 Although the 
arguments of the United States business community were not entirely 
convincing,145 eventually, instead of imposing current taxation on various types of 
tax-haven operations (eg on income attributed to intangible property used 
overseas, and on foreign profits used to create new overseas ventures), the 
United States has since then employed the strategy of eliminating deferral mainly 
on certain passive and highly mobile foreign earnings, while deferral is generally 
continued for income from active business operations.146  
 
5.2.1 THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES SUBPART F PROVISIONS 
 
A foreign corporation is defined under United States tax law as a corporation 
created under the laws of a foreign country. Thus it is not subject to United 
States income tax on its income, unless it is engaged in trade or business in the 
United States, or if it generates income from sources within the United States.147 
Its earnings will, however, be subject to United States tax when dividends are 
distributed to United States shareholders who are subject to worldwide 
taxation.148 The effect of this is that the United States tax on foreign-source 
income earned by a foreign corporation is deferred until the foreign corporation 
distributes dividends to its shareholders.149 
 
A CFC is defined as a foreign corporation, if more than 50% of the total 
                                                 
143   JD Kuntz & RJ Peroni US International Taxation Vol 1 (2005) in par B3.01 at B3-10.  
144   Isenbergh at 1064; Av-Yohan’ Comment on Peroni et al at 536.  
145   Isenbergh at 1064. 
146   Isenbergh at 1064; CM Boise “Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the 
Utility of Amnesty”. Available at >http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929587> 
last accessed 26 October 2006. 
147 Ss 881 and 882 of the Code.  
148   S 243(b) (1) and (5) of the Code. 
149 DA Kleinfeld & EJ Smith Langer on Practical International Tax Planning 4 ed (2001) vol 1 
in par 85.1; WF O’Conner  An Inquiry into the Foreign Tax Burdens of United States 
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combined voting power of all classes of voting stock is owned by United States 
shareholders on any day during the taxable year of the CFC.150 The definition of 
a “United States shareholder” refers to any citizen, resident, partnership, 
corporation, estate or trust.151 A United States shareholder who owns 10% or 
more of the total combined voting power of all classes of voting stock of a CFC 
must include in his income in each year his pro rata share of the CFC’s 
undistributed income.152 In terms of section 958 (a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Code, 
“stock owned” can be  stock owned directly or indirectly by or for the foreign 
corporation, foreign partnership, foreign trust or foreign estate as owned 
proportionately by the entire entity’s shareholders, partners or beneficiaries. Thus 
this section acts as a “look through” provision into these foreign entities.153    
To prevent double taxation of subpart F income, there is no further taxation in the 
United States when the income is actually distributed by the CFC that earned the 
income.154 If the foreign corporation pays tax abroad, the United States 
shareholder that is a domestic corporation receives a foreign tax credit that can 
offset the current United States tax on the undistributed income.155 
 
Subpart F income as defined in section 952(a)(1) and (2) of the Code consists of 
two principle categories of income. These are insurance income and foreign base 
company income.156 Even if income falls into one of the two categories, it does 
not constitute subpart F income, if it is effectively connected with the conduct of a 
United States trade or business of the CFC (unless by treaty the income is 
exempt from tax or is taxed at a reduced rate).157   
 
(1) Insurance income 
                                                                                                                                            
Based Multinational Corporations (1980) at 13. 
150 Ownership is determined on the basis of stock held directly or indirectly through foreign 
entities or owned by reason of broad attribution rules. See s 957(b) and s 957(a) of the 
Code, Treas Reg s 1.951-1(g), 1.957.1.   
151 S 951, 957(d), Treas Reg s 1.957-4.  
152 S 951(b) and 957(a) of the Code, Treas Reg s 1.951-1(g), 1.957.1. 
153   Kuntz & Peroni in par B3.02[2][e] at B3-27.  
154 S 961 of the Code. 
155 S 951 (a)(1)(2) of the Code and Treas Reg s 1.951-1(b). 
156   Note however that subpart F income also includes: “Certain other income to the extent 
that the CFC has an ‘international boycott factor, certain illegal payments to government 
officials and certain income from ‘blacklisted’ countries”. S 952(a)(3), (4), and (5) of the 
Code. 
157   McDaniel et al at 117.  
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When Congress adopted subpart F in 1962, insurance income was one of the 
prime targets. A number of companies were avoiding tax by reinsuring their 
policies abroad, or by placing initial policies with foreign subsidiaries of a United 
States corporation.158  A CFC’s insurance income is taxed in the hands of its 
United States shareholders on a current basis. Section 953(a) defines “insurance 
income” as including  any income that is attributed to the insuring or reinsuring of 
any insurance or annuity contract that would be taxed under subchapter L (which 
deals with rules for insurance companies), if the CFC were a domestic insurance 
company and does not constitute exempt insurance income.159 
 
Insurance income will be exempt from the provisions’ if it is income of a 
“qualifying insurance company”. A “qualifying insurance company” is one that has 
a “real business nexus” with a foreign country. It should be subject to regulation 
as an insurance company by its home country, it derives 50% of its total net 
written premiums from insurance or reinsurance by such CFC, and it should be 
engaged in insurance business that would be subject to tax under subpart L if it 
were a United States domestic corporation.160 However, section 954(i)(1) of the 
Code provides exclusions for certain qualified insurance income. For instance, 
the qualified income may be income that is received from a person other than a 
related person and that is derived from the investments made by a qualifying 
insurance company.161 
 
(2) Foreign base company income 
 
Section 952(a)(3) of the Code sets out “foreign base company income” (FBCI) as 
one of the key elements of subpart F income.162 Section 954 defines this income 
as including: 
(a) foreign personal holding company income; 
(b) foreign base company sales income; 
                                                 
158   Kuntz & Peroni at B3-202. 
159   See also BI Bittker & L Lokken Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 3 ed (2005) 
at 69-12. 
160  S 953(e)(3)(A)-(C) of the Code.  
161   Bittker & Lokken at 69-12. 
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(c) foreign base company service income; 
(d) foreign base company oil-related income.163 
In terms of section 954(b)(3)(A) of the Code, a corporation with a relatively small 
amount of FBCI may be treated as having no FBCI. This section acts as a de 
minimis rule.  
 
In terms of section 954(b)(3)(B) of the Code, a corporation with a relatively large 
amount of FBCI may have all its income treated as FBCI under a full inclusion 
rule. There are also certain provisions that exclude FBCI that would generally be 
included. For instance, in terms of section 954(b)(4) of the Code, if a CFC earns 
income that is subject to an effective rate of foreign tax greater than 90% of the 
highest United States rate, a taxpayer can be excluded from FBCI.  Furthermore, 
United States income that is excluded from subpart F income under section 
952(b) of the Code is excluded from FBCI.164 Section 952(b) of the Code 
excludes from subpart F income United States source income that is effectively 
connected with the conduct of a business in the United States, provided that the 
income is not exempt or subject to a reduced tax rate under a United States tax 
treaty. 
 
(a) Foreign personal holding company income 
 
In terms of section 954(a)(1) of the Code, foreign personal holding company 
income (FPHCI) is one of the major components of FBCI. FPHCI generally 
includes: 
-  dividends, interest, rents and annuities; 
-  net gains from certain property transactions; 
-  net gains from certain commodity transactions; 
-  certain foreign currency gains; 
-  income equivalent to interest; 
-  income from notional principle contracts; 
                                                                                                                                            
162   Treas Reg s 1.952-1(a)(2). 
163   Foreign base company shipping income was previously part of “foreign base company 
income” but it was repealed in 2004. This income was covered under former s 954(a)(4) of 
the Code but repealed by s 415(a)(1) of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Note 
that “foreign base company oil-related” is not discussed in this thesis. 
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-  certain payments in lieu of dividends; 
-  amounts received under certain personal service contracts.165  
 
Not all these categories of FPHCI income are discussed in this thesis. Only the 
categories which are relevant, to comparative study of the CFC legislation of the 
other countries dealt with in this thesis are discussed.166  
 
(i) Dividends: Section 954(c)(c)(1) of the Code provides that dividends received 
by a CFC are FPHCI. Certain dividends are, however, excluded. For instance, 
under section 959(b) of the Code, if a CFC has a subsidiary that also has a CFC 
and the lower-tier CFC has income or earnings that result in income to a United 
States shareholder, if the lower-tier CFC pays a dividend from the earnings and 
profits, that dividend does not trigger a second tax for the United States 
shareholder.167  
 
FPHCI does not include dividends received from a “related person”, that is a 
corporation that was created or organised under the laws of the same foreign 
country under which the CFC was created and that has a substantial part of its 
assets used in its trade or business located in the same foreign country.168 The 
legislators saw no reason for taxing the United States shareholders on dividends 
received by a CFC from a related party where the United States shareholder 
would not have been taxed, if he had owned the stock of the related party 
directly.169 However, a dividend from earnings accumulated before the CFC 
acquired the stock does not qualify for the same country exception. In other 
words, the exception cannot apply to the extent that a dividend comes from 
earnings and profits accumulated while the stock on which the dividend is 
distributed was not owned by the CFC receiving the dividend, either directly or 
indirectly through a chain of corporations that all met the conditions of the same 
country exclusion.170 
                                                                                                                                            
164   Treas Reg s 1.954-1(a)(2).   
165   S 954(c)(1)(A) – (G) of the Code. 
166   See chapter 9 where the CFC legislation of the relevant countries is compared. 
167  Kuntz & Peroni at B3-78. 
168  S 954(c)(3)(A)(i) of the Code; Treas Reg s 1.954-2(b)(1)(i). 
169  Bittker & Lokken at 69-22. 
170  S 954(c )(3)(C) of the Code. 
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(ii) Interest: Section 954(c)(c)(1)(A) of the Code provides that a portion of the 
gross income of a CFC that consists of interest is generally FPHCI. FPHCI does 
not, however, include interest that is derived in the conduct of a banking business 
and “export financing interest”.171 Furthermore, FPHCI does not include interest 
received from a related person, that is a corporation created or organised under 
the laws of the same foreign country under whose laws the CFC was created or 
organised and that has a substantial part of its assets used in its trade or 
business located in the same foreign country.172 
(iii) Royalties: In terms of section 954(c)(c)(1)(A) of the Code, a portion of the 
gross income of a CFC that consist of royalties is generally FPHCI. Exceptions 
exist for certain royalties derived in an active business and for certain royalties 
received from related persons.173  
 
(iv) Banking or financial income: When adopting section 954(c), Congress 
recognised the need to allow United States businesses to compete in foreign 
countries on an equal footing with other businesses in those countries, but 
deferral of United States taxes on passive income from portfolio investments was 
not allowed. This is the main target of section 954(c). There are, however, certain 
exclusions from the definition of FPHCI. For example, section 954(h)(1) of the 
Code excludes from FPHCI the “qualified banking or financing income” of an 
eligible CFC. An eligible CFC means a CFC that is predominantly engaged in the 
active conduct of banking, financing, or similar business and conducts substantial 
activity with respect to that business.174 A corporation is predominantly engaged 
in the active conduct of banking, financing or similar business, if it meets the 
following conditions: 
-  Over 70% of the gross income of the corporation is derived directly 
from active and regular conduct of a “lending or financing business” 
from transactions with customers that are not related persons. 
-  It is engaged in the active conduct of a banking business and, is an 
institution licensed to do business as a bank in the United States. 
                                                 
171  S 954(c)(2)(B) of the Code. 
172  Treas Reg s 1.954-2(b)(4). 
173  Treas Reg s 1.954-2(b)(1)(iii). 
174  S 954(h)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Code.   
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-  It is engaged in active conduct of a securities business and it is 
registered under the provisions of the United States securities law.175 
 
Section 954(h)(1) of the Code excludes income from being FPHCI only if it is 
“qualified banking or financing income”. To qualify, firstly, the income must be 
derived from the active conduct of a banking or financing business by the eligible 
CFC itself or by a qualified business unit of the eligible CFC. Secondly, the 
income must be derived from transactions with customers located in a country 
other than the United States and substantially all the activities must be 
conducted, or deemed to be conducted, in its home country. Further, the 
corporation must treat the income earned as taxable in the corporation’s home 
country.  
 
There are also several anti-abuse rules with respect to the exclusion of qualified 
banking or financial income. 
-  Firstly, there is the disregard of any item of income, gain or loss, or 
deduction with respect to any transaction that has a principal purpose 
of qualifying income or gain for the exclusion.176  
-  Secondly, there is the disregard of any item of income, gain, loss or 
deduction of any entity that is not engaged in regular and continuous 
transactions with customers that are not related persons.177  
-  Thirdly, there is the disregard of any item of income, gain, loss or 
deduction with respect to any transaction using, or doing business 
with, an entity to meet any home country requirement for a special 
purpose entity or arrangement, if one of the principal purposes of the 
transaction is qualifying income or gain for the exclusion under 
section  954(h) of the Code.178  
-  Fourthly, a customer is not treated as a related person, officer, 
director or employee of a CFC, if a principal purpose of such person’s 
transactions is to meet any requirement of section 954(h) of the 
                                                 
175  Bittker & Lokken at 69-35. 
176   S 954(h)(7)(A) of the Code. 
177   S 954(h)(7)(B) of the Code. 
178   S 954(h)(7)(C) of the Code. 
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Code.179  
 
 (b) Foreign base company sales income (FBCSI) 
 
In terms of section 954(d)(1) of the Code, this income includes profits, 
commissions and fees. It may also involve a CFC that either buys and sells for its 
own account or acts as the agent for a related person. Foreign base company 
sales income always involves the purchase or sale of personal property.180 The 
property involved in each transaction must be made and used outside the 
country in which the CFC is incorporated. FBCSI may not result, however, if a 
corporation sells property that it has used in its business.181 A sales transaction 
generates FBCSI only if a related person is involved as a seller or buyer. In 
terms of section 954(d)(3) of the Code, a related person is an individual or entity 
that controls the CFC, an entity controlled by the CFC, or an entity that is 
controlled by the person or persons that control the CFC. “Control” is ownership 
of more than 50% by either voting power or value, of the corporation’s stock. A 
CFC has FBCSI, if it participates in four basic transactions, namely: 
-  The CFC buys personal property from related persons and sells it to 
anyone.  
-  A CFC may have FBCSI as a result of buying personal property from 
anyone and selling that property to a related person.  
-  A CFC may have FBCSI as a result of buying personal property from 
anyone on behalf of a related person.  
-  A CFC may have FBCSI as a result of selling personal property to 
anyone on behalf of a related person.182    
 
Income from a sale is excluded from FBCSI, if the goods are manufactured, 
produced, grown or extracted in the country in which the CFC is organised.183  A 
                                                 
179   S IRC 954(h)(7)(D) of the Code. 
180   B Spitz International Tax Havens Guide: Offshore Strategies (2002) at 299; Kuntz & 
Peroni at B3-123. 
181   Treas Reg s 1.954-3(a)(1)(i). 
182  S 954(d)(1) of the Code. 
183   Kuntz & Peroni at B3-124 to B3-125. For example, a CFC incorporated in country X 
purchases grapefruit grown in country X and resells them to its parent corporation for 
distribution in the United States. This may be evidence that the country of incorporation for 
the CFC was selected for business, not for tax avoidance reasons. But this exclusion may 
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branch engaged in selling or purchasing goods is treated as a separate 
corporation in applying the definition of FBCSI, if it is located outside the country 
in which the CFC is incorporated, and the effective rate at which the CFC is 
taxed on the branch’s income falls below a threshold rate, which is the lesser of 
90% of the rate at which the country of incorporation would tax the income, or a 
rate of 5% below the rate of the country of incorporation.184   
 
FBCSI is basically an anti-avoidance measure that targets avoidance schemes 
involving the sale of goods between related parties.  
 
(c)  Foreign base company service income 
 
In terms of section 954(e)(1) of the Code, “foreign base company service  
income” is generally income derived in connection with the performance of 
technical, managerial, engineering, architectural, scientific, skilled, industrial, 
commercial or like services. For the income to be considered foreign base 
company service income, two conditions have to be met. Firstly, the CFC must 
perform services for or on behalf of a related person.185  Secondly, the CFC must 
perform the services outside the country under the laws of which that corporation 
was created or organised.186 
 
Services are considered to be performed for or on behalf of a related person, if 
the related person pays the CFC for the services, the related person is or was 
obliged to perform the services performed by the CFC, the performance of the 
services by the CFC was a material term of a sale of property by a related 
person or if the related person contributed “substantial assistance” in the 
performance of the services by the CFC.187 
There are, however, exceptions to “foreign base company service income”. For 
instance, it does not result when a CFC derives income for services that relate 
                                                                                                                                            
be lost if the goods are sold through a branch that is physically separate from the 
manufacturing facility and the manufacturing and sales operations are in different 
countries. See Bittker & Lokken at 69.  
184   Treas Reg s 1.954-3(b)(1)(i). 
185  S 954(e)(1)(A) of the Code. 
186   S 954 (e)(1)(B) of the Code. 
187   Treas Reg ss 1.954-4(b)(1)(i) to (iv). 
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directly to the sale or exchange by the corporation of property manufactured, 
produced, grown or extracted by the corporation. Nor does it result when a CFC 
derives income for services that relate directly to an offer to sell or exchange 
property manufactured, produced, grown or extracted by the corporation.188 
There are also exceptions to in respect to income from insurance, banking, 
securities commodities and financing transactions.189  
 
5.2.2 OTHER UNITED STATES ANTI-INCOME TAX DEFERRAL 
PROVISIONS  
 
Passive foreign investment company (PFIC) rules 
 
Since the introduction of CFC legislation, the United States has also enacted 
other anti-tax-haven measures related to the CFC provisions. In 1986, special 
provisions were enacted to deal with domestic portfolio investments in foreign 
investment companies. These rules are referred to as “passive foreign 
investment company” (PFIC) rules.190 They were aimed at the deferral of United 
States tax on passive income earned abroad through an investment fund that is 
organised outside the United States and that does not distribute its income 
annually. Persons owning shares in such investment funds are subject to PFIC 
rules. These rules also apply to United States persons that indirectly own PFIC 
shares through one or more intermediate entities. Under the PFIC rules, an 
interest charge is imposed on foreign earnings which are accumulated and then 
subsequently distributed to United States shareholders. The distribution is 
treated as having been received rateably over the period for which the United 
States shareholder has held the stock, and an interest charge is imposed on the 
taxes which would have been due on the hypothetical distributions. A foreign 
corporation is classified as a passive foreign investment company, if 75% or 
more of its income is passive or if 50% or more of the fair market value or 
adjusted bases of its assets generate passive income.191 
                                                 
188  S 954(e)(2)(A)and (B) of the Code. 
189   S 954(e)(2) of the Code. 
190  Sandler at 24; Doggart at 92; T Viherkentta Tax Incentives in Developing Countries and 
International Taxation (1991) at  77; Bishel & Feinschreiber at 84. 
191 Ault & Arnold at 387; Kleinfeld & Smith in par 85.1. 
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In effect, these rules improve on one aspect of the subpart F rules, in that they 
reach all United States shareholders of foreign corporations that comply with the 
definition of an PFIC. Thus, unlike in the subpart F rules, there is no threshold 
percentage ownership requirement before current taxation is imposed. A second 
difference from the subpart F rules is that there is no minimum shareholding  
Requirementand no required overall level of United States investment.192 
However, by virtue of its definition of a “passive foreign investment company”, 
the PFIC regime follows the pattern of subpart F legislation in leaving deferral 
intact for active foreign business income of foreign subsidiaries.  
 
Provisions relating to the disposition of stock in a CFC 
 
The subpart F provisions prevent the deferral of United States tax on foreign 
base company income.193 However, these provisions do not apply to non-base 
company income. This opened up several avenues for United States 
shareholders to avoid income tax on their foreign earnings. For instance, a 
shareholder could sell the stock of a foreign corporation and realise an increase 
in the value of the stock at capital gains rates. He could also liquidate the 
corporation and convert the foreign earnings into a capital gain.194 To prevent 
such schemes, section 1248 of the Code was enacted to complement the 
subpart F provisions. In terms of this section, if any gain or disposition of stock is 
made in a CFC, it will be treated as a capital gain and must be reported as 
ordinary income to the extent of the foreign corporation’s earnings and profits 
accumulated after 1962.195  
 
Section 1248 applies to any sales or exchange of stock by a United States 
person in a CFC and to any corporate distribution to such person for which 
capital gains treatment is provided. The foreign corporation must be a CFC as 
defined in the subpart F provisions, and the United States person selling or 
exchanging the stock must own at least a 10% interest in the voting stock of the 
                                                 
192 Ault & Arnold at 387; Kleinfeld & Smith in par 85.1. 
193 S 954 of the Code. 
194 Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies International Tax Avoidance Vol B (1979) at 272. 
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corporation. For section 1248 to apply, the corporation need not be a CFC at the 
time the sale or other disposition is made, as long as it was a CFC at any time 
during the 5-year period preceding the sale.196 The effect of this legislation is that 
the accumulated earnings of a CFC that are realised by United States share-
holders through the liquidation or sale or exchange of stock will eventually bear 
the full United States corporate tax at the same rate as if the earnings had been 
distributed as dividends.197 
 
5.2.3  REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
In terms of Internal Revenue Code Regulations section 1.883-1, United States 
shareholders who own 10% or more of the total combined voting power of all 
classes of voting stock of a CFC, must complete a copy of Form 5471 entitled 
“Information Return of US persons with Respect to Certain Controlled Foreign 
Corporations” when submitting their tax returns. In terms of this provision, they 
are expected to disclose: 
- Their name, street address and the taxpayer identification number. 
- Their proportionate share of subpart F income. 
- The percentage value of the shares of the CFC that they own.  
 
5.2.4 HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE THE UNITED STATES PROVISIONS BEEN IN 
CURBING OFFSHORE TAX AVOIDANCE? 
 
On the face of it, the subpart F provisions appear to be an effective measure for 
preventing United States shareholders from deferring United States taxation of 
CFC earnings. However, there are a host of issues that dramatically limit the 
effectiveness of the subpart F provisions. Firstly, subpart F is limited to certain 
kinds of passive, highly mobile income earned by the CFC. Subpart F income 
does not in general include a CFC’s earnings from most active business 
operations. Accordingly, United States shareholders of a foreign corporation, 
which even by virtue of its ownership could be considered a CFC, will not be 
                                                                                                                                            
195 O’Conner at 19. 
196 Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies Vol B at 272. 
197 O’ Conner at 19. 
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subject to current taxation under subpart F on the corporation’s foreign earnings 
from an active business.198 
 
Even if all of a foreign corporation’s income is passive, subpart F may still not 
have the effect of imposing current taxation on that income. Under subpart F, a 
foreign corporation is a CFC only if more than 50% of (1) the total combined 
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote; or (2) the total value of the 
stock of such corporation is owned by United States shareholders. This implies 
that the characterisation of a foreign subsidiary as a CFC may be avoided by 
ensuring that at least 50% of the foreign subsidiary’s stock is owned by foreign 
persons. In such circumstances, United States persons owning stock of the 
foreign subsidiary will enjoy deferral of United States taxation even on the 
subsidiary’s passive foreign earnings.199 
 
The other limitation lies in the fact that the term “United States shareholders” 
includes only those United States persons who own actually or by statutory 
attribution 10% or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of the 
CFC’s stock that are entitled to vote. Thus, a United States corporation may still 
achieve deferral of United States tax on even the passive foreign earnings of a 
foreign subsidiary by simply owning less than 10% of the foreign subsidiary’s 
voting stock. 
 
In general, even though the subpart F provisions are intended to eliminate 
deferral with respect to passive income earned by foreign corporations controlled 
by United States shareholders, subpart F does even this limited duty rather 
poorly, because it does not end deferral for all foreign corporations with passive 
income, nor does it impose current taxation on all United States persons that are 
shareholders of foreign corporations. More importantly, subpart F leaves deferral 
intact for most of the active foreign business income earned by CFCs.200   
Even with the presence of the subpart F provisions, United States taxpayers 
                                                 
198   CM Boise ”Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty” 
(2007)  George Manson Law Review at 3. Available at 
>http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929587>, last accessed 26 November 
2006.  
199  Boise at 4. 
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have found ways of circumventing these provisions. It is estimated that nearly 
$650 billion in foreign earnings are held offshore by foreign subsidiaries of United 
States corporations, out of reach of United States taxation. And it is further 
estimated that $68 billion in tax revenue will be lost between 2007 and 2011, as a 
result of the deferral problem.201  
 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 contained a provision that gave United 
States corporations a one-year window period during which to repatriate earnings 
from their foreign subsidiaries at a tax rate that was a fraction of the marginal 
corporate rate normally applicable to dividends paid to United States 
shareholders by foreign corporations. The rationale behind the enactment of the 
Act was that United States worldwide taxation discouraged United States 
shareholders of CFCs from repatriating foreign earnings of CFCs. Section 
965(a)(1) of this Act permitted a corporate United States shareholder of a CFC to 
deduct from income 85% of the amount of the cash dividends it received from the 
CFC. The effect of the provision was to dramatically reduce the effective rate of 
tax on dividends paid by the CFC to its United States shareholders. Such a 
substantial reduction in the effective tax rate on dividends was expected to create 
a substantial incentive for CFCs to voluntarily end deferral and repatriate foreign 
earnings to their United States shareholders.  
 
 
However, the section afforded the greatest benefits to the multinational industries 
with substantial offshore assets and operations. This is particularly so in the case 
of the pharmaceuticals and technology industries, which have the largest 
concentrations of intangible assets, making it easier for them to shift income 
abroad.202 The provision was therefore strongly supported by these industries, as 
they potentially had the most to gain from a reduced rate of taxation on 
                                                                                                                                            
200  Boise at 6. 
201   Boise at 4. 
202   For example, from 1994 to 2003, the share of pharmaceutical companies’ profits derived 
from foreign jurisdictions increased dramatically from 37.6% in 1994 to over 65% in 2003. 
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repatriated earnings. The section damaged the public perception of the fairness 
of the tax system by cloaking its provisions in the garb of job creation, but 
ultimately benefiting even those corporations that used repatriated earnings to 
cut American jobs. It was viewed by most taxpayers as a corporate give-away.203  
 
5.2.5 NEW IDEAS IN THE UNITED STATES TO CURB OFFSHORE TAX 
AVOIDANCE 
 
It has been suggested that ending deferral would be the most effective way of 
curbing offshore tax avoidance in the United States. To end deferral altogether, 
each United States person owning stock in the foreign corporation would be 
required to currently include a pro rata share of such income or expenses in 
computing his, her or its own United States tax liability. This would end deferral 
with regard to the United States shareholders’ full shares of all the foreign 
corporations’ income, not merely certain categories of income earned by CFCs 
as described in the subpart F rules. In addition, each United States person 
owning stock in a foreign corporation would be apportioned his, her or its share 
of the foreign taxes paid by the corporation during the year, and could claim a 
direct credit for those taxes, to the extent that they are creditable taxes.204 By 
granting a foreign tax credit when the United States citizens or corporations 
derive income from other countries, capital export neutrality is achieved, so that a 
United States taxpayer’s decisions on whether to invest in the United States or 
abroad are not based solely on economic considerations.205 Currently, United 
States tax on the foreign earnings is only imposed when the earnings are 
repatriated to the United States and then a credit is given for the foreign taxes 
paid. When United States tax is deferred through the use of a foreign subsidiary 
until the profits are repatriated, the tax deferral essentially works out as a subsidy 
granted by the United States government for foreign investment.206  
                                                                                                                                            
See MA Sullivan & JA Almond “Economic Analysis: Drug Companies Park Increasing 
Share of Profits in Low-Tax Countries” 104 Tax Notes (2004) at 1336. 
203    Boise at 6. 
204   Peroni et al at 509. 
205   See United States Treasury Department Policy Study at 63, where it is pointed out that 
capital export neutrality was the preferable policy whether viewed from a global or national 
export perspective. 
206   McDaniel at 127; see also Peroni et al at 498. 
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One of the biggest arguments in favour of deferral has been that if United States 
multinationals are subject to current taxation on the foreign source earnings of 
their subsidiaries, they will be unable to compete in host countries against foreign 
multinationals that are based in countries that grant deferral or exemption of 
foreign source income.207 This argument is, however, defeated by the 
recommendations of the OECD report on curbing harmful tax competition, which 
encouraged countries that do not have CFC rules to consider adopting them and 
countries that have such rules to ensure they are apply in order to curb “harmful 
tax competition”, which the OECD report defines as including measures designed 
to attract foreign investors (such as targeted tax holidays).208  
 
Ending deferral is also said to be the most efficient way of promoting equity 
among taxpayers as it ensures that all taxpayers do not limit taxation of foreign 
income by incorporating foreign corporations. At the same time, the abolition of 
deferral would also ensure economic efficiency and welfare, because it would 
largely eliminate taxpayers’ consideration of decisions regarding the location of 
investment. Although it has been argued that the repeal of deferral could result in 
a major loss of revenue,209 Avi-Yonah210 contends that this may not be 
necessarily so. He gives an example of the consequences of the check-the-box 
regulations that encouraged taxpayers to choose whether or not to defer income 
from foreign investments. The elective deferral that these regulations 
encouraged had the opposite effect that lead to loss of revenue. He argues that 
this will not necessarily be the case, where deferral is ended altogether, as each 
taxpayer owning investments in a foreign corporation would be required to 
currently include a pro rata share of any income or expenses in computing the 
United States tax liability.  
 
5.2.6 THE COMPATIBILITY OF UNITED STATES CFC LEGISLATION AND 
                                                 
207   RS Avi-Yonah “Comment on Peroni, Fleming and Shay, ‘Getting Serious About Curtailing 
Deferral of US Tax on Foreign Source Income” SMU Law Review 52 (1999) at 536; Avi-
Yonah at 222. 
208   OECD Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998) at 40-41. 
209   H Ault “The International Tax Policy Challenges Facing President-Elect Clinton” (1992)  
Nov 16 Tax Notes Int’l at 1021; PW Oosterhuis “The Cost of Deferral’s Repeal: If Done 
Properly, It Loses Billions” (1993) Tax Notes at 765. 
210   Avi-Yonah at 223. 
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ITS TAX TREATIES 
 
It has been discussed above that the applicability of CFC legislation may be 
challenged in some countries for being in conflict with its double taxation treaties. 
This however depends on whether it is the country’s CFC legislation or its tax 
treaties that take precedence.211 Thus where a country’s treaties are considered 
paramount to domestic legislation in the event of a conflict, the domestic law 
cannot override the treaty in the absence of specific treaty-override provisions.212 
The CFC legislation may also not be applied, if the respective tax treaty does not 
contain a safeguarding clause that expressly and explicitly authorises that the 
CFC legislation may be applied.213   
 
When a treaty has been signed between the United States and a treaty partner, 
the President submits the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent by a 
two-thirds majority. Approval by the House of Representatives is not required.214 
Some treaties become operative as domestic legislation in the United Sates only 
upon enactment of enabling legislation. Such treaties require majority approval in 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. However, other treaties, 
including tax treaties, are “self executing” in that they do not require separate 
enabling legislation in order to become operative as domestic law. These treaties 
become operative upon approval by the Senate and the subsequent exchange of 
the instruments of ratification of the two governments.215 
 
The legal status and relationship of domestic legislation and tax treaties is 
governed by the Constitution of the United States of America.216 Article VI(2) of 
                                                 
211   Sandler at 54 and at 99.  
212   See International Fiscal Association (IFA), proceedings of a seminar held in Toronto, 
Canada, in 1994 during the 48th Congress of the IFA How Domestic Anti-Avoidance 
Rules Affect Double Taxation Conventions (1995) at 24; Sandler at 54. 
213   Sandler at 99. 
214   Sanlder at 52. 
215   Sanlder at 52. 
216   The Constitution of the United States is the oldest Federal constitution in existence and 
was framed by a convention of delegates from twelve of the thirteen original states in 
Philadelphia in May 1787, Rhode Island failing to send a delegate. The Constitution is the 
landmark legal document of the United States. The Constitution comprises the primary law 
of the U.S. Federal Government. It also describes the three chief branches of the Federal 
Government and their jurisdictions. In addition, it lays out the basic rights of citizens of the 
United States. 
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the Constitution provides that federal legislation and treaties to which the United 
States is a party, as well as the Constitution are the supreme law of the land. 
Thus statues and treaties have equal status under the Constitution.217 This 
implies that treaties and domestic legislation have to be interpreted in the same 
manner as two federal statutes. If there is a conflict between the two, a rule of 
statutory construction that is applied is that a latter statute will be construed as 
repealing an earlier one, but only to the extent of the repugnancy. Thus, a federal 
statute is binding on the courts even if it conflicts with a previous treaty, while a 
statue will give way to a subsequent self-executing treaty.218   
 
There are a number of provisions in the Internal Revenue Code and in tax 
treaties to which the United States is a party that operate to limit conflicts 
between treaties and the Internal Revenue Code. The United States has in its 
domestic legislation the doctrine of “treaty override” that authorises the revenue 
authorities to disregard the terms of a double taxation agreement where tax 
avoidance is anticipated.219  Section 7852(d) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code 
provides that no provision of the Code would apply in any case in which its 
application would be contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States in 
effect on the date of the enactment of the Code. The Revenue Act 1962, which 
contained the subpart F of the Code (that was introduced in 1962), provided that 
section 7852(d) was not applicable in respect to any amendment made by that 
Act. There was a concern that the subpart F provisions and other legislation then 
introduced construed a breach of certain tax treaties entered into by the United 
States. This obviously represents a change from the provision in the 1954 
Internal Revenue Code, which suggested that treaties were considered 
paramount.220 
 
The United States also has other provisions that limit conflicts between treaties 
and the Internal Revenue Code. The United States maintains the position that its 
double tax treaties exist for the benefit of non-resident aliens only, not residents 
                                                 
217   Sandler at 52. 
218   Cook v US, 288 US 102 (1933), p.120 as read from Sandler at 52. 
219 R Rohatgi Basic International Taxation (2002) at 372; M Hampton Offshore Interface: Tax 
Havens in the Global Economy (1996) at 12. 
220   Sandler at 53. 
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or (citizens) of the United States.221 The United States has a “Model Income Tax 
Convention” on which its double taxation agreements are based.222 The “savings 
clause” found in virtually all tax treaties concluded by the United States, subject 
to certain exceptions (such as the foreign tax credit that deals with the relief of 
double taxation) provides that the United States may tax its citizens and 
residents as though the treaty had not come into effect.223 This is intended to limit 
the impact of the treaty provisions on domestic law to non-resident aliens (those 
that are resident in the other contracting state).224  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.7 CHALLENGES E-COMMERCE POSES TO THE UNITED STATES CFC 
LEGISLATION  
 
The United Sates treasury observed in its 1996 report on e-commerce225 that if 
CFCs can engage in extensive commerce, information and services through 
websites or computer networks located in a tax haven, it may become 
increasingly difficult to enforce subpart F legislation, because e-commerce 
makes it difficulty to verify the identity of the taxpayer to whom foreign base 
company sales income accrues, and the amount of such income. Treasury noted 
that it may be necessary to revise subpart F and the regulations under it, in order 
to take these new types of transaction into account.  
                                                 
221   IFA proceedings of a seminar held in Toronto at 24; Sandler at 54. 
222   United States Model Income Tax Convention (15 November 2006). Available at 
>http://www.ustreas.gov/press/release/reports/hp16801.pdf<, last accessed 13 July 2007. 
L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 7.  
223   For example article 1(4) of the United States/South Africa treaty provides inter alia that 
notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, the United States may tax its residents 
and citizens as if the Convention had not come into effect. See Government Gazette No 
18553 of 15 December 1997. 
224   Sandler at 54. 
225   United States Treasury Department (Office of Tax policy) “Selected Tax Policy 
Implications of Global Electronic Commerce” (1996) in par 7.3.5. Available at 
>http://jya.com/taxpolicy.htm<, last accessed 8 November 2007. 
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The treasury report also noted that, apart from the enforcement challenges, e-
commerce has implications for the content and scope of the subpart F rules. 
These rules were enacted in the 1960s, when the foreign business paradigm was 
a manufacturing plant and jurisdiction to tax was based on where transactions or 
activities took place. With e-commerce, new forms of offering services, such as 
Internet access, video conferencing and remote order processing, have 
emerged. These make it difficult to assign a place of performance, a factor that is 
relevant with respect to CFC rules. Similarly, it may be difficult to ascertain a 
place of use, consumption or disposition for the sale of digitised products, such 
as images and computer software that are delivered electronically.226 These new 
technologies increase opportunities for CFCs to be incorporated in low-tax or no-
tax jurisdictions, as they increase the ease with which employees of a CFC can 
be located outside the CFC’s jurisdiction of incorporation, and they also increase 
the ease with which certain products and services can be provided to a CFC.227 
The new technologies also allow CFCs to provide services to customers located 
outside their jurisdiction of incorporation with relative ease. E-commerce also 
poses challenges in respect of the classification or identification of the nature of 
income arising from transactions. Subpart F provisions have different rules for 
different types of income. In certain circumstances, it may be unclear whether 
payments for digitised products are treated as payments for a good, a right or a 
service.228 
 
Doernberg and his co-authors229 note that for a country like the United States, 
which applies its CFC legislation on ”tainted income” (ie passive income or base 
company income) in relation to related parties,230 it may be difficult to determine 
what tainted income is, in the e-commerce era. If a CFC purchases software 
from a related party and sells it to customers in another country, the CFC would 
                                                 
226   United States Treasury Report (1996) in par 7.3.5.  
227   AR Myerson “Ideas and Trends: Virtual Migrants; Need Programmers? Surf Abroad” 
(1998) 18 January New York Times at 4; JS Hiller & R Cohen Internet Law and Policy 
(2002) at 265.  
228   United States Treasury Report (1996) in par 7.3.5. 
229   RL Doernberg, L Hinnekens, W Hellerstein & J Li Electronic Commerce and 
Multijurisdictional Taxation (2001) at 333. 
230   Bittker & Lokken at 69-12. 
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generate tainted income and the CFC rules may be applied. But where the 
employees of a CFC develop software which is then sold to customers in another 
country, the income may not be treated as tainted income under the CFC rules, 
since the CFC is not itself purchasing the software from a related party but rather 
is developing the software.231  
 
In terms of section 954(d) of the Code, selling goods to a CFC in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, for resale to a high-tax jurisdiction, creates “foreign base company 
sales income” that is subject to the CFC rules. However, if the goods are 
completely transformed, this provision may not apply. Consider a CFC in a tax-
haven jurisdiction that acquires software programmes from its parent company in 
the United States, which it copies and provides to its customers, delivering the 
final software product abroad by encoding the programme on a compact ROM 
disc, or delivering the programme by downloading it to the customer’s computer. 
It becomes difficult to determine whether the CFC merely resold the programme 
or if it manufactured a new product.232 Well advised tax payers may use similar 
scenarios and add value to their projects in order to escape the CFC provisions.  
Despite the above, the United States noted in the “Framework for Global 
Electronic Commerce”,233 that e-commerce is still in the early stages of its 
development, so it should not be unnecessarily regulated, as this would distort its 
development. Government attempts to regulate e-commerce are likely to be 
outmoded by the time enactments made; especially to the extent such 
regulations are technology specific. It was thus recommended that governments 
should refrain from imposing new and unnecessary regulations, bureaucratic 
procedures, or taxes and tariffs on commercial activities that take place via the 
Internet.234 “In addition, the United States believes that no new taxes should be 
imposed on Internet commerce and that its taxation should be consistent with the 
                                                 
231   S 954(d) of the Code; see also Doernberg et al at 333; A Maguire & L Anolik “Subpart F 
and Source of Income Issues in E-Commerce” (23 October 2000) Tax Notes International 
at 1935; A Tillinghast “Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Federal Income Tax Issues in 
the Establishment of a Software Operation in a Tax Haven” (1999) 4 Florida Tax Review 
at 339. 
232   Westin at 474; Doernberg et al at 333. 
233 The White House “A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce” (1 July 1997). Available 
at >http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm<, last accessed on 4 June 
2007. See also Hiller & Cohen at 256. 
234   The White House at 3. 
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established principles of international taxation, should avoid inconsistent national 
tax jurisdictions and double taxation, and should be simple to administer and 
easy to understand.”235  In this respect, it was stated that any taxation of internet 
sales should follow these principles: 
It should neither distort nor hinder commerce. No tax system should discriminate among 
types of commerce, nor should it create incentives that will change the nature or location 
of transactions 
 
The system should be simple and transparent. It should be capable of capturing the 
overwhelming majority of appropriate revenues, be easy to implement, and minimize 
burdensome record keeping and costs for all taxpayers 
 
The system should be able to accommodate tax systems used by the United States and 
our international partners today. Wherever feasible, we should look to existing taxation 
concepts and principles to achieve these goals.236  
 
From the above, the challenge for countries is to adapt their tax legislation to 
accommodate the new technological developments. 
 
5.2.8 HOW THE COMPLEXITY OF THE UNITED STATES’ CFC 
LEGISLATION AFFECTS ITS EFFECTIVENESS   
 
A task force set up in 2006 to report on the efficacy of the United States 
                                                 
235   The White House at 4. 
236  In response to these challenges that are international in nature, in 1997, the OECD held a 
conference in Turku, Finland, and called on countries to co-operate and begin formulating 
a policy on the taxation of e-commerce. See OECD “Dismantling the Barriers to Global 
Electronic Commerce” (November 1997). Available at > 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_34223_2751231_1_1_1_1,00.html<, 
last accessed on 4 June 2007. As a follow up, another conference was held in Ottawa in 
1998, where it was suggested that e-commerce should not be subjected to a new form of 
taxation, but that existing tax rules should be amended to cater for the taxation of e-
commerce. See OECD Ministerial Conference on Electronic Commerce: Ottawa Canada 
“A Borderless World” (October 1998). Available at 
>http://www.ottawaoecdconference.org/English/conference-program/agenda.pdf<, last 
accessed on 4 June 2007. It was agreed that the taxation principles which are applied for 
conventional commerce (neutrality, efficiency, certainty and simplicity, effectiveness and 
fairness, and the flexibility of taxation) should also apply to the taxation of e-commerce. 
Further, that in taxing e-commerce transactions, the fiscal sovereignty of countries should 
be maintained, so that each country is able to protect its tax base and at the same time be 
able to avoid double taxation and unintentional non-taxation of e-commerce transactions. 
In 2001, the OECD Global Forum noted that e-commerce is a global phenomenon 
affecting a large percentage of world trade and therefore it required a global solution. It 
was suggested that there was need for dialogue between governments and businesses to 
build up international consensus on the taxation of e-commerce, where e-commerce 
flourishes and also where national sovereignty and neutrality of taxation is maintained. 
See OECD 6th Global Forum “Taxation Aspects of E-commerce: Addressing the 
Challenges and Opportunities” (September 2001). Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/42/2349701.pps#279,1,6th Annual Global Forum<, last 
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international tax laws stated that the workings of the components of subpart F 
income are very complicated.237 Each type of income is complicated with 
exclusions that are not so easy to understand. This is further complicated by 
certain exceptions to the exclusions that make the legislation difficult to interpret 
in practice. Apart from the exclusions complicated by exceptions, there are also 
numerous elections that increase complexity and compliance burdens for 
taxpayers. The task force noted that simplification will not be achieved in the 
absence of policy changes that restrict the degree of electivity in these rules.238  
 
The task force recommended the most effective way to reduce the burden of 
complexity is to reduce the number of elections that could in some cases be the 
driving force behind numerous tax planning schemes.239 An example of some of 
the elective rules that complicates the United Sates CFC legislation, and opens a 
door for tax avoidance, is the Check-the-Box Regulations that were discussed 
above.240 The United States legislators have amended and added to the 
legislation  several  times,  slowly  decreasing  the  ability of residents to defer  
income earned offshore.241 However, it has been noted that most of the 
amendments to the legislation over the past years have been stop-gap 
responses to perceived abuses without significant consideration of underlying 
policies.242 An example is the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which as 
discussed above,243 afforded the greatest benefits to multinational industries that 
have substantial offshore assets and operations.244 
 
It has been noted that, although numerous revisions have been made to the 
United States international tax system, these have only made the system more 
complex without significantly eliminating the problems caused by the deferral of 
                                                                                                                                            
accessed on 4 June 2007.  
237   Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform 59 Tax Lawyer (2006) at 662. 
Available at >http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubs/taskforceintltaxreform.pdf<, last accessed on 
15 August 2007. 
238   Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform at 662. 
239   Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform at 662. 
240   See the discussion in par 5.2.4 above under the heading “Hybrid Entity Techniques”. 
241   RM Bird “Shaping a New International Tax Order” 42 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation (1988) at 296). 
242   Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform at 662. 
243  See par 5.2.4 above under the heading “The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004”. 
244  Peroni et al at 508.  
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taxes.245 The end product of this legislative process has been ineffectiveness, 
since deferral has been left largely intact, thus encouraging United States 
taxpayers to shift their operations abroad to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, but 
requiring that a taxpayer navigate through a number of anti-deferral hurdles to 
attain that result. Moreover, the current rules make deferral elective for the well-
advised United States taxpayers, thus undermining taxpayer confidence in the 
fairness and efficiency of the tax system. It is thus contended that the whole 
system is more complicated, susceptible of tax abuse, and economically 
inefficient.246 
 
Commentators on this state of affairs are of the view that the complexity in the 
United States anti-deferral legislation can be resolved by amending the 
legislation to end deferral on all kinds of income, instead of the legislation ending 
deferral mainly for passive income and base company income.247 This would 
imply that each United States person owning stock in a foreign corporation, 
would be required to currently include a pro rata share of such income or 
expenses, in computing United States tax liability. Then, a foreign tax credit 
would be granted for income derived from other countries .248 It is argued that an 
approach that ends deferral for all types of income would significantly simplify the 
legislation, as all taxpayers would be subject to a foreign tax credit and taxed 
currently.249  
 
As pointed out above, apart from the CFC rules, the United Sates also has other 
anti-deferral provisions, such as the “passive foreign investment company” rules, 
and section 1248 of the Code, that were discussed above.250 The problem with 
this proliferation of anti-deferral regimes is that they often overlap, and taxpayers 
have to go through each of them for its potential application. Each regime is 
complicated by exceptions that require many hours of study. Avi-Yonah251 
suggests that significant simplification would be achieved, if deferral was 
                                                 
245   Peroni et al at 508. 
246  Peroni et al at 508; see also Sweitzer at 7. 
247   Boise at 6; Peroni et al at 498. 
248  Boise at 5; McDaniel et al at 127; Peroni et al at 498. 
249  McDaniel et al at 127. 
250  See par 5.2.2 above. 
251  Avi-Yonah at 223. 
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abandoned and a unified regime adopted that would subject all United States 
shareholders to current taxation on their holdings.  
 
5.2.9 PARTNERSHIPS/CORPORATE HYBRID ENTITIES: THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
United States income tax laws generally recognise only two types of business 
entities: corporations and partnerships.252 Subpart F rules are largely premised 
on the assumption that for non-tax reasons, business will be carried on in a 
corporate form. This makes it possible to avoid these provisions by using 
planning techniques that exploit their corporate focus.253 Planning techniques 
have been encouraged by measures such as the United States “Check-the-Box 
Regulations” that were introduced in 1996. These regulations have allowed 
United States multinational enterprises to significantly reduce the effective rates 
of tax on their non-United States income, thus facilitating tax avoidance 
techniques that generally involve the use of hybrid entities.254 Hybrid entities are 
entities that are recognised as corporations under foreign tax laws, but are 
partnerships or disregarded entities for United States tax purposes.255 By 
exploiting the differences in the United States tax treatment of corporations and 
disregarded entities, as well as differences in entity classification among different 
countries, a United States person is able to deflect operating income from a high-
tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction while avoiding the application of subpart F 
                                                 
252  L Lokken “What Happened to Subpart F? US CFC Legislation after the Check-The-Box 
Regulation” (2005) 7 Florida Tax Review at 194. 
253  United States Treasury Department Policy Study “The Deferral Of Income Earned 
Through US Controlled Foreign Corporations” Tax Analyst 2001 TNT 1-1 at 63, Doc 2001-
492 (Dec 29, 2000). Also accessible on > http:// www.treasury.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/subpartf.pdf> accessed 10 Sep 2006.  
254  TD 8697, 61 Fed Reg 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996); RJ Peroni, C Fleming & SE Shay “Getting 
Serious About Curtailing Deferral of United States Tax on Foreign Source Income” (2005) 
52 SMU Law Review at 515-516; R Altshuler & H Gruber “The Three Parties in The Race 
to the Bottom: Host Government, Home Governments and Multinational Companies” 
Florida Tax Review (2005) 7 at 158 state that the Check-the-Box regulations gave 
companies the freedom to either  identify an entity as a separate corporation or to 
”disregard” it as an unincorporated branch of another corporation by simply checking the 
box on a tax form. See also Lokken at 195; US Treasury Department Policy Study at 6; 
see also Bittker & Lokken in par 69.13.1 at 69-88. 
255  Bittker & Lokken in par 65.3.6 at 65-55; also in par 69.13.1; RS Avi-Yonah “To End 
Deferral As We Know It: Simplification Potential Of Check-The-Box” (1997) 74 Tax Notes 
at 219; Kleinfeld & Smith par 86:2.4; CR Sweitzer “Analysing Subpart F in Light of Check-
The- Box” (2005) 20 Akron Tax Journal at 7-8 .  
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rules.256 The United Sates Treasury Department257 uses this example to explain 
this situation: A United States person wholly owns a CFC in Country A, a high tax 
jurisdiction. To deflect operating income from Country A to country B, a low tax 
jurisdiction, the United States person could cause the CFC to establish an entity 
in country B that would be treated as a corporation in Country A but would be 
disregarded for United States tax purposes. The United States person would 
then cause the hybrid entity to make a loan to the CFC. Because Country A 
treats the hybrid entity as a corporation, the interest payments from the CFC to 
the hybrid would be deductible in Country A and therefore, would reduce the 
amount of CFC operating income that would have been subject to high tax in 
country A. Because Country B is a low tax jurisdiction, the interest payments 
received by the hybrid from the CFC would be subject to little tax or to no tax in 
Country B. Since the United States would treat the hybrid as a disregarded entity 
for United States tax purposes, the taxpayer would take the position that the 
interest payment between the CFC and the hybrid should be disregarded for 
United States tax purposes and thus not be part of subpart F income.258 
 
The check-the-box regulations have facilitated these arrangements, because 
they often allow a foreign entity to be treated, at the taxpayer’s election, as a 
corporation, or as a branch or a partnership. For example, taxpayers can elect to 
treat entities organised under foreign equivalents of the United States limited 
liability company laws as branches or partnerships for United States tax 
purposes, even if they are taxed as separate corporate entities under foreign 
laws.259 These regulations are inconsistent with the policies and rules which are 
intended to prevent the shifting of passive income to lower tax jurisdictions for tax 
avoidance purposes.260 
 
The United States is one of the few countries which has adopted a provision in its 
Model tax treaty and domestic legislation dealing with the application of double 
                                                 
256  US Treasury Department Policy Study (2000) at 63. 
257  US Treasury Department Policy Study (2000) at 63; See other examples described by 
Lokken at 198-199 and also by Bittker & Lokken at 69-87. 
258  US Treasury Department Policy Study (2000) at 63.  
259  Bittker & Lokken in par 69.13.1 at 69-87.  
260  Bittker & Lokken in par 69.13.1 at 69-88.  
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tax conventions to hybrid entities.261 Broadly, this adopts a “flow-through” 
approach.262 Article 4(1)(d) of the 1996 United States Model Convention states 
that:263  
An item of income, profit or gain derived through an entity that is fiscally transparent 
under the laws of either Contracting State shall be considered to be derived by a 
resident of a State to the extent that the item is treated for the purposes of the 
taxation law of such Contracting State as the income, profit or gain or a resident.  
 
 
 
5.2.10  CURBING CONDUIT COMPANY TREATY SHOPPING: THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
The United States makes use of its domestic anti-avoidance provisions such as 
the “substance over form” doctrine264 and the requirement of “business purpose” 
in order to disregard treaty shopping schemes. The United States also has 
specific anti-conduit provisions in its domestic law that are designed to curb 
treaty shopping. Under section 7701(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has authority to re-characterise certain conduit 
arrangements to determine their true nature.265 For instance certain, conduit 
financing arrangements, such as back-to-back loans,266 that are utilised in 
stepping-stone conduits,267 can be disregarded and re-characterised as direct 
                                                 
261  See the Regulations under the Internal Revenue Code s.894(c). 
262  See P Baker “The Application of the Convention to Partnerships, Trusts and Other, Non-
corporate Entities”. Available at 
>http://www.taxbar.com/documents/application_convention_pb_000.pdf<, last accessed 
21 April 2007. 
263  See also article 1(8) of the UK/US Double Taxation Convention of 24th July 2001. 
264 J Ware  & P Roper P Offshore Insight (2001) at 77, the “substance over form” permits 
the tax authorities to ignore the legal form of a tax arrangement and look at the actual 
substance of the relevant transaction.  
265 RA Westin International Taxation of Electronic Commerce (2000) at 403. 
266  See WH Diamond & DB Diamond Tax Havens of the World (Release No. 108 Jan 2002) 
vol. 1 2 at glossary 1, where the term “back-to-back loans”, is used to describe a situation 
where funds are deposited by a subsidiary incorporated in a tax haven as collateral for a 
loan to another foreign subsidiary. Interest earned on the time deposit accumulates free of 
tax while in many locations the interest expense of the borrower qualifies as a tax 
deduction. 
267  After setting up a conduit company structure, “stepping stone” strategies can be applied 
to shift income from the contracting countries. These strategies involve changing the 
nature of the income to appear as tax deductible expenses such as commission of 
service fees. An example is the use of “back-to-back” loans. See FJ Wurm Treaty 
Shopping in the 1992 OECD Model Convention Intertax (1992) at 658; SM Haug “The 
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loans.268 In the case of Aiken industries, Inc v Commissioner 56 TC 925 (1971)269 
this result was achieved by interpreting the treaty by reference to its intentions 
which did not include exploitation of conduit entities. The fact of the case were 
that an intermediary company resident in Honduras that received interest from a 
related United States borrower and paid over a matching amount of interest to a 
parent company organised in a non-treaty  country that could not claim the 
benefit of the treaty between United States and Honduras. Virtually all of the 
intermediary’s assets consisted of loans to the parent‘s other subsidiaries and 
the intermediary paid over virtually all its income back to the third country. 
Because of the intermediary’s offsetting obligation to its parent, the United States 
tax court concluded that the intermediary never had dominion and control over 
the interest it received from the United States borrower and was nothing more 
than a mere collection agent.270  
 
Apart from the above, section 894(c) of the IRC disallows treaty withholding tax 
reductions where the ultimate beneficiary is not resident in either of the 
contracting countries.271 The United States may also curb treaty shopping by 
applying the provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.  
Under section 342 thereof, the IRS must establish procedures to limit the 
advantage of reduced withholding tax rates under income tax treaties to only 
those entitled to the treaty benefits. A certificate of residence has to be filled, in 
which the holder has to state under oath that he is entitled to the reduced rate of 
withholding tax.272 Taxpayers claiming tax benefits under a United States tax 
treaty must file a tax return with the IRS disclosing the “treaty-based return 
position”. This implies that the taxpayer must compare the tax liability to be 
                                                                                                                                            
United States Policy of Stringent Anti-treaty shopping Provisions: A Comparative 
Analysis” (1996) 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Trans-national law at 196; E Tomsett Tax 
planning for Multinational companies (1989) at 149; BJ Arnold & MJ McIntyre 
International Tax Premier (2002) at 114-115. 
268 R Rohatgi Basic International Taxation (2002) at 371; see also International Fiscal 
Association The OECD Model Convention - 1998 and Beyond; The Concept of 
Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties (2000) at 29. 
269 As quoted by Westin at 400. 
270 International Fiscal Association’s 2000 Report on The OECD Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership in Tax Treaties at 28. 
271 MWE Glautier & FW Bassinger A Reference Guide to International Taxation: Profiting 
from Your International Operations (1987) at 228. 
272 C Doggart “Tax Havens and Their Uses” (1990) Special Report No 1191 The Economist 
Publication at 95; Rohatgi at 371. 
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reported on the taxpayer’s return and the tax liability that would be reported if the 
relevant treaty position did not exist. The difference is the reportable “treaty-
based return position” and a reporting must be made.273 
 
In its tax treaties, the United States insists on using the “limitation of benefits” 
(LOB) provision to curb conduit company treaty shopping. As discussed above, 
the LOB is one of the provisions recommended by the OECD for curbing conduit 
company treaty shopping. The purpose of the LOB provision is to lay down 
objective factors to determine whether a conduit entity was incorporated in one of 
the contracting states solely to obtain treaty benefits or whether sound 
commercial reasons exist for its incorporation. In essence, minimum 
requirements are laid down with which an entity must comply before it is entitled 
to treaty benefits.274 For example, the LOB clause in the double taxation treaty 
between South African and the United States makes it difficult, if not impossible, 
to use South Africa as a conduit to avoid United States withholding taxes on 
dividends.275 
 
The United States has been known to employ very strict measures where its 
treaties are used to encourage treaty shopping. For instance, the United States 
terminated its treaty with Malta due to its concern over domestic law changes in 
Malta which could result in persons which are not residents of either of the 
contracting states claiming treaty benefits.276 
 
5.2.11 CONCLUSION  
 
Internationally, CFC legislation is largely prophylactic, which is why there are 
very few cases relating to the legislation. Taxpayers generally plan their affairs to 
avoid the application of the provisions, rather than risk a case questioning 
whether their particular activities fall within the scope of the provisions, let alone 
a case questioning the validity of the provisions themselves.277 
                                                 
273 Diamond & Diamond at INTRO-12. 
274  Olivier & Honiball at 424. 
275  Olivier & Honiball at 267. 
276  P Kallaa “A Study of Article XXIX A of the Canada-US Tax Treaty: The Limitation of 
Benefits Article” 2002 Canadian Tax Journal 2219 at 2221. 
277  Sandler at xix. 
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In order to determine the effectiveness of any country’s CFC legislation, it is 
necessary to evaluate it against the fundamental criteria of a good tax policy.  
These include: meeting revenue needs in an equitable manner, promoting 
economic welfare, minimising compliance and administrative burdens, and 
conforming to international norms as far as possible.278 
 
The core objective of any tax system is to raise revenue to fund government 
functions and services. A perception of unfairness can undermine the willingness 
of taxpayers to comply voluntarily with a tax system.279 For a tax system to raise 
revenue effectively, taxpayers must believe that the tax burden is being equitably 
distributed.280 This requires that some form of anti-deferral regime is necessary to 
prevent taxpayers from using tax avoidance techniques involving foreign 
corporations to reduce the tax on their income from foreign investment.  
 
The rationale for CFC legislation is to reduce the potential inequity by limiting the 
ability of taxpayers to reduce or eliminate taxes on income from foreign 
investment. In order to promote the goal of equity, income from domestic and 
foreign investment should be taxed at a similar rate, in order to promote 
efficiency and economic welfare.  This is achieved by reducing the disparities in 
tax rates between income earned from investments in foreign countries and 
income earned from investments in the home country.281 The principle of “capital 
export neutrality” discussed in chapter 4 requires structuring taxes, so that they 
are neutral and do not cause investors to favour domestic or foreign investment. 
This is the best policy for promoting economic welfare. Where the deferral of 
foreign income does not result in the same tax treatment or tax rate for both 
foreign and domestic investment, the result is economic inefficacy.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 4,282 a good tax policy should also be simple and easy 
                                                 
278  United States Treasury Department Policy Study at 82. 
279   United States Treasury Department Policy Study at 82. 
280   PA Harris Corporate/Shareholder Income Taxation and Allocating Taxing Rights between 
Countries: A Comparison of Imputation Systems (1996) at 10. 
281   United States Treasury Department Policy Study at 84; Harris at 7. 
282   See chapter 4 par 4.9. 
306 
 
 
 
to administer.283 In almost all jurisdictions, CFC legislation is complex and difficult 
to administer. The challenge is to explore avenues for simplifying this legislation, 
so as to facilitate compliance and minimise administrative costs for taxpayers 
and government respectively. However, care should be taken that legislation is 
not over-simplified to the extent that it is easily taken advantage of by 
sophisticated taxpayers. 
 
 
A good tax policy should be in harmony with international norms so as to 
preclude double taxation or non-taxation of income.284  Limiting deferral through 
CFC rules is consistent with international norms, but care should be taken that a 
country’s CFC rules do not conflict with its tax treaties. 
 
With respect to curbing tax avoidance that results from investing in offshore 
partnership/corporate hybride entities, the discussion above has shown that both 
the United Kingdom and the Unitied States have come up with specific provisions 
in their tax treaties that deal with the application of the relevant treaties to 
partnership/corporate hybrid entities. 
 
With respect to conduit company treaty shopping, the discussion above has 
shown that the United Kingdom applies the “beneficial ownership” provision to 
curb the ensuing tax avoidance. It was held in Indofood International Finance Ltd 
v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, London Branch,285 that the term “beneficial 
ownership” should be accorded an international fiscal meaning, taking into 
account the OECD literature and that the meaning should not be restricted to the 
domestic law of the contracting states. The discussion above has also shown 
that Unitied States applies various statutory provisions to curb treaty shopping. In 
its tax treaties, the United States insists on using the “limitation of benefits” 
provision to curb conduit company treaty shopping. 
                                                 
283   United States Treasury Department Policy Study at 84. 
284  United States Treasury Department Policy Study at 85. 
285  [2006] EWCA CV 158 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE “TRUST” CONCEPT: WHY TRUSTS ARE IDEAL FOR OFFSHORE 
TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2000, it was estimated that about 60% of the world’s transactions took place 
offshore.1 It is further estimated that more than 40% of these transactions are 
done via trusts. This implies that more than 24% of the world’s wealth is held in 
offshore trusts.2 In other words, a quarter of the world’s funds are housed in 
offshore trusts.3 The formation of offshore trusts is becoming increasingly popular 
with South African residents, and there are a significant number of South 
Africans who have set up trusts offshore in which the majority of beneficiaries are 
resident in South Africa.4 
 
There are various reasons for setting up such trusts: for instance, non-resident 
trusts could be used for estate planning purposes, to protect assets from 
creditors, to avoid exchange control regulations, as a hedge against the 
devaluation of the currency and political uncertainty, to build up funds to finance 
children’s education, as a vehicle for overseas retirement funds, and also to 
make it easier to engage in international transactions.5 When a trust is set up in a 
low-tax jurisdiction, this often results in some tax advantages that the founder’s 
                                                 
1 PEW Roper “Investing in the Offshore Market Place” (June 2000) Insurance and Tax 
Journal at 7 (“Roper 2000”). 
2 R King & B Victor Law and Estates Planning Easiguide (2006/2007) in par 16; J 
Christensen “Tackling Dirty Money: Illicit Capital flight and Tax Evasion” (World Social 
Forum - Bamako, Mali. 19-23 January 2006) at 5. Available at 
>http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/World_Social_Forum_at_Bamako_-_JEC_-
_Jan_2006.pdf<, last accessed 3 July 2007. 
3 J Ware & PEW Roper ”The World of Offshore Sham Trusts” (1999) Insurance and Tax 
Journal  in par 1 (“Ware & Roper 1999”) see also PEW Roper “Getting to Grips with 
Offshore Trusts” (December 1998) Insurance and Tax Journal at 5 (“Roper 1998”). 
4 T Mhlongo “The Efficacy of Trusts in the Current Legislative Climate” (2002) Insurance 
and Tax Journal 9. 
5 RP Van der Westhuisen & MM Pace Wills and Trusts (2005) at 1; A Kaplan Trusts in 
Prime Jurisdictions (2000) at 27; A Duncan “Hidden Assets” (2004) De Rebus 30; RB 
Whitfield “A Guide to Offshore Trusts and International Financial Planning” The 
Accountant. Available at >http://www.eagletraders.com/books/guide_offshore_trusts.htm<, 
last accessed on 24 May 2007.  
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country of residence may curtail.6 The focus of this research is the tax savings 
that can be achieved by investing in offshore/non-resident trusts. 
 
As will be discussed in more detail further on in this chapter, in South Africa, a 
trust is a taxable entity.7 However, if a trust is formed in an offshore jurisdiction, 
South Africa cannot tax its income, unless it is distributed to resident 
beneficiaries. But if an offshore trust is effectively managed in South Africa, in 
that the trustees carry out the day-to-day management of the trust in the 
Republic, South Africa may apply the residence basis of taxation to tax the world-
wide income of that trust.8 A discussion on the effective taxation of offshore trusts 
in South Africa requires an understanding of the trust concept from a South 
African perspective. It is also necessary to describe the various types of trusts, in 
order to determine which types are prevalent for offshore tax avoidance. 
Effective taxation of offshore trusts also requires an understanding of the general 
features of trusts that encourage tax avoidance. In addition to these features, 
offshore trusts have other unique features that encourage country residents to 
avoid taxes by investing in offshore trusts. These aspects are discussed below.  
 
6.2 THE ORIGIN OF THE TRUST CONCEPT AND ITS INCORPORATION 
INTO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
The concept of a trust appears to have originated in feudal times in England, but 
now it is recognised and employed in most legal systems in the world.9 Trusts 
were created in order to protect the interests of landowners during their 
prolonged absence on the military crusades that were undertaken out of 
mediaeval England between the 11th and 13th centuries.10 In order to finance 
these military crusades, the king had to prescribe a military tax and make other 
                                                 
6 PH Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts 10 ed (2006) at 16; Duncan at 30; Roper (2000) at 
4. See also M Ramjohn Cases and Materials on Trusts 3 ed (2004) at 18.   
7   See the discussion in par 6.8 below. 
8   See the discussion in par 6.8 below. 
9   E Cameron, M De Waal, B Wunsh and P Solomon Honore’s South African Law of Trusts 5 
ed (2002) at 2-3. 
10 Pettit at 12; J Duddington Essentials of Equity and Trust Law (2006) at 64; AW Scott, WF 
Fratcher, ML Ascher Scott and Ascher on Trusts 5 ed (2006) at 5; JE Penner The Law of 
Trusts (2006) at 9 and at 12; F Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 
(2002) 16-17; MM Corbett “Trust Law in the 90’s: Challenges and Change” (1993) Tydskrif 
vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg at 262-263. 
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demands on landowners in return for land grants, thus making land an important 
bargaining commodity worthy of protection. If a crusader did not return, the King 
would dispossess his family of the land. In order to protect property (such as 
land) against the sovereign king, a  practice developed of placing fixed property 
in a trust under the name and care of a trusted friend (feoffee - trustee), to be 
held for the benefit of another.  This enabled the landowner to evade some of the 
feudal dues which fell on the person seized of the land.11 From an early stage of 
their development these trusts, known as “uses”, became a means of reducing 
exposure to the tax liability imposed by the king.12 Although the English common 
law courts did not at first recognise “uses”,13 the Court of Chancery (which was 
headed by the Chancellor and dispensed a system of justice based on equity) 
could often be relied on to declare an “equitable interest” in the property on 
petition by the beneficial owners.14 
 
The formation of trusts gained ground after the arrival of the Franciscan monks in 
England. These monks used trusts as a vehicle to enable them to hold and enjoy 
property donated to them, while vesting the beneficial interests in the local 
community - on the grounds that their religious vows prevented them from 
owning land in their own names. By the 16th century, “uses” were commonplace 
and large areas of land in England were held in use by religious interests. 
Because the king was losing so much revenue in the form of feudal dues through 
the device of the ”use”, in 1535 the Statute of Uses was passed to limit this 
practice. This Statute outlawed ”uses” for land ownership and as a result, the 
church was dispossessed of its trusteeship of substantial amounts of land in 
England.15 However, in the 17th and 18th centuries, the trust again emerged as a 
method of custodianship and distribution of assets upon the death of the settlor.16 
                                                 
11 Pettit at 13; Ramjohn at 2. 
12 G Watt Trusts 2 ed (2006) at 6-7; N Stockwell & R Edwards Trusts and Equity 7 ed (2005) 
at 14-15; Pettit at 12; Penner at 12. 
13 Ramjohn at 3. 
14 Pettit at 13; Penner at 1; Stockwell & Edwards at 6; Watt at 7; Duddington at 65; R Pearce 
& J Stevens The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 4 ed (2006) at 4; MJ De Waal 
”The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of English, Scotish and South African Trusts 
Compared” (2000) South African Law Journal  at 552-554 (”De Waal 2000 SALJ”); King & 
Victor in par 16.1.1; Du Toit at 16-17; L Theron Die Besighelstrust (1990) at 11 (“Theron 
1990”) at 14. 
15 Duddington at 66; Pettit at 13; Watt at 7; Stockwell & Edwards at 7; Du Toit at 16-17; De 
Waal 2000 SALJ at 552-554. 
16 Watt at 6-7; Du Toit at 16-17; Corbett at 262-263; De Waal 2000 SALJ at 552-554. 
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The concept of a trust was unknown in Roman-Dutch law (ie the South African 
common law). The trust concept was imported into South African law by common 
usage after the British occupation of the Cape in 1806.17 However, the South 
African courts had difficulty explaining the trust concept from Roman-Dutch law 
principles. For instance, in Estate Kemp v Mc Donald’s Trustees,18 the first South 
African case in which the validity of a trust had to be determined, it was held that 
the English law of trusts formed no part of our law.19 It was, however, 
acknowledged that the concept of placing assets under a trustee’s custodianship 
for the benefit of others (whereby the trustee has no beneficial interest in the 
property) was so firmly rooted in practice that it needed to be given legal 
recognition, as there was nothing in Roman-Dutch law which was inconsistent 
with the workings of trusts. The trust concept is now part of South African law. 
The courts have devised distinctive South African rules and principles applicable 
to trusts, and new rules are constantly being created. These rules are a mixture 
of English, Roman-Dutch and indigenous South African rules.20 
 
6.3 THE DEFINITION OF A TRUST AND THE PARTIES TO A TRUST 
 
A trust has been defined as a contract whereby a donor (also referred to as the 
settlor, founder or creator, henceforth referred to as the founder) transfers 
property to a trustee or trustees in terms of a trust deed or trust instrument, 
whereby the trustees are bound to hold and apply the property for the benefit of 
other persons (beneficiaries) or for the accomplishment of some special purpose. 
21 
                                                 
17 Cameron et al at 2-3; RP Pace Wills and Administration of Estates (last updated 
September 2006) in par B2; W Abrie, C Graham, D Liebenberg Trusts, Wills and Taxation 
in Estate Planning (1997) at 37 (“Abrie et al 1997”); JP Coetzee ’n Kritiese Ondersoek na 
die Aard en Inhoud van Trustbgeunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, 
LLD Thesis Unisa (2006) at 3; K Huxham & P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 
(2007) at 593; Theron (1990) at 15. 
18   1915 AD 494. 
19 See also CIR V Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656; CIR v Smollan’s Estate 1955 (3) SA 266(A) 
at 269F; Crookes and Another v Watson and Another 1956 (1) SA 277(A) at 280F. 
20 Cameron et al at 82; Coetzee at 16; De Waal 2000 at 557; King & Victor in par 16.2; Du 
Toit at 1; MJ De Waal ”In Search of a Model for the Introduction of the Trust into a Civilian 
Context” (2001) Stellenbosch Law Review at 63 (”De Waal 2001”). 
21  In Deedat v The Master 1995 (2) SA 377 (A) at 383E-F, it was held that a trust exists 
when the creator or founder of the trust has handed over or is bound to hand over to 
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In terms of article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts 
and their Recognition,22 a trust refers to the legal relationship created inter vivos 
or upon death by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the 
control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary, or for a specific purpose. 
Although South Africa is not party to the Hague Convention, the provisions of this 
Convention are internationally accepted, such that the features of the trust 
concept as it has developed in our law conform to the definition of a trust in this 
Convention.23 
 
In terms of section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act,24 the term “trust” means   
the arrangement through which the ownership of property of one person is by virtue of a 
trust instrument made over or bequeathed - 
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed of 
according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of 
persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in 
the trust instrument; or 
(b) to the beneficiary designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed under 
the control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of according to 
the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons 
designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the objective stated in the 
trust instrument, but does not include the case where the property of another is to be 
administered by another person as executor, tutor or curator or in terms of the provisions 
of the Administration of Estates Act 1965. 
 
 
From the above, it can be deduced that the parties to a trust are the founder, the 
trustees and the beneficiaries. It is necessary to set out the legal position and 
responsibilities of these parties so as to appreciate how the legal position and 
responsibilities of these parties can be manipulated in an attempt to avoid taxes. 
The founder is the person who establishes the trust, and he/she is usually the 
original owner of the property being placed in the trust. The founder appoints the 
                                                                                                                                            
another the control of property which, or the proceeds of which, is to be administered or 
disposed of by the other (the trustee or administrator) for the benefit of some person other 
than the trustee as beneficiary, or for some impersonal object. See also Editorial “Estate 
and Tax Planning: The Use of Trusts” (1994) 43 The Taxpayer at 43, where a trust 
instrument is defined as a written agreement or testamentary writing or court order 
according to which a trust was created. See also Cameron et al at 4; Editorial “The Trust 
Property Control Act” (1989) 38 The Taxpayer at 182.  
22 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and their Recognition, which was 
concluded 1 July 1985 and entered into force on 1 January 1992. Available 
at>http://www.legallanguage.com/hague/haguetx30e.html<, last accessed 6 June 2007; 
see also Ramjohn at 11-12. 
23 Cameron et al at 5; see also Editorial on “The Use of Trusts” at 42.   
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trustees by way of a trust deed and also specifies the beneficiaries to the trust 
property.25 The founder of a trust could also be a beneficiary or even the sole 
beneficiary of the trust.26 
 
The trustees are the “management” of the trust.27 They are also the legal owners 
of the trust property, but they have no beneficial interest in the property (except 
where the trustee in his private capacity happens to be a beneficiary as well).28 
Common law requires that the trustees hold the property in a fiduciary capacity.29 
As a result, they are not taxed on trust income in their personal capacity.30 
Section 9 of the Trust Property Control Act31 requires that the trustees exercise 
care, diligence and skill in managing the affairs of the beneficiaries. Under South 
African law, a founder cannot set up a trust by transferring assets to himself as 
the sole trustee, as he would not have divested himself/herself of the trust 
property.32 However, there would be a divestment where the founder transfers 
the property to a number of trustees, among whom the owner himself/herself is a 
co-trustee.33 Even where the founder is a co-trustee, any control exercised over 
                                                                                                                                            
24 Act 57 of 1988.  
25         Pace in par B6.1; Du Toit at 5; see also King & Victor in par 16.2.1/ 
26  S 12 of the Trust Property Control Act; art 2 of the Hague Convention; W Abrie, CR 
Graham & PW Van der Spuy Estates: Planning and Administration 4 ed (2000) at 40; see 
also J Harris The Hague Trusts Convention: Scope, Application and Preliminary Issues 
(2002) at 110; Goodricke v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N) at 408. See 
also Huxham & Haupt at 597. 
27 Pace in par B6.2.1; Du Toit at 6; PC Soars Trusts and Tax Planning 3 ed (1987) at 7.  
28 Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustees 1915 AD 491 at 503-4; see also Coetzee at 354-
355; JG Riddall The Law of Trusts 6 ed (2002) at 2; P Todd & S Wilson Textbook on Trust 
(2003) 6 edition at 50; Harris at 108; EM Stack, M Cronjé and EH Hamel The Taxation of 
Individuals and Companies 15 ed (2001) at 549. 
29 This implies that the fiduciary (trustee) has a duty to act impartially in the interests of 
principle - a trustee must not have a personal interest in exercising his discretion in a 
particular way. Thus a trustee must be motivated to benefit the trust and not himself. See 
Cameron et al at 11; Du Toit at 6; De Waal 2000 SALJ at 559; Todd & Wilson at 368-369; 
Riddal at 274-275; The Trident Practical Guide to Offshore Trusts: A Chancellor 
Publication (1995) at 55 in par 4.4.5.7; MJ De Waal “The Liability of Co-trustees for 
Breach of Trust” (1999) Stellenbosch Law Review at 78 (“De Waal 1999”); MJ De Waal 
“Authorisation of Trustees in Terms of the Trust Property Control Act” (2000) Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg at 472 (“De Waal 2000”); Coetzee at 350-351. 
30 Abrie et al 1997 at 83; L Theron  ”Enkele Gedagtes Oor Die Regsaard van ’n Trust en die 
Aanspreeklikheld van’n Trustee vir Trustskulde” (1991) De Jure at 319 and at 325; Theron 
1990 at 21; King & Victor in par 16.2.1. See also art 2 of the Hague Convention. 
31 Act 57 of 1988.  
32 Editorial on “The Use of Trusts” at 43. 
33 Ex parte Leandy 1977 (4) SA 363 (N) 368E-H; RP Pace & MW Van der Westhuisen Wills 
and Trusts (1995) at 14; L Olivier “Trusts: Traps and Pitfalls” (2001) South African Law 
Journal 226 (“Olivier 2001”); Editorial on “The Use of Trusts” at 43. 
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the property in this capacity should not be to further his own interests.34 
 
The beneficiaries are the equitable or beneficial owners of the trust property and 
all conduct by the trustees and the founder should in principle be for their 
benefit.35 A trustee may also be a beneficiary of the trust, but unlike the founder, 
a trustee may not be the sole beneficiary of a trust.36 
 
It appears from the above discussion that it is possible that a trust can be set up 
where the founder is also the beneficiary of the trust or a co-trustee of the trust. 
This may create a situation where the trust can be manipulated by the founder to 
avoid taxes. It is thus the necessity to look into the requirements for a valid trust.  
 
In South African law, there are five basic essentialia for a valid trust.37 Firstly, the 
founder must intend to create a trust. He must not merely use the trustees as 
contracting parties and yet retain too much power and control over the way in 
which the trust is managed.38 Secondly, the founder must express his intention to 
create a trust in a manner that places a legal obligation on the trustees to 
manage the trust object. This could be done through a will or a contract. In South 
African law, a unilateral declaration of intent to create a trust is insufficient.39 
Thirdly, the subject matter of the trust must be defined with reasonable certainty. 
A trust does not come into existence without an asset donated by the founder to 
the trustees.40 Fourthly, the objective of the trust must be defined with 
                                                 
34 Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 at 503-4. 
35 Pace in par B6.3; Riddal at 2. 
36  S 12 of the Trust Property Control Act; art 2 of the Hague Convention; see also Harris at 
110; Goodricke v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N) 408; Huxham & Haupt at 
597. 
37 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 (4) SA 253 (C) at 258E-F; Cameron et al at 
117; Du Toit at 27; Coetzee at 135-136; Theron 1990 at 31-32. 
38  Cameron et al at 118; Pace in par B8.1. 
39   Cameron et al at 137-138; Pace in par B8.2; King & Victor in par 16.4.1.2. Cameron et al 
at 117 notes that in terms of the South African law of trusts, a trust cannot be created 
unintentionally. Thus the English law mechanisms of resulting and constructive trusts 
have not been received in South African law. A “constructive trust” usually arises where a 
trust is imposed by the courts irrespective of the intention of the owner. In a “resulting 
trust”, although the legal title is vested in a trustee, the founder and the beneficiary are 
actually the same person. This usually happens where the founder has failed to divest 
himself of the equitable interest in the property or where the property has been divested 
from him but has for some reason later reverted to him. See Riddall at 238; Todd & Wilson 
at 69; DJ Hayton The Law of Trusts 4 ed (2003) at 17; Stockwell & Edwards at 14-15; 
Duddington at 169; Pearce & Stevens at 234. 
40 Cameron et al at 146; Pace in par B8.3; King & Victor in par 16.4.1.3. 
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reasonable certainty. For instance, it might be specified in the trust deed that the 
trust funds will be used for the benefit of named or ascertainable beneficiaries, or 
that the funds will be donated to charity. Where the trustees have the discretion 
to choose the beneficiaries, a valid trust would not be created. If a class of 
beneficiaries is mentioned, that class must be defined with reasonable 
certainty.41 And lastly, the trust object must not be illegal.42 Where a trust does 
not comply with the above requirements, it is deemed to be invalid.43 Section 4 of 
the Trust Property Control Act further requires that the trust should be registered 
with the Master of the High Court. A trust that is registered with the Master is 
deemed to be resident in South Africa, which means that in terms of section 1 of 
the Income Tax Act, its worldwide income is liable to tax in South Africa.  
 
6.4 CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS: WHICH KIND IS IDEAL FOR TAX 
AVOIDANCE PURPOSES?  
 
Trusts can be classified and distinguished from each other by considering the 
way in which they were created, or from the viewpoint of the beneficiaries’ rights 
to the ownership of the trust assets.44 When a trust is classified from the 
viewpoint of how it was created, then it could fall into one of two categories, 
namely the testamentary trust, or the inter vivos trust.45  When trusts are 
classified from the viewpoint of beneficiaries’ rights to the ownership of the trust 
assets, then the trusts would fall into three main categories, namely “bewind” 
trusts, vested trusts and discretionary trusts.46 These classifications are analysed 
below so as to determine which type is most frequently used for tax avoidance 
purposes.    
 
6.4.1 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS AND INTER VIVOS TRUSTS 
 
Testamentary trusts 
                                                 
41 Ex parte Estate Kemp 1940 WLD 26; Pace in par B8.4. 
42 Cameron et al at 11; Pace in par B8.5; L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: A South 
African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 230; DM Davis, C Beneke & RD Jooste Estate 
Planning (September 2004) Service Issue 17 in par 5.4; Stack et al at 548.  
43 S 4 of the Trust Property Control Act. 
44 Du Toit at 3; Pace in par B3; King & Victor in par 16.3.1- 16.3.2. 
45   See Pace in par B3. 
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A “testamentary trust” is a trust created in terms of a will, whereby a deceased 
person leaves his estate to a trustee, who administers the estate assets on 
behalf of the beneficiaries.47 A testamentary trust exists from the date of the 
testator’s death, and actual transfer of the property is not essential for the trust to 
come into existence.48 Testamentary trusts are seldom used for tax avoidance 
purposes, as the founder who would be liable for income tax and thus interested 
in its avoidance, is the deceased.   
 
Inter vivos trusts 
 
An inter vivos trust is a trust created by a living person, who transfers some of his 
assets to a trustee or trustees, who then deal with the assets on behalf of the 
beneficiaries.49 An inter vivos trust is created by means of a contract50 between 
the founder and the trustee(s), in terms of which contract the founder donates 
and transfers property to the trustees for the benefit of the beneficiaries.51 Inter 
vivos trusts are the ones that are mainly used for tax avoidance purposes, as the 
contract between the founder and the trustees often involves the control of 
private wealth while the founder is still alive and liable for taxation. 
 
Irrespective of whether a trust was created as a testamentary or an inter vivos 
trust, the rights of the beneficiaries to the ownership of the income or capital of 
the trust could be bewind, vested or discretionary (hence the classification of 
trusts as bewind trusts, vested trusts or discretionary trusts). These different 
trusts are now discussed as instruments used for tax avoidance purposes. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
46   Du Toit at 3.   
47 Du Toit at 21; Coetzee at 121; Huxham & Haupt at 594; Stack et al at 548; DJM Clegg 
Income Tax in South Africa (Nov 2004) in par 17.3 and 17.3.1; AP de Koker Silke on 
South African Income Tax (Nov 2006) in par 24.126; King & Victor in Par 16.3.1; P 
McLoughlin & C Rendell Law of Trusts (1992) at 69; Harris at 43. 
48 Davis et al in par 5.5.  
49 Clegg in par 17.3; De Koker in par 24.126; Theron 1990 at 28; Coetzee at 98; King & 
Victor in par 16.3.1. See also McLoughlin & Rendell at 63; Todd & Wilson at 47; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers at 138. 
50 Crooks NO v Watson 1956 (1) SA 22(A). When the beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust 
accept the rights conferred on them by the contract, they acquire a personal right against 
the trustee. See also King & Victor in par 16.1.2.2. 
51 Clegg in par 17.3.2; Coetzee at 370. 
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6.4.2 BEWIND, VESTED AND DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS 
 
Bewind trusts 
 
A bewind trust is one where the real rights of ownership of the trust vest in the 
trust beneficiaries, but the administration/management and control over these 
assets vest in the trustee.52 If the beneficiary dies, ownership is included in his 
estate for estate duty purposes, and the asset itself is transferable to his heirs, 
either conditionally or unconditionally, depending on the terms of the trust deed.53 
Since the role of a trustee in a bewind trust corresponds to the appointment of an 
administrator in Roman-Dutch law,54 it was at one stage disputed whether a 
bewind trust is to be classified as a trust in the strict sense, as the gap between 
the English trustee - who is the legal owner of the trust property - and the South 
African common law administrator - who is not - was unbridgeable.55 Cameron 
and others56 are, however, of the view that since control by the 
trustee/administrator rather than ownership is the essential feature of a trust, a 
bewind trust, under which the administrator holds an office, is a trust.  Cameron 
and others also contend that this is in line with section 1 of the Trust Property 
Control Act57 - which in effect defines a trust as an arrangement under which the 
ownership of the trust assets may be vested in the trustee/administrator or in the 
beneficiary, depending on the trust instrument.58    
 
Since the ownership of the trust property in a bewind trust vests in the 
beneficiary, and only the administration and control over the trust assets vests in 
the trustees, bewind trusts do not make ideal tax avoidance trusts, as the 
founder cannot  easily manipulate the trust to gain income tax advantages. 
However, it may be possible to manipulate the trust and gain some tax 
advantages, if the founder can devise a mechanism to prevent the beneficiary 
                                                 
52 Cameron et al at 6; Pace in par B6.3.2; Coetzee at 120. 
53 See King & Victor in par 16.3.2. 
54 Cameron et al at 6; Du Toit at 4. 
55 Cameron et al at 6; PA Olivier Trust Law and Practice (1990) at 3; NJ Van der Merwe & 
CJ Rowland Die Suid-Africaanse Erfreg 6 ed (1990) at 334. 
56 Pace in par B6.3.2;Cameron et al at 7. 
57 Act 57 of 1988. 
58 Cameron et al at 7; see also Du Toit at 4; Pace in par B6.3.2. 
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from alienating the trust property without the consent of the trustees.59  
 
Vested trusts 
 
A vested trust is one where ownership and control/administration of the trust 
assets vests in the trustee in his representative capacity, and the beneficiaries 
have only personal rights to claim their trust benefits from the trustees upon the 
happening of a certain event (such as the attainment of a certain age or upon 
marriage) as specified in the trust deed. The right that such a beneficiary has in 
the income or capital of the trust is termed a “vested right”. In ITC 76,60 the 
Special Court defined a vested right as “something substantial; something which 
could be measured in money; something which had a present value and could be 
attached.” Furthermore, in the context of income tax, a vested right is an accrued 
right. This implies that, upon the happening of the relevant specified event, the 
income or capital of the trust must be paid to that particular beneficiary and the 
trustees are merely administering the income or the capital for the beneficiary.61 
 
Vested trusts are not usually used for tax avoidance purposes, as the event that 
has to take place ensures that income accrues to, and is taxed, in the hands of a 
particular beneficiary. The trustees merely administer the trust property and they 
have no right to deal with it according to their own discretion.  
   
Discretionary trusts 
 
A discretionary trust is a trust where discretion is conferred by the founder on the 
trustees to decide (or vary) which member or members of a class of beneficiaries 
should be entitled to the income or capital of the trust.62 The beneficiaries are 
only beneficiaries in name, and what they have is just a “contingent right” to the 
income or capital of the trust. The meaning of the term “contingent right” was 
                                                 
59 Cameron et al at 578. 
60 (1927), 3 SATC 68 at 69.  
61 Pace in par B6.3.1; D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) in par 16.136; 
Huxham & Haupt at 594; Olivier & Honiball at 233; BA van der Merwe “Meaning and 
Relevance of the Phrase: ‘Vested Right’ for Income Tax Law” (2000) 3 SA Mercantile Law 
Journal at 319.  
62 Cameron et al at 20; Davis et al in par 5.11; Coetzee at 166; A Ginsberg International Tax 
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described by Watermeyer CJ in Durban City Council v Association of Building 
Societies63 as being “the conditional nature of someone’s title to the right”.64 
Thus, although the beneficiaries may be eligible to the income or capital of the 
trust, they are not entitled thereto, unless the trustees in their sole and absolute 
discretion decide to pay over the benefits.65 This implies that there is a possibility 
that a beneficiary may never receive any portion of the income or capital in the 
trust.66 It is worth noting however that in ITC 7667 the Special Court defined the 
term “contingent right” as a mere spes - an expectation which might never be 
realised. This definition has been criticised by Davis68 and Jooste,69 who submit 
that the interest of a discretionary beneficiary is a “contingent right”. Cameron 
and others70 explain that “if a trustee has a discretion not merely how, but also 
whether to pay income or distribute capital to the beneficiary, then the latter’s 
right is merely contingent”.   
 
Owing to the fact that the beneficiaries of discretionary trusts do not have vested 
rights in the income and/or capital of the trust, these trusts have been found to be 
ideal vehicles for income tax avoidance.71 This is because the beneficiaries in a 
discretionary trust are not considered to own taxable interests in the income 
and/or capital of the trust until the time when there is a receipt or accrual in 
favour of the beneficiaries. The advantage of this is that, as the trustees are 
given wide discretion over the vesting of the trust income or capital, this gives 
them flexibility and control to vest income and capital assets in beneficiaries at 
ideal moments, with tax avoidance in mind.72 The trustees could, for instance, 
                                                                                                                                            
Havens 2 ed (1997) at 28; Riddall at 283; Watt at 80; Todd & Wilson at 70; Soares at 12. 
63 1942 AD 27 at 33. 
64 See also Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 163 at 175; Meyerowitz in 
par 16.135. Davis et al in par 6.3.1; M Grundy Grundy’s Tax Havens: Offshore Business 
Centres - A World Survey 6 ed (1993) at 78; see also G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 9 
ed (2002) at 12.   
65  Cameron et al at 473; Du Toit at 75; Abrie et al 1997at 56-57; King & Victor in par 16.3.4. 
See also Jewish Colonial Trust v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 163 at 175; Pentz v Gross 1996 
(2) SA 518 (C) at 523. 
66 Meyerowitz in par 16.135; Huxham & Haupt at 594; Olivier & Honiball at 233; Van der 
Merwe at 319; Stack et al at 551.  
67 (1927), 3 SATC 68 at 70.  
68 Davis et al in par 6.3.1. 
69 Jooste at 203. 
70 Cameron et al at 557. 
71 M Grundy Grundy’s Tax Havens: Offshore Business Centres:- A World Survey 6 ed 
(1993) at 78; see also G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 9 ed (2002) at 12. 
72 Mhlongo at 4; Ginsberg at 43; WH Diamond & DB Diamond Tax Havens of the World 
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vest the income or capital in a large number of beneficiaries, so that it is spread 
among them. This creates room for reducing the tax payable, as the quantum of 
taxable income in the hands of each of the beneficiaries is reduced.73 
 
Instead of distributing the income or capital to beneficiaries and thus subjecting it 
to tax in the hands of the beneficiaries, a founder could avoid such taxation by 
accumulating the income or capital in the trust. This is usually achieved by 
distributing benefits to the beneficiaries (normally the founder’s children) only 
when they attain a specific age, or marry, with a provision that they should be 
maintained out of the income of the trust, but that any surplus income should be 
accumulated in the trust.74 In the absence of anti-avoidance measures to prevent 
such schemes, capital gains tax can be deferred, especially if the trust is set up 
in a low-tax jurisdiction, where it will be liable to nil or minimal taxation.75 It is 
worth pointing out, however, that there may be income tax liability when the 
accumulated income/capital is repatriated to the founder’s country of residence.76  
 
The general conclusion reached regarding the classification of trusts is that it is 
mainly trusts created inter vivos which are discretionary trusts that are used for 
tax avoidance. Further discussion of the use of ”trusts” for offshore tax avoidance 
may therefore be taken to refer primarily to this type of trust.    
 
6.5  GENERAL FEATURES OF TRUSTS THAT ENCOURAGE OFFSHORE 
TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
In chapter 3 of this thesis, the features of companies that make them ideal 
vehicles for offshore tax avoidance were discussed. In this chapter, it has been 
pointed out that taxpayers frequently make use of trusts instead of companies as 
a vehicle for offshore tax avoidance. It has actually been noted that trusts are the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Publication 722, Release 108, Jan 2002) at Glossary-4. 
73 Editorial “Estate and Tax Planning -The Trust, the Taxation Aspects” (1994) 43 Taxpayer 
85  
74 McLoughlin & Rendell at 118; Todd & Wilson at 191-192; Soares at 203. 
75 International Trident Trust Group The Trident Practical Guide to Offshore Trusts 2 ed 
(1995) at 62 in par 4.6. 
76 M Hampton Offshore Interface: Tax Havens in Global Economy (1996) at 28; see also 
Gundy at 77; N Boldman “International Tax Avoidance” (1981) 35 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 443. 
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most effective tools for holding assets outside of a taxpayer’s country of 
residence.77 This is based on the assertion that a trust is one of the most reliable 
means that can be used to deal with unforeseen political and economic 
circumstances that often result in increased taxation and thus the need to avoid 
such taxation. This is because, even though the founder of the trust may not be 
able to foresee these circumstances and spell them out in a will or deed of trust, 
by giving his trustees discretionary powers to be exercised within the guidelines 
laid down in the trust deed, the founder can ensure that such unforeseen 
circumstances are taken care of.78 The characteristics of trusts that make this 
possible include the autonomy of trusts, the principle of separation of 
management, ownership and enjoyment of trust property, and the flexibility of 
trusts.  
 
 
The autonomy of trusts  
 
Unlike a company, which owes it existence to a statute, and has defined and 
restricted functions that are set out in its memorandum and articles of 
association,79 a trust owes its existence to the particular rules of a given trust, as 
set out in a will or trust deed.80 A trust deed, unlike a company share register, is 
a private document, and it ensures the anonymity of the beneficiaries of the 
trust.81 Even access to the trust deed may not reveal the trust beneficiaries, 
especially in the case of most discretionary offshore trusts, which often stipulate 
the widest possible class of beneficiaries.82 The autonomy of the trust makes it 
an all-purpose instrument that can be put to a wider range of uses than a 
company can.83 The autonomy of trusts is enhanced by the fact that in South 
Africa there is no specific legislation which regulates the law of trusts, such as 
the Companies Act which regulates companies.84 The Trust Property Control Act 
of 1988 is limited to aspects governing the powers and duties of trustees and 
                                                 
77 Roper 2000 at 7. 
78 Editorial on “The Trust, the Taxation Aspects” at 181.  
79 Soars at 10. 
80 Soars at 10; Editorial on “The Trust, the Taxation Aspects” at 181. 
81 O Stanley & G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning (1986) at 73.  
82 Stanley & Clarke at 73. 
83 Cameron et al at 14; Hayton at 47; Soars at 1; PricewaterhouseCoopers at 185. 
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some supervisory matters. Although this Act contains provisions relating to the 
supervisory jurisdiction over trusts by the courts and the Master,85 it does not 
contain detailed provisions for the control of the operations of trustees and the 
way the trust should be administered.86 Often the law of contract, as well as case 
law have to be taken into account.87 
 
The autonomy of trusts is one of the factors that encourage the location of trusts 
in tax-haven jurisdictions for tax avoidance purposes. 88 This autonomy is 
augmented by the confidentiality laws in the tax-haven jurisdictions that prevent 
the disclosure of the founder and the beneficiaries to authorities of other 
jurisdictions, and the trusts incorporated in the tax-haven jurisdictions are, as far 
as possible, ”insulated“ against claims that might arise from other jurisdictions.89 
 
Separation of management, ownership and enjoyment 
 
Unlike a company that is recognised as a separate juristic person, in South 
Africa, a trust is not generally recognised as a separate juristic person,90 but in 
terms of section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, a trust is treated as a 
separate juristic person for income tax purposes.91 A trust is treated as separate 
and distinct from the founder and the beneficiaries.92 Because of this unique 
feature, a trust can be used as a means of separating assets from the control 
and ownership of their original owner and the beneficiaries’ enjoyment of the trust 
                                                                                                                                            
84 Abrie et al 1997at 35-36.  
85 Ss 2 and 4 of the Trust Property Control Act provide that the trust deed must be lodged 
with the Master. S 6(1) of the same Act provides that a trustee should not carry out any 
action in relation to the trust unless authorised to do so by the Master. See also Abrie et al 
at 35-36.  
86 Cameron et al at 20. 
87 Abrie et al 1997 at 35-36.  
88 Harris at 65. 
89 See Harris at 67; see also International Trident Trust Group in par 4.3.5. 
90   South African Courts have on numerous occasions held that the trust, as indeed a 
deceased estate is not to be regarded as a legal person. See CIR v MacNeillie’s Estate 
1961 (3) SA 833 (A) at 840F-G; Kohlberg v Burnett 1986 (3) SA 12 (A) at 25G; Mariola v 
Kaye-Eddie 1995 (2) SA 728 (W) 731; Rosner v Lydia Swanepoel Trust 1988 (2) SA 126 
(W) at 127A; Jourbert v Van Rensburg 2001 (1) SA 753 (W) at 768F-G 
91 Soars at 2; P Stephan “Trusts: When is a Person Not a Person for Tax Purposes?” (1998) 
Insurance and Tax Journal in par 1. Note that a trust is also considered a separate juristic 
person for purposes of the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 and the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 
1949 and the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1999. See Du Toit at 10. 
92  S 12 of the Trust Property and Control Act; Du Toit at 9; Clarke at 11. 
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property.93 This allows the founder to “put the trust property outside his or her 
competence to dispose of yet retain an effective voice in its administration”.94   
The separation of ownership from the control and enjoyment of the owner is, 
however, not peculiar to the law of trusts. It is also a feature of usufructs of 
property, where the dominus remains a bare owner of the property, but the 
usufructuary manages the property and enjoys the income during his or her 
lifetime.95 The difference between the legal position of the usufructuary and the 
separation of ownership/management and enjoyment in trust law lies in the fact 
that under trust law, the trustee may not necessarily be a present or prospective 
beneficiary, whereas in the case of a usufruct, the usufructuary has a present 
right to the enjoyment of the property, while the bare owner merely has a 
prospective right to enjoy the property.96 Because in trust law this separation 
breaks the chain of legal ownership of the trust property between the founder of 
the trust and his wealth,97 it encourages the use of trusts as a vehicle for 
investing and accumulating income in low-tax jurisdictions, where it will be 
subject to low or minimum tax, and its ownership cannot be easily associated 
with the founder so as to be subjected to tax in his country of residence.98 
 
The flexibility of trusts 
 
Another factor that makes a trust ideal for tax planning is its flexibility.99 The way 
a trust deed explains how a trust is to be administered often allows the trust deed 
                                                 
93 Hampton at 28; Cameron et al at 17; B J Arnold The Taxation of Controlled Foreign 
Corporations: An International Comparison (1986) at 124; see also R Helsby, J McMahon 
& B McCarthy Trouble with the Tax Man? Offshore Survival 2 ed (1990) at 10; J Ware & P 
Roper Offshore Insight (2001) at 179; also B Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service (March 
2002) 66 at OFT/1.  
94 Cameron et al at 20. Effective control may however have detrimental estate duty 
implications – see s 3(5) of the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955. 
95 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947 (3) SA 256 (C) at 258F. A person who has “usufructuary interest” 
in an asset does not own the asset, but is only allowed to use it. A person who has a “bare 
dominum” in an asset, owns the asset, but is not allowed to use it. See also Cameron et al 
at 17; MM Corbett, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (2001) 
409-410; Du Toit at 28; Meyerowitz in par 6.8. 
96 Cameron et al at 17. 
97 Olivier & Honiball at 235. 
98  Grundy at 147. 
99 MJ De Waal ”Anomalieë in die Suid-Afrikaanse Trustreg” (1993) 56 Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg at 8 observes that the flexibility and adaptability of 
the trust derive in part from ambivalences in its legal character. See also Hayton at 47; 
Soars at 1; Davis et al in par 14.1 at 14-4. 
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to be varied to suit the intention of the founder.100 South African law accepts that, 
in view of the contractual nature of an inter vivos trust, a founder (with the 
consent of the trustees) may vary or revoke the trust, if he has reserved the right 
to do so in the trust deed and as long as the beneficiaries have not accepted the 
benefits. This principle was established in CIR v Estate Crewe101 and confirmed 
in Crookes NO v Watson,102 where Centlivers CJ reasoned that: 
a trust deed executed by a settlor and a trustee for the benefit of certain other persons is 
a contract between the settlor and the trustee for the benefit of a third person ... and the 
settlor and the trustee can cancel the contract entered into between them before the third 
party has accepted the benefits conferred on him under the settlement.103  
 
The result, as Hayton104 notes, is that 
... in trust law a settlor may ...  have the power to add or subtract beneficiaries, may have 
powers of appointing income and capital amongst the beneficiaries  ...  may have power 
to revoke his trust, whilst the trustees may have power to accumulate income within the 
trust and to invest in non-income-producing assets. A trust is like a sponge capable of 
soaking up liquid funds and retaining them without undue leakage, yet capable of being 
squeezed lightly or harshly or of being totally squashed so as to yield its contents into the 
required hands; it can even be split up into smaller pieces having the same qualities as a 
whole. 
 
The ability of the founder to vary a trust can be manipulated for tax avoidance 
purposes. In his book on trusts, Watt105 notes that “tax laws change every year, if 
the terms and structures of trusts were not varied by the founder, trusts would be 
’sitting ducks’ for the guns of the inland revenue”.106  
 
The courts also have jurisdiction to sanction the variation of trusts, where the 
variation would be to the benefit of the beneficiaries, or where the public interest 
would be jeopardised.107 Section 13 of the Trust Property Control Act108 confers 
upon the court the power to vary any provisions of a trust instrument if certain 
conditions are present, namely where the provisions bring about consequences 
which, in the opinion of the court, the founder of the trust did not contemplate or 
                                                 
100 Cameron et al at 19; Pace in par B18.2.2; Soars at 1; Watt at 198. 
101 1943 AD 656. 
102 1956 (1) SA 277 (A). 
103 1956 (1) SA 277 (A) at 285; See also Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 (1) SA 382 (A) at 385F; 
Davis et al in par 5.9.2; Editorial on “The Use of Trusts” at 45; King & Victor in par 16.5.  
104 Hayton at 47. 
105 Watt at 197. 
106 Watt at 197. 
107 See also Bydawell v Chapman 1953 (3) SA 514 (A) at 517F; see also Ex parte Naude 
1945 OPD 1; Robertson’s v Robertson’s Executors 1914 AD 503; Pace in par B18.2.5; 
Editorial on “The Use of Trusts” at 45.   
108   Act 57 of 1988. 
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foresee and which provisions hamper the achievements of the objects of the 
founder, prejudice the interests of the beneficiaries or are in conflict with public 
interest. Courts have also sanctioned the variation of the trust even where tax 
avoidance was an issue.109  
6.6 SPECIAL FEATURES OF OFFSHORE TRUSTS THAT ENCOURAGE 
TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
In the discussion above, a description has been made the general features of 
trusts that make them ideal vehicles for offshore tax avoidance. In addition to 
these features, offshore trusts have other special features that encourage 
offshore tax avoidance.110 For South African residents wishing to invest in non-
resident trusts, these features could appear to make it easier to manipulate non-
resident trusts to gain tax advantages than it is when a trust is resident in the 
Republic. The legality of these features and the possibility of using them to gain 
tax advantages is discussed below.  
 
The letter of wishes 
 
                                                 
109  For instance in one English case, Re Windeatt, [1969] 1 WLR 692, the founder sought to 
vary the trust for tax planning purposes, and this involved the moving of the trust from 
England to Jersey. The court approved this variation on the grounds that the family of the 
founder had been in Jersey for nineteen years and the children had been born there and 
they would not be disadvantaged by the variation of the trust. However, in the earlier case 
of Re Weston’s Settlements, [1968] 1 ALL ER 338, where the founder sought to transfer 
property settled by him on his sons from England, where they resided, to Jersey, the court 
denied the variation, as the arrangement was simply to avoid tax and not for the benefit of 
the children. 
  
 In the Jersey case of In the matter of Moody Jersey’s settlement 1990 JLR 264 contained 
in G Clarke & B Spitz Offshore Service Cases Vol 1 (1999) at 518, the trustees of a 
settlement applied to rectify a deed of trust, because the parties to the settlement had 
intended it to avoid tax in the United Kingdom, but a mistake had been made, as a result 
of which the wife of the founder was included as one of the beneficiaries, and this had the 
effect of defeating the intention of the parties. The court held that even though the 
rectification of the deed of settlement would result in the avoidance of United Kingdom tax, 
the court had the discretion to rectify a trust document where it was satisfied that the 
document did not carry out the intention of the parties, since they are entitled to arrange 
their affairs to avoid the payment of tax, if they can legitimately do so. In another Jersey 
case, Re The Peter Hynd’s Settlement 3 ITELR 701, discussed in Clarke & Spitz Offshore 
Service Cases at 412, the founder of a Jersey trust applied for a variation of the trust to 
provide a more flexible form of trust that would enable the trustees to plan how best 
legitimately to avoid United Kingdom taxation. The court consented to the variation, as the 
arrangement was for the benefit of the persons concerned. See also Duddington at 295; 
Pearce & Stevens at 464; Watt at 212; Stockwell & Edwards at 166.  
110 Davis et al in par 17.2.    
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The establishment of offshore trusts is usually accompanied by a so-called letter 
of wishes.111 A “letter of wishes” has been defined as “an instrument outside of 
the trust deed wherein the founder indicates to the trustees how they should 
exercise some of their powers”.112 It is a private letter between the founder and 
the trustee, and it is a very useful guide to the trustees of non-resident trusts, 
who often know very little about the beneficiaries concerned and have to use the 
letter of wishes as a basis for their decisions.113 Since the letter sets out the 
manner in which the founder wishes the trustees to exercise their powers and 
discretion, a founder may request the trustees to carry out certain activities that 
may be contrary to the trust deed, and this could entail carrying out certain 
directions in regard to the trust property that could result in the avoidance of 
taxes. 
 
However, according to the English law of equity,114 a letter of wishes is 
considered not to be binding on the trustees,115 and it does not form part of the 
trust deed. This implies that a beneficiary named in a letter of wishes would not 
be a connected person in relation to the trust.116 In the South African Income Tax 
Act, the term “connected person” in relation to trusts refers to any beneficiary of 
such trust and any connected person in relation to such beneficiary.117 For the 
purpose of the connected person definition, the term “beneficiary” means any 
person who has been named in the founder’s will or the trust deed as a 
beneficiary, or as a person upon whom the trustee has the power to confirm a 
benefit from the trust.  It is worth noting, however, that this definition differs from 
the one provided by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) in Practice Note 
7, where the term “beneficiary” is defined as including any person named in a 
will, trust deed or letter of wishes, upon whom the trustee or the trust has a 
power to confer a benefit from the trust.118 SARS takes the view that a letter of 
                                                 
111 Davis et al in par 17.2; L Lacob “The Offshore Trust World” (2000) 8 Juta’s Business Law 
(2000) at 82. 
112 Editorial “Tax Briefs” Taxgram (July 1999) at 14.  
113 Davis in par 5.16; Rothschild “Trust Financial Planning: Letter of Wishes”. Available at 
>http://www.rothschildtrust.com/strategies/default.asp?doc=articles/ltrs_wishes<, last 
visited 24 May 2007. 
114 Editorial “Tax Briefs” at 14.  
115 Editorial “Tax Briefs” at 14. 
116 Editorial “Tax Briefs” at 14. 
117 S 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
118 SARS Practice Note: No 7 of 6 August 1999 section 31 of the Income Tax Act 1962 (the 
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wishes forms part of the trust deed for the purposes of the connected person 
definition, and by implication, a person named in a letter of wishes would be a 
beneficiary in relation to a trust. As a letter of wishes does not per se form part of 
the trust deed, it is doubtful whether SARS’ views can be relied upon in South 
Africa to deem a person named in a letter of wishes to be a beneficiary. SARS 
Practice Notes are not law, so they are not binding on either SARS or the 
taxpayers.119 Paragraph 3.1 of Practice Note 7 states that this Practice Note was 
drafted as a practical guide and is not intended to be prescriptive or exhaustive. 
Although a letter of wishes may provide suggestions to trustees as to how they 
should exercise the power and discretion accorded to them in the trust deed, 
letters of wishes do not replace the trustees’ exercise of their powers and 
discretion as conferred by the trust deed.120 Where the trustees follow a letter of 
wishes slavishly, there is the danger of the trust being set aside as a scam and 
the assets being regarded as still vested in the founder.121  
 
The mere existence of the letter of wishes does not, however, necessarily imply 
that the trust is a sham.122 The facts of each case have to be analysed to 
determine whether the founder remained in control of the trust in substance, 
although in form, the assets were transferred from the founder. 123 For example, 
in the Jersey case of Abdel Rahman v Chase Bank Trust Company (CI) Ltd and 
Five others,124 the court found that Rahman, the founder, exercised control over 
the trustees in the management and administration of the settlement. He made 
distributions of the capital to himself and to others as gifts or loans, and he 
disposed of the investments, treating the assets as his own and the trustees as 
                                                                                                                                            
Act): Determination of Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International Taxation: 
Transfer Pricing in  par 1.1.4.1 (i); see also PEW Roper  “South African Transfer Pricing 
Explored” (2000) Insurance and Tax Journal in par 5. 
119 SARS Discussion Paper "Proposed System for Advance Tax Rulings" (2003) at 4. 
Available at 
>http://sars.gove.za/legislation/Discussion20%Papers/Discussion%20proposed%20 
sytem20%Advance20%Tax20%Rulings.pdf<, last accessed 7 November 2007. 
120 Davis et al in par 5.16; Olivier & Honiball at 238. 
121 Lacob at 82; Davis et al in par 5.16; Olivier 2001 at 224. If the letter of wishes does not 
accord with the trust deed, it may also constitute breach of faith. 
122 Olivier & Honiball at 238. 
123 Olivier & Honiball at 238. 
124 1991 JLR 103. Available at  
>http://www.jerseylegalinfo.je/Judgments/JerseyLawReports/display.aspx?cases/JLR1991
/JLR910103.htm<, last accessed on 21 July 2007; See also  Ware & Roper “The World of 
Offshore Sham Trusts” (1999) at 17; see also Lacob at 5; see also Davis et al in par 17.4; 
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his agents or nominees. The court found that there was no valid or effective 
delivery of assets to the trustees other than as nominees, as Rahman had 
reserved the rights of disposition over the trust assets so that he could get them 
back for himself.125 It was held that the trust was a sham.  
 
 
South African case law supports the view adopted by the Jersey court in the 
Rahman case. For instance, in Jordann v Jordann,126 the husband had 
transferred some assets from the matrimonial estate to a number of trusts, but he 
continued to use the assets as his own. The court held that the trusts were sham 
trusts. Although this case revolved around divorce matters, it provides a clear 
indication that our courts will not uphold a trust where the founder never intended 
to give up control of the assets transferred. The Rahman and Jordann judgments 
serve as a warning to prospective founders of trusts not to create non-resident 
trusts based on the expectation that the trustees will merely rubber-stamp the 
instructions of the founder.127  
 
Notwithstanding the judgments in the Rahman and Jordann cases, a trust will not 
automatically be a sham trust, simply because the founder is able to exercise 
some control over issues like the amendment of the trust deed, the appointment 
of trustees or investment decisions. With a proper understanding of the powers 
of the trustees, a founder can still structure a trust and gain tax advantages in a 
way that will not render the trust a sham trust. 
 
The office of the protector 
  
Most offshore trusts make provision for the appointment of a “protector”.128 
Different jurisdictions have differing definitions of a “protector”, but generally, the 
protector is a person with certain powers over the trustees or the trust fund. The 
                                                                                                                                            
Ginsberg at 428; Olivier & Honiball at 238. 
125 1991 JLR 103. Available at 
>http://www.jerseylegalinfo.je/Judgments/JerseyLawReports/display.aspx?cases/JLR1991
/JLR910103.htm<, last accessed on 21 July 2007. 
126 2001 (3) SA 288 (KPA) at 289.  
127 Ware & Roper 1999 at 18. 
128 King & Victor in par 19.9.6; Roper 1998 at 168.  
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protector may have the power to appoint or remove trustees, and in some cases, 
the consent of the protector is required before capital distributions are made.129 
The protector could be a trusted friend or a family member who will ensure that 
the trustees are aware of and desirous of fulfilling the founder’s wishes. It is 
usually through the “letter of wishes” that the founder states why the protector 
has been granted his powers, and under what circumstances the founder would 
like the protector to use them.130 A protector is expected to act in a fiduciary 
capacity, such that he is not entitled to benefit.131 
 
The question which arises is whether a valid trust is created under South African 
law where a trust deed provides for the appointment of a protector. Olivier132 
notes that if it can be argued that it is not a requirement for the validity of a trust 
(in South Africa) that the trustees act independently, then it can be said that the 
existence of the protector does not invalidate the trust. If, however, the 
independence of the trustees is a requirement for the continuation of the trust, 
then the existence of a protector may result in the invalidity of the trust.133 This 
issue is not very clear in South African law.134 Olivier135 is of the view, however, 
that the fact that another person has the right to appoint a trustee does not 
necessarily imply that the founder never intended to create a valid trust. Each 
case should be analysed to determine whether the protector is a mere puppet of 
the founder, or whether he/she is acting in an advisory capacity in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries.136   
 
6.7  EXAMPLES OF OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
Blind trusts  
 
                                                 
129 Roper 1998 in par 2.2; Davis in par 17.2; Olivier & Honiball at 236-237. 
130 Ware & Roper 1999 at 17-18; Roper 1998 in par 2.2. 
131 Davis et al in par 17.2. 
132 Davis et al in par 17.2. 
133 Olivier & Honiball at 234-235 
134 Olivier & Honiball at 234-235. 
135 Olivier & Honiball at 234-235. 
136 Olivier & Honiball at 234-235; In the English case IRC v Schroder 57 TC 94 the settlor 
was one of the members of a protection committee. The trust was held to be valid as on 
the facts the settlor did not have control of the protection committee. 
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Blind trusts are trusts that are set up with no clear purpose. In a blind trust, the 
identity of the beneficiaries cannot be established from the provisions of the trust 
deed.137 Blind trusts are often established in tax-haven jurisdictions by a founder 
who donates a substantial sum to a trustee and appoints a charity as a 
beneficiary. However, the charity is never informed of its appointment and it 
never receives any material benefit from the appointment.138 Although a blind 
trust may be regarded as valid in tax-haven jurisdictions, under South African 
law, a blind trust would probably be regarded as a sham or an invalid trust, as 
the object of the trust and the trust beneficiaries are not clearly indicated.139 
 
Asset protection trusts 
 
Offshore trusts can be set up for asset protection purposes. These are often set 
up in tax havens because of their strict confidentiality laws and their history of 
stability during times of war and unrest.140 Asset protection trusts could for 
instance be set up to protect assets from home country risks such as’ political or 
economic risks, liquidation risks and malpractice suits from practicing 
professionals such as lawyers and accountants. An example of a tax haven that 
encourages the setting up of asset protection trusts is Barbados, which in terms 
of its 1995 International Trusts (Amendment) Act, introduced certain features to 
its asset protection provisions. In terms of these amendments,   
-   Barbados law becomes the proper law of a valid Barbados trust, thus 
enabling an offshore settler to escape his own country’s unfavourable 
forced heir ship, matrimonial or bankruptcy legislation; 
-  The settler is able to protect his or her assets against attack by future    
litigation.141 
 
An “asset protection trust” may sometimes contain a so-called “Cuba clause”, 
which permits the transfer of the legal asset and proper law of the trust in 
                                                 
137 Ware & Roper 1999 at 63; Kaplan at 27; Pettit at 16. 
138 Olivier & Honiball at 240. 
139 See par 6.3 above where the requirements for a valid trust in South Africa are set out. See 
also Cameron et al at 96-97; De Waal & Schoeman at 120; Du Toit at 27. 
140  Olivier & Honiball at 466. 
141  Olivier & Honiball at 467. 
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circumstance where it may be necessary to do so, such as in a war situation.142 
Where the main purpose of setting up an offshore trust in a tax haven was for 
asset protection purposes, the fact that the trust deed contains a Cuba clause 
could provide evidence that asset protection was the motivation for investing in 
such a trust as opposed to a tax-avoidance motivation.143 Generally, ”asset 
protection trusts” are tax neutral and are normally not established for tax 
reasons. However, it is now possible to combine the benefits of tax deferral and 
asset protection in one and the same offshore trust.144 
 
Accumulation trusts 
 
These are trusts created for purposes of accumulating income for beneficiaries 
who are children of the settler of the trust or for other persons. Accumulation 
trusts are often set up in the Bahamas and usually consist of American, 
Canadian and European growth securities. Income accumulated in a Bahamian 
trust is for instance not liable to the United States tax when it is derived from 
foreign assets if there are no United States beneficiaries of the trust.145  
 
An example of an accumulation trust is the Isle of Man “Manx” trust. A Manx trust 
is permitted to accumulate income without any form of restriction. The Manx trust 
is ideal for individuals who do not need to make use of their assets invested in a 
trust.  These trusts offer total anonymity as no registration of either settlor or 
beneficially are required. Manx trusts are often used by United Kingdom 
residents to avoid tax on their accumulated income. For United Kingdom 
residents abroad, no tax is levied unless someone resident in the United 
Kingdom benefits. No stamp duties or taxes are levied upon formation of a Manx 
trust and no tax is payable upon the either accumulation or payment of income 
by the trust.  
 
With a portfolio of investments in a Manx trust, a taxpayer can avoid the tax 
levied in the United Kingdom on any capital gains when an investment is 
                                                 
142  Ginsberg at 45 and at 229. 
143  Olivier & Honiball at 467. 
144  Ginsberg at 31. 
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switched. An expatriate who wishes to return to the United Kingdom can set up a 
trust in the Isle of Man before leaving the country in which he is residing. In this 
manner he can eliminate the investments in the trust from his United Kingdom 
estate when he returns to the United Kingdom. In this way, he is able to defer 
capital gains tax until the benefits are realised by the beneficiaries of the trust.146  
 
Purpose Trusts 
 
These are trusts designed for a specific, reasonable and plausible purpose 
without naming any individual as a predetermined beneficiary. For example, in 
Bermuda “purpose trusts” can be created in terms of the Trusts (Special 
provisions) Act of 1989.147  The laws of most jurisdictions classify the beneficiary 
of a trust as an owner of the trust assets. A company or individual taking 
advantage of the Bermuda purpose trust may undertake a commercial activity or 
hold assets in a purpose trust and avoid classification as the owner of the 
commercial activity or trust assets. There are also other commercial and 
regulatory benefits in using a purpose trust. 148 For example, a purpose trust can 
be used to remove voting control of stock from the hands of a company or an 
individual. Several regulatory authorities and taxation statutes impose restrictions 
upon activities and regulatory consequences based on the concept of voting 
control. When voting control is removed by transferring the common shares of a 
company to a purpose trust, the transfer may be free of certain restrictions and 
the tax consequences to which it would otherwise be subject. 149  
 
Pension trusts 
 
Multinational companies have been taking advantage of Bermuda for the creation 
of pension trusts, particularly for the benefit of their employees who transfer from 
one country to another. An offshore pension trust in Bermuda provides:  
-  Low administration costs; 
                                                                                                                                            
145  Diamond & Diamond at Bahamas-11. 
146  Ginsberg at 402. 
147  Ginsberg at 163; Diamond & Diamond at Bermuda-21. 
148  Diamond & Diamond at Bermuda-21. 
149  Diamond & Diamond at Bermuda-22. 
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-  Flexibility in making investments with trust assets; 
-  Simplicity in designing a benefit plan which can cover a particular 
employee as he moves from country to country; 
-  Less restrictive trust laws; and 
-  The option of obtaining an undertaking from the Government granting a 
tax holiday from new applicable tax legislation until 2016.150 In Bermuda, 
no trust may be set aside by reason only that the laws of a foreign 
jurisdiction do not recognise the concept of a trust where the trust defeats 
forced heir ship rights. No taxes, stamp duties or other imposts are 
payable.151 
 
Life insurance trusts 
 
In many jurisdictions, insurance is only included in an estate for the purposes of 
taxation when the descendant possesses the “incidences of ownership”. A life 
insurance trust, as a planning vehicle, is designed to shift the incidence of 
ownership of the insurance policy on to others. Liquidity will be available to avoid 
estate shrinkage due to expenses, taxes and fees without having additional 
death taxes on the same money at the same time.152 
 
The British Virgin Island “VISTA” trusts   
 
In 2003, the British Virgin Islands (BVI) enacted the Virgin Islands Special Trusts 
Act (VISTA) (effective from 1 March 2004). This trust permits a settler to form a 
trust to hold his or her company shares and remove the trustee from 
management responsibility. VISTA trusts are useful in family-held business 
succession planning, where retention of the shares is more important than 
maximising the values of the assets in the trust. 153 These trusts remove the rule 
of governing trustees, which has traditionally made trusts less useful in the family 
business scenario. In terms of this Act, the trustee cannot be a director of the 
company. Beneficiaries of VISTA trusts are not permitted to seek modification or 
                                                 
150  Diamond & Diamond at Bermuda-23. 
151  Ginsberg at 165. 
152  Ginsberg at 112. 
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termination of the trust. The trust instrument may permit trustee intervention 
under specified circumstances. The shares in a VISTA trust must be BVI 
companies, other assets in a VISTA trust must be owned by the BVI company. 
The trustee must be licensed by BVI Financial Services Commission and must 
act as the sole trustee.154 
 
The Cayman Islands “STAR” trust 
 
Under the laws of Cayman Islands, a special type of highly flexible trust can be 
created called the STAR trust, which is an acronym for the name of the 
legislation under which it is created, namely The Special Trust Alternative regime 
of the Trust Law  (2001 Revision). This legislation sets out the unique nature of 
this type of trust, which has trustees but does not need to have beneficiaries. The 
trust however has an “enforcer” whose role is to enforce the provisions of the 
trust deed. The enforcer could be the settler, the intended beneficiary or some 
other person, including a corporate entity.155 Unlike ordinary trusts, a STAR trust 
can be created for the growth and development of a business venture. The 
enforcer has the power to insert a beneficiary in the trust deed at a future date. It 
could then be argued that a person inserted in this manner, would not be 
deemed to have a “contingent right”156 during the past period when the STAR 
trust received income or a capital gain, with the result that from a South African 
perspective, provisions of section 25B(2A) of the Income Tax Act and paragraph 
80(3) of the Eighth Schedule to this Act (discussed in chapter 7) would not apply. 
However, it could be argued that the ordinary meaning of “contingent right” is 
wide enough to cover this situation. Where the enforcer is the settler or someone 
acting as an agent for the settler, he would not have given up control of the trust 
assets. Where the enforcer is the settler or the agent of the settler, and the 
enforcer is legally able to insert himself as a beneficiary of the trust, such a 
person is considered to have an “interest “in the trust and should make such 
disclosure in his annual return for South African income tax purposes.157   
                                                                                                                                            
153  Diamond & Diamond at British Virgin Islands-12. 
154  Diamond & Diamond at British Virgin Islands-12. 
155  Olivier & Honiball at 240. 
156  See discussion with respect to this term in chapter 6. 
157  Olivier & Honiball at 240. 
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Unit trusts (mutual funds) or protected cell trusts 
 
Offshore unit trusts or mutual funds are also some times referred to as “collective 
investment schemes”. However, “offshore collective investment schemes” have 
different structures. Some of them operate under a corporate structure, where as 
others operate under a trust structure. Under the trust structure, in South Africa 
they are referred to as “unit trusts”. Where a “unit trust” is set up in a tax haven, 
investors' funds, securities and other assets bought with those funds, are held in 
a trust. The fund or scheme appoints a trustee to look after the assets in the 
trust. The money pooled in these investments is divided into equal portions called 
units.  
 
In terms of South African exchange controls, a natural person is allowed to take 
a maximum of R2 million out of the country. A number of South Africans, use this 
allowance to invest in offshore unit trusts. Investments in unit trusts ensure that 
investments are properly diversified across different countries, currencies, 
economic sectors, industries and companies. It also helps as a hedge against the 
devaluation of the South African currency. Offshore funds are also useful for 
those South African that have liabilities in a foreign country (for example where 
they have to send their children to study abroad.158 Although a unit trust set up in 
an a tax haven may be liable to nil or minimum taxes, a South Africa resident that 
invests in an offshore unit trust must declare any income and/or foreign dividends 
earned, and/or capital gains realised from an investment in the offshore unit trust. 
 
Examples of tax havens that have legislation that caters for offshore unit trusts or 
mutual funds include: Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Luxembourg, Bermuda, 
Cyprus, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands and Mauritius. Unit trusts 
find it advantageous to set up in the Bahamas where the infrastructure and 
background of banking and trust management expertise are well developed.159 
                                                 
158  Personal Finance FNB “Offshore Investments”. Available at 
http://www.persfin.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=589&fArticleld=2178398> last accessed 20 
March 2007.  
159  Ginsberg at 112. Cyprus is a prominent location for the activities of International Collective 
Investment Schemes. In May 1999, Cyprus assed legislation passed that provides for the 
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In Mauritius, unit trusts or mutual funds are sometimes referred to as “protected 
cell trusts”.160 Mauritius is a platform for open-ended mutual funds, with a large 
number of these funds being listed in Mauritius and/or on major international 
stock exchanges such as London, New York and Hong Kong The bulk of these 
investments are directed towards India, China and South Africa. Mauritius seeks 
to consolidate and develop its mutual funds/collective investment schemes client 
base by emerging as an alternative to the comparatively costlier international 
financial centres in the Caribbean-Pacific region.161 The Mauritius National 
Mutual Fund Ltd (NMF) was established in 1990.162 
 
6.8 SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDENTS AND OFFSHORE TRUSTS                      
                                        
The ability of South Africans to invest offshore has been enhanced by the 
continuous relaxation of the Exchange Control Regulations since 1 July 1997.163 
Currently, the Exchange Control Regulations permit South African residents to 
make direct offshore investments of up to R2 million.164 The offshore allowance is 
not available to trusts,165 but there is nothing that prevents an individual from  
transferring offshore investments made out of R 2 million into an offshore trust.166  
 
South African residents have been known to transfer assets to offshore trusts in 
                                                                                                                                            
establishment and regulation of International Collective Investment Schemes. See Aspen 
Trust group “The Cyprus International Collective Investment Scheme”. Available  at 
>http://www.aamil.com/en/services –collective_investment –schemes.aspx> last accessed 
20 March 2007.    
160  Worldwide Business centre Limited, Mauritius “Mauritius Offshore Company Incorporation” 
Available at > http://www.maritiusoffshorecompanies.com> last accessed on 20 March 
2007. 
161  Aamil Global Financial Services  “Mauritius Offshore, A Major IFC”. Available at 
>http://www. Mondaq.com/article.as?article_id=52152-33k< last accessed 20 March 2007. 
162  National Mutual Fund “National Mutual Fund, Mauritius”. Available at 
>http://www.nmf.mu/> last accessed 20 March 2007, 
163 Roper 2000 in par 1; Davis et al in par 17.1; Ginsberg at 29 and at 581; J Ware & P Roper 
“The Impact of Residence-based Tax on Offshore Trusts” (2001) 16 Insurance and Tax 
Journal at 21 (“Ware & Roper 2001”). 
164 South African Reserve Bank “Exchange Control Manual” in par 6.1.1. Available at 
>http://www.reservebank.co.za/ <, last accessed on 16 May 2007.  
165       Previously the offshore allowance was R750 000, on this note see J Gordon “The R750 
000 offshore allowance: Loans and ‘Loop backs’ Between Trusts and Beneficiaries” 
(2000) Insurance and Tax Journal in par 1.                                    
166 South African Reserve Bank “Exchange Control Manual” in par 6.1.1; Davis et al in par 
8.3.6.  
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two ways. Firstly, assets can be transferred by means of a donation. This is 
usually done by parents who are resident in South Africa and who desire their 
children who are resident in other countries to be able to inherit their wealth.167 
Secondly, assets can be sold to non-resident trusts for cash or on loan account, 
which may or may not bear interest, depending on the circumstances of the 
case.168 Ware and Roper169 note that, as a general rule, South Africans tend to 
sell assets to non-resident trusts on an interest-free basis.  
 
South African residents frequently make use of interest-free loans to transfer the 
amount permitted by the Exchange Control authorities to non-resident trusts.170 
For example, an individual who has obtained permission to export a certain 
amount of money out of the country could transfer the amount into an offshore 
trust set up for the purpose of owning the individual’s offshore assets. The trust 
deed is constructed in such a way that the trust owes the individual the amount 
transferred to the trust and interest is not charged on the outstanding capital. 
Usually care is taken to ensure that the loan is denominated in Rand, so that the 
amount outstanding is not owed to the individual in a foreign currency employed 
by the trust.171 This is necessary so that the individual does not end up owing a 
higher amount due to high exchange rates. 
 
South African beneficiaries of non-resident trusts, who may not be able to utilise 
their offshore investment allowance, because they do not have enough funds in 
South Africa, have also been known to got involved in schemes that enable them 
to take advantage of this allowance to place investments offshore.172 If the non-
resident trust is entitled in terms of the trust deed to make loans to the 
beneficiaries, they can borrow funds from the non-resident trust and use those 
funds to purportedly make use of their offshore investment allowance to transfer 
and invest the funds offshore. After a short period of time, the beneficiary pays 
the loan from the offshore trust by ceding the relevant investment to the trust for 
a certain period of time. This type of scheme has been used as a means for 
                                                 
167 Ginsberg at 586; Olivier & Honiball at 240. 
168 Ware & Roper 2001 at 21; see also Davis et al in par 17.9.   
169 Ware & Roper 2001 at 21.  
170 Davis et al in par 17.9. 
171 Davis et al in par 17.9. 
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South African residents to own offshore assets.173 In the absence of anti-
avoidance measures, such schemes can result in the deferral of capital gains 
tax.  
  
6.9 JURISDICTION TO TAX INCOME FROM OFFSHORE TRUSTS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
As pointed out earlier, a trust is not recognised by the South African courts as a 
legal person. However, in section 1 of the Income Tax Act, a trust is included in 
the definition of a “person” for income tax purposes,174 where it is defined as “any 
trust fund consisting of cash or other assets, which are administered and 
controlled by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, where such person is 
appointed under a deed of trust, or by agreement, or under the will of a deceased 
person”.175 
 
Persons who are resident in the Republic are taxable in the Republic on their 
worldwide income.176 The definition of “resident” in section 1 of the Income Tax 
Act distinguishes between natural persons and persons other than natural 
persons. A trust is not a natural person. It thus falls into the category of a person 
other than a natural person. In terms of section 1 of the Income Tax Act, a 
person other than a natural person is deemed to be a resident of the Republic, if 
it is incorporated, established or formed in the Republic, or if it has its place of 
effective management in the Republic. The Act does not, however, provide a 
definition of the terms “incorporated”, “established or formed”. Where a statute is 
silent on the meaning of any given term, recourse is normally had to the ordinary 
                                                                                                                                            
172 Gordon in par 1. 
173 Gordon in par 1. 
174 The definition of “person” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act. The income tax treatment of trusts 
was prompted by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (as it then was) decision in 
Friedman and Others NNO v CIR: In Re Phillip Frame Will Trust v CIR 1991 (2) SA 
340(W) which ruled that income retained in a trust was not taxable as a trust was not a 
legal person and the trustees were not considered to be its representative taxpayers in 
respect of its undistributed income. The Friedman decision prompted the legislator to 
amend the definition of “person” in the Income Tax Act to include a trust. See also 
PricewaterhouseCoopers at 186; Meyerowitz at 16-44; Cameron et al at 8; MJ De Waal & 
L Theron “Die Aard van die Suid-Afrikaans Reg-Skikking na Aanleiding van Behoefte?” 
(1991) Tydskrif vir Suid Afrikaanse Reg at 449; L Theron “Regulering van die 
Besigheidstrust” (1991) South African Law Journal at 283; L Theron Die Besigheidstrust 
(1990) at 21.   
175 S 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as amended).  
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meaning of the term.177 Ordinarily, as a trust is not required to be incorporated 
(as is the case with a company),178 it can only be deemed a resident of the 
Republic if it is established or formed, or if it has a place of effective 
management, in the Republic.179 
 
In order to determine where a trust was established or formed, an inquiry has to 
be made into how the trust was created. As a testamentary trust is created by the 
will of a testator, by implication such a trust can be deemed a South African 
resident, if the will under which the trust was created was drawn up in South 
Africa. Section 4 of the Trust Property Control Act also requires that a trust be 
registered with the Master of the High Court. As an inter vivos trust is a 
contract,180 it may be argued that such a trust will be resident in South Africa, if 
the contract bringing about its existence was concluded in South Africa.181 
According to the South African law of contract, a contract is generally deemed to 
be concluded at the location where the offeror is informed of the acceptance of 
his or her offer.182 By implication, for a trust to be an offshore trust, it must have 
been formed or established outside the Republic. 
 
Determining the place of effective management of a trust is not an easy task. 
This is because there is no statutory definition of the concept “place of effective 
management” in the South African Income Tax Act, nor is there any case law 
that provides guidance on the interpretation of the term. However, as was 
discussed in Chapter 3, the concept “place of effective management” is 
commonly used in double taxation agreements as a so-called “tie-breaker” 
criterion that is used to determine the residence of an entity, for tax purposes, 
when it is dual resident.183 In terms of article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax 
                                                                                                                                            
176 The definition of “gross income” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act; De Koker in par 24.126.  
177 De Koker in par 27.7. 
178 S 32 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
179 De Koker in par 5.21; Huxham & Haupt in par 27.3.10; see also K Mitchell & L Mitchell 
Offshore Transactions and the World-wide Basis of Taxation (2004 seminar notes) at 85. 
180 Crookes NO and Another v Watson and Others 1956 (1) SA 277 (A) at 258F; see also 
Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA) at 384F.  
181 Olivier & Honiball at 247. 
182 RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) at 32; AJ Kerr The Principles 
of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) at 97; S Van der Merwe Contract: General Principles 2 
ed (2003) at 43. 
183 See art 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 
Condensed Version). See also the discussion in Chapter 3 par 3.6, under the heading 
“How to Determine the Place of Effective Management of a Company”. 
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Convention,184 a dual resident entity is deemed to be a resident only of the state 
in which its place of effective management is situated. For purposes of the 
discussion on trusts, this implies that if a trust is for instance resident in an 
offshore jurisdiction, because it was formed there, but it is also resident in South 
Africa, because it is effectively managed in South Africa, that trust will be 
considered a resident of South Africa, and South Africa will have the jurisdiction 
to tax its world-wide income.  
 
Although South Africa does not have a legal meaning for the term “place of 
effective management, in terms of SARS Interpretation Note 6,185 the term “place 
of effective management” refers to the place where a company is managed on a 
regular day-to-day basis by its directors or senior managers.  That is the place 
where the policies and strategic decisions made by the board of directors are 
executed and implemented, irrespective of where the overriding control of the 
trust is exercised, or where the board of directors meets.186 Although the term 
“place of effective management” is used in Interpretation Note 6 in respect of 
companies, this Interpretation Note can be relied on to determine the meaning of 
“place of effective management” in respect of trusts. As the trustees are the ones 
who have the power and duty to manage a trust, Olivier187 argues that the place 
of effective management of a trust is the place where the substantial or day-to-
day management decisions are taken and implemented. Silke188 also points out 
that the place of effective management of the trust can be determined by 
considering the country of residence of the trustees, the country from which the 
trust fund is administered, or the country where trustees meet to attend to the 
affairs of the trust.   In Nathan Estates v CIR,189 the court held a trust to be 
resident in Natal, because the trustees were resident in that province, and the 
trust fund was administered from that province.  
 
Silke190  further points out that, in determining the place of effective management 
of a trust, each case has to be decided on its own merits, but the place where the 
assets of the trust are effectively managed will be crucial. It would thus be 
                                                 
184   OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 Condensed Version). 
185 Issued on 26 March 2002. 
186 Issued on 26 March 2002. 
187 Olivier & Honiball at 247. 
188 De Koker in par 5.2I. 
189 1948 (3) SA 866 (N). 
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necessary to understand the business activities of the trust and the activities of 
the trustees. In the case of active business operations carried on by the trust, it 
may be easy to determine its place of effective management, as the day-to-day 
business operations of the trust will normally be located where the active 
business of the trust takes place.191 In the case of a passive investment holding 
trust, the activities of the trustees would be limited to trustees’ meetings to 
manage the investments of the trust on an infrequent basis.192 In such a case, 
determining the place of effective management of the trust may be difficult, as it 
would require knowing the place where the decisions concerning the trust are 
made and where they are actually carried out. Where the place of effective 
management is not clear, in that the duties of the trustees are not centralised in 
one specific country (which can be a means of avoiding taxes, as the relevant 
country does not have jurisdiction to tax a trust that is not resident - effectively 
managed, in that country), then the residence status of the trustees may have to 
be considered to decide the tax residence of the trust.193 It may also be 
necessary to consider evidence regarding the trustees’ visits to specific countries 
for the purposes of taking and implementing decisions relating to the trust. The 
passports of the trustees could then be produced as evidence.194 A founder 
could ensure that the trust is not deemed resident onshore by seeing to it that all 
or a majority of the trustees are not resident in the country concerned, and that 
the general administration of the trust is carried on outside that country.195 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that if a trust is deemed to be a resident of 
the Republic, because its place of effective management is here, then it will be 
taxable on its worldwide income. Although SARS Interpretation Note provides 
valuable guidance to the interpretation of the term “place of effective 
management”, the taxation of a trust on the basis of its place of effective 
management being in South Africa may be challenged in a court of law. The 
reason being that, South Africa does not have a legal meaning for the term 
“place effective management”, and SARS interpretation notes are not law.196 As 
                                                                                                                                            
190 De Koker in par 5.2I.  
191 Olivier & Honiball at 247. 
192 Olivier & Honiball at 247. 
193 Olivier & Honiball at 247.  
194 Olivier & Honiball at 247. 
195  Diamond & Diamond at INTRO-94.4. 
196  ITC 1675 (1998), 62 SATC 219. See also the discussion in chapter 3 par 3.6, under the 
heading “How to Determine the Place of Effective Management of a Company”. 
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was recommended in chapter 3, it is reiterated that SARS’s interpretation of the 
term should be given the force of law by refining and incorporating it in the 
Income Tax Act.  
 
6.9     CONCLUSION 
 
From the above description of the trust concept and the appealing features of 
trusts, especially those set up in tax-haven jurisdictions, it is nor surprising that a 
country’s residents may find the trust to be an ideal offshore tax-planning vehicle. 
Although South Africa may apply the residence basis of taxation to tax the 
worldwide income of the trust beneficiaries, and the income of an offshore trust if 
it is effectively managed in South Africa, in absence of specific anti-avoidance 
measures, donors and trust beneficiaries can still avoid taxes when they engage 
in certain tax avoidance schemes. In the next chapter the legislation that South 
Africa has in place to curb certain anti-avoidance schemes is discussed in some 
detail.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CURBING OFFSHORE TRUSTS’ TAX AVOIDANCE: SOUTH AFRICA 
 
7.1 GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE TAXATION OF TRUST 
INCOME 
 
In respect of the general taxation of trusts, section 25B of the Income Tax Act1 
provides that income received by, or accrued to, or in favour of, any person in his 
capacity as the trustee of a trust shall, subject to the provisions of section 7, to 
the extent to which such income has been derived for the immediate or future 
benefit of any ascertained beneficiary with a vested right to such income, be 
deemed to be income which has accrued to the beneficiary, and to the extent to 
which such income is not so derived, be deemed to be income of the trust. 
 
In summary, section 25B read with section 7 sets out three possibilities as 
regards the incidence of tax on income that is the subject of a trust: 
- Income may be taxed in the hands of the founder of the trust (donor) 
where certain circumstances as set out in section 7 come into play.  
- Income that accrues to ascertained beneficiaries who have a vested right 
to the income is taxed in the hands of those beneficiaries. 
- If income is retained in a trust, it is taxed in the trust. 
 
These three possibilities are discussed below in relation to the way they are 
applied to curb tax avoidance that could result from investing in non-resident 
trusts. Note that although the order of income tax liability for a trust, in the 
Income Tax Act, is as set out in the above, for purposes creating a clear flow of 
the discussion, the order of discussing the above possibilities is changed. 
 
7.2 LIABILITY OF THE TRUST 
 
In terms of section 25B(1), if trust income is not distributed to beneficiaries, but 
retained in the trust, the trust is liable for tax since it is deemed to be a “person”, 
                                                 
1  Act 58 of 1962 (as amended). 
343 
 
 
 
and thus a taxpayer, for income tax purposes.2 Currently trusts (excluding 
“special trusts”) are taxed at a flat rate of 40% on all retained income.3 This 
encourages trustees to apportion the trust income to the beneficiaries, rather 
than retain it in the trust.4  
 
If a trust is not resident in South Africa, in other words it was not formed or 
established in the Republic, nor is it effectively managed in the Republic, then 
potentially the trust income and capital could be accumulated in the non-resident 
trust without being liable for tax in the Republic, as the Republic has no 
jurisdiction to tax the income of non-residents, if that income does not have its 
source in the Republic. 
 
7.3 LIABILITY OF THE BENEFICIARIES 
 
Section 25B(1) also provides that the income of a trust may be taxed in the 
hands of an ascertained beneficiary with a vested right to such income, if such 
income is derived for his immediate or future benefit. This implies that when the 
income or capital of a non-resident trust vests in a resident beneficiary, any 
receipt or accrual in his favour that is derived for his immediate or future benefit 
will be taxable in the hands of the relevant beneficiary. 
 
In order to avoid taxation when income from an offshore trust is distributed to 
resident beneficiaries, the income could be accumulated in an offshore trust for a 
period exceeding a year, with the intention that when it is distributed, it will be 
regarded as capital in nature and therefore not taxable in the hands of the 
beneficiary.5 To prevent the ensuing tax avoidance, section 25B(2A) was 
enacted to override any possible argument that when the accumulated income 
vests in the beneficiary, it is of a capital nature and therefore not taxable.6 
                                                 
2   See the definition of “trust” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act. In terms of s 1 of the Income Tax 
Act, the trustee is the representative taxpayer of the trust. 
3   S 5 of the Income Tax Act. 
4 R King & B Victor Law and Estates Planning Easiguide (2006/2007) in par 16.8.6. 
5 K Mitchell & L Mitchell Offshore Transactions and the World-wide Basis of Taxation (2004 
seminar notes) at 88; DM Davis, C Beneke & RD Jooste Estate Planning (September 
2004) Service Issue 17 in par 6.3.1. 
6 S 25B(2A) came into effect on 1 January 2001. See also D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on 
Income Tax (2006-2007) par 16.142A; RP Pace Wills and Adminstration of Estates (last 
updated September 2006) in par B21.3.3. 
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Section 25B(2A)7 provides as follows:  
Where during any year of assessment any resident acquires any vested right to any 
amount representing capital of any trust which is not a resident, that amount must be 
included in the income of that resident in that year, if - 
(a) that capital arose from any receipt and accruals of such trust which would have 
constituted income if such trust had been a resident, in any previous year of assessment 
during which that resident had a contingent right  to that income; and 
(b) that amount has not been subject to tax in the Republic in terms of this Act. 
 
In terms of section 25B(2A)(a), capital should have arisen from receipts and 
accruals of the offshore trust which would have constituted income, if the trust 
had been a resident. This implies that, if the funds are invested as “roll-up” funds 
and “wrap bonds”8 which confer no right to income, section 25B(2A) cannot 
apply. 
 
Initially the term “income” appeared in section 25B(2A),  and it could be argued 
that the section could not be applied to income from a foreign source. In terms of 
the definition of “gross income” in section 1 of the Income Tax Act, a non-
resident is liable for tax in South Africa only on receipts and accruals of income 
derived from a source within or deemed to be within the Republic. To counter 
reliance on such arguments, this section was amended in 2001,9 resulting in the 
amendment of the wording of section 25B(2A)(a) to “receipts or accrual ... which 
would have constituted income if such trust had been a resident”. This made it 
clear that the section did apply to income from a foreign source.10 The Revenue 
Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004 further amended this provision, and now the 
section generally refers to “amount” rather than “income”. The Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 2004 explains that the term  
                                                 
7 As amended by s 27 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004. 
8 RD Jooste “Offshore Trusts and Foreign Income - The Specific Anti-avoidance Provisions” 
(2002) Acta Juridica 201. “Roll-up” funds and “wrap-bonds” are investment structures that 
allow an investor to roll up income and gains generated by underlying assets without 
ongoing tax liabilities. No income or capital gains need to be accounted for in the 
investor’s tax return until benefits are actually taken from the plan. When benefits are 
taken, both investments create a capital gain which is subject to income tax rather than 
capital gains tax. See Davis et al in par 6.3.1. See also Offshore Investments Specialists 
“Offshore Bond: UK Tax Breaks Investing in Offshore Funds through an Offshore Bond”. 
Available at >http://www.offshore.com/investing-offshore-4.htm<, last accessed 9 July 
2007. 
9  S 14(1)(b) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 19 of 2001. 
10   At the time the definition of “gross income” did not distinguish between residents and non-
residents. Receipts or accruals had to be from a South African source or deemed to be 
from a South African source in order to be taxed in the Republic. See DM Davis, C 
Beneke and RD Jooste Estate Planning (September 2004) Service Issue 17 in par 6.3.1; 
see also Jooste at 201.  
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“amount” as used in the section makes it clear that a term which has a broader 
scope than the word “income” is intended.11 
 
Section 25B(2A) limits the application of this provision to receipts or accruals that 
would have constituted income, if the trust had been resident in any previous 
year of assessment at the time of the receipt or accrual. This implies firstly that 
section 25B(2A) cannot apply to receipts or accruals before 1 January 2001 
(when the residence basis of taxation was introduced), as those receipts or 
accruals then had a non-South African source and so they would not have 
constituted “income” at that time.12 Secondly, if the trust has received income 
that is exempt from tax under South African law, section 25(2A) cannot be 
applied.13  
 
Section 25B(2A)(b) makes it clear that where the income or the receipts and 
accruals have been subjected to tax in the Republic, the section cannot be 
applied.14 Thus, if the accumulated income has been subject to tax in South 
Africa, for example in terms of section 7(5) or section 7(8),15 it cannot be taxed 
again in terms of section 25B(2A). This is intended to prevent double taxation of 
the income. It can thus be argued that if SARS fails to apply section 7(5) or 
section 7(8) to tax the income in the year of its accrual to the trust, in 
circumstances where these sections were applicable, then SARS cannot apply 
section 25B(2A) to the accumulated income in a subsequent year when the 
income is distributed as capital. This is because the income was “subject to tax” 
as required by section 25B(2A) in the year of its accrual to the trust, and SARS 
cannot choose to apply section 7(5), or section 7(8), in the year of accrual of 
income to the trust, or section 25B(2A) in the year of distribution of the 
accumulated income.16 
 
In order to apply section 25B(2A), a resident beneficiary who acquires a vested 
right to any amount representing the capital of a non-resident trust, should have 
had a contingent right to that amount in a previous year of assessment. The 
                                                 
11 Clause 27 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 24 of 2004. 
12 Davis et al in par  6.3.1; see also Jooste at 201. 
13 L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 245. 
14 Olivier & Honiball at 245; Jooste at 201; Davis et al in par 6.3.1 at 6-9; De Koker in par 
12.25A. 
15   The operational scope of these sections is discussed in more detail below. 
16 Davis et al in par 6.3.1 at 6-9.   
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meaning of the term “contingent right” was described by Watermeyer CJ in 
Durban City Council v Association of Building Societies17 as being “the 
conditional nature of someone’s title to the right”.18 There have been arguments 
that section 25B(2A) could fail in its application to non-resident discretionary 
trusts, as the interest of a discretionary beneficiary can best be described as a 
spes or a mere hope and not as a “contingent right”.19 Davis20 and Jooste,21 
however, submit that the interest of a discretionary beneficiary is a “contingent 
right” within the meaning of section 25B(2A). These submissions are based on 
Cameron‘s 22 statement that “if a trustee has a discretion not merely how, but 
also whether to pay income, or distribute capital to the beneficiary, then the 
latter’s right is merely contingent”. On the authority of Cameron’s statement 
above, it is submitted that the interest of a discretionary beneficiary is a 
contingent right within the meaning of section 25(2A), and that therefore this 
provision can be applied to non-resident discretionary trusts. 
 
Where a resident beneficiary that had a contingent right to the income of a non-
resident trust, acquires a vested right to any amount representing capital of a 
non-resident in a subsequent year, that amount must be included in the income 
of that beneficiary in that year. Therefore, if the amount representing capital of 
the trust is received by, or accrues to, a trust beneficiary subsequent to the year 
in which the income accrued to the trust, section 25B(2A) cannot be applied.23 
Olivier et al24 also argue that if a beneficiary is only a capital beneficiary and not 
an income beneficiary, the section cannot be applied, as a capital beneficiary 
would not have had a contingent right to the income in a previous year. This may 
necessitate an examination of the trust deed and the trust accounts to establish 
whether the section applies.25  
Tax liability in terms of section 25B(2A) arises from the fact that the beneficiary 
was a resident in the year that he/she acquired a vested right to the capital of the 
                                                 
17 1942 AD 27 at 33. 
18 See also Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 163 at 175; Meyerowitz in 
par 16.135. Davis et al in par 6.3.1; M Grundy Grundy’s Tax Havens: Offshore Business 
Centres - A World Survey 6 ed (1993) at 78; see also G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 9 
ed (2002) at 12.   
19 DJM Clegg Income Tax in South Africa (last updated November 2006) in par 17.3.8.  
20 Davis et al in par 6.3.1. 
21 Jooste at 203. 
22 E Cameron, M de Waal, B Wunsh & P Solomon Honore’s South African Law of Trusts 5 
ed (2002) at 557. 
23 Davis et al in par 6.3.1 at 6-9; De Koker in par 12.25A. 
24 Olivier & Honiball at 246. 
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trust. Thus, if a person has had a contingent right to an amount in a non-resident 
trust for a number of years during which income is accumulated in the trust and 
he/she acquires a vested right to any amount representing the capital of a non-
resident trust in the year he/she is a resident of the Republic, he/she will be liable 
in that year for tax on the accumulated income accruing to him/her. It is 
immaterial whether the taxpayer has always been a resident. The date on which 
he/she became a resident is also immaterial.26 Conversely, if the beneficiary is a 
non-resident in the year that he/she acquires the vested right to any amount 
representing the capital of a non-resident trust, even though he/she may have 
been a resident during the period when he/she had a contingent right to the 
income of the trust, he/she is not liable for tax on the amount that is distributed 
by the trust.27  
 
There is, however, no certainty that the section could be applied, if a beneficiary 
had only a contingent right to the income of the trust for part of the year of 
assessment. It could be argued that, where the beneficiary does not have a 
contingent right to the income at the end of the year of assessment, the section 
is not applicable.28 On the other hand, it could be argued that, as tax is an annual 
event, the holding of a contingent right to the income for only part of the year of 
assessment does not render the section inapplicable.29 It is submitted that the 
latter argument is correct.  
 
It might be possible to avoid the application of section 25B(2A) by providing in 
the trust deed that no income may be awarded by the trust to a resident 
beneficiary in the year in which it accrues to the trust. Then it could be argued 
that when capitalised income is distributed to the beneficiary, section 25B(2A) is 
not applicable, because in the year that the income accrued to the trust the 
beneficiary did not have a contingent right to the income.30 Davis31 submits that 
“on the current wording of section 25B(2A), it may be difficulty to apply the 
provision and that legislative amendment may be necessary to close this loop-
                                                                                                                                            
25 Olivier & Honiball at 246. 
26 Meyerowitz in par 16.142A; De Koker in par 12.15A. 
27 Meyerowitz in par 16.142A. 
28 Olivier & Honiball at 245. 
29 Olivier & Honiball at 245. 
30 Davis et al in par 6.3.1 at 6-10(1); Jooste at 204.  
31 Davis et al in par 6.3.1 at 6-10 - 6-10(1). 
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hole”.32 Although this discussion is not centered on general anti-avoidance 
provisions, it is worth pointing out that such a scheme could be caught by the 
general anti-avoidance provisions in sections 80A-80L of the Income Tax Act, 
which subject to tax any scheme which has the purpose and effect of avoiding 
tax. In brief, a successful application of sections 80A-80L would inter alia require 
the courts to look into the surrounding circumstances of the case to prove that 
the scheme has created a right or obligation which would not normally be created 
between persons dealing at arm’s length.33 In this case, as the resident 
beneficiary can only be awarded the income once it has been capitalised, this 
requirement would have been satisfied. But if the liberal approach adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd)34 
is applied, SARS may not be successful. In that case, it was ruled that a taxpayer 
who sets out to achieve a bona fide commercial objective, can do so through a 
structure specifically aimed at the avoidance of tax even if the contracts in such a 
structure create abnormal rights and obligations. The abnormality requirement in 
the anti-avoidance provisions also require that the provisions be viewed “having 
regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme 
was entered into or carried out”,35 and that the special relationship between the 
parties be taken into account. These requirements limit what constitutes 
abnormality in the particular circumstances and make SARS’s task more 
difficult.36  
 
By the use of the words “arose from”, section 25B(2A) makes it clear that capital 
must have arisen from income received by or accrued to the trust. This 
presupposes a direct causal link between the income that accrues to the 
beneficiary and the capital of the trust. The link may be clearly apparent from an 
arithmetical calculation, or it may be clear through designation by a body or 
persons making the capital distribution in which the source of the capital being 
                                                 
32 Davis et al in par 6.3.1 at 6-10 - 6-10(1). 
33 Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 (A) at 485A, 1980 Taxpayer 49, 41 SATC 179; see also 
Meyerowitz in par 29.7. 
34 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA) at 1151E, 1999 Taxpayer 173. 
35 Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 (A) at 484B, 1980 Taxpayer 49. Note that the previous anti-
avoidance provision under s 103(1) of the Income Tax Act was replaced by ss 80A-80L in 
terms of s 36 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 20 of 2006. Although the new anti-
avoidance provisions are not yet supported by case law, there are a number of similarities 
between the old and the new provisions thus, certain principles established in the cases 
with reference to s 103(1), are still relevant. See K Huxham & P Haupt Notes on South 
African Income Tax (2007) at 360.  
36 Davis et al at 6-10. 
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distributed is named.37  In practice, however, it is difficult to establish a link, for 
the simple reason that, although capital grows on an annual basis as a result of 
income received in the course of a year and not distributed, the capital also 
decreases as a result of distributions made from the capital. The result is that 
there is usually no clear link between a distribution made from capital and the 
various income items that have been aggregated over the years to form the 
capital.38 Where there is no causal link between a distribution made from capital 
and the various income items that have aggregated over the years to form the 
capital, the section cannot be applied.39  
 
The use of the words “arose from” in section 25B(2A) also implies that, if the 
distribution is made up of capital from certain sources, such as capital with which 
the trust was set up, or a capital gain made from the disposal of a capital asset, 
the section will not be applied.40  Thus, if an award is made to a beneficiary out of 
“genuine” capital as opposed to capitalised income, section 25B(2A) cannot be 
applied.41 This may require the trustees to identify the “genuine” capital, so as to 
prevent any disputes that could arise as to the source of the award.42 
 
If section 25B(2A) is to be applicable, the income at issue must accrue to a non-
resident trust. In terms of section 1 of the Act, a non-resident trust is one which 
was not formed or established in South Africa and does not have a place of 
effective management in South Africa. Taxpayers could set up non-resident 
trusts that may be deemed invalid in South Africa, because they do not comply 
with the requirements of a trust (discussed above) as set out in our law. Since 
such a trust would be invalid under South African law, section 25B(2A) cannot be 
applied to it. Some examples are the so-called “non-charitable purpose trusts”, 
which are recognised in jurisdictions such as the Isle of Man, the British Virgin 
Islands, Jersey, the Cayman Islands and Mauritius.43 The “non-charitable 
purpose trust” is a trust set up without ascertainable beneficiaries, and the 
                                                 
37 Olivier & Honiball at 245. 
38 Olivier & Honiball at 245. 
39 Olivier & Honiball at 245. 
40         Olivier & Honiball at 245. 
41 Davis et al in par 6.3.1 at 6-9. 
42 Davis et al in par 6.3.1 at 6-9. 
43 Jooste at 205. 
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purpose of the trust is usually not clearly stated.44 Once again, although this 
discussion is not about general anti-avoidance provisions, it is worth briefly 
pointing out that, where SARS cannot apply the specific anti-avoidance provision 
under section 25B(2A), it may be possible to prevent tax avoidance by attacking 
the integrity of a “non charitable purpose trust” and impugning it as a sham trust 
under Common Law. The reason would be that the founder of the trust had no 
real intention to pass ownership and control of his or her assets to the trustees of 
the trust. The “trust” income would then be deemed to accrue to the founder, as if 
no “trust” had been created.45 The fact that such a trust could be considered a 
sham in the Republic does not necessarily imply that it is a sham in the 
jurisdiction in which it was formed. This is especially so if the trust has been set 
up in a tax-haven jurisdiction where secrecy laws help to disguise offshore 
investments. The formation of sham trusts is, however, coming under attack in at 
least certain offshore jurisdictions, as is evidenced by the judgment by the Royal 
Court of Jersey in the case of Rahman v Chase Bank Trust Company (CI) Ltd 
and Others46 (which was discussed above).  
 
7.4 LIABILITY OF THE DONOR  
 
In terms of section 25B of the Income Tax Act, income retained in a trust is 
taxable in the trust, and beneficiaries with vested rights to the income of the trust 
are liable to tax on any receipt or accrual in their favour. This section is, however, 
subject to section 7 of the Income Tax Act, which is an anti-avoidance measure 
that provides that in certain circumstances, income from the trust will be taxable 
in the hands of the donor. Section 7(5) and section 7(6) are generally applied to 
curb tax avoidance in respect of domestic discretionary trusts, but to some extent 
they can also be applied to non-resident discretionary trusts.47 Section 7(8) 
specifically targets non-resident trusts. These provisions are analysed below. 
Trusts subject to a condition 
 
Taxpayers often take advantage of the fact that the beneficiaries of a 
discretionary trust have no vested interest in the assets of the trust and thus, 
                                                 
44 Davis et al in par 6.3.1; A Kaplan Trusts in Prime Jurisdictions (2000) at 26.  
45 Davis et al in par 6.3.9.  
46 1991 JLR 103. 
47 It is submitted that s 7(7) does not apply to this discussion, as it applies where a donor 
cedes investment income to someone else, but retains the underlying property. 
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they cannot be subjected to tax, until there has been a receipt or accrual in their 
favour. Taxes could be deferred by the donor if he inserts a condition in a trust 
deed, whereby the beneficiaries are denied the benefits, until the relevant 
condition is met. The accumulated funds could then be used to make further 
investments. Section 7(5) is an anti-avoidance provision that can be applied to 
counter the tax advantages that could result from such schemes. This work does 
not, however, entail a detailed discussion of this section since its application to 
offshore trusts is limited as explained below.  
 
In terms of section 7(5), 
If any  person has made any donation, settlement or other similar disposition which is 
subject to a stipulation or condition, whether made or imposed by that person or anyone 
else, to the effect that the beneficiaries or some of them shall not receive the income or 
some portion of the income thereunder until the happening of an event, fixed or 
contingent, so much of any income as would, but for such stipulation or condition, in 
consequence of the donation settlement or other disposition, be received by or accrued to 
or in favour of the beneficiaries, shall until the happening of the event or the death of that 
person, which ever takes place first, be deemed to be the income of that person.48  
 
The general aim of this section is to prevent tax avoidance where and so long as 
the donor does not permit the beneficiary to enjoy the income derived from the 
trust, by deeming the income in issue to be that of the donor.49 There are three 
factors that have to be in place for this section to apply, namely: 
- there must be a deed of donation, settlement or other disposition, 
- it must contain a stipulation to the effect that the beneficiaries, or some of 
them, shall not receive the income, or some portion of it, until the 
happening of some event, whether fixed or contingent, 
- but for that stipulation income would have been received by or accrued to 
the beneficiary, 50 
If an affirmative answer is given to each of these questions, then “the income” 
must be deemed to be the income of the person who made the stipulation.  
                                                 
48  It important to note that s 7(5) applies irrespective of whether the stipulation or condition 
withholding income from the beneficiaries was made by the person making the donation, 
or by some other person. See De Koker in par 12.20; Clegg in par 17.3.5. 
49  Meyerowitz in par 16.144; De Koker in par 12.20; Clegg in par 17.3; D Kruger & W Scholtz 
Broomberg on Tax Strategy 4 ed (2003) at 14. 
50   In ITC 673 (1948), 16 SATC 230 at 233 it was held that: “An analysis of the subsection 
shows that it first of all contemplates a hypothesis, viz. the existence of a stipulation that 
the beneficiary shall not receive the income under the deed till the happening of an event. 
Secondly, the subsection provides what is to be deemed to be a devolution of the income 
until the event takes place. That devolution is back to the donor if apart from the 
stipulation it would be received by or accrue to the beneficiary concerned”. See also ITC 
1033 (1959), 26 SATC 73 at 75; Clegg in par 17.3.5; Davis et al in par 6.3.4 at 6-13; 
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The words “donation” and “settlement” were defined in Ovenstone v SIR51  to 
imply a disposal of property for no consideration, ie a wholly gratuitous disposal, 
made out of the liberality or generosity of the donor, and that the term “other 
disposition” excludes any disposition of property that is a wholly commercial or 
business one.52 The phrase “donation, settlement or other disposition” is used in 
other subsections of section 7 that are discussed in this thesis. Wherever it 
occurs in the remainder of this thesis, the phrase will be considered to bear the 
above meaning. 
 
The facts in Estate Dempers v SIR,53 were that the trust deed settled monies 
upon trustees and directed that until the donor’s death, the annual income could 
be used by the trustees in their discretion for the benefit of the donor’s grandson 
and/or his issue, or for making charitable donations. After the donor’s death, the 
annual income was to be used in the trustees’ discretion for the benefit of the 
grandson, and the balance of the income was to accumulate in the trust. One 
third of the total fund was to be paid to the grandson when he attained the age of 
twenty-five, fifty per cent of the remainder when he attained the age of thirty, and 
the balance when he attained the age of thirty-five. If he were to die before 
reaching any one of these ages, other beneficiaries were substituted for him.  
In determining whether the former section 9(5) (ie the section equivalent to 7(5)) 
was applicable to this case, Corbett JA ruled that it was necessary to determine 
whether the stipulation in the deed of trust provided for an “event”, until the 
happening of which the beneficiaries of the trust would not receive the income 
                                                                                                                                            
Huxham & Haupt at 352. 
51 1980 (2) SA 721 (A) at 735 where it is explained that a “settlement” is usually of the same 
genus as a donation as it is also generally made gratuitously out of liberality or generosity. 
It is probably separately mentioned in the critical phrase because in form, substance, or 
effect it may sometimes not be regarded as a true donation. For example, where the 
recipients of the property are trustees who are not themselves enriched by the 
settlement”.  
52  Although it seems that this does not specifically expand on the words “other disposition”, 
in terms of the ejusdem generis rule, which provides that words following particular and 
specific words must be restricted to things of the same nature as those specified, the 
words “other disposition” can be interpreted as having the same meaning as a donation 
and a settlement. These words could also be interpreted by using the noscitur a sociis 
maxim, which provides that “when two words which are susceptible of analogous meaning 
are coupled together [noscitur] a sociis they are understood to be used in their cognate 
sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, that is, the more general is 
restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. See De Koker in par 25.12; see also 
Clegg in par 17.3.5. 
53 1977 (3) SA 410 (A); 1977 Taxpayer 150.   
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thereof.54 An “event” for the purposes of section 7(5) could be the attainment of 
the stipulated ages by the beneficiary, the death of the beneficiary, or the 
marriage of the beneficiary.55 It was held that a stipulation in the trust deed, to 
the effect that the beneficiary should not receive the accumulated income until 
the happening of an event (viz the termination of the trust by the attainment by 
the donee of the ages stated in the trust deed, or the predecease of the donee, 
causing a devolution upon his issue), satisfied the requirements of the 
subsection.56   
 
It has been argued, in some cases, that for a devolution to take place, the 
beneficiaries ought to have vested rights to the income of the trust, which would 
imply that section 7(5) - which refers to discretionary trusts - is inapplicable. For 
example, counsel for the appellant in the Estate Dempers case submitted that it 
could not be said that, but for the stipulation, the income withheld in terms of the 
stipulation would have been received by or have accrued to or in favour of the 
donee, as the devolution can only apply where the beneficiaries have vested 
rights to the accumulated income and they did not have such rights in the Estate 
Dempers case.57 This argument was also relied on in ITC 775.58 This case, 
however, went off on its particular facts, and it cannot be relied on as providing 
authority on this matter.59 In Estate Dempers Corbett JA ruled that, in the 
application of the subsection, a vested right to the accumulated income is not a 
sine qua non.60 If the beneficiaries have vested rights, then this would be a 
strong, possibly decisive, factor leading to the conclusion that, but for the 
                                                 
54 Estate Dempers v SIR 1977 (3) SA 410 (A) at 421G. 
55  There have been controversies as to whether the exercise of discretion by the trustees is 
an “event” as contemplated by s 7(5). In Hullet v CIR 1944 NPD 263 the court was of the 
view that the exercise of a trustee’s discretion may in certain circumstances be an “event”. 
This interpretation was followed in ITC 775 (1953), 19 SATC 314(C) and ITC 1033 (1959), 
26 SATC 73. However, the respondent counsel in CIR v Berold 1962 (3) SA 748 (A) at 
750H, and the appellant’s counsel in Estate Dempers v SIR at 422E reasoned that the 
exercise of trustees’ discretion was not an event. The same reasoning was also upheld by 
appellant’s counsel in ITC 1328 (1980), 43 SATC 56. In all three cases, the courts did not 
did not make a decision on this matter. It is recommended that the courts should decide 
on this matter to resolve the present controversies. For details see Editorial “Estate and 
Tax Planning: Inter Vivos Trusts: Income Tax and Donations Tax” The Taxpayer vol 43 No 
6 (June 1994) at 111; Jooste at 198; EM Stack, M Cronjé & EH Hamel The Taxation of 
Individuals and Companies 15 ed (2001) at 557; Clegg in par 17.3.5; Davis et al in par 
6.3.4 at 6-17; De Koker in par 12.20. 
56 Estate Dempers at 424. 
57 Estate Dempers at 425. 
58   ITC 755 (1954),19 SATC 314. 
59  Estate Dempers at 425. 
60 Estate Dempers at 425. 
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stipulation withholding the income, it would have been received by them. The 
judge ruled, however, that the subsection is not confined in its application to 
instances where the beneficiary has a vested right to the income which is to be 
withheld. The use of the words “fixed and contingent”61 in denoting the event, 
until the happening of which a beneficiary is not to receive the income, indicates 
that the subsection can also apply to discretionary trusts.  
 
As stated above, section 7(5) generally applies to curb tax avoidance that results 
from investments in discretionary trusts; its application to offshore discretionary 
trusts is limited. The reason is that this provision can only apply, if there is 
evidence in the trust deed that shows that the distribution of the trust benefits is 
subject to a condition. If an offshore trust is effectively managed in South Africa, 
in that the trustees carry on the day-to-day management of the trust here, it may 
be possible to get access to the trust deed, prove the presence of a condition 
and then apply section 7(5) to tax the resident donor. If however the trust was 
formed offshore and if the trust deed is kept offshore, the applicable laws may 
contain secrecy provisions that could prevent access to the relevant trust deed. It 
should also be noted that, if the income is retained in the non-resident trust, 
section 7(5) cannot apply to such a trust, if it receives income only from a non-
South African source.62  
 
Liability of the donor: Retaining the power to revoke the right to income 
 
The flexibility of discretionary trusts can be used to avoid taxes where the trust 
deed contains a stipulation that the donor can revoke a beneficiary’s right to 
receive the trust income and confer that right on another person. With the ability 
to vary the beneficiaries to the trust income, the donor can decide on an annual 
basis which of the beneficiaries has the lowest marginal rate of tax, and then 
direct that the income accruing to the trust should be paid to that particular 
beneficiary.63 This work does not, however, entail a detailed discussion of this 
section since, like section 7(5); its application to offshore trusts is limited as 
                                                 
61  A “contingent event” as an event which may or may not happen. A “fixed event” is an 
event which will certainly and inevitably happen. See Estate Dempers at 425; see also 
Jewish Colonial Trust v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 163 at 175-176; Durban City Council v 
Association of Building Societies 1942 AD 27 at 33-34. For the difference between a 
“vested right” and a “contingent right” see the discussion in chapter 6 par 6.4.2.  
62 Clegg in par 17.3.5; Huxham & Haupt in par 27.3.10.  
63 Clegg in par 17.3.5; Davis et al in par 6.3.5 at 6-17; Huxham & Haupt in par 27.3.7.  
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explained below.  
 
Section 7(6) provides that  
If any deed of donation, settlement or other disposition contains any stipulation that the 
right to receive any income thereby conferred, may, under the powers retained by the 
person by whom the right is conferred, be revoked or conferred upon another, so much of 
any income as in consequence of the disposition, settlement or other disposition is 
received by or accrues to or in favour of the person on whom the right is conferred, shall 
be deemed to be the income of the person by whom it is conferred, so long as he retains 
those powers. 
 
In ITC 543,64 the taxpayers were two brothers who carried on a business in 
which a third brother had been employed. Desiring to provide their brother with a 
pension in consideration of his services, the taxpayers (two brothers) formed a 
trust fund, whereby the third brother was to receive a portion of the income from 
the trust fund during his lifetime. On his death, the trusts had the discretion of 
paying the income to his widow, or to the donors, or their legal representatives. 
The taxpayers’ brother died, and in the exercise of their discretion, the trustees 
paid the income to his widow. The Commissioner invoked section 9(6) (as it was 
then) and taxed the donors on the trust income. The court held that the section 
was applicable, as the trustees were not bound to pay the trust income to the 
widow. In terms of the trust deed, the balance not paid to her was to be divided 
between the two donors.   
 
It appears that section 7(6) is not limited to an express provision in the deed, 
which empowers the donor to revoke a beneficiaries’ right to income and confer it 
upon another, it can also be applied where the exercise of this power is implied.65 
Thus, where the donor has the power to require that income be lent to him, this 
could amount to a right to revoke the income, since the trustee would have been 
deprived of the power to distribute it.66 It is argued that section 7(6) could also be 
                                                 
64 ITC 543 (1942), 13 SATC 118. 
65 Meyerowitz in par 16.151. 
66 Cameron et al at 282. In ITC 673 (1948), 16 SATC 230, the trust deed provided that the 
donor had the right to exercise voting powers in respect of the shares donated, to require 
the trustees to lend him the income of the trust without security and with or without 
interest, to revoke the appointment of any trustee, and to fill any vacancy. In addition, the 
trustees were permitted to abandon any claim or debts due to the trust. It was contended 
by the Commissioner that all these provisions amounted to an implied power to revoke the 
right to receive income. The court rejected this contention, and held that s 7(6) only 
contemplates an express provision in the deed, which reserves the right to the donor to 
revoke the right to any accruing income and to confer it upon another. However, 
Meyerowitz in par 16.151 and Cameron et al at 282 are of the view that s 7(6) should have 
been applied as the circumstance of the case show that donor had retained the power to 
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applied where the donor retains the right to cancel the trust as he would have 
retained the right to confer or revoke the rights under the trust deed. However, if 
the trust deed provides for the automatic termination of the trust at the end of a 
fixed period, even if, on expiry of that period, the income and capital of the trust 
will revert to the donor, he does not retain the power to revoke or confer upon 
another the right to receive the income of the trust as contemplated in section 
7(6).67  
 
It appears that section 7(6) can only be invoked where the beneficiary has a 
vested right to receive the income that is subject to revocation through the 
exercise of powers retained by the donor.68  Thus, where a donation confers a 
discretion on trustees to decide whether to distribute the income to a beneficiary, 
who only has a contingent right to that income, section 7(6) cannot be applied 
until the trustees exercise their discretion. Section 7(5) would be applicable in 
such a case.69  
 
As mentioned above, although section 7(6) can be used to curb tax avoidance in 
regard to discretionary trusts generally, it has limited application to offshore 
discretionary trusts. This provision can only apply, if there is evidence in the trust 
deed that shows that a donor has retained power to revoke the rights under the 
trust deed. It is retaliated that, as in the case with section 7(5), If an offshore trust 
is effectively managed in South Africa, it may be possible to get access to the 
trust deed from resident trustees and tax the resident donor. But where the trust 
was formed in a tax-haven jurisdiction, the applicable laws that contain secrecy 
provisions could prevent access to the trust deed.  
Liability of the donor: Donations made to offshore trusts 
 
Apart from the section 7(5) and section 7(6), which apply generally to 
discretionary trusts, the Income Tax Act does contain provisions, which can be 
used to directly target offshore trusts. One such provision is section 7(8) (as 
amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004). This section 
provides the following:  
Where by reason of or in consequence of any donation, settlement or other disposition 
                                                                                                                                            
revoke the right to income. 
67 Davis et al in par 6.3.5 at 6-19; De Koker in par 12.21. 
68 De Koker in par 12.21. 
69 De Koker in par 12.21. 
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(other than a donation, settlement or other disposition to a foreign entity, as defined in 
section 9D, of a public character) made by any resident, any amount is received by or 
accrued to any person who is not a resident (other than a controlled foreign entity as 
defined in section 9D in relation to such resident), which would have constituted income 
had that person been a resident, there shall be included in the income of such resident so 
much of that amount as is attributable to such donation, settlement or other disposition.70 
 
In summary, this section deems any amount received by, or accruing to, a non-
resident (which would have constituted “income” as defined in the Income Tax 
Act had that person been a resident) and arising from a donation by a resident 
donor to be that of the donor.71 
 
Before analysing the working of this provision, it is worth pointing out that 
previously, non-resident trusts (offshore trusts) were included in the definition of 
“controlled foreign entity”, whereby an amount received by the “controlled foreign 
entity”, which is attributed to a donation, settlement or other disposition, would be 
imputed to the donor, in terms of section 9D (2) of the Income Tax Act. Non-
resident trusts have now been removed from the definition of “controlled foreign 
entity”, which is now referred to as a “controlled foreign company”.72 A non-
resident is only liable to tax in the Republic for income that accrues from a source 
within the Republic. This implies that, if a non-resident trust does not make 
distributions to beneficiaries resident in the Republic (who would be subject to tax 
in terms of section 25B(1)), then in the absence of a provision, such as section 
7(8) which “imputes” to the South African donor the income of  
                                                 
70 See s 5(1) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004.  
71 De Koker in par 12.25A; Huxham & Haupt in par 27.3.10; A Duncan “Hidden Assets” (July 
2004) De Rebus 32. 
72 S 9D(2) was amended by s 22(1)(c) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 45 of 2003.  
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the non-resident trust,73 residents could easily avoid taxes by shifting income-
producing assets to non-resident trusts.74 
 
Before the amendment of section 7(8) in 2004,75 the section referred to “income” 
accruing to or being received by a non-resident. The use of the word “income” 
implied that section 7(8), as it read then, would not be applicable to non-resident 
trusts, as the word “income” is defined in section 1 of the Act as meaning “gross 
income” less “exempt income”. In terms of the definition of “gross income” in 
section 1 of the Income Tax Act, a non-resident is liable to tax in South Africa 
only on receipts and accruals of income derived from a source within, or deemed 
to be within, the Republic. This prompted the argument that section 7(8) (before 
its amendment) could not apply to foreign-source income accruing to the non-
resident trust.76  
 
To remedy this anomaly, it was argued77 that the above interpretation that results 
in the exemption from taxation, could not have been the intention of the 
legislature when enacting section 7(8).78 Jooste79 and Olivier 80 contended that 
the word “income” as used in the section should be given its wider meaning, 
implying “profits” irrespective of their source. Support for this interpretation was 
based on the decision in CIR v Simpson,81 where the court held that the word 
“income”, as used in the equivalent section 7(2), had to be construed as meaning 
the profits and gains, and not “income” in the sense of gross income less 
exemptions, as the term is defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. The court 
in the Simpson case arrived at this interpretation by referring to a rule of law 
which provides that, “if a defined expression is used in a context which the 
                                                 
73 King & Victor in par 16.8.6; B Goodall Tax and Investments Easiguide (2005/2006) in par 
1.17.2.   
74 Jooste at 186. 
75 Amended by s 5 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004. 
76 Olivier & Honiball at 246; Jooste at 189; Davis et al in par 6.3.6A; Clegg in par 17.3.8; De 
Koker in par 4.67B. 
77 De Koker in par 4.67B. 
78 De Koker in par 4.67B. 
79 Jooste at 189. 
80 Olivier & Honiball at 246. 
81 1949 (4) SA 678 (AD),16 SATC 268; it was also held in Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC 
(1921)1 KB 64 at 71 and also in Canadian Eagle Oil Company Ltd v The King (1946) AC 
199 at 140 that “in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what  is clearly said. There is no 
room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a 
tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the 
language used.”   
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definition will not fit, it may be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning”.82 
This is in line with the principle canon of interpretation of statutes, namely, that if 
the meaning of a word used in a statute is not clear, the literal meaning of the 
word must be applied.83 Reference could also be made to contextualisation, 
another rule of interpretation of statutes, which requires that the purpose of the 
legislation can be used to determine the intention of the legislature, where a word 
is ambiguous and does not have the effect the legislature intended.84 The 
decision in the Simpson case is evidence that the South African courts tend not 
to “slavishly” follow the strict meaning of words, or the very letter of a statutory 
provision. Instead, they have sought to solve problems of interpretation by 
endeavouring to determine what the legislature intended, taking into account not 
only the language of the legislature, but factors such as its object, intention and 
manifest purpose.85  
 
In 2004, an amendment was made to section 7(8), whereby instead of referring 
to the word “income”, the section now refers to “any amount” that is received by, 
or accrued to, a non-resident, “which would have constituted income had the 
person been a resident”. This amendment, which was initiated by SARS, is most 
welcome, as it dispels any argument that section 7(8) does not apply to 
donations resulting in income from a foreign source. 
 
In order for section 7(8) to apply, an amount must have been received by, or 
accrued to, a non-resident person (for example a non-resident trust). Thus, if 
trust funds are invested in instruments which confer no right to income, such as 
“roll-up” funds and “wrap bonds”,86 section 7(8) cannot apply. 
 
For section 7(8) to apply, income must have been received by, or accrued to, a 
non-resident by “reason of or in consequence” of a donation, settlement, or other 
disposition made by a resident. The phrase “donation, settlement or other 
disposition” bears the same meaning of a gratuitous disposition, as was 
discussed previously in relation to section 7(5). The words ”by reason of or in 
                                                 
82 A rule laid down in the SHG Halsbury Halsbury’s Laws of England 4 ed (1984) at 1108.  
See also De Koker in par 4.67B. 
83 Meyerowitz in par 3.6-3.8. 
84 De Koker in par 4.67B. 
85 De Koker in par 4.67B. 
86 Jooste at 188; see also Davis et al in par 6.3.6A. For the meaning of “Roll-up funds” and 
“wrap bonds” see fn 8 above.  
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consequence of” denote that there must be a certain nexus between the income 
received by the non-resident and the donation, settlement, or other disposition 
made by the resident.87 It is worth noting that other anti-avoidance provisions in 
section 788 use either the phrase “by reason of”, or “in consequence of”, but 
section 7(8) uses both phrases. Jooste89 notes that the combination of both 
phrases indicates that a very liberal interpretation of the nexus required by 
section 7(8) may be called for, and that the legislature intended the ambit of 
section 7(8) to be even wider in this regard than in the other anti-avoidance 
provisions in section 7.90  
 
The phrase by “reason of”, as used in determining the nexus required by the 
equivalent of the anti-avoidance provision section 7(3), was held by Centlivres CJ 
in CIR v Widan91 to imply some causal relation between the donation and the 
income in question, and that in ascertaining whether such causal relation exists, 
one must look not necessarily to the cause which is proximate in time, but to the 
real effective cause of the income being received.92 In addition, the court held 
that the donor’s motive was an important factor in ascertaining whether the 
necessary connection is present.  In Joss v SIR,93 the taxpayer sold assets to a 
company on an interest-free loan. The taxpayer’s minor daughter was a 
shareholder in the company and received a dividend. SARS deemed the 
dividend to be the taxpayer’s. The court found that the portion of the dividend 
that accrued to the minor, was attributable to the parent, as it was “by reason of” 
the interest-free loan made by the parent.94  
 
There appears to be no difference between the meaning of the words “by reason 
of”, and “in consequence of”, as used in this section.95 The ejusdem generis rule, 
which was discussed previously, would also be applicable here. Its effect would 
be that words following particular and specific words must be restricted to things 
of the same nature as those specified.96 Further, in terms of the “noscitur a 
                                                 
87 Jooste at 191. 
88 See ss 7(2)(a), 7(3), 7(5), 7(6) and 7(7). 
89 Jooste at 191. 
90 Jooste at 191. 
91 1955 (1) SA 226 (A) at 233.  
92 CIR v Widan 1955 (1) SA 266 (A) at 234. 
93 1980 (1) SA 674(T); 1980 Taxpayer 192. 
94 Joss v SIR 1980 (1) SA 674 (T) at 683.   
95 De Koker in par 4.67B; Davis et al in par 6.3.6A at 6-24.   
96 De Koker in par 25.12; see also Clegg in par 17.3.5. 
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sociis” maxim which was discussed earlier, when two words with an analogous 
meaning are coupled together, they are understood as being used in their 
cognate sense.97 Therefore, just as the phrase “donation, settlement or other 
disposition” is understood in a cognate sense, the phrase “in consequence” 
carries the same meaning as “by reason of”. 
 
In light of the above, it appears that section 7(8) has sufficient scope to be 
applicable in a wide range of circumstances. The Explanatory Memorandum on 
the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 2004 gives two examples of such 
circumstances in regard to section 7(8). The first example is where a South 
African resident donates R750 000 to a foreign discretionary trust, which is 
owned by a foreign trustee with oversight from a foreign protector. The foreign 
trustee has the power to vest the trust assets in a wide range of parties, but an 
attached letter containing the donor’s wishes requests that the funds be 
ultimately vested back in the South African resident, or a connected family 
member. The foreign trust places the full R750 000 in a foreign bank account, 
thereby generating R60 000. In terms of section 7(8), the amount of R60 000  
generated by the foreign trust from the foreign bank account is included as 
income of the South African resident, because this amount would have been 
income for the South African resident, had this amount been received by, or 
accrued directly, to the South African resident.  
 
The other example is where the foreign trust transfers an amount of R800 000 of 
accumulated funds to a foreign collective investment scheme, and the scheme 
generates R40 000 of foreign dividends, that are paid to the foreign trust. In 
terms of section 7(8), the full R40 000 would be included as income of the South 
African resident. It is immaterial that the foreign collective investment scheme 
assets stem from the foreign bank account, because the full amount is initially 
attributable to the donation made by the South African resident.  
 
Section 7(8) could also apply, where a resident grants an interest-free loan to a 
non-resident trust. As mentioned previously, South Africans tend to make use of 
interest-free loans to transfer the amount permitted by the Exchange Control 
Regulations to offshore trusts.98 To explain how section 7(8) could be applied in 
                                                 
97 De Koker in par 25.15. 
98 J Ware & P Roper “The Impact of Residence-based Tax on Offshore Trusts” (June 2001) 
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this regard, consider the following hypothetical case: a South African resident 
donor forms an offshore trust. The offshore trust then forms an offshore 
company, in which the offshore trust holds all the equity shares. If the South 
African resident donates an interest-free loan to the offshore trust, which in turn 
donates the interest-free loan to the offshore company, and the company utilises 
the interest-free loan to generate foreign income, would that income be taxable in 
the Republic? 99 
 
To establish whether section 7(8) is applicable to the above scenario, it has to be 
determined whether the interest-free loan amounts to a donation, settlement, or 
other disposition. Secondly, it has to be determined whether the foreign 
company’s income arose “by reason of or in consequence of” the interest-free 
loan.  
 
The question whether an interest-free loan is gratuitous in nature and therefore a 
“donation, settlement or other disposition”, was discussed in CIR v Berold.100 The 
facts of the case were that the taxpayer did not charge interest on the purchase 
price of the assets, which he sold to Luzen Holdings (Proprietary) Limited, a 
company that the taxpayer had incorporated. The taxpayer then created certain 
trusts (for the benefit of his minor children), to which he donated the shares in 
Luzen Holdings. No interest was charged to the trusts for the donation. The 
result was that the interest-free loan and the dividend income ended up being for 
the benefit of the taxpayer’s children.  The court held that the donation of shares 
in the company (on an interest-free basis) to the trusts allowed the trusts to 
obtain the benefit of a continuing donation in the form of the enhanced dividends 
received on the shares.101 As long as the taxpayer refrained from compelling the 
company to pay the loan, there was a continuing loan by him of the interest on 
the loan, which made it subject to tax in terms of section 7(8).102 Section 7(9) 
also specifically states that a disposition for less than market value (which is what 
an interest-free loan basically entails) is considered to be a donation to the extent 
                                                                                                                                            
16 Insurance and Tax Journal at 21; Davis et al in par 17.9.  
99 Davis et al in par 6.3.6A at 6-24; Olivier & Honiball at 246; Jooste at 192; Stack et al at 
560. 
100 1962 (3) SA 748 (A). 
101 CIR v Berold 1962 (3) SA 748 at 753. 
102 Stack et al at 561; Huxham & Haupt at 610-611 also point out that an interest-free loan is 
a gratuitous disposition that should be subject to s 7(8) if all the requirements of the 
section are fulfilled. 
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that the market value exceeds the consideration received.103  
 
In the above scenario, an interest-free loan donated by a South African resident 
to an offshore trust, which is in turn donated to an offshore company, could be 
taxed under section 7(8). Jooste104 notes that for section 7(8) to operate, the 
income in question does not have to accrue to the person to whom the interest-
free loan is made, so it does not matter that the income accrues to the company 
and not the trust. The issue here is simply whether the income accruing to the 
company is “by reason of, or in consequence of”, the interest-free loan made by 
the donor to the trust.105  
 
In CIR v Widan,106 the facts were that in terms of a deed of trust, a father had 
donated all the shares in a company to his four children.  The company declared 
a dividend of £21 000, which the trustees distributed to the father in his capacity 
as guardian of the four children (the beneficiaries). The money was then used to 
subscribe for shares in another company, and it was the income from the second 
company which was at issue. It was held that the income from the second 
company was by reason of the donation, because the original donation was 
intended to produce income, which would be used to acquire the shares in the 
second company. The whole arrangement was in fact a scheme for donating 
income-producing assets to the taxpayer‘s children.  
 
On the authority of the Widan case, it is submitted that, where there is an 
agreement between a resident and an offshore trust, whereby the resident 
makes a loan to the trust on condition that the funds lent are on-lent by the trust 
to a company, such an agreement would clearly support the conclusion that the 
income accruing to the company was “by reason of, or in consequence of”, the 
interest-free loan made by the resident, and so section 7(8) would be applicable. 
Writing on this issue, Davis107 notes that “if the court is satisfied that it was the 
donor’s “all embracing design”108 that his interest-free loan to the trust should be 
on-lent interest-free to the company, in order to generate income in the 
                                                 
103 The need for this subsection is however questionable as a sale at less than market value 
is a “similar disposition” in any event. See also Ware & Roper “The impact of residence-
based tax on offshore trusts” in par 2; Stack et al at 559; De Koker in par 4.67B.  
104 Jooste at 192. 
105 Jooste at 192. 
106 1955 (1) SA at 226 (A) at 234. 
107 Davis et al in par 6.3.6A. 
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company’s hands, it is unlikely that the court would find that this consequence “is 
too remote for the law to treat as a consequence”. Neither is it likely that the on-
lending by the trust to the company will be viewed as a novus actus interveniens, 
which severs the connection between the loan to the trust and the income 
accruing to the company.109 
 
It is also important to note the approach adopted in the (former) Appellate 
Division case, Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith and Another v CIR,110 where there was an 
unwritten agreement between the parties which the court used to infer that the 
resident made the interest-free loan to the trust, on condition that the funds lent 
were on-lent by the trust to the company. The court held that such an agreement 
would clearly support the conclusion that the income accruing to the company 
was “by reason of, or in consequence of”, the interest-free loan made by the 
resident. 
 
Based on the decisions in the above cases, it can be concluded that section 7(8) 
can be applied to curb tax avoidance, where income arises as a result of an 
interest-free loan to a non-resident trust.  
 
Apart from the use of interest-free loans, section 7(8) can also be applied where 
income accrues to a non-resident through a so-called “income on income” 
situation (income accrues from the re-investment of the income from the 
donation).111 An example would be a situation where a resident makes a 
donation to an offshore trust, and by reason thereof, foreign investment income 
accrues to the trust and is then reinvested to generate further foreign investment 
income.112  
 
 
In CIR v Widan, it was held that section 7(8) may be applied to “income on 
income” situations, so as to tax the original investment income and the further 
investment income in the donor’s hands in terms of section 7(8).113 A different 
                                                                                                                                            
108 CIR v Widan 1955 (1) SA 226 (A) at 234. 
109 Davis in par 6.3.6A.  
110 1996 (3) 942 (A) 942; 21 SATC 379. 
111 Huxham & Haupt at 612; Jooste at 195. 
112 Davis et al at 6.3.6A. 
113 1955 (1) SA at 226 (A) at 234. 
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decision was, however, arrived at in Kohler v CIR.114 In this case, income was 
received by the taxpayer’s daughter from a re-investment of the income which 
accrued from a donation made by the father. Briefly, the facts were that a father 
donated a certain amount of money to each of his daughters. Each daughter 
purchased shares using the income which accrued to her from the investment of 
the money. The Commissioner taxed the father on the income which accrued 
from the shares in terms of section 9(3) (now section 7(3)).  Finding in favour of 
the father, it was held that: 
Once income has (actually or by deeming) accrued to or been received by the minor, and 
has been capitalized, its subsequent earning or product is attributed not to the source 
from which the original income was derived but to the advantageous employment of the 
minor’s new capital. In this respect the ”income upon income” now in issue stands, as I 
see it, on the same footing as income derived by the minor from the employment of other 
capital of his, borrowed, earned or bequeathed. 
 
The circumstances in the Kohler case can, however, be distinguished from those 
in the Widan case. In the Widan case, it was ruled that, in cases of this nature, 
there were no hard and fast rules, and each case would have to be judged on its 
merits. In this context Centlivers CJ held: 
There must be some causal relation between the donation and the income in question. 
Difficult cases may conceivably arise. Where, for instance, a father donates a sum of 
money to a minor child and the child buys a business to which he contributes his skill and 
labour and from which he earns an income that may be regarded as being attributable to 
two cases, viz, the donation and the skill and labour of the child. In such a case it may be 
impossible to say which part of the income was the result of the donation and which part 
the result of his skill and labour and it may be that the Commissioner would not be able to 
apply s 9(3) (now (section 7(3)).115 
 
With regard to the scenario above, it can be concluded that the decision in CIR v 
Widan provides authority that section 7(8) may be applied where a South African 
resident donates money to an offshore trust, which in turn donates the money to 
an offshore company, so as to generate further income.116  
 
Apart from the use of interest-free loans and the “income on income” situations 
discussed above, taxpayers could engage in other more complex schemes to 
circumvent section 7(8). For example, instead of donating a loan to an offshore 
trust, a South African resident might subscribe for redeemable preference shares 
in an offshore company, which might then lend the proceeds from the 
redeemable preference shares to an offshore trust, which it uses to generate 
                                                 
114 1949 (4) SA 1022. 
115 CIR v Widan 1955(1) SA 226 (A) at 234. 
116 Davis et al in par 6.3.6A. 
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foreign income.117 On the authority of the Widan case above, it is submitted that 
section 7(8) is applicable to such situations, as there is a causal relation between 
the subscription for the shares in the company and the foreign income generated 
by the offshore trust. But before it can be concluded that section 7(8) would be 
applicable, it would have to be determined whether the subscription for 
redeemable preference shares amounts to a “donation, settlement or other 
disposition”. Jooste118 and Davis119 argue, that where the company is simply an 
empty shell that is interposed between the resident and the offshore trust to 
serve no other purpose than tax avoidance (since it is unable to pay any 
dividend), then it can be concluded that the subscription for redeemable 
preference shares has an element of “gratuitousness and generosity”, that could 
constitute a “disposition” within the meaning of “donation, settlement or other 
disposition”.120 In essence, this would effectively be the same as the resident’s 
making an interest-free loan to the trust. 
 
In general, the reading of section 7(8) makes it clear that the section can only be 
applied, if the “donation, settlement or other disposition” is made by a resident. It 
thus appears that, if a person makes a donation prior to becoming a South 
African resident, any income arising on the donated asset will not fall within the 
ambit of the section after he becomes a resident.121 Jooste122 argues that, if 
section 7(8) is given such a narrow interpretation, it would be simple for an 
immigrant to South Africa to avoid the application of section 7(8) by donating his 
or her foreign income-purchasing assets to a discretionary offshore trust prior to 
becoming a resident.123 In this regard, Jooste124 submits that section 7(8) is 
ambiguous and could be manipulated for tax avoidance purposes. Since the 
provision is designed to prevent tax avoidance, it should be given a wider 
meaning. In Glen Anil Development Corp Ltd v SIR,125 Botha JA held that the 
contra fiscum rule126 of interpretation does not apply to tax avoidance provisions, 
                                                 
117 Jooste at 193. 
118 Jooste at 193. 
119 Davis et al in par  6.3.6A at 6-25. 
120 Jooste at 193-194; Davis et al in par  6.3.6A at 6-25. 
121 Clegg in par 17.3.7.    
122 Jooste at 197. 
123 Jooste at 197. In terms of s 54 of the income Tax Act, donations tax is not payable on 
donations by non-residents. 
124 Jooste at 197. 
125 1975 (4) SA 715 (A). 
126 The contra fiscum rule provides that in the case of any legislation imposing a burden upon 
a subject, the interpretation less cumbersome to the subject must be endorsed as the true 
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and that they should therefore be interpreted in a manner that will advance the 
remedy provided by the section, which is to suppress the mischief against which 
the section is directed.  
 
Where a person donates an interest-free loan to an offshore trust and then 
immigrates to South Africa, would section 7(8) apply, if the loan were still 
outstanding when he or she became a resident? Davis127 argues that the loan is 
deemed to be a ”continuing donation”128 and that section 7(8) becomes 
applicable once the person becomes a resident. What is not clear is whether the 
section would apply, if the donor were a resident when the disposition was made 
and then ceased to be a resident. It is clear that the section cannot operate in 
respect of foreign income. But in respect of South African income, the wording in 
section 7(8) to the effect that “there shall be included in the income of such 
resident” seems to imply that the donor must be a resident at the time when the 
income is included in his/her gross income.129 The courts still have to clarify this 
matter. 
 
In CSARS v Woulidge, 130 the respondents’ father had created two inter vivos 
trusts in terms of which the respondent’s son and daughter were the income and 
capital beneficiaries. During 1982 the respondent sold shares in four companies 
to the trusts. It was agreed that the purchase price would be paid in such 
amounts and at such times as may be mutually agreed upon. Further that, the 
respondent would be entitled to charge interest, not exceeding the prevailing 
bank rate, on the balance of the purchase price. The trust then sold a percentage 
of the shares to another company and then paid outstanding loans to the 
respondent. Relying on the provisions of section 7(3) and 7(5) of the Income Tax 
Act, the Commissioner taxed the respondent for the years 1990 and 1991 on the 
basis that notional interest was due to him in respect of the unpaid purchase 
price of the shares sold by him to the trusts.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
intention of the legislature. See also Glen Anil Development Corp Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 
715 (A) at 727-728. 
127 Davis et al in par  6.3.6A. 
128 CIR V Berold 1962 (3) SA 748 at 753. 
129 Davis et al at 6.3.6A at 6-26(3); Jooste at 198-199. 
130  2002 (1) SA 68 (SCA). 
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The respondent unsuccessfully objected to the assessments and then appealed 
to the Cape Special Court for Hearing Income Tax Appeals where it was the held 
that the respondent should be taxed on the forsaken interest in respect of the 
unpaid price of the shares sold to the trusts. But that such interest would not 
exceed an amount equal to the price of the shares. This limitation on interest was 
said to flow from the operation in the in duplum rule.131 On appeal, the High Court 
in CSARS v Woulidge132  upheld the finding of the court a quo. On further appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal, it was held that there was indeed an 
appreciable degree of gratuitousness as far as the forbearance of interest was 
concerned (in the form of annual donations of the interest not charged), however, 
there was no donation with respect to the sale itself. The market-related 
purchase price, the terms of the deed of sale and the subsequent payment of 
that purchase price constituted due consideration in respect of the sale itself. 
With respect to the in duplum rule, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that this 
rule could only be applied in the real world of commerce and economic activity 
where it served as public policy to protect borrowers against exploitation by 
lenders. The rule cannot be applied in this case as there was no lender or 
borrower in the facts. The facts showed that there was a gratuitous disposition to 
which the in duplum rule cannot apply. The Supreme Court of Appeal directed 
the Commissioner to revise the assessments for the tax years 1990 and 1991 
that were based on the in duplum rule. It should however be noted that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal agreed that the forbearance of interest (in the form of 
annual donations of the interest not charged) was a gratuitousness disposal to 
which section 7(3) could apply. 
It is worth noting that also in CSAR v Brummeria Renaissance (PTY) Ltd and 
others133 (a case that did not specifically deal with trusts), it was held that the 
right to retain and use borrowed funds without paying interest had a monetary 
value which had to be included in the taxpayer’s gross income for the year of 
assessment in which the rights accrued to the taxpayer. Although this case does 
not specifically deal with trusts, its judgement is wide enough to cover trusts. 
                                                 
131  The in duplum rule provides that interest stops running when the unpaid interest equals 
the outstanding capital. This rule aids debtor in financial difficulties. For a detailed 
discussion of this rule, see WG Schulze “The In Duplum Rule: A Short List of Some 
Unresolved Issues” (2006) 18 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 487. 
132  2000 (1) SA 600 (C). 
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Commenting on this case, a 2007 article in “Tax Gram”134 stated that South Africa 
is “littered” with property trusts that have been funded by way of interest-free 
loans from donors. The author of the above mentioned article135 reasons that the 
judgement in this case can be applied where interest-free loans are received, by 
trusts, and no consideration is provided in return for the use of the capital on the 
loan account.  
 
The concern that arises from this judgement, however, is whether SARS can 
reissue previous assessments, and impute interest on the donor. This case 
makes it clear that where a taxable benefit arises from an interest-free loan, the 
borrower (donor in case of a trust) is taxed on the basis that he was deriving a 
non-monetary benefit, namely a contractual right to have use of money without 
paying interest and it is the value of that interest that is taxable.136  
 
In the past, taxpayers used to circumvent section 7(8) by hiding their interest in 
offshore trusts from tax authorities.  This was because offshore disclosure was 
only effected by the income tax return. Section 7(10) has now shifted the onus of 
disclosure onto the taxpayer.137 The section requires that, when submitting a tax 
return, taxpayers should disclose to the Commissioner in writing any donation, 
settlement or disposition.  Failure to disclose the obligation in section 7(10) can 
lead to criminal sanctions.138 It could also result in the taxpayer being subjected 
to additional assessment under section 79 of the Income Tax Act. Section 7(10) 
thus prevents taxpayers from pleading ignorance in mitigation where penalties  
are imposed when they have failed to disclose section 7(8) income, and their 
non-disclosure is discovered.139 
 
In terms of section 78 of the Income Tax Act, where the Commissioner has 
                                                                                                                                            
133  69 SATC 205. 
134  Editorial “Shock SCA decision on Interest-free Loans” (Nov/Dec 2007) Tax Gram. Also 
available at >http://bibinf.unisa.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dII/7b/nf/zmlxa/Ifg5a/mfg5a<, last 
accessed 1 April 2008. 
135  Editorial “Shock SCA decision on Interest-free Loans” (Nov/Dec 2007) Tax Gram. Also 
available at >http://bibinf.unisa.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dII/7b/nf/zmlxa/Ifg5a/mfg5a<, last 
accessed 1 April 2008. 
136  Editorial “Shock SCA decision on Interest-free Loans” (Nov/Dec 2007) Tax Gram . 
137 Jooste at 199; Ware & Roper “The Impact of Residence-based Tax on Offshore Trusts” in 
par 2; De Koker in par 4.67B; Duncun at 33. 
138 S 75 and 104 of the Income Tax Act. 
139 Jooste at 200; Stack et al at 559. 
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reason to believe that a resident has not declared, or accounted for, any funds or 
assets owned outside the Republic, or where the income or capital gains from 
any funds or assets outside the Republic could be attributed to that resident in 
terms of any of the subsections of section 7, or Part X of the Eighth Schedule, 
the Commissioner must estimate the amount of foreign currency of such funds, 
or the market value of those assets, and include the estimated amount in the 
taxable income of that person. The estimation could be based on information 
such as: any funds or assets transferred by that resident from the Republic any 
amount received by, or accrued to, that resident from any source outside the 
Republic, or the period that has elapsed since those funds or assets were 
transferred outside the Republic. 
 
7.5 CAPITAL GAINS TAX (CGT) PROVISIONS THAT RELATE TO 
OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
Before discussing the CGT provisions that can be applied to curb tax avoidance 
when investments are made in non-resident trusts, it is necessary to provide 
some background information on how CGT works.  
 
The Income Tax Act provides for the levying of CGT.140 In order to determine the 
CGT liability of a taxpayer, his/her capital gains and losses must be determined 
in respect of all “disposals” of “assets” that take place on or after 1 October 2001 
(the valuation date). A capital gain in respect of an asset disposed of during a 
year of assessment is determined by deducting the “base cost” of that asset from 
the “proceeds” of that disposal. A capital loss results if the asset’s base cost 
exceeds the proceeds. For the purposes of this discussion on tax avoidance, 
only capital gains will be referred to. 
 
For CGT purposes, an asset is defined in paragraph 1 of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Income Tax Act (any references to paragraphs hereafter are references to 
paragraphs in the Schedule) as including property of whatever nature, whether 
movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, excluding any currency, but 
including any coins made mainly from gold or platinum, and any right or interest 
of whatever nature to or in such property. A vested right in a trust asset qualifies 
                                                 
140   S 26A read with the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
371 
 
 
 
as an asset for CGT purposes.141 In terms of paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule 
to the Act, a South African resident is subject to CGT on the disposal of any 
asset (as defined), whether situated in or outside the Republic. In contrast, a 
non-resident is subject to CGT on the disposal of any immovable property 
situated in the Republic, or any interest or right in immovable property situated in 
the Republic, as well as any asset of a permanent establishment of the non-
resident in the Republic. As this discussion is centred on curbing tax avoidance 
when residents invest in offshore trusts, only the CGT implications of the disposal 
of assets by residents will be considered. 
 
In terms of paragraph 11(1), a “disposal” is defined as any event, act, 
forbearance or operation of law, which results in the creation, variation, transfer, 
or extinction of an asset. This would include a sale or a donation of an asset.142 
In terms of paragraph 11(1)(d), the vesting of an interest in an asset of a trust in 
a beneficiary constitutes a disposal, as it, in effect,  involves the creation for the 
beneficiary of a right to that asset, or a portion of it.143 This implies that the 
exercise of a trustee’s discretionary powers to vest a benefit in a beneficiary, or 
the occurrence of an event (such as marriage or death) that results in the benefit 
vesting in a beneficiary, qualifies as a disposal of an asset.144 It is worth noting, 
however, that in terms of paragraph 11(2)(e), there is no disposal of an asset by 
a trustee in respect of the distribution of an asset of the trust to a beneficiary to 
the extent that the beneficiary already has a vested interest in that asset.  This is 
because a subsequent transfer of ownership to the beneficiary entitled to that 
asset (on distribution) would involve a second disposal by the trust.145 This is in 
line with the time of disposal rules in paragraph 13(1)(d), which provide that the 
time of disposal of an asset in consequence of the vesting of an interest in an 
asset of a trust in a beneficiary is the date on which that interest vests. 
 
The time of disposal of an asset, if it is by means of a donation, is the date of 
compliance with all the legal requirements for a valid donation. In the case of a 
discretionary trust, this would be the date on which the contract (deed of trust) 
                                                 
141 G Swart “The Taxation of Trusts - Superimposing New Rules on Old Principles” (2002) 
Acta Juridica 123-124; see also RC Williams Capital Gains Tax - A Practioner’s Manual 2 
ed (2005) in par 10.2. 
142       Swart at 123. 
143 King & Victor in par 7.19.1; De Koker in par 24.127. 
144 Swart at 124. 
145 Swart at 125 and at 129; see also De Koker in par 24.127. 
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between the donor and the trustee is signed. In terms of paragraph 35, the 
proceeds from the disposal of an asset are deemed to be equal to the amount 
received by, or accrued to, or in favour of, a person in respect of that disposal. In 
term of paragraph 38, where a person donates an asset, or disposes of it to a 
connected person (other than a spouse), such as his child, at a non-arm’s length 
price,146 the donation is treated as a disposal of the asset by the donor and an 
acquisition of that asset by the donee at market value.  
 
In order to curb tax avoidance, a capital gain may in certain circumstances be 
attributed to, and taxed in the hands of a person other than the one in whose 
hands it arises. The circumstances that could cause the CGT attribution rules to 
apply in regard to offshore trusts are generally similar to the way in which income 
is deemed to accrue to a donor in terms of section 7 of the Income Tax Act 
(discussed above). Paragraphs 70 and 71 apply generally to domestic trusts, but 
are to some extent also applicable to non-resident trusts. Paragraphs 72 and 
80(3) specifically target offshore trusts. These provisions are discussed below. 
 
Conditional vesting in a discretionary trust 
 
In terms of paragraph 70 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, when a 
person has made a donation, settlement, or other disposition, that is subject to a 
stipulation or condition imposed by any person,  which is to the effect that a 
capital gain or portion of it will not vest in the beneficiaries until the happening of 
some fixed or contingent event, the capital gain is taken into account in 
determining the aggregate capital gain or loss of the person who made the 
donation, settlement or other similar disposition.147 The working of this provision 
is similar to that of section 7(5) of the Income Tax Act discussed above. 
 
For this paragraph to apply, there must be a stipulation or condition to the effect 
that the capital gain does not vest in the beneficiary, until some fixed or 
                                                 
146   A non-arm’s length price is a price set by a taxpayer when selling to, buying from, or 
sharing resources with a related or connected person. It is usually contrasted with a 
market price, which is the price set in the marketplace for transfers of goods and services 
between unrelated persons where each party strives to get the utmost possible benefit 
from the transaction. South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) Practice Note No 7 
Determination of Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International Taxation: Transfer 
Pricing (s 31 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962) 6 August 1999 in par 7.1; art 9 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 condensed version). 
147 Meyerowitz in par 39.16, Huxham & Haupt in par 30.16.1. 
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contingent event has occurred. The capital gain is then deemed to devolve back 
to the donor, if it would have vested in the relevant beneficiary, had it not been 
for the stipulation or condition. It is worth noting that CGT will be payable by the 
individual who made the donation and not necessarily by the founder of the trust. 
Thus, if a grandfather makes a gratuitous disposition to a trust and the gain 
attributable to it does not vest in a beneficiary in the year concerned, the gain will 
be taxable in the grandfather’s hands. If more than one person has supplied such 
funding, then the gain must be proportionately attributed.148  
 
Paragraph 70 applies only if the person to whom the gain is attributed has been 
resident in South Africa throughout the tax year in which the gain arises. If the 
person has not been resident throughout the year, then the gain will be taxable in 
the hands of the trust.149 
 
For paragraph 70 to apply, it is immaterial whether the trust is resident or non-
resident. In the case of a non-resident trust, however, the provision can only 
apply, if the asset is immovable property situated in the Republic, or if it is an 
asset of a permanent establishment of the non-resident in the Republic.150  
 
Paragraph 70 deals only with capital gains attributable to a donation, settlement, 
or other disposition, and is not concerned with capital losses of any kind. Such 
capital losses remain with the trust, or are attributed to the relevant person, 
depending on the terms of the trust deed.151   
 
Revocable vesting 
 
Paragraph 71 of the Eighth Schedule is similar to section 7(6) of the Income Tax 
Act. This paragraph is intended to curb tax avoidance in a situation where a trust 
deed confers on a resident beneficiary a right to receive a capital gain, but the 
person conferring the right has the power to revoke it, or confer it upon another 
person. In that case, if a person has made a donation to a trust, then, if in a 
particular year a capital gain attributable to such a donation vests in the aforesaid 
beneficiary, the capital gain will be deemed to be that of the person who 
                                                 
148 Clegg in par 5A.7.3.2. 
149 Clegg in par 5A.7.3.2. 
150  Par 2 of the Eighth Schedule.  
151 De Koker in par 24.131. 
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conferred the right and not that of the beneficiary.152 
 
For paragraph 71 to operate, the donor must have retained the power to revoke 
or vary the terms of the trust throughout the year in which the capital gain vests 
in the beneficiary. It appears that for the purposes of paragraph 71, the donor 
must be a resident in order for the provision to apply.  
 
It also appears that it is not essential for the application of this paragraph that the 
person should actually exercise the right of revocation reserved by him/her. All 
that is required is that the person should be vested with the power and that 
his/her exercise of the power would result in the diversion of the capital gain to 
someone else or in the capital gain being accumulated in the hands of the 
trustees.153 
 
Paragraph 71 only deals with capital gains attributable to a donation, settlement 
or other disposition. It does not deal with capital losses. This implies that the 
capital losses remain with the trust or are attributed to the relevant person, 
depending on the terms of the trust.154 
 
 
 
Vesting in a non-resident 
 
Generally, non-resident trusts are not liable to CGT (except in the case of South 
African immovable property, or where a non-resident trust has a permanent 
establishment in South Africa). There is no CGT liability where the non-resident 
trust disposes of assets anywhere in the world. However, distributions of capital 
made to a resident beneficiary, which represent earlier capital gains in the trust 
are subject to CGT in the beneficiary’s hands. As an anti-avoidance measure, 
where the non-resident trust has been funded by a gratuitous disposition from a 
resident, paragraph 72 applies to attribute CGT to the resident donor. The 
purpose of this provision is to prevent the possibility of capital gains escaping the 
CGT net by virtue of their vesting in non-residents who are not subject to tax in 
                                                 
152 See also Clegg in par 5A.7.3.2; Huxham & Haupt in par 30.16.2. 
153 De Koker in par 24.131. 
154 De Koker in par 24.131. 
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South Africa.155 This provision works like section 7(8) of the Income Tax Act 
(described above).  
 
Paragraph 72 provides that, if a resident has made a donation, settlement, or 
other similar disposition to a non-resident during a year of assessment, (other 
than a public benefit organisation as contemplated in section 30), and the capital 
gain attributable to the donation settlement or other similar disposition vested in 
any non-resident (including a non-resident trust), then the capital gain must be 
taken into account when determining the aggregate capital gain or loss of the 
resident donor, who will then have to pay tax on the capital gain.  
 
Example: A, a South African resident disposes of an asset. The disposal results 
in a capital gain of R100 000, which A decides to vest in a Cayman Islands trust 
(which is non-resident for South African tax purposes). In terms of paragraph 72, 
the capital gain will be attributed to A, and the CGT liability for the gain will fall on 
A.156  
 
With this example in mind, even where an asset of the trust has been acquired 
with funds from a donation or low-interest loan, the attribution under paragraph 
72 would apply. In the case of a low-interest loan, the attribution must, however, 
be limited to the interest foregone by the resident on the loan concerned and also 
by any attribution which takes place in respect of the same loan for income tax 
purposes.157 It has to be noted, that since the trust is non-resident, only gains  
on South African fixed property, or permanent establishment assets can be 
attributed.158  
 
A scrutiny of paragraph 72 shows that the paragraph can only apply, if the 
person making the disposal is a resident. Thus, if a person made a disposition at 
a time when he or she was not resident, paragraph 72 would not apply, even if 
that person subsequently became resident.159 
 
                                                 
155 T Mhlongo “The Efficacy of Trusts in the Current Legislative Climate” (Dec 2002) 
Insurance and Tax Journal 9 in par 4.4.1. Also see generally E Mazansky, G Thornton & K 
Feinstein “Capital Gains Tax and Estate Planning” (Nov 2001) Taxgram at 11-15.    
156 Example adopted from Mhlongo in par 4.4.1; see also Meyerowitz in par 39.16.3; Huxham 
& Haupt in par 30.15.2; De Koker in par 24.131; Clegg at 5A.7.3.2. 
157 Clegg at 5A.7.3.6. 
158 Clegg at 5A.7.3.6. 
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Paragraph 72 deals only with capital gains arising from a deed of donation, 
settlement, or other disposition and is not concerned with any capital losses. 
Such a capital loss will remain with the trust, or be attributed to the relevant 
person, depending on the terms of the deed of donation, settlement, or other 
disposition.160 
 
Interests in non-resident trusts 
 
Over the years, South African residents have set up trusts offshore, in which the 
majority of beneficiaries are residents of South Africa. Although the residence 
basis of taxation does make residents liable for tax on their world-wide income 
(which also includes capital gains), the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
also provides that there will be a liability for CGT in the event of a vesting taking 
place in favour of a resident beneficiary.   
 
In terms of paragraph 80(3), when a resident acquires a vested right to an 
amount representing  capital of any non-resident trust and that capital arose from 
a capital gain of the trust determined in any previous year of assessment, during 
which the resident had a contingent right to the capital, or any amount which 
would have constituted a capital gain of the trust, if the trust had been a resident; 
and the capital gain has not been subject to tax in the Republic, that amount 
must be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the aggregate capital 
gain or loss of the resident in the year of assessment in which he acquires the 
vested right.  This provision is similar to section 25B(2A) of the Act,161in that it 
prevents tax avoidance, where capital is accumulated in a non-resident 
discretionary trust and is only distributed to the beneficiaries in subsequent 
years.162 
 
This provision could apply in the following example: Trust X, which is located in 
Australia, disposes of an asset. In the process, a capital gain of 100 000 
Australian dollars is realised. The trustees then decide to vest this gain in Z, a 
beneficiary of the trust, who is a South African resident. In terms of this provision, 
                                                                                                                                            
159 Clegg at 5A.7.3.6 ; De Koker in par 24.134A. 
160 De Koker in par 24.131. 
161 Discussed in par 7.3 above. 
162 Meyerowitz in par 39.16.9; see also Huxham & Haupt in par 30.15.3; Mitchell & Mitchell at 
92. 
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Z will be liable for CGT on the Rand equivalent of the capital gain.163 
 
In order for paragraph 80(3) to apply, the gain must be determined as though the 
trust was a resident. This implies that non-South African gains are included.164 To 
prevent any double taxation that would arise, the paragraph provides that, if the 
capital gain had been subject to tax in the Republic (say under paragraph 70 or 
paragraph 72), then the provision would not apply. For example, if the non-
resident trust owned fixed property situated in the Republic and then realised the 
property, any resultant capital gain would have been included in the taxable 
income of the trust and subjected to normal tax. Should the resident beneficiary 
in a subsequent year of assessment acquire a vested right to the capital gain 
included in the capital of the trust, the amount has to be disregarded for 
purposes of CGT.165 
 
Paragraph 80(3) makes it clear that it applies only where the resident acquires a 
vested right to an amount representing the capital of the trust, and where that 
capital arose in any previous year of assessment, during which the resident had 
a contingent right  to the capital. As discussed above in regard to section 
25B(2A), it may be argued that a discretionary beneficiary of a non-resident trust 
has only a spes (ie a mere hope) of benefiting, and that this does not constitute a 
right. It is, however, submitted that a discretionary beneficiary is still covered by 
the provision. As was also discussed  with regard to section 25B(2A), another 
way of avoiding paragraph 80(3) would be to provide in the trust deed that the 
beneficiary has no right (vested or contingent) to any capital gain in the year that 
it accrues to the trust, but that it may be vested in the beneficiary in a later year. 
However, general anti-avoidance provisions under sections 80A-80L of the 
Income Tax Act may be applied, where CGT has been avoided, reduced, or 
postponed through the use of the offshore trust. Another possibility is that the 
trust could be deemed to be a sham trust, and its capital gains could be treated 
as those of the founder of the trust.166 
 
For paragraph 80(3) to apply, the capital must have arisen from the capital gain 
of the trust. This implies that it may be necessary for individuals receiving 
                                                 
163 Example adopted from Mhlongo in par 4.4.2. 
164 Clegg in par 5A.7.3.6; Mhlongo in par 4.4.3. 
165 De Koker in par 24.134A; Mhlongo in par 4.4.3. 
166 Davis et al in par 2A-12.  
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distributions from such trusts to establish the origins of amounts representing the 
capital of the trust from the trustees. The onus is on the taxpayer to prove the 
nature of an amount, and if satisfactory evidence is not produced, SARS can 
make an assessment based on any terms.167  
 
Where a non-resident trust distributes an asset directly to a resident, there is no 
deemed disposal by the trust (unless the asset is South African immovable 
property, or a permanent establishment asset of the non-resident trust). Such an 
event therefore has no CGT repercussions, unless it represents capitalised 
capital gains from prior years.168  
 
In order to prevent over-taxation in a situation where a capital gain is attributed to 
a resident and also where income is attributed to a resident in terms of the 
section 7 anti-avoidance provisions, paragraph 73 states that, when both an 
amount of income and a capital gain are derived by reason of, or are attributable 
to, a donation, settlement, or other similar disposition, the total amount of that 
income, that is required to be included in the income of the resident under 
section 7, and the amount of the capital gain, that is to be attributed to the 
resident, may not exceed the amount of the benefit derived from the donation, 
settlement, or other similar disposition. Paragraph 73(2) provides that, for the 
purposes of paragraph 73, the benefit derived from a donation, settlement, or 
other similar disposition, means the amount by which the person to whom it was 
made, has benefited from the fact that it was made for no consideration, or for an 
inadequate consideration. 
 
CGT consequences of interest-free loans made to trusts  
 
Traditionally South African residents have been known to transfer assets to trusts 
in circumstances where no money changes hands but the trust remains indebted 
to the seller for the assets disposed of. In many cases interest is not charged on 
the loan that arises between the seller of the assets and the trust being the 
purchaser thereof.169 In effect, the settler is deemed to have donated the asset to 
                                                 
167 Clegg in par 5A.7.3.6. 
168 Clegg in par 5A.7.3.6. 
169  Edward Nathan Friedland “Estates and Trusts: Interest free loans made available to trusts 
- the fiscal consequences” (October, 2003). Available at http://www. 
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the trust.  
 
Normally, when assets are donated to a trust, whether it is located in South 
Africa or offshore, the donor pays donations tax at a rate of 20% of the value of 
the donation.170 Individual taxpayers (natural persons) are currently entitled to an 
exemption of R100 000 a year from donations tax.171 In other words, when a 
donation is made to a trust, the 20% tax only becomes payable on any amount 
over R100 000. In order to take advantage of the donations tax exemption, 
schemes are devised whereby the donor gradually reduces the loan by writing off 
R100 000 a year as a tax-free donation to the trust.172 
 
 
Generally countries’ tax authorities deal with such schemes by imputing interest 
on the donor where an interest-free loan is made to a trust. In other words, the 
donor who gave the loan is taxed on the amount of interest he or she is deemed 
to have received each year.  
 
In terms of paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, this 
donation is regarded as a capital gain in the hands of the trust that is subject to 
capital gains tax. An example of a case in which this provision was applied is ITC 
1793.173 The brief facts of the case are that the testatrix had sold shares to a 
family trust (the taxpayer in this case). And the taxpayer owed the testatrix 
money on loan account in respect thereof. The testatrix had bequeathed the debt 
to the taxpayer in her last will and testament. On her death, the commissioner 
was of the view that the bequest is issue was a discharge of a debt for no 
consideration and thus a capital gain had been created in the hands of the trust. 
The taxpayer’s executor sought a ruling that the provisions of paragraph 12(5) of 
                                                                                                                                            
saica.co/integritax/1128_interest_free_loans_made_available_to_trusts_the_fiscal_conse
quences.htm> last accessed 20 March 2007. 
170  S 64 of the Income Tax Act. In terms of this section, the 20% donations tax rate applies to 
property donated on or after 1 October 2001. 
171  S 56(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. In terms of this section, this exemption does not apply to 
casual gifts, but to all property donated by a natural person. 
172  Kwazulu-Natal Law Society “Words and Deeds” Current News in the Field of Property 
Law (5 September 2006). Available at> 
www.lawlibrary.co.za/notice/wordsanddeeds/2006/2006_09_05.htm - 105k -< last 
accessed 1 March 2007.  
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the Eighth Schedule did not apply to the bequest. It was held that the provisions 
in the testatrix’s will that discharged the taxpayer’s debt, constituted a deemed 
disposal in terms of paragraph 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule. Consequently CGT 
was payable by the taxpayer on the amount of the discharged debt.  
 
7.6  SECTION 31(1): TRANSFER PRICING AND NON-RESIDENT TRUSTS 
 
In chapter 1 of this thesis it was mentioned that “transfer pricing” (described 
below) is one of the mechanisms used by taxpayers to avoid taxes in their 
country of residence. Since “transfer pricing” is a substantial topic in its own right, 
a comprehensive discussion thereof is beyond the scope of this work.  
 
For purposes of this discussion, it is however worth noting that the transfer of 
funds to non-resident trusts on an interest-free basis could also be caught by the 
transfer pricing provisions under section 31(2) of the Income Tax Act. The term 
”transfer pricing” describes the process by which related entities set prices at 
which they transfer goods or services between each other.174 Transfer pricing is 
also described as the systematic manipulation of prices, in order to reduce or 
increase profits artificially, or cause losses and avoid taxes in a specific 
country.175 A transfer price is a price set by a taxpayer when selling to, buying 
from, or sharing resources with a related or connected person. It is usually 
contrasted with a market price, which is the price set in the marketplace for 
transfers of goods and services between unrelated persons176 where each party 
strives to get the utmost possible benefit from the transaction.177 Transfer prices 
                                                                                                                                            
173  (2005) 67 SATC 256 (G). 
174  South African Revenue Service (SARS) Practice Note No. 7 : Section 31 of the Income 
Tax Act 1962 (the Act): Determination of Taxable Income of Certain Persons from 
International Taxation: Transfer Pricing (6 August 1999) in par 2.1. 
175   The Second Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Tax Structures of 
South Africa Thin Capitalisation Rules (1995) in par 1.3b; see also B Arnold & MJ 
McIntyre International Tax Primer (2002) at 53; see also N Boldman “International Tax 
Avoidance” (1981) 35 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 443; A Stoud & C 
Masters Transfer Pricing (1991) at 10; J Ware & P Roper Offshore Insight (2001) at 178; 
AW Oguttu “Resolving Transfer-pricing Disputes: Are ‘Advance Pricing Agreements’ the 
Way Forward for South Africa?” (2006) 18 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 462. 
176 Arnold & McIntyre at 55. 
177  SARS Practice Note No 7 at 7.1; art 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (2003 condensed version). See also D Hay, F Horner & J Owens ”Past and 
Present Work in the OECD on Transfer Pricing and Selected Issues” (1994) 10 Intertax 
424; OECD Report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs Issues in International Taxation No 
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are usually not negotiated in a free, open market and so they may deviate from 
prices agreed upon by non related trading partners in comparable transactions 
under the same circumstances.178  
 
Transfer pricing may occur when South African residents sell assets to non-
resident trusts on an interest-free loan basis.179 The ensuing tax avoidance can 
be prevented by section 31(2) of the Income Tax Act, which provides that   
where any goods or services are supplied or acquired in terms of an international agreement 
and the acquirer is a connected person in relation to the supplier; whereby goods or services 
are supplied or acquired at a price which is either less than the price which such goods or 
services might have been expected to fetch if the parties to the transactions had been 
independent persons dealing at arm’s length (such price being the arm’s length price); or 
greater than the arms length price, then for purposes of this act in relation to either the 
acquirer or supplier, the commissioner may, in the determination of the taxable income of 
either the acquirer or suppliers, adjust the consideration in respect of the transaction to reflect 
an arm’s length price for the goods or services. 
 
In brief, the section provides that the Commissioner of the South African 
Revenue Service can adjust the consideration for goods or services supplied in 
terms of an international agreement, if the actual price paid is either less or 
greater than the price that would have been paid, if the supply of the goods or 
services had been between independent parties dealing on an arm’s length 
basis. In other words, the adjustment that is made on the consideration in 
determining the taxable income of the connected parties is based on the 
conditions which would have existed between unconnected persons under 
comparable circumstances. 
 
The following is noted in the South African Revenue Service (SARS) Practice 
Note 7, under the heading “Interest-free loans to non-residents”  
Residents of the Republic making loans to non-resident individuals, trusts or companies 
often charge no interest on the loans and no repayment conditions are agreed upon. In 
exercising his discretion in terms of section 31(2) to adjust the consideration in respect of 
the granting of the financial assistance, the Commissioner will take into account the 
amount of income of the non-resident which is taxed in the Republic in terms of the 
provisions of section 9D, the impact of the transaction on the tax base of any of the taxes 
imposed under any of the Acts administered by the Commissioner, the business activities 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Thin Capitalisation: Taxation of Entertainers, Artists and Sportsmen (1987) at 17; VH 
Miesel, HH Higinbotham & CW Yi “International Transfer Pricing: Practical Solutions for 
Inter-Company Pricing - Part 11” (2003) 29 International Tax Journal 1. OECD Report of 
the Committee on Fiscal Affairs ‘Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrators’ (1994) 172 Intertax 318 in par 12. 
178 M van Blerck “Transfer Pricing and Thin Capitalisation: The Basics” (1995) 8 SA Tax 
Review 44; AW Oguttu “Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance: Is the Arm’s-length Principle 
Still Relevant in the E-commerce Era?” (2006) 18 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 142-143. 
179 Ware & Roper “The Impact of Residence-based Tax on Offshore Trusts” at 21. 
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of the non-resident and the ruling interest rates in the Republic as well as the country of 
residence of the non-resident who/which borrowed the funds.180   
 
The Commissioner determines an arm’s length price by using one of the 
methods set out in Practice Note 7.181 Although, South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) Practice Notes, or Interpretation Notes, are not law,182 Practice Note 7 
sets out the methods which have been developed in international practice for 
determining and appraising a taxpayer’s transfer prices.183 These methods are 
the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price method (RP), 
the cost price method (CP), the transactional net margin method (TNMM), and 
the profit split method.184 Generally, all the methods are based on measuring a 
multinational’s pricing strategies against a benchmark of the pricing strategies of 
independent entities in uncontrolled transactions.185 
 
For the purposes of the applicability of section 31(2) to non-resident trusts, it is 
necessary to define some of the terms used in the section.  
                                                 
180 SARS Practice Note 7 in par 11.8. 
181  SARS Practice Note 7 in par 9.1.2 to 9.1.3; See also De Koker in par 17.59.  
182 ITC 1675 (1998), 62 SATC 219 at 229A.  
183  These methods are recognised by the Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
“Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators” (1994) 
Intertax pars 92-115. 
184 The ”comparable uncontrolled price” (CUP) method is the primary pricing method. This 
method requires a direct comparison to be drawn between the price charged for a specific 
product in a controlled transaction and the price charged for a closely comparable product 
in an uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances. See OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines in par 92. Then there is the ”resale price” method. This method is based on the 
price at which a product which has been purchased from a connected enterprise is resold 
to an independent enterprise. The resale price is then reduced by an appropriate gross 
margin, to cover the reseller’s operating costs, so as to provide an appropriate profit 
having taken into consideration the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed 
by the reseller. The balance is then regarded as the arm’s length price. See OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines in par 65. The other method is the ”cost plus” method. This 
method requires an estimation of an arm’s length consideration by adding an appropriate 
mark-up to the costs incurred by the supplier of goods or services in a controlled 
transaction. This mark up should provide for an appropriate profit to the supplier, in light of 
the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed. See OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines in par 115. Then there is the ”transactional net margin method” (TNMM). This 
method examines the net profit margin that a taxpayer realizes from a controlled 
transaction, relative to an appropriate base of for example costs, sales or assets. The 
profit level indicator of the tested party is compared to the profit level indicators of 
comparable independent parties. See SARS Practice Note No 7 in par 9.7.1. Lastly there 
is the ”profit split” method. Under this method the combined profit is identified and split 
between the connected parties in a controlled transaction. The profit is split by 
economically approximating the division of profits that would have been anticipated and 
reflected in an agreement made at arm’s length. See SARS Practice Note No 7 in par 
9.8.1; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in par 131. 
185 SARS Practice Note 7 in par 9.2.1-9.2.3. 
383 
 
 
 
 
The term “connected person”, as used in section 31(2), is defined in section 1 of 
the Act, in relation to a trust, to imply any beneficiary of such trust and any 
connected person in relation to such beneficiary. A connected person in relation 
to a trust (other than a collective investment scheme) includes any other person, 
who is a connected person in relation to such trust. In defining the term 
“connected person” in relation to a natural person, section 1 of the Act also 
provides that any trust, of which such natural person or such relative is a 
beneficiary, is a connected person. This implies that a non-resident trust is a 
connected person in relation to a South African resident, if such person or his or 
her relatives are a beneficiary of the trust.186 So if a South African resident, who 
is a connected person in relation to a trust, enters into a transaction with the 
trustees of an offshore trust and the transaction is not concluded at arm’s length, 
then section 31(2) may come into play.187 What is not clear, however, is whether 
section 31(1) would apply where the provider or acquirer of a loan is not a 
beneficiary, or a relative. 
 
The term “service”, as used in section 31(1), is defined in the section to include 
the granting of financial assistance, including the making of a loan, advance or 
debt, and the provision of any security or guarantee.188 
 
The term “international agreement” is defined in section 31(1) to include a 
transaction, operation, or scheme entered into between a resident and a non- 
resident for the supply of goods or services to or from the Republic. 
 
If a South African resident grants an interest-free loan to a non-resident trust, 
SARS could consider the South African resident not to have received a market-
related rate of interest on the loan, as an interest-free loan is not a market-based 
interest rate (not an arm’s length transaction), in terms of section 31(2).189 The 
provision of the loan in terms of the trust deed can be deemed an international 
                                                 
186 See also Meyerowitz in par 12.23; “Tax Briefs” Taxgram (July 1999) at 14.  
187 Ware & Roper “The Impact of Residence-based Tax on Offshore Trusts” at 22; see also 
SARS Practice Note 7 in par 2.7; see also SC Borkowski “Transfer Pricing Documentation 
and Penalties: How Much is Enough?” (2003) 26 International Tax Journal 3; Blerck 45. 
188 Meyerowitz in par 9.112. 
189 Ware &  Roper “The Impact of Residence-based Tax on Offshore Trusts” at 22; Mitchell 
and Mitchell at 93; Tax Briefs at 14; Olivier & Honiball at 248. 
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agreement, the lending is a service, and the parties are connected persons.190  
Thus, the granting of an interest-free loan to an “offshore trust” could lead to the 
invocation of the transfer pricing rules, since the interest-free loan is not an arm’s 
length transaction, in terms of section 31(2). 
 
It must be noted that the above transfer pricing provisions do not apply only to 
trusts, but can also be applied to companies. Again, a detailed discussion of 
transfer pricing in this regard is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
7.7  CONCLUSION  
 
With all the above provisions in place, one could conclude that the tax net seems 
to have closed in on opportunities by South African residents to avoid taxes by 
investing in offshore trusts. However, it is presumptuous to suggest that the trust 
has outlived its usefulness as a tax avoidance tool on the basis of the above 
legislative provisions.  
 
Writing on the efficiency of trusts as a tax avoidance tool in the current legislative 
climate, Mhlongo191 suggests that this has “simply altered the terrain and 
landscape” in which taxpayers use trusts for tax avoidance. Inevitably, the 
current legislation places an even greater responsibility on taxpayers to 
constantly keep abreast of legislative and other developments pertaining to 
trusts, so as to fully appreciate their implications. In so doing, they will be 
equipping themselves to make optimum use of the trust as a unique planning 
instrument. Ware and Roper192 note that a correctly structured offshore trust will 
continue to be a versatile tax avoidance tool. 
                                                 
190 Huxham & Haupt at 348. 
191  Mhlongo in par 5. 
192   J Ware & P Roper “The World of Offshore Sham Trusts” (Dec 1999) Insurance and Tax 
Journal at 19. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CURBING TAX AVOIDANCE BY OFFSHORE TRUSTS: THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
In this chapter, a study is made of the United Kingdom and the United States 
legislation that curbs income tax avoidance, as a result of investments in offshore 
trusts by residents. It is trite that the trust concept is a creation of Anglo-Saxon, 
and specifically English law, and that the concept of the offshore trust is an 
essential part of the law of numerous tax-haven jurisdictions that have a historical 
connection with the United Kingdom.1 The use of the English trust, which is 
respected worldwide, encourages the setting-up of offshore trusts in those 
jurisdictions.2 The United Kingdom has historically had to curtail the offshore trust 
tax-avoidance schemes that its residents get involved in. In respect to the United 
States, it is notable that this nation is historically known for being very unforgiving 
in its treatment of offshore tax avoidance. A look at the anti-avoidance legislation 
of these two countries, in regard to offshore trusts, is likely to suggest various 
measures for reforming South Africa’s law in areas where there are 
shortcomings.   
 
8.1 UNITED KINGDOM: TAXATION OF OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
Regarding investments made in offshore trusts by country residents, Lord Walker 
recently observed in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd3 that: 
It has become common for wealthy individuals in many parts of the world (including 
countries which have no indigenous law of trusts) to place funds at their disposition into 
trusts (often with a network of underlying companies) regulated by the law, of, and 
managed by trustees resident in, territories with which the settler (who may be also a 
beneficiary) has no substantial connection. These territories (sometimes called tax 
havens) are chosen not for their geographical convenience … but because they are 
supposed to offer special advantages in terms of confidentiality and protection from fiscal 
                                                 
1 JE Penner The Law of Trusts (2006) at 12; AW Scott, WF Fratcher, ML Ascher Scott and 
Ascher on Trusts 5 ed (2006) at 5; DJ Hayton The Law of Trusts 4 ed (2003) at 1; see DM 
Davis, C Beneke & RD Jooste Estate Planning (2004) Service Issue 17 in par 17.2, 17-7. 
MJ De Waal, RRM Paisley, R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) at 
819; see the discussion in Chapter 6 par 6.2. 
2 RH Blum Offshore Haven Banks, Trusts and Companies: The Business of Crime in the 
Euromarket (1984) at 8. 
3   [2003] 3 All ER 76 at 1. 
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demands (and, sometimes, from problems under the insolvency laws, or laws restricting 
freedom of testamentary disposition, in the country of the settlor’s domicile). The trusts 
and powers contained in a settlement established in such circumstances may give no 
reliable indication of who will in the event benefit the settlement. Typically it will contain 
very wide discretions exercisable by the trustees … in favour of a widely-defined class of 
beneficiaries. The exercise of those discretions may depend on the settlor’s wishes as 
confidentially imparted to the trustees … As a further cloak against transparency, the 
identity of the true settler may be concealed behind some corporate figurehead.    
 
The offshore trust has long been the primary vehicle used by United Kingdom 
domiciled individuals in offshore tax planning; even now, it is still being used as a 
tax planning vehicle.4 The United Kingdom legislation contains a number of 
measures to discourage individuals, who are both resident and domiciled in the 
United Kingdom, from seeking to avoid or defer their tax liabilities through the 
use of offshore trusts. (This discussion will be limited to the income tax and 
capital gains tax measures. Inheritance tax implications will not be discussed.) 
The term “trust” is, however, not comprehensively defined in the statute law of 
the United Kingdom.5 The lack of such definition in the English trust law is also 
carried over into revenue law. The Income and Corporations Taxes Act 1988 
(“ICTA”), which is the main taxing statute for income and corporation tax, uses 
the term ”settlement”, instead of the term “trust”. A “settlement” is defined in 
section 660 of the ITCA as including any disposition, trust, covenant, agreement, 
arrangement, or transfer of assets. This definition applies to both income tax and 
capital gains tax.6    
 
The term “settlor” (which carries the same meaning as “founder” of a trust), is 
defined in section 660G of the ICTA as meaning any person who makes a 
settlement. A person is deemed to have made a settlement, if he has made, or 
entered into, a settlement directly or indirectly, if he has directly or indirectly 
provided, or undertaken to provide, funds for the purpose of the settlement, or if 
he has made a reciprocal arrangement with another person for that person to 
make a settlement.7 
                                                 
4   G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 9 ed (2002) at 11. 
5 A Kaplan Trusts in Prime Jurisdictions (2000) at 51. 
6 Kaplan at 52; Clarke at 326. 
7 Clarke at 328. 
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The term “offshore trust” is not defined in any United Kingdom statute, but it 
generally denotes a trust that is resident outside the United Kingdom.  
Under English law, a trust does not have a residence, since it is not considered a 
separate legal person in its own right.8 It is the residence status of the trustees, 
and not that of the settlor or the beneficiaries, that determines whether a trust is 
an “onshore” trust, or an “offshore” trust. The residence and domicile status of 
the settlor and beneficiaries are only relevant in determining how the trust income 
and gains are taxed.9 
 
The ICTA does not provide a single definition of residence that applies to 
trustees across all taxes. There are separate and different definitions of the 
residence status of trustees for income tax on the one hand and capital gains tax 
on the other. 
 
For income tax purposes, there is no specific rule for determining the residence 
of trustees (except where some trustees are, and some are not, resident in the 
United Kingdom).10 This implies that the general rules for determining the 
residence status for individuals have to be applied to each trustee.11 Where all 
the trustees are resident in the United Kingdom, the trust will be resident there. 
Where none of the trustees are United Kingdom residents, the trust will not be 
resident in the United Kingdom.12  Where some trustees are resident in the 
United Kingdom and others are not, then, in terms of section 110 of the 1989 
Finance Act (FA), the residence of the trust will depend on the residence and 
domicile status of the settlor. If the settlor is  resident, ordinarily resident, or 
domiciled in the United Kingdom at one or more key times (such as time of the 
                                                 
8 Kaplan at 55; Hayton at 3. 
9 Kaplan at 55. 
10 Clarke at 262. 
11  Kaplan at 55. The United Kingdom does not have a basic statutory definition of residence 
in respect of individuals and so each case is decided on its particular facts. In Levene v 
CIR [1928] AC 217 at 222, it was held that the term residence means “to dwell 
permanently or for a considerable time, to have one’s settled or usual abode, to live in or 
at a particular place”. In a number of instances, United Kingdom tax legislation also refers 
to the term “ordinary residence”. In Shah v Barnet London Borough Council [1983] 1 ALL 
ER 309 at 343, the House of Lords indicated that “ordinary residence”  refers to “a man’s 
abode in a place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as 
part of the regular order of his life for the time being, whether of long or short duration”. 
12   R Fraser & J Wood Taxation of Offshore Trusts and Funds (2002) at 17; AR Thornhill & 
KJ Prosser Potter and Monroe’s Tax Planning with Precedents 11 ed (2004) at 1401. 
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creation of the trust, or when the settlor provides funds directly or indirectly to the 
trust), then the residence of even one trustee in the United Kingdom will make 
the trust resident in the United Kingdom.13    
 
8.1.1 INCOME TAX MEASURES TO PREVENT THE USE OF OFFSHORE 
TRUSTS TO AVOID TAXES  
 
According to the law of the United Kingdom, a trust is not liable to tax, since it is 
considered not to be a legal person. Liability for income tax falls on the trustees, 
except where a beneficiary is liable for income tax, if he is absolutely entitled to 
the trust income.14 Apart from the liability of the trustees and the beneficiaries, 
there are a number of anti-avoidance provisions which deem the income of the 
trust to be that of the settlor. These provisions can be divided into two categories. 
The first category contained in sections 660A-682A in Part XV chapters IA and IB 
of the ICTA, applies generally to all trusts, whether resident or non-resident.15 
The second category contained in sections 739-746 of the ICTA, is not limited to 
trusts, but counters all transfers of assets abroad to avoid tax in the United 
Kingdom, and so these provisions are also relevant to offshore trusts.16 These 
two categories are considered below. 
 
The taxation of the income of settlors of non-resident trusts (Part XV of the 
ICTA)  
 
In terms of section 660 of the ICTA, income arising under a settlement (whether 
resident or non-resident) is deemed to be that of the settler, if he retains an 
interest in the settlement, or if he receives a benefit from the settlement. The 
settlor is regarded as having retained an interest in the settled property, if it is, or 
if it becomes payable to him, or applicable for the benefit of the settlor or his 
spouse in any circumstance.17 There are certain exceptions, however. Under 
                                                 
13  S McKie & S Anstey Tolley’s Estate Planning (2005-2006) at 179; Kaplan at 55; M Hutton 
& I Ferrier Tolley’s UK Taxation of Trusts (2004) at 190; Fraser & Wood at 18. 
14 Kaplan at 58; RM Antoine Trusts and Related Tax Issues in Offshore Financial Law 
(2005) at 295. 
15 Clarke at 323. 
16 Clarke at 323. 
17  B Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service  (March 2002) Issue  66 at UK/32; Kaplan at 75; 
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section 660A of the ICTA a settlor does not have an interest in the settlement  
- if a person can only benefit in the event of the bankruptcy of a 
beneficiary;,  
- in the case of an assignment or change by a beneficiary of his interest; 
- in the case of a marriage settlement, the death of both parties thereto 
and any children of the marriage; 
- in the case of the death of a beneficiary under the age of 25; 
- if a person under the age of 25 is alive, and during that person’s life the 
settlor and his spouse cannot benefit.18  
 
Under section 660B(1) of the ICTA trust income paid to or for the benefit of a 
child of the settlor who is under the age of 18, is treated as the income of the 
settlor. Section 660B(1)(b) was introduced by section 64 of the 1999 Finance 
Act. It provides that, if income is appropriated to the child without being paid to 
him in such circumstances that the income is treated as his for tax purposes, the 
settlor will be taxed. This applies even where income is accumulated and 
distributed as capital (section 660B(6)(a)). Thus, a capital distribution to a child of 
the settlor is taxed as the settlor’s income, save to the extent that it exceeds 
retained income in the trust which has not been applied towards expenses or 
otherwise treated as that of the settlor.  
 
Under section 660G(3) of the ICTA, income arising under a settlement, which is 
situated inside or outside the United Kingdom, is taxed in the hands of the settlor, 
if it is either income chargeable to income tax, or income which would have been 
so chargeable if received by a person resident and domiciled in the United 
Kingdom. In terms of section 660G(4), income arising under the settlement is 
excluded, if the income did in fact arise to the settlor, and he is not liable for 
income tax, because he is not resident or domiciled in the United Kingdom. The 
effect of this section is that if the settlor is not resident in the United Kingdom, the 
foreign income of the settlement is not deemed to be his. But the income of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Antoine at 295; N Eastaway, I Richards & D Garlick Tolley’s Tax Advisers Guide to Trusts 
2 ed (2003) at 279-286. 
18 Antoine at 295. 
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settlement is treated as his, whether the settlement is resident or non-resident.19  
 
In terms of the United Kingdom legislation, the source income of a resident 
settlor, who is not domiciled in the United Kingdom, is excluded from taxation, 
unless it is remitted to the United Kingdom. Section 660G(4) of the ITCA 
provides that income is deemed to arise under the settlement in the year of 
remittance, if the settlor would have been chargeable had he been actually 
entitled to it. 
 
Transfer of assets abroad (ss 739-746 of the ICTA) 
 
Sections 739-746 of the ICTA are the most powerful weapons used to counter 
offshore tax avoidance in the United Kingdom. The sections relate to the taxation 
of assets that are transferred abroad so they also apply to transfers of assets to 
offshore trusts. 
  
Section 739 of the ICTA provides for a charge on the settlor. This section comes 
into play where, with a view of avoiding income tax, there is a transfer of assets 
resulting in income being paid to a person resident or domiciled outside the 
United Kingdom.20 Under section 739(2), a settlor will be liable to a charge where 
  
- he has in some way “power to enjoy” any income of a non-resident or 
non-domiciled person, or 
- where he may receive, or be entitled to, any “capital sum” in any way 
connected to the transfer or any associated operation.  
 
 
The phrases ”power to enjoy” and ”capital sum” need to be explained, in order to 
make the working of this provision clear.  The phrase ”power to enjoy” as used in 
section 739, is explained in section 742(a)-(e). In terms of this section, a settlor 
(transferor) is deemed to have “power to enjoy” income of a non-resident or a 
                                                 
19 Clarke at 330; Fraser & Wood at 23-24. 
20  Spitz & Clarke at UK/42; see also Clarke at 277; Kaplan at 78; Antoine at 296; Eastaway 
et al at 282; Fraser & Wood at 27; Thornhill & Prosser at 1403. 
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non-domiciled person, if  
- the income concerned is dealt with so as to ensure a benefit to the settlor, 
- the income concerned is applied in such a way that it increases the value 
of the assets held by the settlor (or the value of assets held for his 
benefit),  
- the settlor receives a benefit, or is entitled to receive a benefit, and the 
benefit derives from either the income or monies available because of 
associated operations that caused the income to arise,21 
- the settlor becomes entitled to the enjoyment of the income and the 
events which cause him to become entitled to that income, are exercised 
by reason of the powers he has to control the application of the income.22 
 
In terms of section 739(2), liability does not arise, unless the settlor or transferor 
is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom in the tax year in which he has 
“power to enjoy”. 
 
In terms of section 739, if the settlor or his spouse either receives, or is entitled to 
receive, a “capital sum”, he will be liable to a charge. The term “capital sum” is 
defined in section 739 as including the making of a loan to the transferor, or the 
repayment of a loan he has made. It also includes any capital sum not paid for 
full consideration in money or money’s worth. The payment of the sum must be 
connected with the transfer or an associated operation, and the settlor must be 
resident in the United Kingdom at the time of receipt or entitlement.23 
  
Relief is granted where the taxpayer subsequently receives the income taxed 
under section 739, for example, where the transferor has been charged to tax on 
income which has been deemed to be his under section 739, and it is subse- 
quently received by him. The income received is deemed not to form part of his 
                                                 
21  In CIR V Botnar CA [1999] STC 711, the taxpayer transferred shares to a trust in 
Liechtenstein. The Special Commissioner had held that s 739 did not apply as the 
taxpayer was excluded from the benefit under the trust. On appeal it was held that the 
section applied as the assets could be transferred to another trust from which the taxpayer 
and his family might benefit (as read from Hutton and Ferrier at 198). See also Eastaway 
et al at 286. 
22  Kaplan at 79-80; Clarke at 283; Spitz & Clarke at UK/43; Antoine at 296; Eastaway et al at 
283; Hutton & Ferrier at 198; McKie & Anstey at 180. 
23  Clarke at 286; Kaplan at 79; Eastaway et al at 283; Fraser & Wood at 29. 
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income again for income tax purposes.24 
 
There are, however, limitations to the application of section 739. In practice, the 
section proved wide in its interpretation, which made it cumbersome to 
administer. In Vesty v IRC,25 the House of Lords decided to restrict its wide 
interpretation. The imposition of liability under section 739 also has a limitation, 
as it applies only to the transferor (or his spouse) and not to a beneficiary who is 
not a transferor.26 In order to cater for these limitations, section 740 was enacted 
to tax benefits received by non-transferors (beneficiaries).27 The conditions for 
the application of section 740 as set out in section 740(1)(a) are the following:  
-  Income must be payable to a person resident or domiciled inside the 
United Kingdom, by virtue or in consequence of a transfer of assets, 
either alone or in conjunction with associated persons.  
-  The income must arise from a person resident or domiciled outside 
the United Kingdom, or by virtue of the transfer or any associated 
operation, and the income can directly or indirectly be used for 
providing a benefit for the taxpayer, or enabling a benefit to be 
provided for him.  
-  The taxpayer must be ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom in the 
year in which he receives the benefit.  
-  The taxpayer must not be taxable under section 739.28  
Where these conditions apply, the amount of the value of the benefit is deemed 
to be taxable as the income of the recipient (beneficiary).  
 
A benefit that is received by a resident is defined in section 742(9) as including a 
payment of any kind. In terms of section 740(1), the benefit is taxable, if the 
recipient is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom in the year of assessment in 
which the benefit is received. It is taxed in the year of receipt to the extent that it 
                                                 
24 S 743(4); see also Clarke at 292. 
25 [1980] AC 1148; see also Hutton & Ferrier at 198. 
26 Kaplan at 81; Eastaway et al par 10.29 at 287; A Shipwright & R Baldry Trusts and UK 
Taxation 2 ed (2000) at 252.  
27 Finance Act Notes British Tax Review (1997) No 4 at 235; Clarke at 297-298; Eastaway et 
al at 288; McKie & Anstey at 180; Hutton & Ferrier at 242; Thornhill & Prosser at 1403-
1404. 
28 See also Clarke at 297. 
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equals, or is less than the relevant income of the current or prior years. If it 
exceeds the relevant income, it is carried forward and taxed as and when there is 
relevant income in a future tax year.29 Thus, if the recipient is domiciled in the 
United Kingdom, the benefit is fully taxable, even if it is received and kept 
abroad. For instance, a benefit is received, if offshore trustees allow a beneficiary 
the use of a holiday home in a foreign country. Also, if income is accumulated in 
an offshore trust for the benefit of the settlor’s children, and no capital sums are 
paid out to or for their benefit until they attain a certain age, each child may be 
charged income tax under section 740, on the income which arose to the 
trustees (before or after they attained the relevant age) and was accumulated 
and which could, when it arose, have been (directly or indirectly) used to provide 
a benefit for them. 30 
 
There is, however, an exception to the application of the United Kingdom 
provisions. Both section 739 and section 740 are subject to the motive defence 
test, as set out in section 741 of the ICTA. In terms of this provision, the taxpayer 
has to prove that the transfer and any associated operations were bona fide 
commercial transactions, not designed for purposes of avoiding liability to 
taxation.31 For instance, in A Beneficiary v IR Commissioners,32 a Japanese 
grandfather deposited money in England and then transferred it to a Jersey 
discretionary trust. The money was intended for the support of his granddaughter 
and her children and grandchildren resident in the United Kingdom. It was held 
that tax avoidance was not the motive for the transfer and so section 739 was 
found not to be applicable.  
 
8.1.2 CAPITAL GAINS TAX MEASURES TO PREVENT THE USE OF 
OFFSHORE TRUSTS TO AVOID TAXES  
 
In terms of section 2(1) of the Taxation of Capital Gains Act 1992 (“TCGA”), a 
                                                 
29 S 740(2). 
30 McKie & Anstey at 180-181. 
31  J Kessler “Tax Avoidance Purpose and Section 741 of the Taxes Act 1988” (2004) 4 
British Tax Review 375; Spitz & Clarke at UK/43; Clarke at 313; Kaplan at 83; Hutton & 
Ferrier at 198; Antoine at 297; Eastaway et al at 289; Fraser & Wood at 29; Thornhill & 
Prosser at 1404. 
32 [1999] STC Section CD 174 as read from Kaplan at 84. See also Eastaway et al at 289. 
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person is chargeable for capital gains tax (CGT) in respect of capital gains 
accruing to him in a year of assessment during which he is resident or ordinarily 
resident in the United Kingdom. A person who is resident or ordinarily resident in 
the United Kingdom, but is not domiciled in the United Kingdom, is not liable to 
CGT on gains arising from assets situated outside the United Kingdom, except 
when the amount representing the gains is remitted to the United Kingdom. A 
person who is not resident or ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom at any 
time in the tax year, is not liable to CGT, except where the non-resident is 
carrying on a trade, profession or vocation in the United Kingdom, through a 
branch or agency, whose assets are situated in the United Kingdom and used in 
the United Kingdom business, branch or agency at or before the time of 
disposal.33  
 
Determining the residence status of a trust for capital gains tax purposes  
 
As noted above, in the United Kingdom a trust is not a taxable entity. The 
residence status of the trustees is used to determine how a trust’s capital gains 
are taxed.34 For the purposes of capital gains tax, unlike income tax (dealt with 
above), there are specific statutory rules for determining the residence status of 
trustees.35  Instead of being viewed as individuals, the trustees are regarded as a 
single and continuous body of persons that is considered to be resident and 
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, unless: 
- the general administration of the trust is ordinarily carried on outside the 
United Kingdom; and 
- either all or the majority of the trustees are either not resident, or not 
ordinarily resident, in the United Kingdom.36 
 
In terms of section 69(2) of the TCGA, there is an exception in the case of 
professional trust managers acting as trustees, who are regarded as non-
resident where the whole of the trust property is, or derives from, property that 
was provided by a person who was neither resident, ordinarily resident or 
                                                 
33  S 12(1) TCGA 1992. 
34 Kaplan at 55. 
35   Antoine at 297. 
395 
 
 
 
 
domiciled in the United Kingdom at the time.  
 
How a CGT charge arises 
  
CGT is charged on any gain arising on a disposal, or deemed disposal, of an 
asset. A gain is calculated as the difference between the net disposal proceeds 
of an asset and the cost of acquisition of the asset, including the cost of any 
enhancement reflected in the state of the asset at the time of disposal. In terms 
of section 12 of  the TCGA, a disposal is defined as including a sale of an asset 
and also a transfer for no consideration (for instance a gift), as well as the loss or 
destruction of an asset.  
 
In regard to trusts, when a person becomes absolutely entitled to any trust 
property, there is a deemed disposal and an immediate re-acquisition of that 
property by the trustees at its market value. This means that any increase in the 
value of the property, while held in trust, is deemed to be realised by the 
trustees, and the beneficiary takes over the property at an acquisition cost equal 
to its market value. Only gains accruing after 6 April 1965 (when CGT was 
introduced) are liable to tax.   
 
 
 
Events giving rise to a United Kingdom CGT charge in regard to offshore 
trusts 
 
The five events that give rise to a charge to CGT in regard to offshore trusts are: 
-  transfers of assets into offshore trusts; 
-  the disposal of an interest in an offshore trust; 
-  realisation of a gain by an offshore trust; 
-  capital payments to beneficiaries resident in the United Kingdom;   
-  the emigration of a United Kingdom trust.37  
These events are discussed below. 
                                                                                                                                            
36 S 69(1) of TCGA 1992.  
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The transfer of assets into offshore trusts 
 
In terms of section 2(1) of the TCGA, when a settlor, who is resident or ordinarily 
resident in the United Kingdom, settles assets in an offshore trust, he makes a 
disposal and is liable for CGT. The disposal is treated as having been made for a 
consideration equal to the market value of those assets.38   
 
Disposal of an interest in an offshore trust 
 
In terms of section 12(1) of the TCGA, individuals resident or ordinarily resident, 
but not domiciled in the United Kingdom, are not liable to CGT on the disposal of 
assets situated outside the United Kingdom. A CGT charge does, however, arise 
on any gains accruing when they are received in the United Kingdom.39 The CGT 
charge is calculated on the actual proceeds, or the market value.40  
 
 
 
 
Realisation of capital gains of an offshore trust (attribution to the settlor) 
 
Gains realised by the trustees of an offshore trust (except those associated with 
a trade in the United Kingdom) are not chargeable to CGT, as the trustees are 
not resident in the United Kingdom. In the absence of countering measures, non-
resident trustees could take advantage of this provision by realising gains 
completely free of CGT, except where they carry on business in the United 
Kingdom. (It should be remembered that for CGT purposes, the trustees are 
regarded as a single continuing body of persons that is regarded as resident, or 
ordinarily resident, in the United Kingdom, unless the general administration of 
the trust is carried on outside the United Kingdom, and either all, or the majority 
                                                                                                                                            
37   Antoine at 298. 
38 Kaplan at 101. 
39   Antoine at 299. 
40 Kaplan at 123. 
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of the trustees are not resident, or not ordinarily resident, in the United Kingdom.) 
In order to avoid any opportunity for tax avoidance, there are provisions that 
attribute the offshore gains to the settlor. These provisions apply where the 
settlor or an associated person has retained an interest in the trust. 41 In terms of 
section 86 and Schedule 5 of the TCGA, gains which arise where a settlor has an 
interest in the settlement, and the settlement is a “qualifying settlement”, will be 
liable to CGT.42  
 
Section 86(1)(c) of the TCGA provides that the gains of a qualifying settlement 
can only be attributed to the settlor, if in the year in which the gains arise, the 
settlor is both resident and domiciled in the United Kingdom. A person is a settlor 
in relation to a settlement, if the settled property consists of, or includes, property 
originating from him.43 Property “originates” from the settlor where it has been 
directly or indirectly provided by him, or is property representing such property.44 
  
In terms of section 86 of the TCGA, a settlor is treated as having an interest in 
the settlement, if the property or income in the settlement is, or will, or may 
become, applicable for the benefit of a “defined person”, or payable to him in any 
circumstance, or if the defined person enjoys a direct or indirect benefit from any 
property or income in the settlement.45 The “defined persons”, according to 
paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 5 of the TCGA, are: the settlor, the settlor’s spouse, 
any child of the settlor or his spouse, the spouse of any child, the grandchild of 
the settlor or his spouse, any spouse of such grandchild, or any companies 
controlled by them. A “defined person” may benefit where:  
- there is property originating from the settlor, which is, or may, at any 
time be included in the trust property and may become payable or 
applicable for the benefit of that person,  
- there is income originating from the settlor, which arises, or may arise 
under the trust that may become payable or applicable for the benefit 
of that person, or where 
                                                 
41  McKie & Anstey at 185; Clarke at 333; Kaplan at 103; Hutton & Ferrier at 206; Eastaway 
et al at 301. 
42   Qualifying settlements are those potentially caught by the legislation. 
43  Schedule 5 par 6; see also Spitz & Clarke at UK/33; Clarke at 333; Kaplan at 106. 
44 Kaplan at 107. 
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- the person already enjoys a benefit directly or indirectly from such 
property or income.46  
 
There are certain exceptions to section 86 of the TCGA, as set out in Schedule 5 
to the TCGA. A settlor is not deemed to have an interest in the settlement, if a 
defined person can only benefit in the following instances:  
- The bankruptcy of a beneficiary, the assignment, or change by a 
beneficiary of his interest.  
- In the case of a marriage settlement, the death of both parties thereto 
and any children of the marriage, or the death of any beneficiary under 
25 years of age (paragraph 2(4) of schedule 5 of the TCGA).  
- Under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Schedule 5 of the TCGA, gains are not 
attributed to the settlor, if only one defined person has an interest in the 
settlement in a year of assessment and that person dies during the year, 
or if two or more persons have interests and they all die during the year.  
- Gains are also not attributed, if the only defined person with an interest 
in the settlement is the spouse of the settlor, or the spouse of one of his 
children or grandchildren, and the marriage ends during the year 
concerned.47 These exceptions are perhaps intended to cover those 
situations where tax avoidance is not the motive.  
 
In terms of section 86(1)(e) of the TCGA, a charge is made of the amount on 
which the trustees would have been chargeable to CGT for the tax year 
concerned, if they had been resident in the United Kingdom. The settlor will be 
taxable on any gains realised by the trustees, unless he is domiciled outside the 
United Kingdom in the relevant tax year, is neither resident, nor ordinarily 
resident in the United Kingdom during any part of the year, or if he is dead. The 
offshore charge arises in the year following the exporting of the settlement.48 
 
Realisation of capital gains (attribution to the beneficiaries) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
45 Clarke at 334; McKie & Anstey at 186; Kaplan at 106. 
46 Kaplan at 107. 
47 Clarke at 335. 
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Where a capital payment is made, or a benefit out of capital is provided to a 
United Kingdom resident and domiciled beneficiary, CGT arises.49 In terms of 
section 87(3) the TCGA, where in any tax year the trustees of a settlement are 
resident outside the United Kingdom throughout the year, and a beneficiary who 
is both resident and domiciled in the United Kingdom receives a capital payment 
from that settlement, the beneficiary will be chargeable when the gain is deemed 
to accrue to him. This implies that, until a capital payment is received by a United 
Kingdom resident and domiciled beneficiary, no capital gains tax will be payable 
on any disposal by the trustees.50 The attribution of gains to beneficiaries should 
not exceed the amount actually received by them. A charge under this provision 
does not require the settlor to be a United Kingdom resident, or to be domiciled 
in the United Kingdom at any time.51 Basically, the conditions for the application 
of this section are the following:  
- There must be a “beneficiary”, who is both domiciled in the United 
Kingdom and either resident, or ordinarily resident, in the United 
Kingdom at some time in the year.   
- The trust must be an offshore trust throughout the year, and it must have 
“trust gains” in that year, and the beneficiary must receive a “capital 
payment” in that year, or have received a capital payment in the previous 
year.52  
 
The term “beneficiary”, as defined in section 87 of the TCGA, refers not only to a 
person named in the trust deed, but also to any person, who has received, or is 
treated as having received, a capital payment after 18 March 1991. This rule 
excludes trustees of the trust in question, or trustees of any other trust.53 
 
“Trust gains” are defined in section 87 of the TCGA as gains made by the 
trustees in any year, in respect of which they would have been charged CGT, if 
they had been resident, and also any gains made in previous years, which have 
                                                                                                                                            
48 Mc Kie & Anstey at 159. 
49   Antoine at 299. 
50 Hutton & Ferrier at 203; McKie & Anstey at 161; A Shipwright & R Baldry Trusts and UK 
Taxation 2 ed (2000) at 272. 
51 Kessler at 400; Kaplan at 113. 
52 Kaplan at 114. 
53 Kaplan at 114. 
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not yet been attributed to the beneficiaries, or attributed to the settlor in terms of 
section 86. The “trust gains” also include gains realised by a closely held non-
resident company that are apportioned to the offshore trustees as direct or 
indirect participators.54 
 
The term “capital payment”, as used in section 87, is defined in section 97 of the 
TCGA as meaning any payment, which is not chargeable to income tax on the 
beneficiary or, if the beneficiary is not resident or ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom, any payment received otherwise than as income, and any transfers of 
assets, or the conferring of any benefit. In terms of section 87(7), a beneficiary 
will not be liable for capital gains tax for a capital payment received from an 
offshore trust, unless he is domiciled in the United Kingdom at some time during 
that year. A beneficiary is treated as having received a payment from trustees, 
whether he receives it directly or indirectly; if it is directly or indirectly applied by 
the trustees for the beneficiary’s benefit, or for the payment of his debts; or if it is 
received by a third person at the beneficiary’s direction.55  
 
Where a settlor returns to the United Kingdom after less that five years of non-
residence, and gains have accrued to him in the years of absence, the settlor is 
deemed to realise those gains in the year of return, and so he is liable to CGT on 
those gains. If the gains include those attributed to him under section 86 of the 
TCGA as a settlor of an offshore trust, then only the portion of those gains, that 
has not already been attributed to beneficiaries under section 87, is 
chargeable.56 
 
Under section 91 of the TCGA, a supplementary charge is imposed on 
beneficiaries of offshore trusts. This section is intended to prevent the deferral of 
CGT where offshore trustees do not make capital payments and so indefinitely 
defer the CGT that would have been paid by United Kingdom-domiciled resident 
beneficiaries. This charge is made, where a capital payment is matched with a 
trust gain arising before the year immediately preceding the relevant year of 
                                                 
54 Clarke at 352; Kaplan at 114. 
55 Kaplan at 115. 
56 Kaplan at 121. 
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assessment.57 In effect, the supplementary charge prevents deferral of CGT 
when it is accumulated in an offshore trust. 
 
As a further deterrent to the deferral of CGT in the United Kingdom, in terms of 
the Finance Act (FA) 1991, interest is charged on beneficiaries, who receive 
capital payments from offshore trusts. Ten per cent per annum is charged on the 
CGT due under section 87 of the TCGA, on delayed capital payments to 
beneficiaries and this interest rate can go up to a maximum of 60%.58  
 
 
 
 
 
Curbing tax avoidance: Offshore companies holding the assets of offshore 
trusts 
 
Where an offshore company holds assets owned by an offshore trust, the United 
Kingdom has a number of provisions that can be used to curb the ensuing tax 
avoidance. For instance, section 92 of the TCGA extends the provisions of 
section 87, by providing that payments received by beneficiaries in terms of 
section 87 include 
- payments from a company controlled by the trustees, either alone or 
together. with the settler, and persons connected with the settlor; and  
- payments to a non-resident company controlled by beneficiaries.  
 
Further, section 13(10) of the TCGA extends to non-resident trustees the 
provisions attributing gains made by non-resident close companies to 
shareholders resident or ordinarily resident (or individuals domiciled) in the 
United Kingdom. Such gains realised by non-resident trusts are brought within 
the ambit of section 87. Then section 96 of FA 2000 amended section 96(5) of 
the TCGA to eliminate the requirement that each of the persons controlling an 
                                                 
57  Shipwright & Baldry at 275; Hutton & Ferrier at 206; McKie & Anstey at 188; Kaplan at 
120; Antoine at 299; Eastaway et al in par 10.37 at 290.   
58 Hutton & Ferrier at 211. 
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offshore company, to which payments are made by offshore trustees, must be 
resident, or ordinarily resident, in the United Kingdom. The interposition of non-
resident persons in the control of the offshore company had been used to 
frustrate the operations of section 96 of the TCGA.59 
 
In terms of section 94 of FA 2000, section 79B was inserted in the TCGA to 
prevent the use of double tax treaties to shelter gains realised by offshore 
companies owned by a trust. Such gains may be attributed to resident or non-
resident trustees as participators in those companies. 
 
 
 
 
Emigrating settlements 
 
When a trust that was formerly resident in the United Kingdom emigrates 
offshore, a CGT charge arises. Emigration takes place where there is an 
appointment of new non-resident trustees to constitute a majority, or where 
trustees that were formerly resident in the United Kingdom emigrate and the 
majority of trustees are now non-resident.60 A trust is also deemed to have 
emigrated, if the general administration of the trust is transferred abroad.61 Under 
section 80 of the TCGA, where a United Kingdom resident trustee emigrates, the 
trustee will be deemed to have disposed of the “defined assets” and acquired 
them at their current market value immediately before the trust emigrated.  The 
“defined assets” of a trust that emigrates from the United Kingdom, are defined in 
section 80(4) of the TCGA as including all trust assets other than those which 
would in any event remain within the United Kingdom tax charge, in terms of 
section 10 of the TCGA.  There is an exception in the case where a double-
taxation agreement applies, whereby the taxing rights on the disposal of the 
asset have been surrendered by the United Kingdom to the jurisdiction to which 
                                                 
59 Hutton & Ferrier at 214. 
60   Antoine at 299. 
61  Clarke at 211; Kaplan at 121.  
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the trust emigrates.62 There are, however, provisions to prevent a double charge 
to tax with reference to disposals of interest under trusts. In terms of section 82 
of the TCGA, there are limitations to the charge to tax, where there is an 
inadvertent change in residence resulting from the death of a trustee, or where 
the former residence status is resumed within six months. Then there are also 
provisions governing the liability for tax of past trustees, where a United Kingdom 
trust becomes non-resident and an export charge remains unpaid.  
 
In terms of section 89 of the TCGA, a capital payment made to a beneficiary 
during a time when the trust was resident in the United Kingdom can be 
apportioned, if it was made in anticipation of a disposal made by the trustees 
subsequently, when non-resident. 
Related to the emigration of trusts is the situation where funds held in separate 
trusts are derived from a single settlement and one fund of the settlement is 
exported offshore, leaving another with trustees resident in the United Kingdom. 
The trustees in the United Kingdom may bear the capital gains tax liability for 
gains made by the offshore trustees of the fund that is exported (since in terms of 
section 69 of the TCGA, the trustees are treated as a single and continuing body 
of persons resident in the United Kingdom, unless the administration of the 
settlement is carried on outside the United Kingdom and a majority of the 
trustees are resident outside the United Kingdom). In Roome and Denne v 
Edwards HL,63 a settlement, which had been divided into two funds was held to 
constitute a single settlement and the trustees, resident and non-resident, to 
constitute a single body, so that United Kingdom trustees could be assessed for 
gains which accrued to Cayman Islands trustees.   
 
8.1.3 OTHER CGT PROVISIONS ENACTED TO CURB CERTAIN TAX 
AVOIDANCE SCHEMES INVOLVING OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
Dual resident trusts were often used to avoid taxes in the United Kingdom. A dual 
resident trust could arise where the majority of the trustees of a trust are resident 
in the United Kingdom, but its general administration is carried on elsewhere. 
                                                 
62  Hutton & Ferrier at 206; Kaplan at 121-122; Clarke at 214. 
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Generally, in terms of section 69 of the TCGA, the trust would be United 
Kingdom resident, but a double taxation treaty might provide that the trust would 
be treated as resident, where the general administration was carried on. Use of 
certain reliefs (like gift reliefs or other roll-over reliefs) would allow assets to be 
transferred into such trusts, or disposed of without tax under the protection of the 
double tax treaty.64 Section 69 of the TCGA is an anti-avoidance provision that 
denies the roll-over relief on the transfer. 
 
Section 83 is another anti-avoidance provision that can be used to curb tax 
avoidance where, by virtue of a double taxation treaty, dual resident trustees use 
their residence status in another country to avoid a United Kingdom CGT charge. 
The section applies where the trustees are resident and ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom under United Kingdom domestic law, but become exempt from 
capital gains tax on the disposal of assets, because of the residence provisions 
of a double tax treaty. In terms of section 83, the trustees are deemed, 
immediately before becoming dual resident, to have disposed of the assets and 
reacquired them at market value. Although the United Kingdom does not have 
double tax treaties that cover capital gains tax with most tax havens, this 
provision is necessary in the light of the fact that section 788(3) of the ICTA gives 
tax treaties primacy over any enactment, including anti-avoidance provisions.65  
 
Schedule 26 of the FA 2000 has provisions relating to an offshore tax avoidance 
scheme known as “flip-flop”, which results in gains being extracted from a trust 
tax-free, or with minimum taxation, by making use of borrowed money. The way 
flip-flop works is that the trustees borrow money on the security of assets in the 
trust and advance the money to another trust, after which the settlor severs his 
interest in the first trust. In the following tax year, the trustees of the first trust sell 
the assets and use the proceeds to repay the debt. The effect of this scheme is 
that it results in capital payments being made to United Kingdom resident 
beneficiaries from the second trust without charge to tax.66 In terms of Schedule 
4C to the TCGA, the anti-avoidance provision in Schedule 26 of the FA 2000, 
                                                                                                                                            
63 1981, 54 TC 359 as read from Hutton & Ferreir at 191. 
64 Hutton & Ferrier at 205. 
65 Hutton & Ferrier at 207. 
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that prevents the use of flip-flop schemes, also extends to offshore trusts, in that 
beneficiaries are charged in respect of gains accruing to offshore trustees by 
virtue of a transfer of value made to them. 
 
Another scheme that was utilised to avoid taxes in the United Kingdom involves 
bringing a trust onshore and then exporting it again. The gains on the trust 
property escape a CGT charge, because they were realised while the trust was 
onshore, and the beneficiary pays little or no tax on the sale of an interest in the 
trust, because of the rule providing for its value to be uplifted on the trust’s exit 
from the United Kingdom.67 Section 94 of the FA 2000 amended section 85 of 
the TCGA to block such schemes, with the result that there will be no uplift where 
the trust is ”pregnant” with gains not attributed to beneficiaries, or the trust has 
gains which are caught under the measures to counter flip-flop schemes in the 
FA 2000. 
 
The above provisions reflect an endeavour by the United Kingdom to enact 
specific provisions dealing with certain anti-avoidance schemes as they arise.  
 
8.1.4 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
United Kingdom law imposes several reporting obligations on trustees, settlors 
and beneficiaries of offshore trusts. In terms of section 745 of the ICTA, the 
following applies:  
- Where a person transfers property to an offshore trust, he is expected 
within 12 months to report details of the property transferred, the date 
of transfer, the consideration (if any), and the identity of the trust.   
- Within 12 months of becoming domiciled in the United Kingdom, as 
an ordinary resident, a settlor of an offshore trust must report his 
name, address, date of creation of the trust, and the names and 
addresses of the trustees. 
- The trustees of a United Kingdom resident trust that emigrates from 
the United Kingdom must within 12 months file a return specifying the 
                                                                                                                                            
66 Hutton & Ferrier at 214; Thornhill & Prosser at 1411. 
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date of creation of the trust, the name and address of each person 
who was a settlor immediately before emigration, and the names and 
addresses of each trustee before emigration.  
- Within three months of creating an offshore trust, the settlor must 
report his address and the names and addresses of trustees and the 
date of creation of the trust. This obligation does not extend to non-
domiciled settlors, or settlors who, although domiciled in the United 
Kingdom, are not ordinarily resident.68 
 
Apart from the reporting obligations imposed on the trustees, settlors and 
beneficiaries, section 98 of the TCGA confers on Inland Revenue wide 
information-gathering powers with regard to sections 87-90 of that Act and also 
the same powers in terms of section 745 of the ICTA, with regard to sections 739  
and 740 of the ICTA. 
 
8.2 UNITED STATES: TAXATION OF OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
In the United States, a trust is a separate taxpaying entity, and it is liable for 
income tax on any income that is received by, or accrues to it.69 In United States 
law, the residence of the trust depends on the legal and fiduciary control over the 
trust.70 A trust that is resident in the United States is referred to as a domestic 
trust. There are two tests used in the United States to determine whether a trust 
is a domestic trust. In terms of section 7701(a)(30) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(“the Code”) of 1954, a trust is classified as a domestic trust for tax purposes, if 
- a United States court can exercise primary supervision over the 
administration of the trust, and 
- one or more United States persons have the authority to control all 
substantial decisions of the trust. 
 
These two tests are referred to as the “court test” and the “control test”. The first 
                                                                                                                                            
67 Hutton & Ferrier at 214. 
68 Kaplan at 124-125. 
69  KE Anderson, TR Pope & JL Kramer Prentice Hall’s Federal Taxation: Corporations 
Partnerships, Estates and Trusts (2004) at 14-3.    
70 Kaplan at 128. 
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test is satisfied, if the trust instrument is governed by United States laws. The 
second test is satisfied, if only United States persons make all the substantial 
decisions in the trust, with no non-United States person having the power to veto 
any substantial decisions. If either of these tests is not satisfied, the trust is 
treated as a foreign trust (offshore trust).71 In the United States, offshore trusts 
are mainly used for asset protection purposes (so as to shield the assets 
transferred to the trust from future creditors), but this could result in some tax 
advantages that revenue may curtail.72 
 
8.2.1 INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF OFFSHORE TRUSTS  
 
The income tax benefits arising from the use of offshore trusts have been 
significantly curtailed in the United States. One of the schemes that was utilised 
by United States taxpayers to avoid taxes, was to shift income from high bracket 
taxpayers to lower bracket taxpayers, without transferring the underlying assets 
directly to the donee. This is commonly referred to as “tax-bracket shopping”. 
The implications are that income from the trust assets is not taxed at the rate 
applicable in the transferor’s tax bracket, but rather at the applicable rate in a 
lower income tax bracket governing either the trust itself, or its beneficiaries, who 
are often the taxpayer’s children.73 The tax savings derived from such income-
shifting are curtailed in the United States through the application of two 
measures: 
- Firstly, “tax-bracket shopping”, that involves either accumulating 
income in the trust, or distributing the income to beneficiaries, is 
curtailed by limiting the tax brackets for trusts, so that all trust income 
is taxed at the highest marginal rate. So income tax savings, that 
result from shifting income to the trust, in the hope of earning the tax 
rate for the trust accumulation of income, become minimal. In 
addition, in terms of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (”TRA”), provisions 
were enacted whereby income beyond $1000 earned by children 
                                                 
71 Kaplan at 129; Antoine at 302-303; PR McDaniel, HJ Hugh & JR Repetti Introduction to 
United States International Taxation 5ed (2005) at 80. 
72  EM Nelson “Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Icing on the Cake” (1996) 15 
Virginia Tax Review 404. 
73  Nelson at 406. 
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under 14 years of age is taxed at the parents’ highest marginal rate. 
This curtailed the use of trusts to obtain a lower rate on distribution to 
trust beneficiaries.74 
- The second method used in the United States to prevent tax-bracket 
shopping is the grantor trust rules. The grantor trust rules are used to 
prevent taxpayers from shifting income to lower tax bracket taxpayers 
without actually relinquishing control of the trust property.75  
 
A “grantor” is defined as including a person who creates a trust, or a person who 
directly or indirectly makes a gratuitous transfer of property to a trust.76 In terms 
of section 671 of the Code, a grantor trust’s assets are treated as assets owned 
by the grantor for income tax purposes. The implications of this are that any 
income received by the grantor trust is deemed to have been received by the 
grantor.77  
 
The United States grantor trust rules are also used to prevent foreign trusts from 
being used to defer taxation of the income of United States persons. This is done 
by treating most foreign trusts created by United States persons as “grantor 
trusts” for income tax purposes, and by treating most trusts created by non-
resident aliens as non-grantor trusts.78  A “non-grantor” trust is a trust that is not 
treated as the property of the grantor. The income of a non-grantor trust is taxed 
in the trust itself, if the income is accumulated in the trust, or in the hands of a 
beneficiary, to whom it is distributed.79 
 
8.2.2 GENERAL RULES RELATING TO GRANTOR TRUSTS 
 
Before describing the working of the grantor trusts, it is worth pointing out that 
                                                 
74 Nelson at 407. 
75 Nelson at 407. 
76   CM Bruce United States Taxation of Foreign Trusts (2000) at 99 (“Bruce 2000”); JG 
Glattmachr & AM Michaelson Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts 14 ed (2005) in par 
3.1 at 3-2. 
77  Kaplan at 130; RJ Morril, HB Cheney, CM Korsel & RG Stewart Grantor Trusts 
Demystified (2006) at 31; see also generally CM Bruce, LD Solomon & LJ Saret “Asset 
Protection, Privacy and AML Compliance” Taxes (September 2004) at 15; Nelson at 408; 
Anderson et al at 14-30.   
78 Spitz & Clarke at United States/42. 
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there have been a number of amendments to these rules since they were 
introduced in 1954 the reason being that taxpayers soon came up with schemes 
that escaped the grantor trust rules, while retaining significant benefits from the 
trust assets. The TRA of 1986 effectively curtailed these schemes. In terms of 
the 1986 amendments, any powers or interests held by the grantor’s spouse 
were rendered attributable to the grantor.  
 
Further, before the TRA 1986, a grantor could have a reversionary interest in 
trust assets and not be taxed under the grantor trust rules, as long as the trust 
term exceeded ten years (Clifford Trusts).80 After the coming into effect of the 
TRA 1986, the ten-year trusts were also deemed to be grantor trusts, with the 
effect that all reversionary interests in such trusts result in the grantor being liable 
for tax.81   
 
The rules that determine when a trust is a “grantor trust”, subjecting the grantor 
to tax liability, are set out in sections 673 to 679 of the Code. These are 
considered below. 
 
Reversionary interests 
 
Section 673(a) of the Code, as amended by the TRA 1986, provides that a 
grantor is taxed on income of the trust, if he has a reversionary interest in either 
the income or the principal worth over 5% of the value of the trust at its inception. 
Under section 672(e), a grantor is treated as holding any interest held by him or 
his wife. As an exception to this rule, the grantor rules will not apply, where the 
value of the reversionary interest does not exceed 5% of the value of the trust. 82 
The rules will also not apply, if the reversion will occur only if the beneficiary dies 
before reaching the age of 21, and the beneficiary is a linear descendant of the 
grantor.83 If approval of an adverse party is required before any powers may be 
exercised by, or for, the grantor, then the grantor is released from the application 
                                                                                                                                            
79  Anderson et al at 14-30; Spitz & Clarke at US/34-40; Kaplan at 131. 
80 Anderson et al at 14-31; Bruce 2000 at 95; Glattmachr & Michaelson in par 3.1 at 3-3. 
81 Nelson at 409.  
82 Nelson at 410; Bruce at 106. 
83 Bruce 2000 at 106.  
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of this provision.84 
 
Power to control beneficial enjoyment 
 
Grantor trust rules apply where the grantor retains the power to designate the 
recipients of trust income or principal.85 Under section 674 of the Code, a grantor 
is taxed on income, if (without the consent of an adverse party) he or his spouse 
has the power to control another’s beneficial enjoyment, such as by deciding how 
much income to distribute.  
 
In terms of the United States legislation, the amounts distributed from a grantor 
trust are not taxable to a beneficiary, because they are treated as gifts from the 
grantor. However, the United States legislation gives a wide meaning to the term 
beneficiary in regard to a United States beneficiary. A trust has a United States 
beneficiary, even if United States beneficiaries may not receive distributions 
during the grantor’s lifetime. A trust is also considered to have a United States 
beneficiary, even if the beneficiary cannot receive distributions while resident in 
the United States and can only receive distributions after terminating his 
residence status. If a trust, that has no United States beneficiaries, subsequently 
acquires a United States beneficiary, the grantor will be taxable on all income 
that accrued to the trust from inception, and thereafter the trust will be treated as 
a grantor trust.86 
 
The section 674 grantor rules do not apply: 
-  if the power is applied to support a dependant;  
-  if the power affecting the beneficial enjoyment occurs after an 
event such that a grantor would not be treated as the owner under 
section 673 of the Code;  
-  if the power is a reversionary interest; 
-  if the power is exercisable by a will, other than the grantor’s power 
or discretion concerning the income of the trust that is exercised 
                                                 
84 Nelson at 410. 
85 Nelson at 410. 
86 Spitz & Clarke at US/42. 
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without the approval of any adverse party; 
-  if the power is exercised to allocate income among charitable 
beneficiaries; 
-  if the power is exercised to withhold income temporarily, for 
instance during the disability of a beneficiary.87  
 
Administrative powers 
 
Grantor trust rules apply where the grantor enjoys self-serving administrative 
powers over the trust.88 In terms of section 675 of the Code, such powers would 
include the power to purchase or exchange trust property for less than market 
value, the power to borrow from the trust without adequate interest or security, 
and the power to vote stock of a corporation in which the holdings of the grantor 
and the trust are significant. 
 
Power to revoke 
 
Grantor rules apply, if the trust is revocable.89 Section 676 of the Code, entitled 
“Power to revoke”, provides that the grantor of a revocable trust shall be treated 
as the owner of any portion of the trust and shall be taxed on income generated 
by the revocable trust, if he can control assets conveyed to the trust by altering 
the terms of the trust (including the identify of the beneficiaries) and/or 
withdrawing assets from the trust. Section 676 of the Code does not, however, 
apply to a power, which, if exercised, can only affect the beneficial enjoyment of 
the income for a period commencing after the occurrence of an event relating to 
reversionary interests under section 673 of the Code.  
 
Income for the benefit of the grantor 
 
In terms of section 677 of the Code, grantor trust rules apply, if the trust can be 
used to benefit the grantor. For instance, with respect to income that may be 
                                                 
87 Bruce 2000 at 107-109. 
88 Anderson et al at 14-32; Nelson at 409; Bruce 2000 at 110.    
89 Anderson et al at 14-31; Nelson at 409. 
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distributed to the grantor or his spouse, income held or accumulated for future 
distribution to the grantor or his spouse, income used to pay premiums on life 
policies on the life of the grantor or his spouse, or the use of trust income to 
provide for the support for a child that the grantor is legally obliged to support.90 
This provision does not in respect to the beneficial enjoyment of the income for a 
period commencing after the occurrence of an event relating to reversionary 
interests under section 673 of the Code.  
 
Persons other than the grantor treated as owner of trust assets 
 
The grantor rules generally result in the grantor being treated as the owner of the 
trust’s assets and thus liable to tax. The exception to these provisions is section 
678, which provides that an individual other than the trust’s grantor will be taxed 
on the trust income, if he has the power exercisable solely by himself under the 
trust instrument to vest the trust principal or income in himself.  
 
Foreign trusts having one or more United States beneficiaries 
 
Not all grantor trust rules come into play as a result of retained powers. Under 
section 679 of the Code, enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act 1976, a United 
States person transferring property to a foreign trust will be treated as the owner 
of the trust assets under the grantor rules for any year in which a United States 
person is a named beneficiary of any portion of the trust.91 In a nutshell, the 
section provides that, if a foreign trust is created by a United States person and 
that trust has, or has the possibility of having a United States beneficiary, then, 
for tax purposes, the trust will be ignored and the grantor will be treated as the 
owner of the assets. In terms of section 679(c) of the Code, a trust is treated as 
having a United States beneficiary, unless; 
 
(i)  no part of the income or corpus may be paid, or accumulated, for 
                                                 
90 Nelson at 409; Bruce 2000 at 112. 
91 See generally CM Bruce New United States Withholding Tax Rules: A Practical Guide 
(2002) at 55 (“Bruce 2002”); BI Bittker & L Lokken Fundamentals Of International Taxation 
(2005/2006) par 83.2.1 at 83.4; Antoine at 304; McDaniel et al at 141; Glattmachr & 
Michaelson in par 4.2 at 4.4. 
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the benefit of a United States person, and 
(ii)  if the trust were terminated, no part of the income or corpus could 
be paid to, or for the benefit of, a United States person. 
 
This legislation owes its origin to the fact that historically, United States persons 
were creating foreign trusts, in order to accumulate income in countries that did 
not impose any taxes on trust income, and thus the accumulated income was 
subject to neither United States, nor foreign taxes. Section 679 of the Code 
applies to trusts created in any foreign jurisdiction, not just “tax havens”. For that 
matter, the section applies even if the settlor of the trust retains no interest or 
powers over the trust assets. 92 Thus, even if a grantor can relinquish all practical 
control over the trust property, he can still be treated as the owner of the 
property, simply because he is a United States person, the trust is a foreign trust 
and there is a United States beneficiary.93  
 
Embedded in section 679 of the Code, is a special rule applicable to a foreign 
grantor who subsequently became a United States person. The provision is to 
the effect that, if a non-resident alien individual becomes a resident alien (United 
States taxpayer) within five years after directly or indirectly transferring property 
to a foreign trust, section 679 will apply, as if the individual made the transfer to 
the trust immediately upon coming to the United States.94 The amount of the 
transfer is equal to the amount in the trust attributable to the property transferred 
to him. Undistributed net income for years prior to the time the individual came to 
the United States is taken into account in determining the amount in the trust 
attributable to property transferred by him.95  
 
Section 679 of the Code also contains a provision to the effect that the grantor 
will be taxed, if the trust acquires a United States beneficiary at a later date. 
Thus, if a foreign trust does not have a United States beneficiary, but 
subsequently acquires such a beneficiary, then the grantor is treated as having 
an income for the taxable year equal to the undistributed net income of the trust 
                                                 
92 Bittker & Lokken at 85-5; Bruce 2000 at 54; Nelson at 411.  
93 Bruce 2000 at 94. 
94 McDaniel et al at 142; Antoine at 304; Bittker & Lokken at 83-10; Bruce at 163. 
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at the close of the year immediately preceding the taxable year. A beneficiary, 
who at the outset of the trust was not a United States resident alien, but then 
immigrated to the United States, causes the grantor to become taxable on all the 
income earned in the trust.96  
 
Section 679 of the Code does not, however, apply to transfers to the foreign trust 
by reason of the death of the grantor, sales, or exchanges of property at fair 
market value, where gain is recognised by the grantor, or to transfers made by 
foreign transferors prior to becoming United States residents.97  
 
A special rule applicable to foreign grantor trusts 
 
When the grantor trust rules were codified in 1976, they applied to both domestic 
and foreign trusts. The foreign grantor trusts were, however, utilised to avoid 
United States tax. The reason was that a foreign person, who created a domestic 
or foreign trust, would not be liable to United States tax, as he was not resident 
for tax purposes. And the beneficiary, even though a United States citizen or 
resident, would not pay any tax on distributions.98  In order to prevent the 
avoidance of United States taxation, the TRA 1996 enacted section 672(f) of the 
Code to prevent the application of the grantor trust rules to foreign grantors, 
where this would result in the owner of the trust assets being a non-United States 
citizen or resident, or a domestic corporation not being liable to tax.99 By limiting 
the circumstances in which a non-resident alien would be treated as the owner of 
the trust’s income, the Code limits the ability of United States beneficiaries to 
receive distributions from trusts that avoid United States income tax.100 
The general rule preventing the application of the grantor trust rules to foreign 
grantor trusts does not, however, apply to any trust or portion of a trust, 
-  if the power to revest absolutely in the grantor title of the trust property 
is exercisable solely by the grantor without the approval or consent of 
                                                                                                                                            
95 Antoine at 304; Bruce at 163; McDaniel et al at 142; Bittker & Lokken at 83-10. 
96 Bittker &  Lokken at 83-10; Bruce 2000 at 164; Antoine at 304; Mc Daniel et al at 142. 
97 Nelson at 411; Bittker & Lokken at 83-11. 
98 Bruce 2000 at 116; McDaniel et al at 82. 
99  SK Vetter “Keep Trusts Offshore” (2003) 142 Trusts and Estates at 69; Bruce 2000 at 93; 
Bittker & Lokken par 83.2.2 at 83-13. 
100 Anderson et al at 14-33. 
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another person, or with the consent of a related or subordinate party 
who is subservient to the grantor, 
-   if the only amounts distributable from the trust during the lifetime of 
the grantor are amounts distributable to the grantor or the spouse of 
the grantor.  
Furthermore, the rule would not apply to any trust distributions that are taxable 
as compensation for services rendered.101  
 
Apart from the above, the United States has other anti-avoidance provisions that 
relate to offshore trusts. 
 
8.2.3 GAINS ACCUMULATED AND DISTRIBUTED BY FOREIGN TRUSTS 
 
In order to prevent deferral of taxes, section 643(a)(6) and section 667(a) of the 
Code provide that gains accumulated and distributed by a foreign trust lose their 
character as capital gains and are taxed as ordinary income. The capital gains 
are included in distributable net income.102 Deferral of tax on income 
accumulated in a foreign trust is further prevented by a “throw-back” rule (which 
is a penalty rule), that results in an increased tax rate on the accumulation 
distribution, by taxing the income passed out to the United States beneficiary at 
the ordinary income tax rates that would have applied, if the distribution had been 
made in the year earned.103  
 
On top of the additional tax imposed by the “throw-back” rules, in terms of 
section 668 of the Code, an annual interest charge is imposed to eliminate the 
benefit of paying the tax later. The interest is charged against the artificially high 
tax liability created by the throw-back rule, as if this were the tax previously 
deferred. In addition, the interest charge is compounded and is not deductible in 
computing net taxable income.104 
 
                                                 
101 Bittker & Lokken at 83-14; Bruce 2000 at 117. 
102 Bruce 2000 at 156; Bittker & Lokken at 83-5, 83-26. 
103 Bruce 2000 at 75. 
104 Vetter at 69; Bruce 2000 at 160-162; Bittker & Lokken at 83-5, 83-28; Glattmachr & 
Michaelson in par 4.3 at 4-7. 
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Loans from foreign trusts to a United States grantor or beneficiary  
 
Section 643(i) of the Code provides that, if a foreign trust makes a loan of cash 
or marketable securities, directly or indirectly, to a United States grantor or 
beneficiary, or to any person, who is related to the grantor or beneficiary, the 
amount of the loan will be treated as a distribution taxable in the hands of the 
recipient. 
 
8.2.4 TAX TREATMENT OF CERTAIN UNDERLYING ENTITIES 
 
A foreign trust that is owned by a United States person, can own, or participate 
in, a number of investments and entities. For example, it can own a corporation 
or a partnership, it can be a grantor, or a beneficiary of another trust, and it can 
even own insurance policies.105 Before considering the income tax implications of 
such ventures, it is important to point out that a transfer of property by a United 
States person to a foreign non-grantor trust is taxable as a sale of property for its 
market value.106 Further, if a domestic trust migrates outside the United States, 
all the trust’s assets are considered to have been sold on the day on which the 
domestic trust was converted into a foreign trust, and the gain will be taxable in 
the domestic trust on that day.107 However, in terms of section 367 of the Code, 
the transfer of assets by a trustee of a foreign non-grantor trust to a foreign 
corporation is not subject to tax, since for tax purposes, the foreign trust is a non-
United States person. With foreign ownership of this kind, taxation of United 
States income can be deferred by United States beneficiaries of the foreign non-
grantor trust (who are also shareholders in the foreign corporation), until the 
income is distributed and repatriated to the United States. An example of a 
scheme that has been used to defer United States taxation is the formation of a 
foreign non-grantor trust, where there are no United States beneficiaries but 
instead a foreign charity is named as the beneficiary. When the income from the 
                                                 
105 Bruce 2000 at 223. 
106  In terms of s 684(b) of the Code, the general rule under s 684(a) does not apply to a 
transfer to a foreign trust by a United States person to the extent that any person is 
treated as the owner of the foreign trust under s 671. Thus, a United States grantor will not 
be subject to this provision, if he transfers appreciated property to a foreign grantor trust. 
See Kaplan at 132. 
107 Bruce 2000 at 165. 
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foreign corporation is distributed, the trustees of the foreign non-grantor trust only 
make nominal distributions to the foreign charity, using the rest of the income for 
purposes such as the acquisition of  foreign-issued life insurance on the life of a 
United States person (the insured normally being the settlor, who created the 
foreign non-grantor trust, or some other United States persons, who only become 
beneficiaries one year after the death of the settlor and his spouse). The use of a 
foreign non-grantor trust in such circumstances allows the deferral and 
avoidance of substantial income taxation, as well as the removal of insurance 
proceeds from the estate of the United States insured.108     
 
In order to prevent the avoidance and deferral of taxes, where a foreign non-
grantor trust (with United States beneficiaries) transfers assets to a foreign entity, 
the United States has controlled foreign corporation (CFC) legislation, which 
provides that a United States shareholder, who owns 10% or more of the total 
combined voting power of all classes of voting stock of a CFC, must include in 
his income in each year his pro rata share of the CFC’s undistributed income.109 
A United States shareholder, as defined in section 951(b) of the Code, includes a 
trust that directly or indirectly owns more than 10% of the corporation’s voting 
stock. This covers indirect ownership of the beneficiary through his interest in a 
foreign trust.  
 
Where an offshore trust that is owned by a United States settlor makes 
investments in a “passive foreign investment company” (PFIC), so as to defer 
United States tax on the investment, passive foreign investment legislation 
(PFIC) may also come into play.  A PFIC is any foreign corporation, if at least 
75% of its gross income for the tax year is passive, or at least 50% by value of 
the assets it held during the year produce passive income.110  In terms of section 
1291(a)(1) and (2) of the Code, a United States shareholder must pay United 
States tax, plus interest, based on the value of the tax deferral.  All gains and 
distributions are deemed to be ordinary income, rather than capital gains, and 
the United States shareholders must report the distributions and dispositions to 
                                                 
108 Kaplan at 132-133. 
109 Ss 951(b) and 957(a) of the Code, Treasury Regulations 1.951-1(g), 1.957.1. 
110 See also Bruce 2000 at 235. 
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Revenue. 
 
8.2.5 REPORTING RULES AND PENALTIES 
 
In terms of section 6048(a) of the Code, as amended by the TRA 1996, a person 
who transfers property to a foreign trust under the grantor rules, or a person who 
receives a gift or a bequest from a foreign trust, is supposed to comply with 
certain reporting rules. Section 6048(a)(1) of the Code provides that such a 
person must within 90 days inform Revenue Services about the foreign trust and 
transfers of property to the trust. The purpose of the reporting requirements is 
generally to ensure compliance with the requirements of section 679 of the 
Code.111  
 
Section 6048(b) of the Code requires that any United States person, who is 
treated as the owner of any portion of the assets of a foreign trust, must ensure 
that the foreign trust files an annual return setting out information regarding trust 
activities and operations. 
 
Section 6048(c) requires any United States beneficiary, who receives a 
distribution from a foreign trust, to file a return, which includes the name of the 
trust and the aggregate amount of distributions received. If adequate records are 
not provided to the IRS to determine the proper treatment of the distribution, the 
entire distribution will be treated as an accumulation distribution that is included 
in the recipient’s gross income.112 
 
Failure to file a report under section 6048(a)(1) of the Code, is subject to a 
penalty equal to a certain percentage of the amount transferred to the trust. 
Section 6677 also prescribes certain penalties that apply where information 
required by section 6048 has not been filed.113 In terms of section 671(a) of the 
Code, interest charges may also apply where an item is not included in 
                                                 
111  JO Allen “Taxation of Investment Income from Offshore Trusts and other Foreign Entities”. 
Available at >http://www.diloffshore.com/lib_taxation.htm<, last accessed 26 May 2007; 
McDaniel et al at 143; Glattmachr & Michaelson in par 4.5 at 4-10. 
112 Antoine at 309. 
113 McDaniel et al at 143; Bruce 2000 at 246. 
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computing taxable income. 
 
8.2.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The above discussion shows that both the United Kingdom and the United States 
have been vigilant in enacting legislation to curb specific tax avoidance schemes 
with respect to offshore trusts. It is however, worth pointing out that, despite 
these provisions, the offshore trust has not outlived its usefulness as a tax 
avoidance vehicle. Clarke114 points out that despite rigorous anti-avoidance 
legislation, significant tax advantages can still be achieved through investing in 
offshore trusts. Evidence shows that when laws are enacted, taxpayers soon find 
loopholes.  
                                                 
114   Clarke at 11. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
THE ROLE OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS IN LIMITING THE OUT-FLOW OF 
CAPITAL TO OFFSHORE JURISDICTIONS (SOUTH AFRICA) 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapter 1,1 it was pointed out that this thesis focuses mainly on some of the 
legislation that is employed to curb offshore income tax avoidance. The previous 
chapters have analysed the effectiveness of this legislation from a South African 
perspective, and a comparative study of similar legislation in the United Kingdom 
and the United States has also been covered. It is however worth noting that a 
discussion on “offshore tax avoidance” cannot be complete without reference to 
the exchange control requirements of investing offshore. Exchange controls are 
implemented by countries to limit and control the outflow and inflow of capital.2 
Essentially, exchange controls complement the anti-avoidance legislation in 
preventing the outflow of capital from a country that could lead to the depletion of 
the tax base. Note that, as the discussion of exchange controls is not the main 
focus of this thesis, this chapter deals with only the role of South Africa’s 
exchange control measures in preventing the depletion of the tax base. A 
discussion of exchange controls with respect to the United Kingdom3 and the 
United States4 is not covered.   
In South Africa, the main purposes of exchange control are to – 
                                                 
1  See chapter 1par 1.6 under the heading “Scope of the Study”. 
2  TE Johnson Export/Import Procedures and Documentation (2002) at 22. 
3  Note that in the UK, exchange controls were abolished in 1979. See MJ Artis & M P Taylor 
“Abolishing Exchange Control: The UK Experirence”. Available at 
>http://ideas.respec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/294.html<, last accessed 8June 2007; Centre for 
Economic Policy Research “UK Exchange Controls: Efffects of Abolition” Available at 
>http://www.cepr.org/bubs/bulletin/dps/dp294.htm<, last accessed 8 June 2007; K 
Phylaktis “Exchange Controls Cannot be Enforced” (Jan-March 1985) Economic Affairs at 
12-13. 
4  For information on United States Exchange Controls see AC Stockman & DA Hernandez 
D "Exchange Controls, Capital Controls, and International Financial Markets" (February 
1989). National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No W1755. 
Available at >http://ssrn.com/abstract=227403<, last accessed 7 Octoner 2007; A van 
Campenhout “United States: International Monetary Fund Agreement and Foreign 
Exchange Control Regulations: Perutz v Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation  (1953) 2 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 389-392.  
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(a) ensure the timeous repatriation into the South African banking system 
of certain foreign currency acquired by residents of South Africa, 
whether through transactions of a current or of a capital nature; and  
(b) prevent the loss of foreign currency resources through the transfer 
abroad of real or financial capital assets held in South Africa.5  
 
The relationship between capital flows and exchange control regulations has long 
occupied policy makers in South Africa. Exchange controls were first introduced 
in South Africa in the form of Emergency Finance Regulations at the outbreak of 
the Second World War in 1939.6 The intention was to protect South Africa's 
foreign exchange reserves. However, exchange controls on capital transfers 
were minor from the immediate post-war period until the late 1950s.7 During the 
apartheid era, South Africa had a negative political reputation, the price of gold 
declined, so exchange controls became increasingly restrictive to protect the 
Rand from further devaluation. Exchange controls on residents were tightened in 
response to the large-scale capital outflows experienced in the apartheid era.8 
Particularly significant was the decision to block the repatriation of the proceeds 
of sales of South African securities by non-residents during that time.9 
 
The change in the political situation in South Africa culminated in the democratic 
election of a Government of National Unity in April 1994, which duly inherited an 
economy which was not highly indebted but where residents had little opportunity 
to diversify their portfolios. The process of re-integration into the world’s financial 
markets provided opportunities for liberalising exchange controls. The re-
integration into the global economy, through complying with world norms and 
standards, has also boosted South Africa’s international credibility and 
recognition. This has in turn encouraged greater confidence from both local and 
foreign investors thus creating an economic environment for further easing of 
                                                                                                                                            
   
5  South African Reserve Bank “Exchange Control Manual” par E. Available at 
>http://www.reservebank.co.za< last accessed on 11 March 2008. 
6  Exchange Control Manual par C; B K Spitz Exchange Control Encyclopedia (2002 Service 
Issue 4) at Part at 2-1.  
7  R M Gidlow The South African Reserve Bank Monetary Policies under Dr TW De Jongh: 
1967- 1980 (1995) at 180. 
8  Olivier & Honiball at 438. 
9  Exchange Control Manual par C.   
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exchange controls. The exchange control system has been gradually liberalised 
over the past few years, and it is the stated intention of National Treasury that 
the liberalisation and deregulation of exchange controls will continue. 10  
 
9.2  ADMINISTRATION OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS 
 
In terms of section 9 of the Currency and Exchanges Act 9 of 1933, the 
President11 is empowered to make regulations in regard to any matter directly or 
indirectly relating to or affecting currency, banking or exchanges. Exchange 
Control Regulations were promulgated by Government Notices R1111 and 
R1112 of 1 December 1961. These regulations have been amended and 
updated on several occasions since then.12  
 
The regulations aim to control capital movements in and out of the Common 
Monetary Area (CMA). The CMA consists of South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland. There are no exchange control restrictions among the members of 
the CMA as they form a single exchange control territory. The Monetary 
agreement between South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho provides for 
the free flow of funds and access to capital markets between the countries. 
However, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have their own exchange control 
authorities as well as their own regulations and rulings. But in terms of the 
Common Monetary Area Agreement the application of their regulations and 
rulings must at least be as strict as those of South Africa.13 It follows that 
authorised dealers (defined below) are not permitted to enter into foreign 
currency transactions with customers of banks in other CMA countries. If such 
requests are received, customers are referred back to their banks in the CMA 
country concerned.14  
 
In South Africa, Exchange Control Regulations are administered by the Minister 
of Finance in terms of regulation 22E, who delegates his powers, functions and 
                                                 
10  Exchange Control Manual par C.   
11  Note that in terms section 9 of this Act, it was formally the Governor-General. 
12  Exchange Control Manual par C. 
13  Exchange Control Manual par D7.   
14  Olivier & Honiball at 437. 
423 
 
 
 
obligations to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). However certain powers, 
functions and duties have been assigned to and imposed by National Treasury. 
In terms of the Exchange Control Regulations, the National Treasury in turn, has 
appointed as "authorised dealers" certain banks (such as selected commercial 
and merchant banks), to administer certain categories of transactions on its 
behalf.15 The authority of the authorised dealers is regulated by Exchange 
Control Rulings. All applications to the “Exchange Control” (the National Treasury 
and SARB, acting through it Exchange Control Department) must be made 
through an authorised dealer. However applications for the approval of certain 
transactions, have to be made to the Exchange Control and not to the authorised 
dealers.16 For instance, applications for the relaxation of any restrictions or for 
requests which require special consideration in terms of the wide discretion given 
to the Exchange Control in the various regulations.17 Each case is considered on 
its own merits. Where an application is unsuccessful, the Exchange Control is 
obliged to give reasons therefor in terms of section 33 of the Constitution and 
section 5 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2002. 
  
In S v De Blom18 the validity of the delegation of the minister’s powers to the 
South African Reserve Bank in terms of Rule 2 of the Exchange Control 
Regulations was challenged. The court held that the delegation of the Minister’s 
powers to the SARB was appropriate and valid. This decision was reinforced in 
1987 with the insertion of section 9(2)(c) in the Currency and Exchanges Act, 
which specifically permits any regulation to authorise any person who is vested 
with any powers (or who must fulfill any duty), in terms of any regulation to 
delegate that power or assign that duty to any other person. The Exchange 
Control has wide discretion that is exercised in accordance with the Exchange 
Control Regulations and the Exchange Control Rulings in line with the policy 
guidelines laid down by the Minister of Finance. The discretion is however, not 
arbitrary but is based on policy guidelines set out in Exchange Control Rulings 
                                                 
15  Exchange Control Manual par D4; Spitz in Part 1 at 3-2.  
16  Exchange Control Manual par D4 and D5; Spitz in Part 1 at 3-3.  
17  Oliver & Honiball at 438. 
18  1977 (3) SA 513 (A). In S v Seedat 1977(2) SA 686 (RA), the Appellate Division of 
Rhodesia held that the delegation of the powers of the Minister of Finance to the Reserve 
Bank of Rhodesia in terms of s 32 of Rhodesia’s Exchange Control regulations, was an 
appropriate and valid delegation.  
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and Circulars that are issued by the Minister to the authorised dealers.19 The 
Rulings and Circulars have general application to residents and are set out in the 
Exchange Control Manual E which is updated from time to time.  
 
The purpose of the Exchange Control Manual20 is to give guidance to authorised 
dealers, their clients, and other interested parties on the operation of the 
exchange control system in the Republic of South Africa and the CMA. However, 
the Manual itself has no special legal status.21 In terms of Exchange Control 
Regulation 2, the general policy approach to exchange controls is that 
… except with permission granted by the Treasury, and in accordance with such 
conditions as the Treasury may impose, no person other than an authorised dealer shall 
buy or borrow any foreign currency or any gold from, or sell or lend any foreign currency 
or any gold to any person not being an authorised dealer and an authorised dealer shall 
not buy, borrow or receive or sell, lend or deliver any foreign currency or gold except for 
such purposes or on such conditions as the Treasury may determine.  
 
From the above, it is clear that the legal framework of exchange control is one of 
a total prohibition to deal in foreign exchange except with the permission of and 
on the conditions set by the Treasury. The economic policy underlying exchange 
control is, however, not totally prohibitive, since such an approach would not be 
conducive for international trade and investment. 22 
 
 
 
9.3 THE MEANING OF THE WORDS “PERSON” AND “RESIDENT” 
 
In terms of regulation 2, the exchange control regulations apply in respect to a 
“person”. However there is no definition of “person” in the Currency Exchanges 
Act or in the Regulations. According to the Exchange Control Manual D 8, the 
term “person” refers to a natural person, body corporate, foundation, a trust or a 
partnership.23 Some of the exchange control regulations refer to a “person 
resident in the Republic”, while some regulations refer to a person who is 
                                                 
19  Exchange Control Manual par D2.  
20  Exchange Control Manual par D4.   
21  B Wunsh “The Legal Aspects of Exchange Control” (1995) 112 The South African Law 
Journal  407. 
22  Exchange Control Manual par E; see also Oliver & Honiabll at 438. 
23  Note that In terms of the Income Tax Act, a partnership is not a taxable person. 
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“resident outside the Republic”. Since this work deals with offshore tax avoidance 
in relation to residents, only the regulations that deal with persons who are 
resident in the Republic will be dealt with. 
 
It should be noted that the definition of the term “resident” in the Income Tax 
Act24 is not necessarily the same for exchange control purposes. The term 
“resident” is not defined in the Currency Exchanges Act or the Exchange Control 
Regulations. The Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 also does not contain a definition 
of the term “resident”.25 However, Exchange Control Manual D 8, states that a 
“South African resident” is a person, whether of South African or any other 
nationality, who has taken up residence, is domiciled or registered in the 
Republic. Since this work deals with curbing tax avoidance as a result of offshore 
investments in respect to companies and trusts, only these categories of resident 
persons will be dealt with. Note that for income tax purposes, a person other than 
a natural person (eg a company or a trust) is resident in South Africa if it is 
incorporated, established or formed in South Africa, or if it has its place of 
effective management in South Africa.26 In terms of Exchange Control Manual D 
8 a legal person (such as a company) is resident if it has its normal place of 
registration in South Africa. It is arguable that the phrase “normal place of 
registration” in this context means either the equivalent of incorporation or it is a 
factual test. For example, it can be argued that this definition will not include a 
foreign company merely because it is registered as an “external company” in 
term of section 322 of the Companies Act,27 as such registration is not its “normal 
place of registration”, but rather a secondary registration which is required when 
the foreign company, already registered elsewhere, establishes a place of 
business in South Africa. Consequently, based on definition of “resident” in the 
Exchange Control Manual, a branch of a foreign company will not necessarily be 
an exchange control resident merely because it has been registered as an 
                                                 
24  The definition of the term resident in s 1 of the Income Tax Act distinguishes between 
natural persons and persons other than natural persons. In terms of this provision, a 
natural person is resident in South Africa if he is ordinarily resident in South Africa (CIR v 
Kuttel 1992 (3) SA 242 (A)) or if he meets the requirements of the physical presence test.  
25  Olivier & Honiball at 440. 
26  The definition of the term resident in s 1 of the Income Tax Act.  
27  Act 69 of 1984. 
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external company in South Africa.28  
 
Regulation 17 provides that for exchange control purposes, a branch must be 
treated as if it is a separate person, even though it forms part of the same legal 
entity as the foreign head office and is controlled from the same head office. In 
Sagit Property Holdings Ltd v Union Bank of Switzerland,29 the court stated that if 
the effect of regulation 17 was that the branch was resident in South Africa, then 
the transaction is to be treated accordingly, even if the actual control of such 
branch from overseas would otherwise make it non-resident. Nevertheless, 
although a branch is a person separate from its head office in terms of regulation 
17, the Court stated that it was still a question of fact whether the relevant branch 
was a resident. For instance, it has to be determined whether the branch in issue 
is registered in terms of section 322 of the Companies Act.30  
 
In practice, the issue about the exchange control residence of a branch is 
relevant in two instances: firstly, where loans are made to a branch by a South 
African resident, or by a branch to a South African resident, then no approval 
from the Exchange Control would be required if the relevant branch was a 
resident. Secondly, this issue is relevant where shares are issued by a branch in 
terms of a separate branch register. Such shares may only be taken up by South 
African exchange control residents if the branch itself is an exchange control 
resident.31 Based on the definition of a resident in the Exchange Control Manual 
and on the Sagit Property Holdings case, merely registering the branch as an 
external company in terms of section 322 of the companies Act will not make it a 
resident. The branch will therefore have to take active steps to show that on the 
facts it is a South African exchange control resident before South African 
residents may take up shares issued by it.32  
 
It appears that in circumstances where regulation 17 applies, it is only the branch 
and not the foreign head office which is the exchange control resident, and that 
                                                 
28  Olivier & Honiball at 443. 
29  1977 (3) SA 897(W). 
30  Olivier & Honiball at 443. 
31  Olivier & Honiball at 443. 
32  Olivier & Honiball at 443. 
427 
 
 
 
the foreign head office is regarded as non-resident for exchange control 
purposes. Based on the above, it can be concluded that a company incorporated 
in South Africa will always be an exchange control resident despite the fact that 
its place of effective management may be else where.33 This is similar to the 
income tax position, where a company incorporated in South Africa is always an 
income tax resident despite the application of a tax treaty which may give 
another state taxing rights on the basis of the place of the effective management 
of the company. Note that for income tax purposes, a branch is not considered a 
separate legal entity.34 It thus cannot be considered a “resident” for income tax 
purposes.  
 
With respect to trusts, there is no regulation or statutory provision that 
determines the residence of a trust for exchange control purposes. In practice 
the Exchange Control treats a trust as a person. In determining a trust’s 
residence, the residence status of the trustees is considered. Thus a trust will 
become non-resident for exchange control purposes if the majority of the 
trustees become non-resident although the trust remains registered with the 
Master of the High Court of South Africa.35 It should be noted that for income tax 
purposes, a trust is a taxable person and it is considered a “resident” if it formed 
in South Africa or if it has a place of effective management in South Africa.36 This 
implies that even if the majority of the trustees become non-resident, the trust will 
be resident if it was formed in the Republic and was registered with the Master.  
 
From the above, it is clear that the meaning of the term “resident” appears to 
have certain differences for exchange control purposes and for income tax 
purposes that may create uncertainties. It has been pointed out that the Currency 
Exchanges Act does not have a definition of the term “resident”. Although 
Exchange Control Manual D 8 provides a definition of the term, the Exchange 
Control Manual has no legal status.37 As stated above, its purpose is to give 
guidance to authorised dealers and their clients on the operation of the exchange 
                                                 
33  Olivier & Honiball at 443. 
34  B J Arnold & M J McIntyre International Tax Premier 2 ed (2002) at 73. 
35  Oliver & Honiabll at 444. 
36  In terms of s 1 of the Income Tax Act, trust as a person other than a natural person. 
37  Wunsh “The Legal Aspects of Exchange Control” SALJ (1995) 407. 
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control system in the Republic of South Africa and the CMA.38 Thus, the 
application of definition of the term “resident” in the Exchange Control Manual to 
a particular situation may be challenged in a court of law.  
 
It is recommended that order to fill the lacuna in the law, the Currency 
Exchanges Act should be amended to include a definition of the term “resident” 
that can be used for exchange control purposes. The definition of this term as 
used in the Income Tax Act could also be applied for exchange control purposes 
subject to certain exceptions that may be particular to exchange controls (an 
example is the issue of branches discussed above). 
 
9.4 REGULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE INVESTMENTS BY 
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES 
 
Companies which are exchange control residents are subject to all the 
regulations, unless generally or specifically exempted. With respect to outward 
payments, the general rule in regulation 2 provides that only authorised dealers 
may buy, borrow or sell foreign currency, or gold. Furthermore, the authorised 
dealers may only sell foreign currency to exchange control residents as allowed 
in terms of the regulations. On application, various exemptions or approvals may 
be obtained, which may have the effect that the general rule in regulation 2 or 
any other regulation applies conditionally or unconditionally.39 
 
Direct investments by South African companies outside the CMA 
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.2.1, South African private 
companies, public companies and listed companies that wish to make new 
offshore direct investments outside the CMA, may do so without prior approval of 
the Exchange Control, if the total cost of such new investments does not exceed 
R50 million per company per calendar year. To qualify as a foreign direct 
investment, a South African company must obtain a minimum of at least 10% of 
the voting rights in the foreign offshore entity. Authorised dealers have the 
                                                 
38  Exchange Control Manual par D4.   
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responsibility of ensuring that the foreign investment is undertaken by bona fide 
South African companies for foreign direct investment purposes. All further 
investments must be reported annually to the Exchange Control, accompanied 
by audited Financial Statements of the offshore entity and the holding 
companies.  
 
Where the total cost of the foreign direct investments exceeds the R50 million 
limit, an application has to be submitted to the Exchange Control, before the 
investment is made. In general, companies wishing to invest outside the CMA 
should demonstrate a long term monetary benefit to the Republic, for example, 
enhanced earnings derived from the export of goods and services. 
 
Reporting of offshore ventures  
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.2.2, all South African companies that 
establish subsidiaries, branches, offices or joint ventures abroad are required to 
annually submit financial statements on these operations to the Exchange 
Control. In certain instances regular progress reports are also required.  
 
Regulations with respect to the repatriation of profits and dividend   
 
Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.2.3 provides that dividends repatriated from 
abroad by South African companies may be re-transferred abroad for the 
financing of approved foreign direct investments or approved expansions. 
However, such dividends may not be transferred abroad for any other purpose. 
South African holding companies may also retain offshore dividends declared by 
their offshore subsidiaries without any recourse to South Africa. Such funds may 
also not be utilised to fund investments into the CMA and the SADC for any 
purpose whatsoever via a “loop structure”,40 except if the investment is approved. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
39  Exchange Control Manual par F.2.  
40  The working of the “loop structure” scheme is discussed further on in this chapter. 
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Regulations with respect to remission of funds to expand offshore 
operations  
 
In terms of Exchange Manual F 6.1.2.4, an application has to be submitted to the 
Exchange Control where funds have to be remitted regularly from the Republic to 
finance the running expenses or working capital of an offshore company that 
generates insufficient income or does not generate income. The application 
should be supported by a report on the foreign company’s operations of the past 
year; and an up-to-date of its financial statement.  
 
Prior approval from the Exchange Control is not required where South African 
companies have to expand their existing offshore business for instance, the 
acquisition of further assets/equity interests offshore. However, such expansion 
should be in the same line of business and the South African company should be 
able to demonstrate that the relevant expansion can enhance monetary benefit 
for South Africa. The expansion must be financed without recourse to South 
Africa to fund or guarantee such offshore expansion. All expansion plans, 
including plans to enhance the monetary benefit for South Africa, must be placed 
on record with the Exchange Control at an early stage.  
 
Companies that wish to expand their existing offshore operations with recourse 
to South Africa, i.e. by transferring cash or issuing guarantees from South Africa, 
have to submit a fully motivated application to the Exchange Control.  
 
Transfer of funds offshore 
 
Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.2.5 provides that, even though South African 
companies are permitted to make new outward foreign direct investments, the 
Exchange Control reserves the right to stagger capital outflows in respect of very 
large foreign investments. This is necessary to manage any potential impact on 
the foreign exchange market.  
 
Companies that require foreign acquisitions may apply to the Exchange Control 
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to raise foreign finance on the strength of their South African balance sheet. 
Companies may also finance their offshore investments or the repay existing 
offshore debts by applying to Exchange control for permission to engage in the 
issue of offshore bonds. Authorised Dealers may also extend foreign currency 
denominated facilities to South African companies for the financing of approved 
foreign direct investments.  
 
Purchasing of additional shares in existing offshore entities 
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.2.6, an application has to be made to 
Exchange Control where a company wishes to purchase additional shares in 
existing offshore entities so as to expand its offshore business venture.  
 
 
 
Loans by residents companies to non-residents  
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.3, approval from Exchange Control 
has to be granted before a South African company can grant a loan to a non-
resident. Generally, approval is only given in exceptional circumstances, for 
instance, if the loan is related to an approved foreign investment by a company.  
 
Portfolio investments by residents  
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.4.1, the export of capital for portfolio 
investments, for instance in quoted stocks and shares, is prohibited subject to 
certain exceptions.41  
 
Foreign portfolio investments by South African institution investors  
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.4.2, retirement funds, long-term 
insurers, collective investment schemes and management companies are 
                                                 
41   These exceptions are set out in Exchange Control Manual F 6.1.1.  
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allowed to transfer funds from South Africa for investment abroad. The limit on 
foreign portfolio investment by institutional investors is applied to an institution’s 
total retail assets. The foreign exposure of retail assets may not exceed 20% in 
the case of retirement funds and long-term insurers. Collective investment 
scheme management companies are restricted to 30% of the total retail assets 
under management.  
 
Institutional investors are allowed to invest an additional 5% of their total retail 
assets by if they acquire foreign currency denominated portfolio assets in Africa 
through foreign currency transfers from South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
Dividend distributions to non-resident shareholders 
 
In terms of section F 2.2.3.1 of the Exchange Control manual, dividend 
distributions, whether of a capital or revenue nature are freely remittable to non-
resident shareholders abroad. However, non-listed companies must provide an 
authorised dealer with an auditors’ certificate that confirms that the amount 
transferred is derived from profits realised from the normal course of business 
and is payable to a non-resident who has not previously been a resident. Capital 
distributions require a letter from an auditor indicating how the capital arose and 
that the sale price was at arm’s length and at fair value. This requirement is to 
ensure that there is no illegal export of capital and secondly, to ensure that the 
non-resident entity will not contravene the local borrowings restrictions in paying 
the dividend.  
 
Royalties and license fees payable to non-residents   
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual F 2.2.3.2, the Exchange Control allows 
royalty, license and patent fees derived from the sale of a locally manufactured 
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product to be paid to non-resident owners of intellectual property, provided prior 
approval has been obtained. The Exchange Control has delegated some of its 
authority in this regard to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
Applications to the DTI must be supported by a completed questionnaire 
(MP337(b)) which can be obtained from an authorised dealer, and should be 
directed to DTI. Where there is no local manufacturing, then any agreement to 
pay royalty, license or patent fee to a non-resident is subject to the approval of 
the Exchange Control, not the DTI.  The royalty payment must be substantiated 
by an auditor’s report confirming the basis of the calculation and that it is in terms 
of the relevant royalty agreement.42  
 
 
Management and administration fees 
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual F 2.3.7, authorised dealers may approve 
payment of management or administration fees by a resident company to a non-
resident, if there is documentary evidence confirming the amount involved. The 
amount paid must be reasonable in relation to the services provided. Payments 
of such fees by wholly-owned subsidiaries of overseas companies are not readily 
approved where other payments to the same foreign company, like royalties, 
have been approved. Fees calculated on the basis of a percentage of turn over, 
income, sales or purchases will generally not be approved. 
 
Offshore listings 
 
Exchange Control Circular D 250 of 1 February 1999 states that it is not 
government policy to allow South African resident companies to have primary 
listings on foreign stock markets. Companies will not be allowed to delist from the 
JSE to list overseas, and only dual listings where the company retains its primary 
listing in South Africa will be considered. This policy does not affect South African 
                                                 
42  The Directorate of Technology Promotion of the DTI has issued a general information 
document (Form DTP001) which sets out the guidelines for application for approval of a 
royalty agreement. 
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companies which had already moved their primary listings to a foreign stock 
market before the date of this circular.43 
 
9.5 REGULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE INVESTMENTS BY 
SOUTH AFRICAN TRUSTS 
 
Provisions contained in testamentary trusts44 relating to the bequest of assets to 
non-residents do not require the prior approval of the Exchange Control. Income 
may be transferred through normal banking channels provided there are no 
excess borrowings by the trust. However the Exchange Control has in place 
certain restrictions in respect to inter vivos trusts.45 Exchange Control Manual N 
5.6 states that although inter vivos trusts are normally established for legitimate 
purposes in estate planning, they operate like a conduit through which assets 
pass to the beneficiaries during the lifetime and/or after the death of the donor, 
and they are sometimes used to export capital from the Republic. Consequently, 
in December 1985, Exchange Control directed that all requests for the transfer of 
income and capital distributions to beneficiaries resident outside the CMA, must 
be referred to the Exchange Control for consideration. The purpose is firstly to 
ensure that a non-resident is entitled to such a distribution and secondly to 
prevent the export of capital disguised as income distributions through the trust.46  
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual N 5.6.2, when determining the policy to be 
adopted with respect to a particular trust, the source of financing is very 
important. Trusts funded by own assets, rather than third-party funded trusts, get 
more favourable treatment. Thus, where a trust is established and funded by an 
emigrant prior to the date of emigration, Exchange Control could consider 
allowing the income generated subsequent to emigration to be transferred to the 
                                                 
43  Olivier & Honiball at 457. 
44  A “testamentary trust” is a trust created in terms of a will, whereby a deceased person 
leaves his estate to a trustee, who administers the estate assets on behalf of the 
beneficiaries. See  Exchange Control Manual N 5.6. See also AP de Koker Silke on South 
African Income Tax (2007) in par 24.126; R King & B Victor Law and Estates Planning 
Easiguide (2006/2007) in par 16.3.1; F Du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and 
Practice (2002) at 21.  
45  In terms of Exchange Control Manual N 5.6, an inter vivos trust is a trust created during a 
person's lifetime. 
46  Exchange Control Manual N 5.6.1; see also Olivier & Honiball at 457. 
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emigrant. In terms of Regulation 4(2), distributions from trusts established by a 
South African resident in favour of a non-resident must be placed to the credit of 
a blocked account.47   
 
In terms of Exchange Control Manual N 5.6.4, the rules that apply to third-party 
funded trusts differ according to whether the beneficiaries are emigrants or non-
residents, as well as the timing of the establishment and the nature of the funding 
thereof. In the case of emigrants, income will be allowed to be distributed if the 
funding of the trust took place at least five years before the date of emigration. If 
the funding took place within a period of five years before emigration, then all 
income distributions to such an emigrant will only be allowed to a blocked 
account in terms of Regulation 4(2).  
 
Regulations with respect to “loop structures” 
 
“Loop structures” are tax avoidance schemes where by South African residents 
invest in offshore trusts that, in turn re-invest funds in South African businesses 
in which the original investors have a stake.48 Usually the offshore trust would be 
funded by using the foreign investment allowance in terms of Exchange Control 
Manual F 6.1.1.49 The Offshore trust would then subscribe for shares or 
purchases shares in a resident company. This would normally be done directly or 
                                                 
47  A “blocked account” is a bank account from which funds cannot be withdrawn for any of a 
number of reasons, for example, bankruptcy proceedings, liquidation of a company, or 
government order when freezing foreign assets. See BNET Business Dictionary. 
Available at >http://www.dictionary.bnet.com/definition/blocked+account.html – 43k<, last 
accessed 11 April 2008. Exchange Control Regulation 4(1) and (2) provides that 
"blocked account" means an account opened with an authorised dealer for the purposes 
specified in the succeeding sub-regulations. Whenever a person in the Republic is under 
a legal obligation to make a payment to a person outside the Republic but is precluded 
from effecting the payment as a result of any restrictions imposed by or under these 
regulations, the Treasury may order such person to make the payment to a blocked 
account. See also Spitz in Part 2 at SECT 2-7.   
48  L du Preez “No Sign of Extension to Amnesty Yet” (8 November 2003). Available at  
>http://www.persfin.co.za/index.php?fSectionld=&fArticleld=280017< last accessed on 20 
March 2007. Wiseman Khuzwayo Business Report “FirstRand's loop legal - Dippenaar “ 
(September 9, 2007). Available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleld=4023192< 
last accessed on 20 March 2007. 
49  Olivier & Honiball at 449. 
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indirectly via an offshore company by using the so-called 74/26 structure.50 In 
terms of this structure, only a 74% interest in the South African company is taken 
up in this manner but the balance would be held by the South African settler of 
the offshore trust. The reason for the 74% limit is that local borrowing restrictions 
apply only where the foreign shareholding is 75% and higher.51 The South African 
company would then use the proceeds received from the trust (which was 
originally the foreign investment allowance) together with the local borrowings 
from the settler or a bank, to purchase capital assets in South Africa. Should 
those capital assets have included shares, dividends would be remitted 
overseas.52 On realisation of the capital assets the company would be liquidated 
and the capital gain would be remitted to the offshore trust.53 Investments in such 
loop structures have been popular in the Jersey Islands54 and they have been 
offered by numerous financial institutions in South Africa.55 
 
Loop structures are considered to be in breach of exchange control regulations56 
and they have always been frowned upon by the SARB. However, there are 
conflicting views regarding the applicability of regulation 10(1)(c) to these 
structures. These views revolve around the meaning of the words “capital” and 
“indirectly exported” that are used in this regulation. On the one hand it is 
reasoned that loop structures are not in contravention of the regulation, since the 
consent of the Exchange Control is normally granted before the export of capital 
from South Africa. It is also reasoned that the dividend which is remitted 
comprises revenue profits which cannot be regarded as the export of capital. It is 
                                                 
50  Wiseman Khuzwayo Business Report “FirstRand's loop legal - Dippenaar “ (September 9, 
2007). Available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleld=4023192< last accessed 
on 20 March 2007. 
51  Olivier & Honiball at 449. 
52  Olivier & Honiball at 449. 
53  Olivier & Honiball at 449. 
54  C van Gass & C Benjamin “South Africa: Noseweek to Publish As Judge Denies Bank 
Gag” Business Day (21 September 2007). 
55  Wiseman Khuzwayo Business Report “FirstRand's loop legal - Dippenaar “ (September 9, 
2007). Available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleld=4023192< last accessed 
on 20 March 2007. 
56  Wiseman Khuzwayo Business Report “FirstRand's loop legal - Dippenaar “ (September 9, 
2007). Available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleld=4023192< last accessed 
on 20 March 2007. See also Deneys Reitz Attorneys “Renewed Interest in Secondary 
Listings”. Available at 
>http://www.deneysreitz.co.za/news/item/renewed_interest_in_secondary_listingd,1178.ht
ml< last accessed 20 March 2007. 
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further argued that where a South African company is liquidated, any remittable 
capital gain, even if regarded as the export of capital, is incidental to the 
arrangement and cannot be considered to be part of the original transaction.57 
 
On the other hand, based on the wide meaning of the word “indirect”, it is argued 
that any remittance of a capital profit, for example on liquidation of the South 
African company, is an indirect export of capital and consequently a 
contravention of the regulation.58 It may be argued that loop structures cannot be 
considered a contravention of regulation 10(1)(c) until the capital gain is remitted 
from South Africa on liquidation of the South African company. However, Olivier 
& Honiball59 point that when interpreting regulation 10(1)(c), it should be noted 
that capital does not have to have been exported before this regulation can 
apply. For example, in S v De Castro60 where the appellant had made an 
arrangement for money to be exported, but where the money had not yet been 
exported, the then Appellate Division held that the appellant had contravened 
regulation 10(1)(c) even though he had been arrested before the money could be 
exported. 
 
Exchange Control Circular D 417 and D 405, makes it clear that the Control 
regards loop structures as a contravention of regulation 10(1)(c). Exchange 
Control Circular D405 point out that these structures result in the direct or indirect 
export of capital abroad for the ultimate benefit of a South African resident. The 
structures also result in the export of dividends arising from increased profits, 
revenue reserves and/or capital reserves accruing from the introduction of the 
assets to the resident company. The Circular states:  
It has come to the attention of the Exchange Control Department of the Reserve Bank 
that certain private individuals, resident in South Africa, have entered into a transaction or 
a series of transactions the purpose, and/or effect of which is to export capital, directly or 
indirectly from the Republic. These Transactions, which contravene the Exchange Control 
Regulations, invariably entail the formation, by (or at the behest of) a resident, of an 
offshore structure which, by a re-investment into South Africa, acquires shares, or some 
other interest, in a South African resident company or a South African asset.61 
 
                                                 
57  Olivier & Honiball at 449. 
58  Olivier & Honiball at 449. 
59  Olivier & Honiball at 449. 
60  1979 (2) SA (1)(A). 
61  Exchange Control Circular D417 and D405 issued on 30 September 2003. 
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The South African Reserve Bank issued this Circular to all authorised dealers 
giving them instructions as to how loop structures should be dealt with in terms of 
the 2003 Exchange Control Amnesty (discussed ahead). The Circulars set out 
certain administrative concessions relating to the unwinding of these structures. 
The Control undertook not to take further action against residents who unwound 
these structures in the manner set out in the circulars, provided that this was 
done on or before 27 February 2004 and that certain levies were paid. These 
concessions were designed to facilitate application for exchange control amnesty 
in terms of the exchange control Amnesty and Amendment Act 12 of 2003, and 
effectively extended the scope of the amnesty, which had a deadline of 29 
February 2004.  
 
Despite the fact that “loop structures” are considered to be in contravention of the 
Exchange Control, the decision of the court in Pratt v FirstRand Bank and 
another,62 seems to accept the legality of loop structures. The facts were that 
Ann Pratt controlled the offshore trust (The Fast Track Trust) which acquired 
70% of the shares in her South African company (Ann Pratt & Associates). On 8 
May 2000, the Fast Track Trust purchased 700 ordinary shares in Ann Pratt & 
Associates. In December 2001, Ann Pratt borrowed R25 million from FirstRand 
Bank to capitalise a close corporation (Classy Living CC) which purchased the 
shares from the Fast Track Trust. The issue was whether the arrangements 
contravened Exchange Control Regulation 10(1)(c). After a detailed analysis of 
the Exchange Control Regulations and Rulings that relate to the transfer of 
shares to non-residents (Regulation 3(1)(e) and 10(1)(c)), the court ruled that 
transactions in contravention of these regulations were null and void. It however 
found that Exchange Control approval had been granted for the respective 
transactions since the shares in question had been "endorsed" by the Authorised 
Dealer Bank. It concluded that the endorsement of a share certificate by an 
Authorised Dealer Bank, following the required procedures (inter alia, ensuring 
that the market value had been confirmed by an independent valuation), was 
evidence of compliance with the Exchange Control Regulations. The court ruled 
that the transference of the purchase price to the non-resident was an authorised 
                                                 
62  [2004] 4 All SA 306 (T). 
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export of capital. It is submitted that this case was wrongly decided. The bank’s 
confirmation cannot create legality of an otherwise illegal act. 
 
This decision could be regarded as authority for the establishment of a valid loop 
structure. The decision calls into question the validity of Exchange Control 
Circular D 405 and D 417, which pointed out that such transactions were 
contraventions of Exchange Control Regulation 10(1)(c).63  
 
9.6 CONSEQUENCES OF CONTRAVENING THE EXCHANGE CONTROL 
REGULATIONS 
 
Exchange Control Regulation 10(1)(c) provides that no person shall, except with 
permission granted by the Treasury enter into any transaction whereby capital or 
any right to capital is directly or indirectly exported from the Republic. The 
question that arises is whether a transaction which contravenes the regulations 
or an agreement which does not have the required consent of the Control is void. 
In general, where an enactment says “no person shall”, the legislature intends 
that the transaction thus prohibited will be invalid.64 However, the decisions of the 
South African courts in respect to the issue have not been consistent.  
 
In S v De Castro65 it was held that a transaction which created a "channel" for the 
future export of capital out of the Republic was null and void. In Abreu v 
Campos66 the court cited the general rule in regulation 10(1)(c) and noted that: 
Here the purpose of the legislature is to conserve the country’s foreign exchange and, to 
that end, to prohibit dealings in foreign currency without permission. It cannot have been 
the intention to allow enforcement of contracts involving dealings in foreign currency 
without permission for that would encourage the very mischief which the legislature seeks 
to avoid.  
 
However in Barclays National Bank v Brownlee67 the court concluded that a 
contravention of the prohibition under Regulation 3(1)(e) did not imply that the 
                                                 
63  Bowman Gilfillan Attorneys “Ann Pratt case - New Precedent on Exchange Control 
Compliance”. Available at http://www.bowman.co.za/LawArticles/Law-
Article.asp?id=2132417203< last accessed on 20 March 2007. 
64  Swart v Smarts 1971 (1) SA 819 (A) at 829-830. 
65  1979 (2) SA 1 (A). 
66  1975 (3) SA 73 (RA). 
67  1981 (3) SA 579 (D). 
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particular transaction was null and void. The court relied on the following citation 
in Standard Bank v Estate van Rhyn68  for its decision: 
[b]ut that which is done contrary to law is not ipso jure null and void, where the law is 
content with a penalty laid down against those who contravene it. The reason for all this I 
take to be that in these and the like cases greater inconveniences and impropriety would 
result from the rescission of what was done, than would follow the act itself done contrary 
to the law. 
 
The above contradicting decisions appear to have been settled by the Appellate 
Division in Barclays National Bank Ltd v Thompson,69 in which it was held that a 
contravention of the regulations cannot result in any agreement being void; 
rather, it prevents performance in terms of the agreement. The court pointed out 
that in such cases, the legislature prescribes criminal sanctions to enforce 
compliance with the regulations.  
 
However, even after this Appellate Division decision, in Couve and Another v 
Reddot International (Pty) Ltd and Others70 it was held that the transfer of 
intellectual property and shares to a non-resident without the approval by the 
Exchange Control was void. Even in the Prat case (referred to earlier) the court 
ruled that transactions in contravention of the Exchange Control Regulations 
were null and void. 
 
Despite the fact that there have been a number of cases that decided that a 
contravention of exchange controls is null and void, it is submitted, in agreement 
with Olivier and Honiball71 that the Appellate Division’s decision in the Thompson 
case is correct. It is submitted that the cases in which it was ruled that 
transactions that contravene the regulations are null and void, were wrongly 
decided. 
 
9.7 PENALTIES FOR CONTRAVENING EXCHANGE CONTROL 
REGULATIONS 
 
                                                 
68  1925 AD 266. 
69  1985 (3) SA 778(A).   
70  2004 (6) SA 425 (W). 
71  Olivier & Honiball at 460. 
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In S v Immelman72 the court made it clear that the contravention of the 
regulations is a serious offence since it prejudices the economic interest of the 
state and the general body of its citizens. Regulation 22 sets out certain penalties 
for contravening the regulations. Where a person is convicted of an offence, a 
fine in the maximum of R250 000 may be charged. A person could also be 
imprisoned for a period not exceeding five years. In certain cases, both a fine 
and imprisonment may be imposed. Money or goods relating to the contravention 
may also be attached or forfeited.   
 
9.8 THE 2003 AMNESTY FOR PERSONS THAT HAD CONTRAVENED 
THE EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS 
 
Of particular relevance to the discussion on curbing offshore tax avoidance in 
South Africa is the 2003 Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation 
Laws Act,73 which granted amnesty for certain persons that had contravened the 
exchange control regulations. According to the preamble to this Act, its objectives 
are: 
(a) to enable violators of Exchange Control Regulations and certain tax 
Acts to regularise their affairs in respect to their foreign assets 
attributable to those violations; 
(b) to ensure maximum disclosure of foreign assets and to facilitate 
repatriation thereof to the Republic; and 
(c) to extend the tax base by disclosing previously unreported foreign 
assets. 
 
9.8.1 EXCHANGE CONTROL AMNESTY PROVISIONS THAT RELATE TO 
COMPANIES  
 
In terms of Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act, 
tax amnesty was granted to certain applicants for the 2003 year of assessment, if 
they complied with certain conditions. Section 3(1)(a)  and (b) of this Act, inter 
alia provides that a close corporation was among the persons that could apply for 
                                                 
72  1978 (3) SA 726 (A). 
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amnesty.74 A close corporation is included in the meaning of a “company” in 
section 1 of the Income Tax Act. Sections 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Exchange 
Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act provide inter alia that, a 
close corporation could apply for amnesty if; 
- on 28 February 2003, it held any foreign assets which had been wholly 
or partly derived from any unauthorised asset, or if  
- on the 28 February 2003 it held any foreign assets which had been 
wholly or partly derived from any amount that was not declared to the 
Commissioner in terms of the Income Tax Act or the Estate Duty Act 45 
of 1955. 
For purposes of this thesis, reference will only be made to Exchange Control 
Amnesty provisions that relate to the Income Tax Act. 
 
In terms of section 6 of the Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of 
Taxation Laws Act, where a close corporation applied for amnesty, in respect of 
any foreign asset held on the 20 February 2003 in contravention of the Exchange 
Control Regulations, it was required inter alia to: 
- disclose the market value of that asset in the foreign currency in which 
that foreign asset is situated; 
- describe the characteristics and the location of that foreign asset; 
- submit the market value of that foreign asset in the foreign currency of 
the country in which it is located; 
- disclose receipts or accruals of that foreign asset that were derived from 
a source outside the Republic that were not disclosed to the 
Commissioner for the previous year of assessment. 
 
After complying with all the requirements of the Act, the applicant would not be 
liable for the payment of any amount in terms of the Income Tax Act. The 
applicant would also be deemed not to have committed any offence in terms of 
that Act, in respect of any receipts or accruals of a foreign asset that were 
derived from a source outside the Republic during any year of assessment 
                                                                                                                                            
73  Act 12 of 2003. 
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ending on or before 28 February 2002, which were not declared to the 
Commissioner.75   
 
9.8.2  EXCHANGE CONTROL AMNESTY PROVISIONS THAT 
RELATE TO TRUSTS 
 
The 2003 Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act,76 is 
also relevant to offshore trusts. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that a donor in 
relation to a non-resident discretionary trust could elect that any foreign assets, 
held by that discretionary trust on the 28 February 2003, be deemed to be held 
by the donor. Donors were granted amnesty with respect to the foreign assets of 
the discretionary trust on condition that the donors elected to be treated as 
directly holding that trust’s assets for tax purposes.77 The assets contemplated 
by this provision, were those acquired by the foreign discretionary trust, by way 
of a donation made by the donor, or assets derived wholly or partly from any 
unauthorised asset, or from any amount not declared by the donor to the 
Commissioner, as required by the Income Tax Act 1962 (or the Estate Duty Act 
1955).78 It was a requirement that at the time of the election, the asset should not 
have vested in any beneficiary of that discretionary trust. This implied that 
applicants could only apply for amnesty, if the foreign asset was held by the trust 
on 28 February 2003.79  
                                                                                                                                            
74  This section also provides that, natural persons (including the deceased estate of a natural 
person) and trusts, could also apply for amnesty.  A discussion of the Exchange Control 
Amnesty provisions that relate to trusts is dealt with in chapter 7.  
75  Section 15 of the Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act 12 of 
2003. 
76  Act 12 of 2003. 
77  Regulation 4 of the Explanatory Memorandum on the Regulations Published in Terms of s 
30 of the Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act 12 of 2003. 
78  S 4(2) of the Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act 12 of 
2003. 
79  S 4(2)(c) of the Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act 12 of 
2003. See also Regulation 4 of the Explanatory Memorandum on Act 12 of 2003. In terms 
of s 4(3) of this Act, a person who made such an election in relation to a foreign asset, 
was deemed to have held that foreign asset from the date that the discretionary trust 
acquired that foreign asset. For the purposes of the Income Tax Act, for the year of 
assessment that ended 28 February 2003, if the foreign asset was disposed of by the 
discretionary trust to any person, the person that made the election was deemed to have 
disposed of that foreign asset for a consideration equal to its market value on the date of 
disposal. A deemed disposal could include a transfer of funds to a foreign trust due to 
under-invoicing  or over invoicing (ie sales or purchases at other than fair market value), 
as well as other forms of indirect donations, such as trust distributions from other trusts 
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Section 4(3)(b) of the Act provides that where such an election was made, the 
provisions of sections 7(5),7(8) and 25B of the Income Tax Act 1962, and 
paragraphs 70,72 and 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, would 
not apply in respect to any income, expenditure or capital gain relating to that 
foreign asset, while it was deemed to be held by that person.   
 
The enactment of this Act seems to have had an effect on the use of offshore 
trusts as a tool for tax avoidance. Although the parties that disclosed their 
investments in offshore trusts were awarded the amnesty, this was for only one 
year of assessment. For SARS, this amnesty was an exposure of the magnitude 
of offshore investments that were not taxed, thus creating an opportunity for 
expanding the South African tax base. 
 
It was noted that after the 2003 Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of 
Taxation Laws Act came in force, the secrecy of offshore trusts, which is one of 
its appealing features, appears to have been thwarted.80 A number of South 
Africans considered transferring the administration of their offshore trusts 
onshore, or winding the trusts up and distributing the assets.81 Some tax advisers 
encouraged South African offshore investors to explore new offshore investment 
vehicles as alternatives to offshore trusts.82 For instance, Spitz83 advised that 
South Africans should rather set up offshore companies – for instance 
companies limited by guarantee, which (unlike offshore trusts) are less difficult 
and expensive to administer, and can be used either independently or in 
conjunction with an offshore trust.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
acting at the instance of the donor. See Regulation 2 of the Explanatory Memorandum on 
Act 12 of 2003. 
80  B Cameron “Why Offshore Trusts Have Lost Their Appeal” (26 July 2003) Personal 
Finance at 1. Available at 
>http://www.persfin.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=706&ArticleId=196524<, last accessed 4 
June 2007. 
81  Investec Bank (UK) Ltd (Investec Trust) “Post-amnesty Planning: Remain Offshore or 
Repatriate Funds” at 1. Available at >http://www.investec.co/NR/rdonlyres/114C2988-
0095-45EF-B5C0-40CFE13F1FD9/1433/PostAmenstyplanning.pdf<, last accessed 9 July 
2007. 
82  Cameron at 1. 
83  As quoted by Cameron at 1. 
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However, some tax advisers were against South Africans transferring trusts 
onshore, as there could still be tax savings if the trusts were left offshore.84 It is, 
for instance, advised that, if the donor dies, the provisions deeming the income 
and capital gains to be those of the donor fall away and future income and gains 
could be accumulated in the offshore trust without being liable to South African 
tax. In addition, where there is no living South African donor, a beneficiary in 
respect of a distribution from an offshore trust, who is not resident for South 
African tax purposes, should not be liable to South African tax (although there 
may be tax in the country where the beneficiary is resident). With the increasing 
“globalization” of families, this can prove very advantageous and provide a 
significant tax saving opportunity. It is also suggested that, if payments to non-
resident beneficiaries are timed correctly, it may be possible for subsequent 
distributions to be made to South African resident beneficiaries without tax 
liability. The reason being that as income and capital gains are taxed differently 
in South Africa, offshore trustees can ensure avoidance of tax by identifying 
suitable investment products that ensure that the returns are in the form of 
capital gains that are not liable to tax. At the same time, they can defer taxation 
of the income indefinitely by accumulating it offshore, or investing it in offshore 
companies.85    
 
Results of the Exchange Control Amnesty 
 
The following are the findings of the Treasury,86 with respect to the responses to 
the 2003 Exchange Control Amnesty. The initial deadline for submission of 
applications was 30 November 2003. Ten thousand applications for amnesty 
were received in November 2003. The Minister of Finance then announced an 
extension of the deadline for the submission of applications from 30 November 
2003 to 29 February 2004. A taxpayer could regularise his affairs by paying an 
Exchange Control Levy of 10% of the market value of an illegal asset retained 
offshore or 5% if that asset was repatriated. Illegal tax liabilities would be forgiven 
                                                 
84  Investec Bank (UK) Ltd (Investec Trust) at 1. 
85  Investec Bank (UK) Ltd (Investec Trust) at 1.  
86  Treasury “Taxation”. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documments/mtbps/2004/mtpps/Chapter%204.pdf> Last 
accessed on 20 March 2007. 
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generally without additional cost (or at an additional cost of a 2% levy for certain 
domestic tax violations). A total of about 43 000 applications were received 
before the deadline of 29 February 2004. By September 2004, a total of 16 033 
applications had been adjudicated with total levies payable of about R826 million. 
In reaction to a number of representations, further administrative concessions 
were made in terms of which certain categories of offshore income and assets 
could be regulated via a declaration to the Exchange Control Department of the 
South African Reserve Bank. In terms of this concession, approximately 11 300 
applications were received by the deadline of 29 February 2004. An additional 1 
227 applications were received by the Exchange Control Department of the 
South African Reserve Bank relating to the unwinding of “loop structures”. Levies 
amounting to approximately R52 million were paid in this regard by the end of 
August 2004. In terms of applications approved for emigrants to transfer their 
remaining blocked assets abroad, a total amount of R238,2 million in respect of 
the 10 per cent exit charge were credited to the Corporation for Public 
Deposits.87 
 
Conclusions regarding the tax amnesty 
 
Although South Africa lost the tax that it could have been collected from the 
applicants, the tax amnesty was advantageous to the economy, as it encouraged 
the relevant taxpayers to repatriate their income to South Africa, where it could 
possibly be reinvested. To qualify for the amnesty, the applicants were required 
to disclose and describe their foreign assets, and the countries in which the 
assets were located.  By disclosing previously unreported assets, South Africa’s 
tax base for the proceeding tax years was expanded without the benefit of 
amnesty for those years.  
 
 
9.9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
                                                 
87  Treasury “Taxation”. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documments/mtbps/2004/mtpps/Chapter%204.pdf> Last 
accessed on 20 March 2007. 
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From the above it can be concluded that the relaxation of the exchange controls 
ensures that foreign investment is encouraged. However, the Exchange Control 
Regulations make it illegal to transfer capital out of the Republic without the 
Exchange Control’s approval. In this respect, the exchange controls complement 
the anti-avoidance legislation in that they prevent the outflow of capital from the 
South that would result in the depletion of the tax base. For instance the 
exchange controls have been instrumental in ensuring that “loop structures” are 
not used to transfer capital out of South Africa.  
 
The complementary role of the exchange controls in preventing the depletion of 
South Africa’s tax base will be even more effective if the Currency Exchanges 
Act is amended to include a definition of the term “resident” that is similar to the 
one in the Income Tax Act, subject to certain exceptions that may be particular to 
exchange controls.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 10 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
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In chapter 1 of this thesis, it was pointed out that curbing offshore tax avoidance 
requires a concerted effort at both the international and the national levels. At the 
international level, harmful tax competition can be prevented if countries adhere 
to the recommendations of the OECD. In this chapter, a comparative analysis is 
made of the ways in which the United Kingdom, the United States and South 
Africa have responded to the OCED recommendations on preventing harmful tax 
competition. This analysis is followed by comments on the effectiveness of those 
recommendations in curbing offshore tax avoidance in South Africa.   
 
At the national level, offshore tax avoidance can be prevented if countries have 
effective anti-tax avoidance legislation in place. This chapter also contains a 
comparative analysis of the offshore anti-tax avoidance laws and policies of the 
above-mentioned countries in relation to offshore companies and trusts. Finally, 
the effectiveness of South Africa’s legislation in curbing offshore tax avoidance is 
commented on.   
 
10.1 INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO CURB HARMFUL TAX 
COMPETITION   
 
10.1.1  THE LISTING OF TAX HAVENS 
 
OECD recommendation 
 
The OECD recommended that countries should come up with lists identifying tax-
haven jurisdictions and harmful tax regimes so as to ensure that links with those 
countries are not used to promote harmful tax competition.88 
 
United Kingdom  
 
In terms of the controlled foreign company (CFC) provisions, certain countries 
have been identified and “black-listed” as tax havens. A company resident in one 
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of the listed territories will only be excluded from CFC provisions if it carries on 
business in a foreign country, and at least 90% of its income or profits are 
generated in that country.89 
 
United States  
 
Subpart F income includes certain income from “black-listed” countries.90   
 
South Africa  
 
South Africa does not have legislation in place which black-lists tax havens. The 
closest that South Africa has ever come to compliance with this recommendation 
was the old section 9E(8) (now repealed) of the Income Tax Act, which 
empowered the Minister of Finance to exclude from CFC provisions specific 
forms of income derived from designated countries, the list of which was 
published by notice in the Government Gazette.91 
 
 
 
 
Comments 
 
The repeal of the exclusion from the CFC rules of specific forms of income 
derived from designated countries is to be commended. A number of countries 
objected to not being listed, although they had concluded a double taxation 
agreement with South Africa.  It was argued that countries that were not on the 
                                                                                                                                            
88   OECD Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998) in par 75. See 
discussion in chapter 2 par 2.4.5. 
89  United Kingdom Controlled Foreign Companies (Excluded Countries) Regulations 1998 
(SI 1998/3081); B Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service (March 2002) Issue 66 at UK/23; R 
Chidell & S Laing Tax Planning: Business (2005-2006) at 739. See discussion in chapter 
5 par 5.1.3.  
90   Subpart F income includes: “Certain other income to the extent that the CFC has an 
‘international boycott factor, certain illegal payments to government officials and certain 
income from ‘blacklisted’ countries”. S 952(a)(3), (4), and (5) of the Code. 
91   S 9E was repealed by Revenue Laws Amendment Act 45 of 2003 with effect from 1 June 
2004. See discussion in chapter 2 par 2.6. 
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list were potentially black-listed.92 It was further contended that the listing of 
countries could have negative connotations that might prove a disincentive to 
foreign investment in South Africa. 
 
10.1.2  TERMINATING TREATIES WITH UNCOOPERATIVE TAX 
HAVENS 
 
OECD recommendation 
 
The OECD recommended that countries should consider terminating their tax 
treaties with tax-haven jurisdictions that are used to encourage harmful tax 
competition.93  
 
United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom has concluded tax treaties with a number of tax havens, 
most of which are United Kingdom dependent territories. 
 
United States  
 
The United States applies harsh measures when the treaties it has negotiated 
with particular tax havens are used to promote harmful tax competition. For 
instance, the United States terminated the old treaty with the Netherlands, which 
encouraged harmful tax competition, and a new treaty was renegotiated.94 The 
treaty with the Netherlands Antilles was also terminated.95 In 1984, the United 
States suspended the treaty it had concluded with the United Kingdom-linked 
territories, like the Virgin Islands, to which the United States/United Kingdom 
treaty applied by extension.96 
                                                 
92   L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 120.   
93   OECD 1998 Report in par 76. See discussion in chapter 2 par 2.4.5. 
94 M Barrett, HLB Nathans “Trading in Ireland: The Low Corporate Tax Regime” Offshore 
Investment.com (May 2004) Issue 146 at 25. 
95 WH Diamond & DB Diamond Tax Havens of the World (Release No 108 Jan 2002) vol 
1 at INTRO 10. 
96 C Doggart “Tax- Havens and their Uses” The Economist Publication (1990) Special 
Report No 1191 at 93-94. 
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South Africa  
 
South Africa has concluded treaties with a number of tax-haven countries, 
namely Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, Singapore, the Seychelles and Luxembourg.97 
These treaties could encourage harmful tax competition. The treaty with 
Mauritius, for instance, contains a tax sparing clause that could encourage South 
African residents to set up offshore companies in Mauritius to take advantage of 
the tax-sparing benefits.98 
 
Comments  
 
Severing treaties with tax-haven countries may not necessarily be the right 
approach for South Africa. Tax treaties are not generally negotiated on tax 
considerations alone. Treaties are also used to attract foreign investment and to 
encourage offshore activities. However, where the loss of tax revenue is 
significant compared with the other non-tax benefits of a particular tax treaty, 
steps have to be taken to curb the ensuing tax avoidance. 
 
 
 
 
10.1.3  EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION  
 
OECD recommendation 
  
The OECD recommended that countries should make an effort to intensify 
international cooperation and exchange of information concerning transactions 
that constitute harmful tax competition. The OECD came up with a Model 
Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, which serves as a model 
                                                 
97  Olivier & Honiball at 24.  
98  See discussion in chapter 2 par 2.6. 
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for the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral agreements.99 This Model 
Agreement is now being used by a number of countries, and it forms the basis 
for several tax information exchange agreements between countries.100 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom signed the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters.101 The Convention makes it easier for tax 
administrators to work together to enforce their national tax laws. 
 
United States 
 
The United States signed the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters, but reserved the right not to provide any assistance in 
respect to certain articles of the Convention.102 
 
 
 
South Africa 
   
South Africa has mutual administrative assistance agreements in place that could 
serve the same purpose as the OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of 
Information on Tax Matters. South Africa has signed a number of these 
agreements with various nations.103 Similar agreements have been negotiated 
                                                 
99  OECD “Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters”. Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf<, last accessed on 18 May 2007.  
100  See discussion in chapter 2 par 2.5. 
101   OECD “Exchange of Information: UK signs OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters”. Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/documents/35/0,2340,en_2649_33767_38645475_1_1_1_1,00.html
<, last accessed on 30 May 2007. 
102   OECD “Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters – Declaration from the United Sates”. Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/document/55/0,3343,en_2649_201185_2498807_1_1_1_1,00.html<
, last accessed on 17 July 2007. 
103  South African Revenue Service “Current List of Customs Agreements on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance” (12 December 2006). Available at 
>http://www.sars.gov.za/it/DTA/Customs%20Agreement/Current%20List.htm<, last 
accessed on 17 May 2007. 
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with other nations, and further agreements are still under negotiation. Acting 
upon these agreements will help South Africa to obtain the necessary information 
to curb the harmful tax practices that any of these countries may be involved in, 
even if they are not tax havens themselves.104 
 
Comments  
 
South Africa has not entered into mutual administrative assistance agreements 
with tax-haven countries. It has nevertheless signed double taxation agreements 
with some tax-haven countries.105 Signing mutual administrative assistance 
agreements with tax-haven countries would enhance the exchange of information 
concerning transactions that constitute harmful tax competition. 
 
10.1.4  EMPLOYING THE RESIDENCE BASIS OF TAXATION   
 
OECD recommendation   
 
The OECD recognises the residence basis of taxation as effective in curbing 
offshore tax avoidance.106 A dual-resident entity is deemed to be resident in the 
state where it is effectively managed, and that state can tax its worldwide 
income. The “place of effective management” is where the key management and 
commercial decisions of an entity are made by the most senior persons.107 
However, with technological advances, the OECD meaning of the term “place of 
effective management” could be manipulated to avoid taxes as e-commerce 
makes it possible for an entity to be managed in multiple places. This could have 
the effect of rendering the OECD meaning of the term ineffective as a tie breaker 
test for dual-resident entities.108  
 
                                                 
104   See discussion in chapter 2 par 2.6. 
105   The tax-haven countries that South Africa has signed double taxation agreements with are 
Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, Singapore, the Seychelles and Luxembourg. See Olivier & 
Honiball at 24. See also discussion in chapter 2 par 2.6. 
106  In terms of art 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 
Condensed Version).  
107   Art 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. 
108   See discussion in chapter 3 par 3.7. 
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United Kingdom 
 
The residence basis of taxation is used to tax the worldwide income of resident 
entities.109 A company incorporated in the United Kingdom is a resident, even if it 
is not managed and controlled there. The “central management and control” of a 
company is used as a test of residence only in respect of companies registered 
abroad.110  A dual-resident company is resident where it is effectively managed. 
Inland Revenue regards the place of effective management as the place where 
the day-to-day management of a company is carried on, which may not be the 
place where the highest policy decisions of the company are taken.111 
 
United States 
 
The residence basis of taxation is used to tax the worldwide income of entities 
incorporated in the United States. The “place of incorporation” is used to 
determine the residence of corporations.112 However, the “place of incorporation” 
is not an effective tie-breaker test. It may merely reflect a corporation’s formal tie 
with one country while its entire management, business operations and assets 
are located in another country. In the present e-commerce environment this test 
can easily be manipulated for purposes of tax avoidance. 113 
 
South Africa 
 
The residence basis of taxation is used to tax the worldwide income of South 
African residents. An entity is “resident” if it is incorporated, established or 
formed, or has a place of effective management in South Africa.114 There is no 
definition of “place of effective management” in the Income Tax Act, and there is 
no case law to provide guidance on its interpretation. However, the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) regards the “place of effective management” as the 
                                                 
109   B Spitz & G Clarke Offshore Service (March 2002) Issue 66 at UK/4-10. 
110   See discussion in chapter 3 par 3.7. 
111   G Clarke Offshore Tax Planning 9 ed (2002) at 272. See discussion in chapter 3 par 3.7 
112   S 11 of the Internal Revenue Code 1954; See discussion in chapter 3 par 3.8.  
113   See discussion in chapter 3 par 3.8. 
114  The definition of “gross income” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
455 
 
 
 
place where a company is managed on a regular day-to-day basis by the 
directors or senior managers. This is the place where company policy and 
strategic decisions are carried out, irrespective of where the overriding control is 
exercised, or where the board of directors meets.115 
 
Comments  
 
Of the three countries, it is only the United States that does not apply the “place 
of effective management” as a test for company residence. It uses only the 
“place of incorporation” test.  
 
In South Africa, SARS’s interpretation of “place of effective management” may 
limit the possibility of multiple residences, and the possibility of tax avoidance, as 
the actual implementation of senior managers’ commercial and management 
decisions is less likely to occur in more than one location. However, SARS’s 
Interpretation Notes are not law and in a number of cases it has been argued 
that SARS is not bound by its own Practice Notes and Interpretation Notes.116 
Although SARS’s Interpretation Notes may provide some guidance, South 
African courts are not bound to follow them. 
10.1.5  ADOPTING EFFECTIVE ANTI-AVOIDANCE LEGISLATION 
 
OECD recommendation 
 
The OECD has recommended that countries should adopt effective legislation to 
curb offshore tax avoidance. Such legislation includes “controlled foreign 
company” (CFC) legislation, which is dealt with in this thesis.117 The OECD has 
stated that CFC rules help in countering the transfer of profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions by targeting passive and low-tax income rather than the profits of the 
CFC itself.118 Paragraph 23 of the “Commentary on article 1” states that CFC 
                                                 
115   Income Tax Interpretation Note 6 of 26 March 2002.  
116 ITC 1675 (1998), 62 SATC 219 (G) at 229A. 
117   OECD Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998) in par 67-71. See 
chapter 2 fn 27 and also the discussion in chapter 4. 
118   OECD Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Controlled Foreign Company 
Legislation (2000) at 10.  
456 
  
rules have been adopted by a significant number of OECD Member and non-
Member countries, and that they “are now internationally recognised as a 
legitimate instrument to protect the domestic tax base”. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom enacted CFC legislation in 1984.119 In terms of section 
747(1) and (2) of the Income and Corporations Taxes Act 1988 (ICTA), a CFC is 
a foreign company that is controlled by United Kingdom shareholders who hold at 
least a 25% interest in the foreign company. The foreign company should be 
subject to “a lower level of taxation” (ie less than 75% of the corresponding 
United Kingdom tax).   
 
The United States 
 
The United States enacted CFC (“Subpart F”) provisions in 1962.120 In terms of 
section 957(a) and (b) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), a CFC is a 
foreign corporation if more than 50% of the total combined voting power of all 
classes of voting stock is owned by United States shareholders on any day 
during the taxable year of the CFC.  
 
South Africa 
 
CFC legislation was introduced in South Africa in 1997.121 In terms of the current 
section 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act (the Act), a CFC is a foreign company if one 
or more South African residents, directly or indirectly, hold more than 50% of the 
total participation rights of the company, or if more than 50% of the voting rights 
of that foreign company are held (or exercisable) directly or indirectly by one or 
more residents.  
 
                                                 
119   The provisions are set out in ss 747-756 and Schedules 24-26 to the Income and 
Corporations Taxes Act (ICTA) 1988. 
120 Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies International Tax Avoidance Vol A (1979) at 272. 
121  CFC legislation was introduced in terms of s 9C and s 9D of the Income Tax Act 28 of 
1997. The then s 9C has been repealed but s 9D has been amended.  
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Comments  
 
There are two basic approaches to applying CFC legislation, namely the 
“jurisdictional approach” and the “transaction approach”. In terms of the 
“jurisdictional approach” tax-haven companies are identified and the 
shareholders are taxed on all the income of the companies, regardless of its 
source or nature. The United Kingdom follows this approach.122 In terms of the 
“transaction approach” only the tainted income (eg passive income) of the CFC is 
attributed pro rata to domestic shareholders.123 This is the approach followed by 
the United States. In South Africa the initial CFC legislation followed the 
“transaction approach”, as only investment income of a foreign company or a 
foreign trust was attributed to the South African controller.124 When South Africa 
moved to the residence basis of taxation with effect from years of assessment 
commencing on or after 1 January 2001, the CFC legislation was amended to 
follow the “entity approach”, as not only investment income but all income, 
including capital gains that accrue to or are received by a CFC, is attributed to 
the South African resident controller.125  
 
10.2  NATIONAL MEASURES TO CURB TAX AVOIDANCE: OFFSHORE 
COMPANIES   
 
10.2.1 CFC RULES CONTINUED  
 
In paragraph 9.1.5 above, the workings of the CFC rules in the United Kingdom, 
the United States and South Africa were briefly compared.  This comparison will 
now be explored in more detail with respect to how the exemptions from the CFC 
rules work in these countries.  
 
Exemptions from the United Kingdom’s CFC rules  
                                                 
122   BJ Arnold & MJ Mclntyre International Tax Primer 2 ed (2002) at 94. 
123   Arnold & McIntyre at 94. 
124   See Olivier & Honiball at 394. The previous s 9C of the Income Tax Act 28 of 1997, which 
was repealed by s 9 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000, defined investment 
income as including any income in the form of any annuity, interest, rental income, royalty 
income or other income of a similar nature.  
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The acceptable distribution policy: In terms of paragraph 2 of Schedule 25 to 
ICTA, an exemption is granted where a CFC distributes at least 90% of its net 
chargeable profits for the accounting period to its United Kingdom shareholders, 
if the dividends are taxable in their hands. 
 
The exempt activities test: In terms of paragraph 7 of Schedule 25 of ICTA, an 
exemption applies if throughout the accounting period in question the CFC has a 
business establishment in the territory in which it is resident and its business 
affairs in that territory are effectively managed there. 
 
The public quotation test: In terms of paragraphs 13-152 of Schedule 25, an 
exemption applies if the CFC is listed on a recognised stock exchange in the 
country in which it is resident. 
 
The motive test: In terms of paragraphs 16-19 of Schedule 25, an exemption is 
granted if the reduction of United Kingdom tax, through the diversion of profits 
away from the United Kingdom, was not one of the main purposes of the 
company’s existence. 
 
The low profit exemption test: In terms of section 748(1)(d) of ICTA, a CFC 
charge does not arise if the chargeable profits of the CFC are below  
₤50 000 in any accounting period (the de minimis rule). 
 
Exemptions from the United States’ CFC rules 
 
Under section 952(a)(1) and (2) of the Code, CFC rules cover two principle 
categories of income, namely insurance income and foreign base company 
income.126 
 
                                                                                                                                            
125   Olivier & Honiball at 394.    
126   Note however that subpart F income also includes the following: “Certain other income to 
the extent that the CFC has an ‘international boycott factor, certain illegal payments to 
government officials and certain income from ‘blacklisted’ countries”. S 952(a)(3), (4), and 
(5) of the Code. 
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(1) Insurance income: This income is included in the CFC rules in terms of 
section 953(a) of the Code. Under section 953(e)(3)(A)-(C) of the Code, 
insurance income is exempt from CFC provisions if it is income of a “qualifying 
insurance company”. That is, an insurance company that has a “real business 
nexus” with a foreign country. It should also be regulated as an insurance 
company by its home country, and it should derive 50% of its total net written 
premiums from insurance or reinsurance by such CFC. 
 
(2) Foreign base company income (FBCI): In terms of section 952(a)(3) of the 
Code, FBCI includes foreign personal holding company income, foreign base 
company sales income, foreign base company service income and foreign base 
company oil-related income.127  
 
(a) Foreign personal holding company income (FPHCI): The various components 
of this income are set out in section 954(a)(1).128 Only the components of this 
income that are comparable to South Africa’s CFC legislation are discussed in 
this chapter.129  
 
(i) Dividends are covered under FPHCI in terms of section 954(c)(c)(1) of the 
Code. There is however an exclusion from FPHCI where dividends are received 
from a CFC that has a subsidiary which also has a CFC. Dividends from the 
lower-tier CFC do not trigger a second tax for the United States shareholder.130  
FPHCI also excludes dividends received from a “related” CFC that was created 
in the same foreign country as the CFC in issue, where substantial parts of the 
assets used in the related CFC’s trade are located in the same foreign 
country.131 
 
(ii) In terms of section 954(c)(c)(1)(A) of the Code, interest income of a CFC is 
covered under the FPHCI. This, however, excludes interest derived in the 
                                                 
127  The last category is not discussed in this work owing to its limited relevance in regard to 
South Africa’s CFC legislation. 
128   See chapter 5 par 5.2.1 under the heading “Foreign personal holding company income”. 
129   See chapter 5 par 5.2.1 under the heading “Foreign personal holding company income”.  
130   S 959(b) of the Code. 
131   S 954(c)(3)(A)(i) of the Code; Treas Reg s 1.954-2(b)(1)(i). 
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conduct of a banking business and “export financing interest”.132 CFC provisions 
also exclude interest received from a “related” CFC that was created in the same 
foreign country as the CFC in issue, where substantial portions of the assets 
used in the related CFC’s trade are located in the same foreign country..133 
 
(iii) In terms of section 954(c)(c)(1)(A) of the Code, a portion of the gross income 
of a CFC that consists of royalties is generally FPHCI. There are, however, 
exemptions for certain royalties derived in an active business and for certain 
royalties received from related persons.134  
 
(iv) Under section 954(h)(1) of the Code, the “qualified banking or financing 
income” of an eligible CFC is excluded from CFC provisions. An eligible CFC 
means a CFC that is predominantly engaged in the active conduct of banking, 
financing or similar business and conducts substantial activity with respect to that 
business. But as an anti-abuse measure, this exclusion does not apply to any 
income, gain, loss or deduction of any entity that is not engaged in regular and 
continuous transactions with customers that are not related persons. 
(b) Foreign base company sales income (FBCSI): This income is included in the 
CFC provisions under section 954(d) of the Code. A sales transaction generates 
FBCSI only if a related person is involved as a seller or buyer. Income from a 
sale is excluded from FBCSI if the goods are manufactured, produced, grown or 
extracted in the country from which the CFC is organised. 
 
(c) Foreign base company service income: This income is included in the CFC 
provisions under section 954(e) of the Code. This is income derived from the 
performance of services, such as technical, managerial, engineering, 
architectural, scientific, skilled or industrial services. The CFC must perform 
these services for or on behalf of a related person.  The services must be 
performed in the country where the corporation was created. Income from these 
services is excluded if it relates directly to the sale or exchange by the 
corporation of property manufactured, produced, grown or extracted by the 
                                                 
132   S 954(c)(2)(B) of the Code. 
133   Treas Reg s 1.954-2(b)(4). 
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corporation.  
 
The United States has also enacted special provisions to deal with domestic 
portfolio  investments  in  foreign investment companies. These provisions are  
referred to as “passive foreign investment company” (PFIC) rules. 135 They are 
aimed at the deferral of United States tax on passive income earned abroad 
through an investment fund that is run from outside the United States and that 
does not distribute its income annually. 
 
Exemptions from South Africa’s CFC rules 
 
Under section 9D(9)(b) of the Act, a “foreign business establishment” is excluded 
form CFC rules. For a place of business to qualify as a “foreign business 
establishment”, there must be an “economic substance” and “a business 
purpose”.136 As an anti-avoidance measure, the Act provides that this exemption 
does not apply to certain diversionary transactions between a CFC and a 
connected person.137  Section 9D certain circumstances in terms of which the 
“foreign business establishment” exemption will not be granted. Section 
9D(9)(b)(i) deals with rules that relate to diversionary activities and section 
9D(b)(ii) deals with reversionary rules.  
 
Diversionary activities: 
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(b)(i), no exemption will be granted where the net 
income of a “foreign business establishment” of a CFC is derived from 
transactions with its connected person (who is a resident) relating to the supply 
of goods or services by or to the CFC unless the price at which such transactions 
take place is an arm’s length price in terms of section 31 of the Income Tax 
Act.138  
                                                                                                                                            
134  Treas Reg s 1.954-2(b)(1)(iii). 
135  See discussion in chapter 5 par 5.2.2.  
136 Olivier & Honiball at 374. 
137  See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.4 under the heading “The foreign business 
establishment exemption”.     
138 See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.4 under the heading “The foreign business 
establishment exemption”, particularly the discussion on s 9D(9)(b)(i). 
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Reversionary rules:  
 
(a) Section 9D(9)(b)(ii)(aa) deals with “CFC in-bound sales”. In terms of this 
provision, the “foreign business establishment” exemption will not apply to net 
income that is attributed to any amounts derived from the sale of goods by the 
CFC to its connected person who is a resident. This provision is, however, 
subject to certain exceptions.139 
 
(b) Section 9D(9)(b)(ii)(bb) deals with “CFC out-bound sales”. In terms of this 
provision, the “foreign business establishment” exemption does not apply to net 
income that is attributed to any amounts derived from a sale of goods or any 
tangible intermediary inputs by the CFC to a non-connected person who is a 
resident, where these goods were initially purchased by the CFC from a 
connected person who is a resident. This provision is, however, subject to certain 
exceptions.140  For instance, an exception applies where the creation, extraction, 
production, assembly, repair or improvement of goods undertaken by the CFC 
amounts to more than minor assembly or adjustment, packaging, re-packing and 
re-labeling. This provision is similar to the United States’ section 954(d) of the 
Code, which relates to “foreign base company sales income”. In both countries, 
CFC provisions apply in respect to the sale of goods between connected or 
related persons. However, in both countries the CFC provisions do not apply in 
respect to goods that are manufactured, produced or extracted in the country 
from which the CFC is organised.  
 
(c) Section 9D(9)(b)(ii)(cc) deals with “CFC connected services”. In terms of this 
provision, the ”foreign business establishment” exemption does not apply to net 
income that is attributed to any services performed by the CFC to its connected 
person who is a resident, unless the service is performed outside the Republic 
                                                 
139   See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.4 under the heading “The foreign business 
establishment exemption”, particularly the discussion on s 9D(9)(b)(ii)(bb).   
140   See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.4 under the heading “The foreign business 
establishment exemption”, particularly the discussion on s 9D(9)(b)(ii).   
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under certain conditions.141 An example would be services that relate to the 
extraction or production of goods used outside the Republic. This provision is 
similar to the United States’ section 954(e) of the Code, which deals with “foreign 
base company service income”. In both countries, the CFC provisions do not 
apply in respect to income from services that relate to the extraction or 
production of goods by the CFC.   
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(b)(iii), the “foreign business establishment” exemption 
does not apply to net income that is attributed to any amounts derived from 
mobile passive income of an enterprise. This provision is, however, subject to 
certain exclusions. For instance, the provision does not apply when the principal 
trading activities of the CFC from which the amounts arise are banking or 
financial services, insurance or rental businesses. An exception applies to the 
receipts and accruals of a CFC that was a “foreign financial instrument holding 
company” at the time they were derived. 142 This provision acts as an anti-
avoidance provision because it covers “foreign financial holding companies” that 
are located in tax-haven jurisdictions.143 This provision is similar to the United 
States’ section 964(h)(1) of the Code, which excludes the “qualified banking and 
financing income” of an eligible CFC from the CFC rules. Like the South African 
provision, the United States’ provision contains an anti-abuse measure in that the 
exclusion does not apply to the banking or financing income of an entity that is 
not engaged in regular or continuous transactions with customers that are not 
related persons.   
 
In terms of section 9D(9)(c) of the Act, CFC rules do not apply to income which is 
attributed to any policy issued by a company licensed to issue long-term 
insurance policies. This provision is similar to the United States’ section 
953(e)(3)(A)-(C) of the Code, which exempts insurance income from CFC 
provisions. 
 
                                                 
141   See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.4 under the heading “The foreign business 
establishment exemption”, particularly the discussion on s 9D(9)(b)(ii)(cc). 
142   See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.4 under the heading “The foreign business 
establishment exemption”, particularly the discussion on s 9D(9)(b)(iii). 
143 See Olivier & Honiball at 382. 
464 
  
Under section 9D(9)(e) of the Act, CFC rules do not apply to the net income of a 
CFC where it is included in the taxable income of the company in the Republic 
and has not been or will not be exempt or taxed at a reduced rate in the Republic 
as a result of the application of any double taxation agreements. 
 
Under section 9D(9)(f) of the Act, foreign dividends declared to a CFC by another 
company from an amount that will be, or has been, included in the income of a 
resident are excluded from CFC rules. This is intended to avoid the double 
taxation of income. This provision is similar to the United States’ section 959(b) 
of the Code which exempts from CFC provisions any dividends from a  
CFC that has a subsidiary which also has a CFC. The dividend from the lower-
tier CFC does not trigger a second tax for the United States shareholder.144  
 
Under section 9D(9)(fA) of the Act, CFC rules do not apply to a CFC’s income 
that is derived from any interest, royalties and rentals that are paid to it, or are 
deemed to have been paid to it by another foreign company, provided that both 
companies belong to the same group of companies. This provision appears to be 
similar to the United States’ provisions which deal with “foreign personal holding 
company income” that relates to dividends, interest, rents and annuities. 
Although these categories of income are covered by the United States CFC 
rules, as in South Africa, there are exclusions where the particular income is 
received from a “related” CFC that was created in the same foreign country 
where the CFC in issue was created and substantial parts of the assets used in 
the related CFC’s trade are located in the same foreign country.145  
 
In South Africa, there are no specific anti-avoidance rules that relate to foreign 
investment schemes, as is the case in the United States. However it is worth 
noting that section 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act refers to foreign investment 
schemes (unit trusts). In terms of this provision CFC rules apply where more than 
50% of the participation rights or voting rights of a foreign collective investment 
                                                 
144   JD Kuntz & RJ Peroni US International Taxation Vol 1 (2005) at B3-78.  
145   See s 954(c)(3)(A)(i) of the Code in respect of dividends, Treas Reg s 1.954-2(b)(4) in 
respect to interest and Treas Reg s 1.954-2(b)(1)(iii) in respect to royalties. For details, 
see the discussion in chapter 5 par 5.2.1 under the heading “Foreign personal holding 
company income”. 
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scheme are held by South African residents. But the rules do not apply to 
residents who are connected persons, if they individually hold less than 5% of the 
participation  rights or voting rights  in a foreign  collective investment scheme.146 
The intention of this provision is to lessen the administrative burden on tax 
authorities. This provision acts as a de minimis rule. 
 
Comments  
 
In all three countries, there is some form of de minimis rule. The United Kingdom 
rules do not apply if the chargeable profits of a CFC are below ₤50 000 in any 
accounting period.147 The United States rules apply only if more than 50% of the 
voting power of all classes of voting stock is owned by United States 
shareholders on any day during the taxable year of the CFC.148 In South Africa, 
the rules apply where more than 50% of the total participation rights or voting 
rights of a CFC are held by South African shareholders. The rules do not apply to 
residents who are connected persons if they individually hold less than 5% of the 
participation rights or voting rights in a foreign collective investment scheme.149 
  
Unlike the United Kingdom’s provisions, the South African CFC rules do not have 
a motive test that discriminates between genuine investors and those who are 
not genuine. In this respect, it could be argued that the South African provisions 
cover such a wide scope of transactions that greater administrative capacity may 
be required to deal with the numerous issues that could arise. It could also be 
argued that since the South African provisions do not discriminate between 
genuine investors and those who are not genuine, this may deter foreign 
investors. It is, however, worth noting that some of the exemptions to the CFC 
rules, for instance the “foreign business establishment” exemption, cover 
situations that concern genuine investors.  
 
The workings of the exemptions to the South African CFC provisions seem to be 
similar to those of comparable provisions in the United States. It is noteworthy, 
                                                 
146 See the discussion of the South African CFC legislation in chapter 4.  
147 S 748(1) (d) ITCA 1988. 
148 S 957(b) and s 957(a) of the Code, Treas Reg s 1.951-1(g), 1.957.1.   
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however, that all three countries have an exemption that deals with “business 
establishments”.150 As an anti-avoidance measure, schemes involving the sale  
of goods or services between related or connected parties are excluded from this 
exemption.  
 
 
 
 
10.2.2  CFC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  
 
United Kingdom 
 
Sections 112-113 and Schedule 17 of ICTA bring CFC provisions into line with 
the United Kingdom corporation tax self-assessment regime, which became 
effective from 1 July 1999. Any company which has an interest in a CFC must 
complete a supplementary page to the self-assessment return, unless the CFC 
falls within the “Excluded Countries Regulations”, or the interest of the United 
Kingdom company and that of persons connected or associated with it is less 
than 25%.151 The onus rests on the United Kingdom resident to disclose the 
details of his interests in foreign subsidiaries and associated companies.152 
 
The United States  
 
United States shareholders who own 10% or more of the total combined voting 
power of all classes of voting stock of a CFC must disclose their names, street 
addresses and taxpayer identification numbers, their proportionate share of 
subpart F income and the percentage value of the shares of the CFC that they 
                                                                                                                                            
149 See comparative study of these countries’ CFC legislation as set out above.   
150   In South Africa, s 9D(9)(b) previously referred to the “business establishment” exemption 
to the CFC rules but in terms of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 20 of 2006, the term 
“business establishment” was deleted from the Act and replaced by the term “foreign 
business establishment”.   
151 D Whitecross & J Pearse “Controlled Foreign Companies and Self Assessment” (1998) 
British Tax Review at 9-10.  
152   See discussion in chapter 5 par 5.1.6. 
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own.153 
 
South Africa 
 
Section 72A(1) of the Income Tax Act imposes a duty on every South African 
resident who has shares in a CFC, to submit certain information about the CFC 
to the Commissioner.154 
 
Comments  
 
The United Kingdom self-assessment provisions and section 72A(1) of the South 
African Income Tax Act work in a similar manner, in that they place the onus on 
taxpayers to disclose information about their interests in a CFC. 
 
10.2.3  CONFLICT BETWEEN CFC LEGISLATION AND TAX TREATIES 
 
The OECD’s views 
  
Although it is argued that CFC legislation conflicts with certain fundamental 
principles of tax treaties,155 the OECD recognises implicitly that CFC legislation 
does not raise treaty problems.156 Paragraph 23 of the Commentary on 1 of the 
OECD Model Convention states that “whilst some countries have felt it useful to 
expressly clarify, in their conventions, that controlled foreign companies 
legislation did not conflict with the Convention, such clarification is not necessary. 
It is recognised that controlled foreign companies legislation structured in this 
way is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention.”  
 
United Kingdom 
 
                                                 
153   Internal Revenue Code Regulations s 1.883-1. See discussion in chapter 5 par 5.2.3. 
154  For details of the information that should be disclosed to the Commissioner, see the 
discussion in chapter 4 par 4.6.  
155   See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.7. 
156   Par 23 of the Commentary on art 1 and par 37 of the Commentary on art 10 of the OECD 
Model Convention.  
468 
  
Section 788(3) of the ICTA provides that the arrangements specified in the treaty 
shall “notwithstanding anything in any enactment” have effect in relation to 
income tax and corporation tax in so far as they provide relief from income tax in 
respect of income or chargeable gains. Upon entry into force in the United 
Kingdom, the provisions of the treaty are recognised as having the authority of 
statute law. Where there is a conflict between existing law and the treaty 
provisions,  the  treaty  will  prevail,157  but  where  there  is  a  conflict  between  
the treaty  as  adopted  in  United  Kingdom  law  and  a  subsequent  legislative  
enactment, the subsequent enactment prevails. However, the use of the phrase 
“not withstanding anything in any enactment” in section 788(3) suggests that 
treaty provisions would supersede subsequent domestic legislation.158   
 
The United Kingdom maintains that its CFC legislation is compatible with its tax 
treaties. This is based on the premise that, in terms of section 747(6)(a) of the 
ICTA, the CFC legislation calculates the notional corporate tax payable by the 
CFC as if the CFC were resident in the United Kingdom. The tax can then be 
apportioned among resident shareholders who hold 25% or more of the CFC’s 
shares (Bricom Holdings Ltd v IRC159). It is reasoned that this attribution-of-tax 
approach does not conflict with tax treaties.160 
 
United States 
 
The legal status and relationship of domestic legislation and tax treaties is 
governed by the Constitution of the United States of America.161 Article VI(2) of 
the Constitution provides that federal legislation and treaties to which the United 
States is a party, as well as the Constitution are supreme law of the land. Thus 
                                                 
157   Ostime v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1995) 38 TC 492 at 514. 
158   D Sandler Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the 
Boundaries 2 ed (1998) at 51. 
159   [1996] STC (SCD) 228.  
160   See discussion in chapter 5 par 5.1.8.  
161   The Constitution of the United States is the oldest Federal constitution in existence and 
was framed by a convention of delegates from twelve of the thirteen original states in 
Philadelphia in May 1787, Rhode Island failing to send a delegate. The Constitution is the 
landmark legal document of the United States. The Constitution comprises the primary law 
of the U.S. Federal Government. It also describes the three chief branches of the Federal 
Government and their jurisdictions. In addition, it lays out the basic rights of citizens of the 
United States. 
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statues and treaties have equal status under the Constitution.162 There are 
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code and in tax treaties to which the United 
States is a party that operate to limit conflicts between treaties and the Internal 
Revenue Code. For example, the United States has in its domestic legislation the 
doctrine of “treaty override” that authorises the revenue authorities to disregard 
the terms of a double taxation agreement where tax avoidance is anticipated.163   
 
The United States maintains the position that its double tax treaties exist for the 
benefit of non-resident aliens only, not for residents or citizens of the United 
States.  Under its “savings clause”, found in almost all its tax treaties, the United 
States may tax its citizens and residents as though the treaty had not come into 
effect. This is intended to limit the impact of the treaty provisions on domestic law 
to non-resident aliens. Thus its CFC provisions do not conflict with its tax 
treaties.164 
 
South Africa 
 
In terms of section 9D(2A) of the Income Tax Act, the “net income” of a CFC is 
not its actual income, but an amount equal or similar to such is included in the 
income of a controlling resident, as if it had been a resident for the purposes of 
certain specified sections of the Act. This would accord with the United Kingdom 
decision in the Bricom Holdings case. As South African residents are taxed on 
notional amounts, it is unlikely that the courts will hold that South African 
residents will be entitled to rely on a double taxation agreement on the basis that 
the same amounts are effectively being taxed. Olivier and Honiball165 note, 
however, that although South African residents are taxed on notional amounts, 
the issue of the conflict between CFC legislation and tax treaties is still unclear. 
 
Comments  
 
                                                 
162   Sandler at 52. 
163 R Rohatgi Basic International Taxation (2002) at 372; M Hampton Offshore Interface: Tax 
Havens in the Global Economy (1996) at 12. 
164   See discussion in chapter 5 par 5.2.6. 
165   Olivier & Honiball at 397. See the discussion in chapter 4 with reference to fn 171-175. 
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In South Africa, section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act, read with section 231 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that as soon as 
the double tax agreement is ratified and has been published in the Government 
Gazette, its provisions are effective as if they had been incorporated into the 
Income Tax Act.166 This implies that treaty provisions and any other provisions of 
the Income Tax Act (eg section 9D) have equal status under South African 
law.167  
 
In effect South Africa’s tax treaties do not override domestic law, even if there is 
a conflict between the two. In order to resolve a potential conflict, a South African 
court may have to consider domestic interpretation rules (such as lex posterior 
derogate legi priori)168 and international interpretation rules (in so far as they are 
relevant). Section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides 
that customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. In this respect, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Commentary on the OECD Model 
Tax Convention can be referred to in order to resolve the conflict.169 However, an 
attempt to interpret the treaty provisions using the various interpretation rules 
may not be effective in resolving the conflict between CFC rules and tax 
treaties.170 
 
It is therefore important that South Africa should come up with a specific 
provision in its domestic legislation or in its tax treaties that resolves the conflict 
between CFC legislation and South Africa’s tax treaties.171  
 
10.2.4  CHALLENGES E-COMMERCE POSES TO CFC LEGISLATION 
  
OECD recommendations 
 
                                                 
166 D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006/2007) in par 30.11.  
167   Olivier & Honball at 30. 
168   See the discussion in chapter 4 par 4.7 under the heading ”South African rules of 
interpreting statues”. 
169   See discussion chapter 4 par 4.7 under the heading “International interpretation rules”. 
170  See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.7 under the heading “International interpretation rules”.  
171   See recommendation in chapter 10 par 10.3.1.  
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In 1997, the OECD called on countries to cooperate on the formulation of a 
policy on the taxation of e-commerce.172 The OECD recommended that e-
commerce should not be subjected to a new form of taxation, but that existing tax 
rules should be amended to cater for the taxation of e-commerce.173 
Furthermore, the taxation principles which are applied to conventional commerce 
(neutrality, efficiency, certainty and simplicity, effectiveness and fairness, and the 
flexibility of taxation) should also apply to the taxation of e-commerce. In taxing 
e-commerce transactions, the fiscal sovereignty of countries should be 
maintained, so that each country is able to protect its tax base while at the same 
time avoiding double taxation and the unintentional non-taxation of e-commerce 
transactions. 
 
The United Kingdom   
 
Inland Revenue recognises that e-commerce poses challenges to the 
administration of tax legislation, as it makes it difficult to identify the parties to a 
business transaction or the place where the transaction was performed. In 
respect of CFC legislation, Inland Revenue acknowledges that this legislation 
was introduced in 1984 and largely reflects the world before e-commerce. This 
legislation may not be adequate to deal with e-commerce transactions. With e-
commerce, the exemptions to the CFC legislation could be manipulated for tax 
avoidance purposes. These exemptions may need to be changed to ensure 
adequate protection of the tax base.174 
 
The government is, however, of the view that taxation should not be a barrier to 
the growth of e-commerce.175 Tax rules and tax compliance should be neutral 
                                                 
172   See OECD “Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce” (November 1997). 
Available at > 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_34223_2751231_1_1_1_1,00.html<, 
last accessed on 4 June 2007. 
173    OECD Ministerial Conference on Electronic Commerce: Ottawa Canada “A Borderless 
World” (October 1998). Available at 
>http://www.ottawaoecdconference.org/English/conference-program/agenda.pdf<, last 
accessed on 4 June 2007. 
174   See discussion in chapter 5 par 5.1.9. 
175   Inland Revenue “Electronic Commerce: The UK’s Taxation Agenda” (1999) at 54. 
Available at >http://www.irwa.org.uk/e-commerce/resource/ecom.pdf<, last accessed on 
16 July 2007. 
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between e-commerce and more traditional forms of commerce. The United 
Kingdom is working hand in hand with the OECD to develop internationally 
acceptable guidelines for the taxation of e-commerce. 
 
The United States  
 
Treasury recognises that e-commerce poses challenges to the enforcement of 
tax legislation. In respect of CFC legislation, treasury observed that if CFCs can 
engage in commerce, through websites located in tax-haven jurisdictions, it may 
become increasingly difficult to enforce subpart F legislation.  Treasury noted that 
it may be necessary to revise subpart F and the regulations under it, in order to 
take e-commerce transaction into account.176   
 
The United States is, however, of the view that e-commerce is still in the early 
stages of its development and that it should therefore not be subjected to 
unnecessary regulation, as this would hamper its development. Furthermore, no 
new taxes should be imposed on e-commerce.177 Its taxation should be 
consistent with the established principles of international taxation, should avoid 
inconsistent national tax jurisdictions and double taxation, and should be simple 
to administer and easy to understand. The United States is working hand in hand 
with the OECD in developing internationally acceptable guidelines for the 
taxation of e-commerce.  
 
South Africa   
 
The Katz Commission Report178 noted that e-commerce impacts on the basic 
methods by which international taxation is currently levied, making irrelevant the 
concept of physical presence in order to trade. The Report noted that there is a 
need to protect South Africa’s tax base from the tax avoidance that might arise 
                                                 
176   United States Treasury Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce 
(1996) in par 7.3.5.  
177  The White House “A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce” (1 July 1997). Available 
at >http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm<, last accessed on 4 June 
2007. 
178 Katz MM (Chairman) The Fifth Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain 
Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa (1997) at 31. 
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from e-commerce transactions. 
The legal framework in South Africa is currently insufficient to deal with e-
commerce issues.179 In 2002 the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act180 was enacted. This Act contains certain provisions which, if complied with  
and effectively enforced, could alleviate some of the identification problems 
posed by e-commerce.181 
 
Comments 
 
If e-commerce is not regulated and appropriately taxed, the loss of revenue could 
be tremendous. There is therefore a need for governments to strike a balance 
between the development of e-commerce and its taxation. Since the challenges 
e-commerce poses affect the international community, South Africa should work 
hand in hand with developed and developing nations in order to come up with a 
feasible way of taxing e-commerce transactions.  
 
10.2.5 HOW THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CFC LEGISLATION IS AFFECTED BY 
ITS COMPLEXITY  
 
United Kingdom 
 
In 2006, the Tax Reform Commission182 noted that the United Kingdom’s CFC 
legislation has been complicated by repeated amendments.183 As each 
amendment is introduced, tax advisers exploit the loopholes created and then tax 
authorities respond with more amendments. The Commission noted that this 
cycle can be hard to break, and that it makes planning more difficult and 
investment less attractive.  
 
                                                 
179  Department of Communications’ Green Paper on E-commerce Making it your Business 
(November 2000) at 10-14. 
180  Act 25 of 2002. 
181  The relevant sections of this Act are discussed in chapter 4 under the heading “South 
Africa’s response to the challenges posed by e-commerce”. 
182   United Kingdom Tax Reform Commission “Tax Matters: Reforming the Tax System” 
(October 2006) at 7. Available at >http://www.taxreformcommission.com/report.php<, last 
accessed 10 September 2007). 
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In order to simplify this legislation, it has been recommended that “participation 
exemptions” should be introduced for all income from qualifying foreign 
shareholdings.184 It is argued that the introduction of participation exemptions 
would remove most of the complexities in the CFC legislation, as most of the 
complicated rules for calculating underlying tax credits would become redundant. 
The result would be to make the United Kingdom a lot more attractive as a 
location for controlling international business.185   
 
United States 
 
In 2006, the Task Force on International Tax Reform186 noted that the workings 
of the components of subpart F income are very complicated. Each type of 
income is complicated with exclusions that are not easy to understand. As a 
further complication, there are certain exceptions to the exclusions that make the 
legislation difficult to interpret in practice. Apart from the exclusions complicated 
by exceptions, there are also numerous elections that increase the complexity of 
the legislation and the compliance burdens for taxpayers. It was recommended 
that the most effective way to reduce the burden of complexity would be to 
reduce the number of elections that could, in some cases, be the driving force 
behind numerous tax planning schemes.187 
 
Commentators on this state of affairs are of the view that the complexity in the 
United States anti-deferral legislation could be resolved by amending the 
legislation to end deferral on all kinds of income, instead of the legislation ending 
deferral mainly for passive income and base company income.188 An approach 
that ends deferral for all types of income would significantly simplify the 
                                                                                                                                            
183   UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 53. 
184   UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 82. 
185  UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 82-83. 
186   Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform 59 Tax Lawyer (2006) at 662. 
Available at >http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubs/taskforceintltaxreform.pdf, last accessed on 
15 August 2007. 
187   Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform at 662. 
188   CM Boise ”Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty”. 
Available at >http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929587>, last accessed 26 
November 2006; RJ Peroni, JC Fleming & SE Shay “Getting Serious About Curtailing 
Deferral of United States Tax on Foreign Source Income” (1999) 52 SMU Law Review at 
498.  
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legislation, as all taxpayers would be subject to a foreign tax credit and would be 
taxed currently.189 
 
South Africa 
 
South Africa’s CFC legislation is quite difficult to understand, comply with and 
administer. The complexities in the legislation derive mainly from the following:  
there are terminological difficulties in that the legislation contains various terms 
whose interpretation depends on other terms used in defining the original term. 
Then there are certain ambiguous concepts, the ambit of which creates some 
interpretation difficulties. The CFC legislation is also complicated by the fact that 
its application brings into play various provisions of the Income Tax Act, some of 
which, like transfer pricing, foreign currency transactions and capital gains tax, 
are quite detailed and difficult to apply in practice. The legislation is also 
complicated by the fact that it is has a number of exemptions to its applicability, 
limited by various exclusions. In addition, the legislation allows taxpayers to elect 
whether or not to fall within the ambit of the rules. Although the elections are 
potentially advantageous to taxpayers, they also add to the complexity of the 
CFC legislation and the compliance burdens for taxpayers.190 
 
Comments 
 
While it is necessary to consider how other developed countries have applied 
their CFC legislation, care should be taken not to introduce rules that have 
complicated other countries’ CFC legislation. South Africa’s legislators should 
take note of the fact that in other countries, like the United Kingdom, CFC 
legislation has been complicated because of repeated amendments coupled with 
unclear policy considerations.191 The introduction of major changes followed by 
successive refinements and/or policy reversals reduces certainty. The instability 
or unpredictability in the legislation can thus prove a deterrent to international 
investment.  
                                                 
189   PR McDaniel, HJ Ault & JR Repetti JR Introduction to United States International Taxation 
5 ed (2005) at 127.  
190  See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.9. 
476 
  
 
10.2.6  LEGISLATION TO ENCOURAGE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION 
OF FUNDS 
 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
 
This Act gave United States corporations one year to repatriate earnings from 
their foreign subsidiaries at a reduced tax rate, compared to the corporate rate 
normally applicable to dividends paid to United States shareholders by foreign 
corporations. This was expected to create an incentive for CFCs to voluntarily 
end deferral, and repatriate foreign earnings to their United States shareholders. 
However, this Act mainly benefited multinational industries with substantial 
offshore assets. This was particularly true of pharmaceuticals and technology 
industries which have large concentrations of intangible assets that make it 
easier for them to shift income abroad. These industries strongly supported the 
Act as they potentially had the most to gain from a reduced rate of taxation on 
repatriated earnings. The Act damaged the public perception of the fairness of 
the tax system by cloaking its provisions in the garb of job creation, but ultimately 
benefiting even those corporations that used repatriated earnings to cut 
American jobs. It was viewed by most taxpayers as a corporate give-away.192  
 
South Africa’s 2003 Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of 
Taxation Laws Act 
 
The Act was intended to enable violators of exchange control regulations and 
certain tax acts to regularise their affairs in respect of their foreign assets 
attributable to those violations. The Act was also intended to ensure maximum 
disclosure of foreign assets, and to facilitate the repatriation thereof to the 
Republic. Disclosing previously unreported foreign assets would result in the 
extension of the tax base. In terms of section 3(1) of this Act, the only persons 
that could apply for amnesty were: close corporations, natural persons (including 
                                                                                                                                            
191  UK Tax Reform Commission Report at 53. 
192   Boise 2006 at 6. See also the discussion in chapter 5 par 5.2.4 under the heading “The 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004”. 
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the deceased estate of a natural person) and trusts. 
 
Comments  
 
As South Africa’s 2003 Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation 
Laws Act restricted the categories of persons that could apply for the amnesty, it 
did not create the same negative effects and sentiments as the American Jobs 
Creation Act. South Africa should learn from the negative effects of United 
States’ American Jobs Creation Act and not enact legislation of such a nature 
that it undermines taxpayer confidence in the tax system.  
 
10.2.7 LEGISLATION IN RESPECT OF PARTNERSHIP/CORPORATE 
HYBRID ENTITIES 
 
The OECD 
 
Paragraph 2 of the Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Convention 
points out that, domestic laws differ in the treatment of partnerships. These 
differences create various difficulties when applying tax treaties to partnerships. 
In 1999, the OECD issued a Report on Partnerships,193 but the taxation of 
partnerships still poses problems. In terms of article 1 of the OECD Model 
Convention, a treaty applies to persons who are residents of one or both of the 
contracting states. In terms of article 3(1)(a) of the OECD Model Convention,  a 
partnership as a “body of persons” can be treated as a person for treaty 
purposes.194 In terms of article 3(1)(b), a partnership could also be regarded as a 
“company” if it is treated as a “taxable unit according to the tax laws of the 
contracting state in which it is organised”.195  
 
However, domestic laws differ in the treatment of partnerships. These differences 
create various difficulties when applying the tax conventions in relation to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
193  OECD The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships (1999). 
194  A Easson “Taxation of Partnerships in Canada” 54 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation (April 2000) at 169. 
195  Daniels at 141. 
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partnerships.196 Paragraph 3 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model 
Convention provides that a main source of difficulties is the fact that, some 
countries treat partnerships as taxable entities, where as other countries treat 
partnerships as fiscally transparent (not taxable) but the individual partners are 
taxed on their respective share of the partnership’s income. The different 
treatment of the entity in the two countries creates difficulties with respect to the 
entitlement to treaty benefits and it also causes many tax planning 
opportunities.197 Taxes can be avoided by exploiting the differences between the 
tax treatment of taxpayers or transactions in the two countries.198  
 
United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom has legislation that deals with Limited Liability partnerships 
(LLPs). The LLP combines the organisation flexibility and taxation treatment of a 
partnership but with limited liability for its members.199 The United Kingdom LLP 
is thus seen as a “hybrid creature” that is based on the corporate model”.200 For 
purposes of taxation, the LLP is treated as a partnership.201  
                                                 
196  OECD Report on the Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships. 
197  Arnold & Mclntyre at 144.    
198  An entity opaque in one jurisdiction but transparent in another jurisdiction can afford 
opportunities for double-dipping, without the restrictions imposed by the relevant anti-
avoidance legislation - e.g. interest paid by an Australian limited partnership of which 
United Kingdom companies are members may obtain tax relief in both jurisdictions. A 
similar result can also follow from the use of an entity whose nature can be determined by 
a "check the box" type election; in this way a "triple-dip" may be obtained. See Richard 
Edmonds: International Tax Planning Association “Limited Partnerships”. Available at 
http://www.itpa.org/open/summaries/cannes2003s.html< last accessed on 20 March 2008. 
199  Armour at 295. 
200  G Morse “Limited Liability Partnerships Law Reform in the United Kingdom” in JA 
McCahery, T Raaijmakers & EPM Vermeulen The Governance of Close Corporations 
and Partnerships US and European Perspectives(2004) 317 at 325. 
201  S 118ZA of the ICTA 1988 provides that for purposes of the Tax Acts, a trade,[profession 
or business carried on by a limited Liability partnership with a view to profit shall be treated 
as carried on in partnership by its members (and not by the Limited Liability partnership as 
such); and, accordingly, the property of the limited liability partnership shall be treated for 
those purposes as partnership property. Then s 59A of the TCGA 1992 provides that 
where a limited liability partnership carries on a trade or business with a view to profit – 
 (a)  assets held by the  limited liability partnership shall be treated for purposes of tax 
in respect of changeable gains as held by its members as partners, and 
 (b) any dealings by the limited liability partnership shall be treated for those purposes 
as dealings by its members in partnership (and not by the limited Liability partnership as 
such),  
 any tax in respect of chargeable gains accruing to the members of the limited liability 
partnership on the disposal of any of its assets shall be assessed and chargeable on them 
separately.  
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In Padmore v IRC202 it was held that a partnership was a “body of persons” so as 
to be capable of satisfying the definition of “resident” and benefit from the treaty. 
As a result of the Padmore case, the United Kingdom has begun to include 
specific references to partnerships in treaties recently negotiated.203 Where 
neither state regards a partnership as a taxable entity separate from its partners, 
partnerships are excluded from the definition of a person.204 Where, however, the 
other treaty state recognises a partnership as a separate entity, such a 
partnership is regarded as a person but a specific provision to that effect is 
included in the Convention.205  
United States 
 
The United States “Check-the-Box” regulations, which were introduced in 1996, 
have facilitated tax avoidance techniques that generally involve the use of hybrid 
entities.206 The Check-the-Box regulations allow a foreign entity to be treated at 
the taxpayer’s election, as a corporation, a branch or a partnership.207 By 
exploiting the differences in the United States tax treatment of corporations and 
disregarded entities, as well as differences in entity classification among different 
countries, the United States person is able to deflect operating income from a 
high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction while avoiding the application of 
subpart F rules.  
 
The United States is one of the few countries which has adopted a provision in its 
                                                 
202  [1987] S.T.C. 36, affirmed by the Court of Appeal [1989] S.T.C. 493. The UK’s general 
approach to partnerships is discussed in an exchange of correspondence printed in 
[1995] B.T.R. 111-114. The Inland Revenue confirmed that a partnership cannot be 
regarded as a UK resident for treaty purposes as it is not liable to tax in the UK.  
203  Some earlier treaties also dealt expressly with partnership. Thus the Conventions with 
Cyprus (1974, Art. 3(1)(h)) and Bulgaria (1987, Art. 3(1)(e)) expressly exclude 
partnerships from the scope of the treaty, while that with the United States (1975 Art. 
3(1)(c)) expressly included partnerships (the Convention of 1973 with Malaysia, Art. 
2(1)(g), originally excluded partnerships; this was amended by Protocol in 1987).  
204  For example, Art.3(1)(e) of the U.K. - Ghana Convention of 1993 provides: “the term 
‘person’ comprises an individual, a company and any other body of persons, but does not 
include a partnership;”.  
205  See Art. 25(1) of the UK/ India Convention of 1993, Art 24 of the UK/Ukraine Convention 
of 1993.  
206  RS Avi-Yonah “To End Deferral As We Know It: Simplification Potential Of Check-The-
Box” (1997) 74 Tax Notes at 219; CR Sweitzer “Analysing Subpart F in Light of Check-
The- Box” (2005) 20 Akron Tax Journal at 7-8.  
207  See discussion in chapter 5 par 5.2.4 under the heading “Hybrid entity techniques”. 
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Model tax treaty and domestic legislation dealing with the application of double 
tax conventions to hybrid entities.208 Broadly, this adopts a “flow-through” 
approach.209 
 
South Africa 
 
In terms of section 24H(5) of the Income Tax Act, the income of a partnership is 
taxed in the hands of the individual partners at the time it accrues to or is 
received by the partnership. The Income Tax Act does not recognise a 
partnership as a distinct taxable entity. However, the definition of the word 
“company” in section 1 of the Income Tax Act causes certain anomalies with 
respect to the taxation of foreign incorporated partnerships. This definition covers 
both companies incorporated in South Africa and those incorporated outside 
South Africa. It would for instance cover certain partnerships that are 
incorporated under the company law of certain jurisdictions. An example is the 
limited liability partnership (LLP) that is a corporate entity in the United Kingdom 
but is foreign to South African law.210 The unique nature of some foreign 
incorporated entities creates anomalies in light of the wording of the definition of 
“company” in the Act. These anomalies can be manipulated to avoid taxes. 
 
 
 
 
Comments  
 
There are no specific tax laws in South Africa that re-characterise an entity on 
the basis of its tax treatment in another country.211 In terms of the definition of 
“company” in South Africa’s Income Tax Act, a foreign incorporated partnership 
is taxed as a company in South Africa even though it may be taxed as a 
partnership in its country of incorporation. Where a South African resident invests 
                                                 
208  See the Regulations under the Internal Revenue Code s.894(c). 
209  See art 4(1)(d) of the 1996 United States Model Convention. 
210  Olivier & Honiball at 464. 
211  Olivier & Honiball at 465-466. 
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in a foreign incorporated partnership (such as the United Kingdom’s LLP), it is 
not clear whether the CFC legislation is applicable to the LLP. Although the 
United Kingdom LLP is considered a foreign company, it has no share capital.212 
It could therefore be argued that the CFC legislation which requires that South 
African residents hold more than 50% of the total participation or voting rights in 
the foreign company is not applicable to a United Kingdom LLP.  There is thus 
need for legislation in South African to provide for the taxation of income that 
could be deferred when investments are made in offshore partnerships with 
corporate features.213 
 
10.2.8 CURBING CONDUIT COMPANY TREATY SHOPPING  
 
OECD  
 
The Commentary on article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention suggests 
specific clauses that can be inserted in tax treaties to curb conduit company 
treaty shopping. In this work, the “beneficial ownership” provision is discussed. 
This provision has the effect of denying treaty benefits to a conduit company, 
unless the beneficial owner is a resident of one of the contracting states.214 
However, the effectiveness of this provision in curbing treaty shopping is affected 
by the fact that the term “beneficial ownership” is not explicitly defined in OECD 
Model Tax Convention or its Commentary.215 The OECD only offers certain 
guidelines to interpreting the term. The first guideline is that a nominee or agent 
who is a treaty country resident may not claim benefits if the person who has all 
the control and economic interest in the property (the beneficial owner) is not 
also a resident. The second guideline is that a conduit company cannot be 
regarded as a beneficial owner if it has very narrow powers which render it, in 
relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on 
account of the interested parties.216 Apart from the exclusion of agents and the 
                                                 
212  Morse at 324. 
213  Olivier & Honiball at 465-466. 
214  Par 12.2 of the Commentary on article 10 of the OECD Model Convention. 
215 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Condensed version) (2005). For 
the remark see OECD International Fiscal Association The OECD Model Convention - 
1998 and Beyond; The Concept of Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties (2000) at 15. 
216 OECD 1987 Report in par 14(b). 
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nominees, it has been argued that the term “beneficial ownership” has not been 
fully defined.217  
 
Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Convention provides that where a term is not 
defined in the Convention, unless the context otherwise requires, a contracting 
state can make use of the meaning of the term under the law of that state for the 
purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies.218 It is however, argued 
that unilaterally relying on article 3(2) to apply the domestic meaning of the term 
“beneficial ownership”, is not the right procedure that countries should apply in 
finding an international meaning to the term. Using the domestic meaning of the 
term would result into the loss of the uniformity in the OECD Model Convention 
and its Commentary that has long existed in the interpretation of tax treaties and 
tax treaty terms. Using the domestic meaning of the term would also result into 
uncertainty and loss of reliability for taxpayers.219 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
In line with the OECD recommendations, the United Kingdom uses the 
“beneficial ownership” provisions in its tax treaties to curb conduit company treaty 
shopping. However, there are no cases which have considered the meaning of 
the term “beneficial ownership” in a treaty context.220 In the domestic context, the 
term beneficial ownership has a different meaning for Common law and for 
Equity.221  
 
One case which provides clarity on how the term should be interpreted in a treaty 
context is Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch.222 In this case, the Chancellor in the Court of Appeal ruled that 
the term beneficial ownership "should be accorded an ‘international fiscal 
                                                 
217 Oliver et al at 20. 
218 See also OECD 2000 Report of the International Fiscal Association Report at 15.   
219 Oliver et al at 45; Jones 1993 at 253.  
220  Olivier & Honiball at 349. 
221 Oliver et al at 41. 
222  [2006] EWCA CV 15. See the more detailed discussion in 5 par 5.1.12 under the heading 
“Conduit Company Structures: The United Kingdom”. 
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meaning’ not derived from the domestic laws of contracting states".223  
 
The United States 
 
The United States makes use of domestic anti-avoidance provisions such as the 
“substance over form”224 doctrine and the requirement of “business purpose” in 
order to disregard treaty shopping schemes. The United States also has specific 
anti-conduit provisions in its domestic law which prevent treaty shopping if a 
conduit company lacks sufficient business purpose.225 The United States also 
curbs treaty shopping by applying the provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982.  Under section 342 thereof, the IRS must establish 
procedures to limit the advantage of reduced withholding tax rates under income 
tax treaties to only those persons entitled to the treaty benefits.  
 
In its tax treaties, the United States insists on using the “limitation of benefits” 
provision to curb conduit company treaty shopping. The “limitation of benefits” 
provision is one of the provisions recommended by the OECD for curbing conduit 
company treaty shopping. This clause lays down objective factors to determine 
whether a conduit entity was incorporated in one of the contracting states solely 
to obtain treaty benefits or whether sound commercial reasons exist for its 
incorporation.226  
 
South Africa 
 
Although South Africa is not a member of the OECD,227 most of South Africa’s 
treaties follow to a large extent the OECD Mode Tax Convention.228 In South 
                                                 
223  See the discussion in chapter 5 par 5.1.12 under the heading “Conduit Company 
Structures: The United Kingdom”. 
224 Ware & Roper at 77, the ‘substance over form’ doctrine is described as a doctrine 
frequently used in Anglo-Saxon legal systems which is similar to the abuse of law 
doctrine in Western Europe Civil law systems. The doctrine permits the tax authorities to 
ignore the legal form of a tax arrangement and look at the actual substance of the 
relevant transaction.  
225  S 7701(1) of the IRC 
226  Olivier & Honiball at 424. 
227 Huxham & Haupt at 357 in par 16.9.4; Olivier & Honiball at 8. 
228 Although different countries use various models for drafting their double tax agreements, 
there are three commonly used models for drafting double taxation agreements. Firstly, 
there is the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, published by the Organisation 
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Africa, the “beneficial ownership” concept is used in most of its tax treaties to 
curb conduit company treaty shopping. However, the term “beneficial ownership” 
does not constitute a clearly defined juristic concept in South African Law.229 The 
term is however used in South African company law in respect of the fact that a 
“nominee” or “agent” of a company’s shares is not considered the beneficial 
owner of those shares.230  The company law meaning of “beneficial ownership” 
appears to be in line with the guidelines offered by the OECD in interpreting the 
term.  
 
The Income Tax Act does not provide a meaning to the term “beneficial 
ownership”. In terms of section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act,231 read together 
with section 231 of the Constitution,232 when the national executive of South 
Africa enters into a double tax agreement with the government of any other 
country, and the agreement is ratified and entered into the Government Gazette, 
its provisions are effective as if they had been incorporated into the Income Tax 
Act. Even if such a treaty is considered as part of the Income Tax Act, the lack of 
a definition of the term “beneficial ownership” in this Act, implies that the Act 
cannot be relied on to determine the treaty meaning of this term. 
 
Comments 
 
In South Africa, constitutionally tax treaties rank equally with domestic legislation 
after enactment in terms of section 108 of the Income Tax Act. In order to come 
up with an interpretation of the term “beneficial ownership”, section 233 of the 
                                                                                                                                            
for Economic Co-operation and Development “OECD”). This model was prepared by 
developed countries of the world and embodies rules and proposed by capital exporting 
countries. Then there is the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention. This 
Model has been drafted between developed and developing countries and it attempts to 
reflect the interests of developing countries. Lastly there is the United States Model which 
is followed by most treaties that the United States has signed with other countries 
including South Africa. See K Huxham & P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 
(2007) at 357; Edward Nathan and Friedland “Residence Basis of Taxation: Double 
taxation agreements” (October 2001) 
http://www.saica.co.za/integritax/935_Double_taxation_agreements.htm last visited 
2005/07/21.  
229 CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd and Others 66 SATC 346. 
230  MS Blackman, RD Jooste & GK Everingham Commentary on the Companies Act Vol 1 
(2002) in par 98. 
231 Act 58 of 1962. 
232 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
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Constitution requires that the courts must prefer an interpretation that is 
consistent with international law. Although international interpretive rules can be 
used to interpret the term, the problem is that the OECD Commentary provides 
little guidance on what the term means, other than to imply that an agent or a 
nominee can never be a beneficial owner.  
 
By concluding tax treaties which contain the concept “beneficial ownership”, 
knowing that it is not a well-defined concept in domestic tax law, it must be 
surmised that the South African authorities have intended that an internationally 
accepted meaning of the concept must apply. This international meaning should 
be in line with the guidelines offered by the OECD in this regard.  
 
10.3  NATIONAL MEASURES TO CURB TAX AVOIDANCE: OFFSHORE 
TRUSTS 
 
The OECD initiatives against harmful tax practices target offshore trusts as one 
of the vehicles used by taxpayers to hide the identity of the beneficial owner of 
offshore assets. The OECD recommended that countries exchange information 
about taxpayers’ beneficial ownership in offshore trusts as requested by onshore 
countries in the enforcement of their laws and tax policies.233 
10.3.1 JURISDICTION TO TAX OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Under English law, a trust does not have a residence, since it is not considered 
to be a separate legal person. The residence of the trust depends on the 
residence status of the trustees. For income tax purposes, where all the trustees 
are resident in the United Kingdom, the trust will be resident there.  Where some 
trustees are resident in the United Kingdom and others are not, the residence of 
the trust will depend on the residence and domicile status of the settlor.234 
                                                 
233   OECD “Framework for a Collective Memorandum of Understanding on Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices” (2000) in par B. Available at >http://www.tax-
news.com/asp/res/MOUrev20novR1.pdf<, last accessed 10 July 2007. 
234   S 110 of the 1989 Finance Act. 
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United States  
 
A trust is a separate taxpaying entity, and it is liable for income tax. In terms of 
section 7701(a)(30) of the Code, a trust is a domestic trust for tax purposes if 
United States courts can exercise primary supervision over the administration of 
the trust and if one or more United States persons have the authority to control 
all substantial decisions of the trust. 
 
South Africa  
 
 In terms of section 1 of the Income Tax Act, a trust is included in the definition of 
a “person” for income tax purposes. A trust is deemed a resident of the Republic 
if it is established or formed in the Republic or if it has a place of effective 
management there.  
 
Comments  
 
Although the rules used to determine the residence status of trusts seem to differ 
in the three countries, the emphasis seems to fall on the place where the 
trustees administer the trust.  
10.3.2  TAXING A DONOR THAT RETAINS AN INTEREST IN THE TRUST  
 
United Kingdom 
 
In terms of section 660A of ICTA, income arising under a settlement (whether 
resident or non-resident) is deemed to be that of the settlor if he retains an 
interest in the settlement or if he receives a benefit from the settlement.  
 
Under section 660G(3) of ICTA, income arising under a settlement that is 
situated inside or outside the United Kingdom is taxed in the hands of the settlor 
if it is either income chargeable to income tax or income which would have been 
so chargeable if received by a person resident and domiciled in the United 
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Kingdom. 
 
United States  
 
In terms of section 671 of the Code, “grantor trust” rules are used to prevent 
foreign trusts from being used to defer the taxation of the income of United 
States persons. Most foreign trusts created by United States persons are treated 
as “grantor trusts”. Any income received by a grantor trust is deemed to have 
been received by the grantor. 
-     Under section 673(a) of the Code, a grantor is taxed on income of the 
trust if he has a reversionary interest in the income or the principal 
worth over 5% of the value of the trust.  
- Under section 674 of the Code, a grantor is taxed on income if he or 
his spouse has the power to control another’s beneficial enjoyment of 
the income of the trust. 
-  In terms of section 675 of the Code, grantor trust rules apply where 
the grantor enjoys self-serving administrative powers over the trust. 
- In terms of section 676 of the Code, grantor rules apply if the trust is 
revocable. 
- In terms of section 677 of the Code, grantor trust rules apply if the 
trust can be used to benefit the grantor. 
 
South Africa  
 
Certain subsections of section 7 of the Income Tax Act can be used to prevent 
tax avoidance in respect of discretionary trusts. In terms of section 7(5) of the 
Act, a donor will be liable to tax if he makes a donation, settlement or other 
disposition that is subject to a condition to the effect that a beneficiary will not 
receive income from the trust until the happening of some event. 
 
Section 7(6) of the Act provides that income is deemed to be that of the donor if 
a donation, settlement or other disposition contains a stipulation to the effect that 
the right to receive any income thereby conferred may, under the powers 
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retained by the person by whom the right is conferred, be revoked or conferred 
upon another. 
 
Comments  
 
The United States grantor trust rules and the United Kingdom provisions in 
section 660A of ICTA appear to work in a similar manner to the provisions of 
section 7(5) and 7(6) of South Africa’s Income Tax Act in that the relevant 
provisions result in the taxation of a donor, thereby preventing any tax avoidance 
that could arise through the use of discretionary trusts. Nevertheless, the 
applicability of South Africa’s section 7(5) and 7(6) to offshore discretionary trusts 
is limited. If an offshore trust is dual resident, it may be deemed to be resident in 
South Africa if it is effectively managed here. In order to apply the above 
provisions to such a trust, a trust deed has to be procured to prove whether it is 
conditional. Procuring the trust deed of a dual resident trust (eg, if it was 
incorporated in a tax-haven jurisdiction) may be difficult where the applicable 
laws contain secrecy provisions.  
 
 
10.3.3  TAXING INCOME TRANSFERRED TO OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Section 739 of ICTA provides for a charge on the settlor where assets have been 
transferred abroad with a view to avoiding income tax, resulting in income being 
paid to a person resident or domiciled outside the United Kingdom. A settlor is 
liable to a charge where he has “power to enjoy” any income of a non-resident or 
non-domiciled person, or where he may receive, or may be entitled to, any 
“capital sum” in any way connected to the transfer or any associated operation. 
The section is, however, subject to the motive defense test in section 741 of 
ICTA. 
 
United States 
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Under section 679 of the Code, a United States person transferring property to a 
foreign trust will be treated as the owner of the trust assets under the grantor 
rules, for any year in which a United States person is a named beneficiary of any 
portion of the trust.  
 
South Africa 
 
Section 7(8) of the Income Tax Act deems any amount received by, or accruing 
to, a non-resident (which would have constituted “income” as defined in the 
Income Tax Act had that person been a resident) and arising from a donation by 
a resident donor to be income of the donor.  
 
Comments  
 
In general, the workings of the United Kingdom and the United States provisions 
are similar to the South African provision in so far as they tax the resident donor 
on any income accruing to a non-resident that arises from a donation by the 
donor.  
 
Unlike the United Kingdom provision, South Africa’s section 7(8) casts a wider 
net, as its application is not limited to the donor’s subsequent power to enjoy the 
income, or to the receipt of any capital payment from that income. Unlike the 
United States provision, which applies if there is a United States beneficiary, the 
South African provision casts a wider net because as long as a resident makes a 
donation to a non-resident the resident donor will be liable for tax. 
 
10.3.4  TAXING BENEFICIARIES OF OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Section 740 of ICTA taxes a beneficiary who is ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom on any income that is received from a person resident or domiciled 
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outside the United Kingdom. The section is, however, subject to the motive 
defense test in section 741 of ICTA. 
 
United States  
 
Section 643(i) of the Code provides that if a foreign trust makes a loan of cash or 
marketable securities, directly or indirectly, to a United States grantor or 
beneficiary, or to any person who is related to the grantor or beneficiary, the 
amount of the loan will be treated as a distribution taxable in the hands of the 
recipient. 
 
South Africa  
 
Section 25B(2A) of the Income tax Act provides that where in a year of 
assessment a resident acquires a vested right to any amount representing the 
capital of a non-resident trust, that amount must be included in the income of that 
resident in that year. The income is included if the capital of the non-resident 
trust would have constituted income if that trust had been a resident in any 
previous year of assessment during which that resident had a contingent right  to 
that income. That amount should not have been subject to tax in the Republic in 
terms of the Act. 
 
Comments  
 
In general, South Africa’s section 25B(2A), which relates to the taxing of 
beneficiaries of offshore trusts, works in a similar manner to the provisions 
applicable in the United Kingdom. It is worth noting, however, that South Africa’s 
25B(2A) is not subject to the motive defense as is the case with the comparable 
section 740 of the United Kingdom’s ICTA. The application of the South African 
provision is therefore wide, as it leaves South African taxpayers no avenues for 
rendering the section inapplicable and thereby avoiding tax. 
 
10.3.5  TAXING THE CAPITAL GAINS OF OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
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United Kingdom 
 
In terms of section 2(1) of the Taxation of Capital Gains Act (TCGA) of 1992, 
when a settlor who is resident, or ordinarily resident, in the United Kingdom 
settles assets in an offshore trust, he makes a disposal and is liable for Capital 
Gains Tax (CGT). 
 
In terms of section 12(1) of the TCGA, a CGT charge arises on the disposal of 
assets situated outside the United Kingdom when they are received in the United 
Kingdom. In terms of section 86 of the TCGA, a CGT charge arises where a 
settlor retains an interest in an offshore settlement. 
 
In terms of section 87(3) of the TCGA, where in any tax year the trustees of a 
settlement are resident outside the United Kingdom throughout the year, and a 
beneficiary who is both resident and domiciled in the United Kingdom receives a 
capital payment from that settlement, the beneficiary will be chargeable when the 
gain is deemed to accrue to him. 
 
In terms of section 91 of the TCGA, United Kingdom-domiciled resident 
beneficiaries are liable to a CGT charge if the offshore trustees do not make 
capital payments and so indefinitely defer CGT. A further deterrent to the deferral 
of CGT is that in terms of the 1991 Finance Act interest is charged on capital 
payments from offshore trusts received by beneficiaries. 
 
In the past, dual resident trusts were often used to avoid taxes in the United 
Kingdom. In terms of section 83 of the TCGA if, by virtue of a double taxation 
treaty, dual resident trustees use their residence status in another country to 
avoid a United Kingdom CGT charge, the trustees are deemed, immediately 
before becoming dual resident, to have disposed of the assets and reacquired 
them at market value. 
  
In addition to the above, the United Kingdom has legislation in place to prevent 
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the use of specific schemes for avoiding CGT. For example, in terms of Schedule 
26 to the 2000 Finance Act, “flip-flop” schemes which result in gains being 
extracted from a trust tax-free, or with minimum taxation, by making use of 
borrowed money are prohibited.235  In terms of Schedule 4C to the TCGA, the 
anti-avoidance provision in Schedule 26 of the FA 2000, that prevents the use of  
“flip-flop” schemes, also extends to offshore trusts, in that beneficiaries are 
charged in respect of gains accruing to offshore trustees by virtue of a transfer of 
value made to them. 
 
Another scheme that is utilised to avoid taxes in the United Kingdom involves 
bringing a trust onshore and then exporting it again. The gains on the trust 
property escape a CGT charge, because they were realised while the trust was 
onshore, and the beneficiary pays little or no tax on the sale of an interest in the 
trust, because of the rule providing for its value to be uplifted when the trust 
leaves the United Kingdom. Section 94 of the Finance Act of 2000 amended 
section 85 of the TCGA to block such schemes, with the result that there is no 
uplift where the trust is “pregnant” with gains not attributed to beneficiaries. 
 
United States  
 
Section 643(a)(6) and section 667(a) of the Code provide that gains accumulated 
and distributed by a foreign trust lose their character as capital gains and are 
taxed as ordinary income. The capital gains are included in distributable net 
income.  
 
Deferral of tax on income accumulated in a foreign trust is further prevented by a 
“throw-back” rule (or penalty rule), which results in an increased tax rate on the 
accumulation distribution, by taxing the income passed out to the United States 
beneficiary at the ordinary income tax rates that would have applied if the 
distribution had been made in the year in which the income was earned.  
 
On top of the additional tax imposed by the “throw-back” rules, in terms of 
                                                 
235  As to how the “flip-flop” schemes work, see the discussion in chapter 8 par 8.1.3.  
493 
 
 
 
section 668 of the Code an annual interest charge is imposed to eliminate the 
benefit of paying the tax later. The interest is charged against the artificially high 
tax liability created by the throw-back rule, as if this were the tax previously 
deferred. In addition, the interest charge is compounded and is not deductible 
when computing net taxable income.  
 
South Africa  
 
Certain paragraphs of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act are applied 
when taxing the capital gains of offshore trusts. Paragraph 70 provides that when 
a person has made a donation, settlement, or other disposition that is subject to 
a stipulation or condition imposed by any person, which is to the effect that a 
capital gain or portion of it will not vest in the beneficiaries until the happening of 
some fixed or contingent event, the capital gain is taken into account in 
determining the aggregate capital gain or loss of the person who made the 
donation, settlement or other similar disposition. 
 
Paragraph 71 provides that where a trust deed confers on a resident beneficiary 
a right to receive a capital gain, but the person conferring the right has the power 
to revoke it, or confer it upon another person, the capital gain will be deemed to 
be that of the person who conferred the right and not that of the beneficiary. 
 
Paragraph 72 provides that if a resident has made a donation, settlement, or 
other similar disposition to a non-resident during a year of assessment, and there 
is a capital gain attributable to the donation, settlement, or other similar 
disposition vested in any non-resident (including a non-resident trust), then the 
capital gain must be taken into account when determining the aggregate capital 
gain or loss of the resident donor, who will then have to pay tax on the capital 
gain.  
 
Paragraph 80(3) provides that when a resident acquires a vested right to an 
amount representing  capital of any non-resident trust, and that capital arose 
from a capital gain of the trust determined in any previous year of assessment, 
during which the resident had a contingent right to the capital or to any amount 
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which would have constituted a capital gain of the trust if the trust had been a 
resident; and the capital gain has not been subject to tax in the Republic, that 
amount must be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the aggregate 
capital gain or loss of the resident in the year of assessment in which he acquires 
the vested right.   
 
Comments  
 
South Africa’s CGT provisions appear to work in a similar manner to those of the 
United Kingdom. A distinctive aspect of the provisions applicable in the United 
States and the United Kingdom is the penalty charging of interest on gains 
accumulated in offshore trusts. In South Africa, interest charges are not imposed 
on income accumulated offshore.  
 
It is noteworthy that the United Kingdom legislators have endeavoured to come 
up with specific provisions to deal with certain tax avoidance schemes as they 
arise (eg the “flip-flop” schemes). South Africa does not seem to have a policy of 
enacting specific provisions to deal with notorious anti-avoidance schemes. This 
could be ascribed to the fact that South Africa’s provisions cast a wider net in 
certain respects. For example, section 7(8) of the Income Tax Act can be applied 
to tax a donor on an amount that has arisen “by reason of or in consequence of 
any donation, settlement, or other disposition” made to a non-resident.  
 
10.3.6 OFFSHORE TRUSTS’ REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  
 
United Kingdom 
 
In terms of section 745 of ICTA:   
-  Where a person transfers property to an offshore trust, he is expected 
within 12 months to report details of the property transferred, the date 
of transfer, the consideration (if any), and the identity of the trust.   
-  Within 12 months of becoming domiciled in the United Kingdom either 
as a resident or as an ordinary resident, a settlor of an offshore trust 
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must report his name, address, date of creation of the trust, and the 
names and addresses of the trustees. 
-  The trustees of a United Kingdom resident trust that emigrates from 
the United Kingdom must within 12 months file a return specifying the 
date of creation of the trust, the name and address of each person 
who was a settlor immediately before emigration, and the names and 
addresses of each trustee before emigration.  
-  Within three months of creating an offshore trust, the settlor must 
report his address and the names and addresses of trustees and the 
date of creation of the trust. This obligation does not extend to non-
domiciled settlors, or settlors who, although domiciled in the United 
Kingdom, are neither resident nor ordinarily resident. 
 
United States  
 
In terms of section 6048(a) of the Code, as amended by the Tax Reform Act 
1996, a person who transfers property to a foreign trust under the grantor rules, 
or a person who receives a gift or a bequest from a foreign trust, is supposed to 
comply with certain reporting rules. Section 6048(a)(1) of the Code provides that 
such a person must within 90 days inform Revenue Services about the foreign 
trust and transfers of property to the trust. 
 
South Africa  
 
Section 7(10) of the Income Tax Act places the onus of disclosing  a taxpayer’s 
donation, settlement or disposition on the taxpayer, who must report in writing to 
the Commissioner when submitting a tax return.  There are certain penalties in 
the event of default or omission to file a return.  
 
Failure to disclose the obligation in section 7(10) can lead to a penalty under 
section 75 of the Act, whereby the taxpayer may be liable for a fine, or for 
imprisonment for a period of not more than 24 months. The taxpayer may also 
be subjected to additional assessment under section 79 of the Act. In terms of 
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section 78 of the Act, where the Commissioner has reason to believe that a 
resident has not declared or accounted for any funds or assets owned outside 
the Republic which could be attributed to that resident in terms of section 7 or  
Part X of the Eighth Schedule the Commissioner must estimate the amount of 
foreign currency of such funds, or the market value of those assets.  
 
 
 
Comments  
 
Section 7(10) of South Africa’s Income Tax Act only places the onus on a 
taxpayer to disclose  any donation, settlement or disposition  when submitting a 
tax return. It does not contain specific provisions concerning dates when assets 
were transferred offshore and details of the names of the parties involved, nor 
does it set time limits within which the parties concerned must comply with the 
provision. This may give taxpayers leeway not to disclose certain information, 
and to report on their dealings in their own time and at their own pace.   
 
10.4 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
In the light of the cryptic comparative analysis provided in this chapter, which – in 
essence – summarises the key issues discussed in the previous chapters, some 
recommendations for the reform of South Africa’s offshore anti-avoidance 
legislation that relates to offshore companies and trusts are suggested in the 
next (final) chapter.  
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CHAPTER 11 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It has been pointed out in this thesis that, the globalisation of trade and 
investment and, the removal of exchange controls and other barriers to the free 
movement of capital, have resulted in increased international trade. This has in 
turn led to increased competition among businesses in the global marketplace. In 
order to remain competitive in the global marketplace, taxpayers often avoid or 
defer domestic taxes by inventing strategies that exploit variations in international 
tax rates. This is often done when investments are made offshore in “tax-haven” 
jurisdictions, or in low-tax countries.236 An increasing number of investors around 
the world are attracted by these offshore jurisdictions, where they can establish a 
business in the form of an offshore company, or an offshore trust.237  This, 
however, often results in the depletion of the tax bases of the countries of 
residence of such investors. This thesis has dealt with the effectiveness of some 
the measures that are proposed and/or applied in order to prevent or deter 
offshore tax avoidance.  
 
It has been explained in this thesis that, the increasing ability of residents of a 
                                                 
236 A Ginsberg International Tax Havens 2 ed (1997) at 5. BJ Arnold The Taxation of 
Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison (1986) at 62 also states 
that taxation is a factor in foreign investment decisions. HCAW Schulze “Legal Aspects of 
Offshore Transactions” (1994) xxvii CILSA at 26; Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(Vol A): International Tax Avoidance (1979) at 29. 
237   It is estimated that around 60% of the world’s wealth is held offshore in offshore accounts 
by using offshore companies or offshore trusts and that around 50% of the world’s trade in 
goods is transacted through various offshore jurisdictions. See DeltaQuest Offshore 
Incorporation & Investment “Secure your future – Protect Your Assets – Go Offshore”. 
Available at http://www.mydelataquest.com/english/<, last accessed on 4 June 2007.  
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country both to transfer capital to offshore companies and trusts, and to defer or 
avoid taxes in their countries of residence, results from a combination of two 
main factors. Firstly, offshore tax avoidance is encouraged by the continued 
existence of tax-haven jurisdictions and preferential tax regimes.238 These 
jurisdictions provide a responsive legal environment and favourable tax regime - 
thereby offering a potential investor, incentives to operate offshore rather than 
from his or her country of residence. This often causes harmful tax competition 
that may result in the depletion of countries’ tax bases. Secondly, offshore tax 
avoidance is encouraged by the fact that taxpayers are able to make use of the 
structural features of trusts and companies to avoid taxes by taking advantage of 
the loopholes in their countries of residence’s own legislation. In this thesis, a 
critical analysis has been done of the recommendations of international 
organizations, such as the OECD, in order to curb harmful tax competition. 
 
In this chapter, recommendations are offered as to how South Africa can 
enhance the effectiveness of its offshore anti-avoidance legislation by adhering 
to the OECD recommendations that it has not yet implemented. Suggestions are 
also offered as to how the OECD can enhance the effectiveness of its own 
recommendations on curbing harmful tax competition. 
 
With reference to the comparative study of the United Kingdom and the United 
States anti-tax avoidance legislation that deals with offshore companies and 
trusts, this chapter also provides some recommendations on how the 
effectiveness of South Africa’s comparable legislation can be enhanced.  
 
11.1 RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO INTERNATIONAL 
MEASURES TO CURB HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION  
 
It has been explained in this thesis that tax-haven jurisdictions and preferential 
tax regimes are sovereign countries that have the right to determine their own tax 
policies, which include setting up their countries as tax havens. Other countries 
cannot enact legislation to remove the existence of tax-haven jurisdictions; all 
                                                 
238  OECD Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Controlled Foreign Company 
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they can do is to enact legislation to prevent their own residents from avoiding 
domestic taxes when they invest in those jurisdictions. The tax-haven status of 
these jurisdictions can only be addressed at an international level, if at all.239  
From the discussion in the thesis, it  is clear  that  international  
bodies such as the European Union (EU) and Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) are unlikely to desist from their desire to 
curb many of the “harmful tax practices” of the world’s tax havens and 
preferential tax regimes. For instance, the sanctions imposed by various 
countries in response to the OECD recommendations cannot be underestimated 
or ignored by these jurisdictions.  
 
11.1.1  RECOMMENDATIONS ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
 
Despite criticisms of the OECD’s approach in dealing with the tax-haven 
problem, the OECD has played a major role in areas such as persuading tax-
haven jurisdictions to cooperate on information exchange. Its “Model Tax 
Information Exchange Agreement”, which is intended to address the problems 
that relate to the exchange of information, is a valuable tool in this regard.  
 
Although South Africa is not a member country of the OECD, the OECD 
Guidelines have become a globally accepted standard.240 Following these 
guidelines is an important means of helping South Africa curb offshore tax 
avoidance. Regarding the OECD recommendation that countries should 
exchange information concerning transactions that constitute harmful tax 
competition, South Africa has signed “Mutual Administrative Assistance 
Agreements” with the customs administrations of certain countries, but these 
countries are not necessarily tax havens.241 These agreements could serve the 
                                                                                                                                            
Legislation (2000) at 15. 
239 RL Doernberg, L Hinnekens, W Herrerstein & L Jinyan Electronic Commerce and Multi-
jurisdictional Taxation (2001) at 92-93. 
240 See South African Revenue Service (SARS) Practice Note. 7, section 31 of the Income 
Tax Act 1962 (the Act): Determination of Taxable Income of Certain Persons from 
International Taxation: Transfer Pricing (1999) in par 3.2.1. 
241  South African Revenue Service “Current List of Customs Agreements on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance” (12 December 2006). Available at 
>http://www.sars.gov.za/it/DTA/Customs%20Agreement/Current%20List.htm<, last 
accessed on 17 May 2007. 
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same purpose as the OECD “Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on 
Tax Matters”. It is recommended that South Africa should consider negotiating 
similar agreements with tax-haven countries, especially those with which it has 
already signed double-taxation agreements. These countries are: Cyprus, Malta, 
Mauritius, Singapore, the Seychelles and Luxembourg.242 Negotiating Mutual 
Administrative Assistance Agreements with these countries will help South Africa 
obtain the necessary information to curb the harmful tax competition that could 
be encouraged by these countries. 
 
It is however worth noting that, if some tax-haven jurisdictions cooperate in the 
area of information exchange, tax avoiders are likely to shift their funds from 
those jurisdictions to the non-cooperating ones, thereby rewarding the non-
cooperating jurisdictions and deterring others from cooperating. This could be 
one of the reasons why some jurisdictions have refused to cooperate. The 
OECD’s endeavours in this respect would be more successful if, instead of 
merely imposing sanctions on uncooperative jurisdictions, incentives could be 
provided for those jurisdictions that cooperate with information exchange. This 
could be done by for instance encouraging the signing of double-taxation treaties 
with the cooperative jurisdictions. This approach could encourage some of the 
uncooperative jurisdictions to comply.   
 
11.1.2  RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW THE OECD COULD ENHANCE 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
“HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION”  
 
It has been argued that, although some OECD member countries create the 
impression in the political arena that they are committed to curtailing harmful tax 
practices, this may not necessarily be the case.243 For some of these countries, it 
may well be that harmful tax practices are of little significance compared to the 
investments that flow into these countries from the tax-haven jurisdictions.244 The 
common perception that the benefits of being a tax haven flow primarily to 
                                                 
242   L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: a South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) at 24. 
See also discussion in chapter 2 par 2.6. 
243   M Grundy Essays in International Taxation (2001) at 6-7. 
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residents of the tax haven is misguided. It has also been observed that funds 
cannot remain in tax-haven jurisdictions and be productive.245 Rather than merely 
sheltering their funds in the tax havens, most taxpayers have their funds 
reinvested in economies that have a better infrastructure and more political 
stability. It has been argued that it is possibly because major powers have a lot to 
gain from such investments, that their governments do not have the actual 
political will to stop harmful tax competition.246 Avi-Yonah and Cohn247 suggest 
that, if the political will existed, harmful tax competition could be curtailed, if the 
major powers could, for instance, deny certain tax exemptions in respect to 
transactions with non-cooperating tax havens. They could also restrict the ability 
of financial institutions to provide services with respect to tax-haven operations. 
 
Some commentators248 are of the view that, the OECD initiatives would be more 
attainable, if the OECD provided a “level playing field”, where all the countries 
concerned could be involved in the discussions about harmful tax regimes. The 
question, however, is whether it is possible to attain a level playing field in 
international financial and fiscal issues.  The concept of a level playing field 
appears to be a “utopian” goal. While it may be theoretically and logically 
desirable to have one, it is doubtful whether this ideal can be achieved. Human 
nature seems to incline to the optimistic belief that any problem or issue can be 
resolved by the application of pure reason. We live in a society where 
advancement is largely based on merit, and talent is by no means equally 
distributed across the population. The legal framework protects people against 
certain forms of discrimination, but unequal results are positively encouraged.249 
 
It is also worth acknowledging that, in spite of the OECD’s campaign against 
                                                                                                                                            
244   Grundy at 6-7. 
245   RS Avi-Yonah & II Cohn “Hearing on Offshore Transactions” (1 August 1 2006) in par 
6(e). Available at 
>http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMAviYonahUafMI.pdf#search=%22Prepared%20testim
ony%20of20Avi-Yonah%20before%20permanent%20subcommitte%20<, last accessed  
on 20 October 2006. 
246   Grundy at 6-7; Avi-Yonah & Cohn in par 6(e). 
247   Avi-Yonah & Cohn in par 6(e). 
248   A review commissioned by the International Tax and Investment Organisation and The 
Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners conducted by E Stikeman Towards a Level 
Playing Field: Regulating Corporate Vehicles in Cross Border Transactions  (2002) at 16. 
249   T Bennett International Initiatives Affecting Financial Havens (2001) at 33.  
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“harmful tax competition”, tax competition is probably here to stay. International 
tax competition in the global marketplace is due to the high tax rates that 
individuals and multinational enterprises face in their countries of residence. 
Because of these high taxes, people are increasingly developing global 
strategies in order to maximise profits, and their links with any single country with 
a favourable tax climate are becoming stronger. It is a well known fact that in all 
business transactions, tax is an expense, and if businesses are to remain 
competitive, taxes should not be too high.250 The OECD has tried to campaign 
against the negative effects of international tax competition, terming it “harmful 
tax competition”,251 but its endeavours have been criticised as a means of forging 
a “World Tax Organisation”.252 It is hard to imagine any government agreeing to 
join such an organisation. Tax nationalism is likely to ensure that this will not 
materialise.  
 
It should be noted that, although the OECD’s recommendations represent an 
indispensable first step towards limiting harmful tax competition, they are 
incomplete.253 These recommendations are not legally binding. For example, the 
“Framework for a Collective Memorandum of Understanding on Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices”,254 only requires jurisdictions identified as tax havens to 
demonstrate their commitment to transparency and effective co-operation. It is 
hard to imagine how such formal commitments will be turned into real tax 
reforms that will change the way the respective countries administer their tax 
systems to prevent harmful tax competition. The OECD has also acknowledged 
that more work still needs to be done to fully implement the standards it has set, 
so that national tax laws can be fairly and effectively enforced.255 At present, 
                                                 
250 Grundy at 1-2. See also Ginsberg at 5; Arnold at 62. 
251   OECD Harmful Tax Competition – An Emerging Global Issue (1998) in par 75. 
252   Bennett at 35.  
253   RS Avi-Yonah “Globalisation, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State” 
113 Harvard Law Review (May 2000) No 7 at 66. 
254   OECD “Framework for a Collective Memorandum of Understanding on Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices”. Available at 
>http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/c707a7b4806fa95c125685d005300b6/c125692
700623b74c12569a100492e0c/$FILE/JT00100664.PDF<, last accessed 10 July 2007. 
255   P Ciocca, Chair of OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs” Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Releases Outcome of Review of Preferential Tax Regimes in OECD Member Countries”. 
Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/document/31/o.3343.en_2649_37427_37446047_1_1_1_37427,…<
, last accessed 3 July 2007. 
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individuals who reside in one OECD member country can invest in another 
OECD member country through a tax-haven entity and escape the exchange-of-
information net. It is not clear whether the exchange of information programme 
envisaged by the OECD report will be able to overcome this problem.256 
Comparing the effectiveness of OECD initiatives to those of the EU, it is worth 
noting that although the EU Code of Conduct is also not a legally binding 
document; the directives it has issued against harmful tax competition are legally 
binding on member countries.257 In addition, the European Court of Justice, 
which enforces tax harmony so as to ensure the creation of a single European 
market, also makes the EU stand a better chance in curbing harmful tax 
competition among its own members. However, any success the EU achieves 
internally may simply make it more vulnerable to tax competition from non-EU 
countries.258  
 
Tax havens and preferential tax regimes have been around for decades, and it 
appears that they will continue to survive in the foreseeable future. The fact that 
they are still around, in spite of the domestic and international onslaught against 
them, is an indication that it may not be so easy to have them abolished, 
although the continual onslaught has taken its toll.  
 
11.2 RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO NATIONAL MEASURES TO 
CURB OFFSHORE TAX AVOIDANCE  
 
As mentioned above, it is not only the presence of tax-haven jurisdictions and 
preferential tax regimes that encourages offshore tax avoidance. The benefits 
offered by companies and trusts also encourage offshore tax avoidance when 
they are utilised to take advantage of the loopholes in a country’s legislation. On 
the basis of the comparative study made of the United Kingdom, United States 
and South African legislation, recommendations for the reform of the South 
African legislation are suggested below, where such legislation has been found 
wanting.   
                                                 
256  Avi-Yonah at 1665. 
257  See discussion in chapter 2 par 2.4.1. 
258  Bennet at 35. 
504 
  
 
11.2.1  RECOMMENDATION ON HOW TO ENHANCE THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE RESIDENCE 
BASIS OF TAXATION  
 
The study has demonstrated that the residence basis of taxation, that is applied 
in all three countries, is an effective tool in curbing offshore tax avoidance, as the 
worldwide income of residents is taxable, even if it is invested in offshore 
jurisdictions. In South Africa, a person other than a natural person (such as 
company or a trust) is considered a “resident”, if it is incorporated, established, or 
formed in the Republic of South Africa, or if it has a place of effective 
management in South Africa.259 Of all these tests, the one that is of particular 
relevance to offshore investments is the “place of effective management”. This 
test is an important tool in curbing offshore tax avoidance that could result where 
an entity is a dual resident. In terms of South Africa Revenue Service (SARS) 
Interpretation Note 6,260 where an entity is dual resident, for instance if it is 
resident in a tax-haven jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that it was incorporated 
there, but is also resident in South Africa because it is effectively managed here, 
it is deemed resident in South Africa, and its worldwide income may be subject to 
tax here.  
 
Although this test of residence can be an effective measure in curbing the tax 
avoidance that could result from the dual residence of entities, the effectiveness 
of this test is hampered by the fact that South Africa does not have a statutory 
definition of the concept “place of effective management”. Although SARS has an 
interpretation for the term,261 SARS Interpretation Notes are not law.262 South 
African courts are, however, bound to follow the international interpretation of the 
term as used in the OECD Model Tax Convention.263 However, as was discussed 
                                                 
259   S 1 of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended. 
260   SARS Income Tax Interpretation Note 6 of 26 March 2002. 
261   SARS Income Tax Interpretation Note 6. 
262  ITC 1675, 62 SATC 219. 
263  In CIR v Dowing 1975 (4) SA 518 (A) at 523 the court held that South Africa is bound to 
take cognisance of the guidelines for interpretation issued by the OECD in its 
commentaries on the concepts used in the OECD Model Tax Convention. S 231 of the 
Constitution of South Africa provides that courts are bound to apply customary 
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in chapter 3, with the continuous growth of e-commerce, the OECD interpretation 
is not effective in curbing tax avoidance, as the interpretation results in multiple 
residences.264 Although SARS’s interpretation of the term has some 
unsatisfactory details that need to be clarified,265 it is a better tie breaker test 
than the alternative OECD interpretation that recognises central control as an 
indicator of effective management. It is recommended that the SARS’s 
interpretation of the term should be refined and be given legal force. This could 
be done by expanding the meaning of “resident” in section 1 of the Act and 
adding a subsection that incorporates the SARS’s interpretation. It is worth noting 
that in 1997 the Katz Commission Report266 recommended that the term “place 
of effective management” should be defined in the Income Tax Act but this 
recommendation was never followed. It is suggested that the subsection to the 
definition of “resident” could for instance read as follows: 
 The “place of effective management” is the place where an entity is managed on a 
regular or day-to-day basis by the directors or senior managers of the company. That is, 
the place where the board of directors executes and implements the entity’s policy and 
strategic decisions, irrespective of where the overriding control is exercised, or where the 
board of directors meets. 
 (i) If management functions are exercised at a single location, that location will be the 
place of effective management.  
(ii) If management functions are not exercised in one place, for example if the directors or 
senior managers exercise their management functions by using distance communication 
networks, the place of effective management is where the business operations are 
actually carried out. 
(iii) If business operations and activities are controlled from various locations, the place of 
effective management is the place with the strongest economic nexus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.3 RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB TAX AVOIDANCE IN RESPECT TO 
OFFSHORE COMPANIES: CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY 
                                                                                                                                            
international rules and practices. 
264    See discussion in chapter 3 par 3.6. 
265  See discussion in chapter 3 under the heading “Does SARS’s interpretation of the term 
“place of effective management” achieve the tie breaker purpose?”  
266  Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa Fifth 
interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of 
South Africa (1997) in par 6.1.2.1. See the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 
“The limitations of applying SARS’s interpretation of “place of effective management”. 
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LEGISLATION  
  
Although the “residence basis of taxation” can ensure the worldwide taxation of 
the income of a country’s residents, taxes can still be avoided, if such income is 
invested in an offshore company. In most tax systems, the income of a foreign 
company is not subject to domestic tax, since the foreign company is 
incorporated and recognised as a separate juridical entity in another 
jurisdiction.267 This implies that a country cannot apply the “residence basis” to 
tax the worldwide income of an offshore company, unless the income is 
distributed to the shareholders as dividends.268 As long as the income is not 
distributed, taxation can be avoided, or deferred, or postponed, implying that the 
taxes due currently are postponed to a future year.269 To prevent the deferral of 
taxes, the countries studied have “controlled foreign company” (CFC) legislation 
that ensures that the undistributed income of a controlled foreign company is not 
deferred, but is taxed in the hands of its domestic shareholders on a current 
basis.270   There are however certain issues about South Africa’s CFC legislation 
that could hinder its effectiveness as an anti-avoidance measure.  
 
11.3.1         RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN  
       CFC LEGISLATION AND TAX TREATIES 
 
Although CFC legislation is viewed as an effective measure in curbing the 
deferral of taxes, this study has demonstrated that the applicability of this 
legislation may be challenged on the grounds that it may be in conflict with a 
country’s tax treaties.  
 
 
In South Africa, residents who directly or indirectly hold more than 50 percent of 
the voting rights or participation rights in a CFC, are taxed on notional 
                                                 
267 J Arnold & MJ McIntyre International Tax Primer 2 ed (2002) at 87. 
268  Arnold & McIntyre at 87. 
269  Olivier & Honiball at 358; WH Diamond & DB Diamond Tax Havens of the World (Release 
No 108 Jan 2002) Vol 1 at INTRO/1; Arnold & McIntyre at 87. 
270  Arnold at 131; Arnold & McIntyre at 91. See also Olivier & Honiball at 358. 
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amounts.271 This is in line with the United Kingdom position, as it was explained 
in Bricom Holdings Ltd v IRC.272 As South African residents are taxed on notional 
amounts, it may be argued that it is unlikely that a South African court will hold 
that a South African resident will be entitled to rely on a tax treaty on the basis 
that the same amounts are effectively being taxed. Despite the fact that South 
African residents are taxed on notional amounts the issue of the conflict between 
South Africa’s CFC legislation and its tax treaties still unclear.273  
 
It has been argued that the manner in which a domestic court will resolve the 
conflict between CFC legislation and a tax treaty, depends on whether it is the 
CFC legislation or the tax treaty that takes precedence.274 In South Africa, 
section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act, read with section 231 of the Constitution of 
South Africa275 provides inter alia that as soon as the double tax agreement is 
ratified and has been published in the Government Gazette, its provisions are 
effective as if they had been incorporated into the Income Tax Act.276 This 
implies that treaty provisions and any other provision in the Income Tax Act (eg 
section 9D) have equal status under South African law, even if the Income Tax 
Act contains a provision that is inconsistent with the treaty.277 Thus, although the 
Constitution of South Africa sets out the procedure of incorporating treaties into 
domestic law, where a treaty conflicts with a particular provision of domestic law, 
section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act provides no solution. The country could 
therefore, be faced with a host of challenges to the applicability of its CFC 
legislation for being incompatible with its tax treaties. Indeed, some countries 
have had their CFC legislation challenged on this basis.278 
                                                 
271   S 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act. See also the discussion of this issue in chapter 4 par 4.7. 
272   [1996] STC (SCD) 228. 
273   Olivier & Honiball at 397. 
274   D Sandler Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the 
Boundaries 2 ed (1998) at 99. 
275 Act 108 of 1996. 
276 Huxham & Haupt at 356.  
277   Olivier & Honball at 30. 
278   In the United Kingdom, the compatibility of CFC legislation with its tax treaties was 
challenged in Bricom Holdings Ltd v IRC [1996] STC (SCD) 228. The compatibility of art 
209B of the French Tax Code with its tax treaties was challenged in cases such as: 
Schneider SDA v DVNI and TA Strasbourg Decision of 21 November 1995, Lower 
Administrative Court of Paris, No 207093/1 (as read from Sandler at 213); Strafor Facom 
SA v DG, Decision of 12 December 1996, Lower Administrative Court of Strasbourg, No 
9158. In Finland the applicability of CFC legislation and Finland’s tax treaties was 
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In order to fill the lacuna in the law and thus resolve this conflict, it is 
recommended that South Africa comes up with a safeguarding clause that 
authorises its CFC legislation to override its tax treaties.279 Alternatively, South 
Africa should insist on inserting a specific CFC clause in the new treaties it  
negotiates.280 The problem in the existing and older treaties could be resolved by 
renegotiation. A clause of this nature could be inserted in article 23(1) of South 
Africa’s respective double taxation agreements which normally deals with the 
elimination of double taxation. A sub-article 23(1)(a) could be inserted, to read as 
follows:  
Nothing in the Convention shall prevent South Africa from applying the provisions in 
section 9D of its Income Tax Act or any substantially similar provisions that may amend 
or replace the provisions of this section.281 
 
11.3.2  RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW CFC LEGISLATION CAN BE 
SIMPLIFIED  
 
The complexity of CFC legislation is an aspect of this legislation that could hinder 
its effectiveness in curbing offshore tax avoidance. Although there is a need to 
protect countries tax bases against erosion, it is also necessary to ensure that 
the legislation does not make it difficult for taxpayers to compete internationally, 
so that they are forced to give up their residence status in favour of residence in 
a jurisdiction with more favourable tax rules.282  These complexities create traps 
for the unwary taxpayers and in turn undermine taxpayer confidence in the 
fairness and efficiency of the tax system. In a country like South Africa, it is 
important that the CFC legislation is not so overcomplicated that it results in a 
significant compliance burden for taxpayers and requires excessive 
administrative costs to government, if it is to curb abuse. Commentators and tax 
                                                                                                                                            
challenged in A Oyj Abp, KHO:2002:26, (2002) 4 International Tax Law Reports at 1009. 
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279   Olivier & Honiball at 392-393. 
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reform commissions in different countries suggest different means of simplifying 
the specific problems in their CFC legislation.283 However, certain general 
principles of how the CFC legislation can be simplified have been pointed out 
and these, can be emulated in South Africa. 
 
The discussion on the complexities in South Africa’s CFC legislation284 shows 
that, there are numerous anomalies and tax ambiguities that complicate it, which 
need to be resolved. One way of resolving these complexities is by picking on 
specific ambiguous provisions and rectifying the uncertainties and complexities 
they create. One such provision is the definition of a “controlled foreign company” 
which inter alia refers to one or more South African residents, directly or 
indirectly, holding more than 50% of the total participation rights of a foreign 
company.285 The use of the word “indirectly” in respect to participation rights in a 
CFC, is rather confusing as it seems that those rights are not limited to interests 
in the shares of the foreign company, but also include indirect interests in the 
profits or reserves of a foreign company, such as the interests of unsecured 
creditors of a company. An unsecured creditor cannot be said to have a direct 
right to participate in the profits or reserves of the company but merely an indirect 
right to do so. In order to clarify the interpretational problems caused by this 
aspect of this legislation, the definition of a “controlled foreign company” in 
section 9(D)(1) should be amended to make it clear that the word “indirectly” 
refers to holding through another company and not to conditional holdings. 
Proviso (d) could be added to the other provisos to the definition of a controlled 
foreign company to read as follows:  
A  ‘controlled foreign company’  means any foreign company where more than 50 per 
cent of the total participation rights in that foreign company are held, or more than 50 per 
cent of the voting rights in that foreign company are directly or indirectly exercisable, by 
one or more residents: Provided that:  
(d) No regard be had to conditional participation rights, such as the holdings of an 
unsecured creditor.  
 
Another confusing provision, that needs to be clarified, is the one that was that 
was created by the introduction of the definition of the term “country of residence” 
                                                                                                                                            
282 Olivier & Honiball at 358. 
283   See discussion in chapter 5 par 5.1.10 and 5.2.9.  
284   See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.9. 
285  S 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
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in section 9D. As explained in chapter 4,286 a “country of residence in relation to a 
foreign company means the country whether it has its place of effective 
management”. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment 
Bill of 2006 provides that, the South African tax law interpretation of the term 
“place of effective management” should be applied, and yet as pointed out 
above, South Africa has no statutory or case law definition of the term. Although 
SARS Interpretation Note 6287 provides a definition of this term, SARS 
Interpretation Notes are note law and courts are not bound to follow them. To fill 
this lacuna in the law, and thus resolve the complexities created by the 
introduction of the definition of “country of residence”, it is reiterated that SARS 
interpretation of the term be given legal force, by incorporating it in the Income 
Tax Act.  
 
Although the need to minimise uncertainty has encouraged every possible 
circumstance to be defined, this has to be done with adequate consultation. The 
process of major changes followed by successive refinements and/or policy 
reversals reduces certainty. It is recommended that the amendment process 
must allow sufficient time for proper consultation. The study has shown that most 
amendments appear to be “stop-gap” responses to perceived abuses without 
significant consideration of underlying policies.288 The result may well be that the 
legislation may become more complicated, susceptible of abuse, economically 
inefficient, and extremely difficult to administer.289 In the United Kingdom, it was 
recommended that instead of mainly relying on amendments to the legislation, by 
introducing new definitions to rule out the uncertainties, reliance should rather be 
placed on principles and the intention of the law. This principle based approach 
has the advantage of reducing the complexity of the legislation.290 It is 
recommended that the principle based approach be introduced in South Africa, 
as it will alleviate the need to amend the legislation now and then. For example, 
                                                 
286  See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.9.  
287  SARS Income Tax Interpretation Note 6 of 26 March 2002. 
288   American Bar Association “Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform” (2006) 
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since most of South Africa’s treaties largely follow the OECD Model Tax 
Convention,291 and since South African courts are bound to take cognisance of 
the guidelines for interpretation issued by the OECD in its commentaries on the 
concepts used in the OECD Model Tax Convention,292 the OECD’s 
interpretations of terms used in the CFC legislation (such as the term “permanent 
establishments”) should be relied upon rather amending the legislation now and 
then.   
 
Perhaps the most complicated aspect of most countries CFC legislation, relates 
to the exemptions to the rules that cover situations where the presence of a 
company in an offshore jurisdiction, is not mainly for tax avoidance purposes, but 
for genuine business reasons. Often, these exemptions contain numerous 
complex exclusions, exceptions to the exclusions, and also provisions for the 
selection of various options. In South Africa, an example is the “foreign business 
establishment” exemption to the CFC rules, which is riffle with numerous 
exclusions that are difficult to navigate.293 It is recommended that, SARS issues 
an Interpretation Note on section 9D that would serve to explain the complex 
provisions of this section. Although the National Treasury has issued a detailed 
explanation of the section, it is unclear to what extent, if any, SARS considers 
itself bound by this explanation.294  For the present, it remains to be seen 
whether section 9D will achieve its objective of curbing tax avoidance that results 
from foreign investment by South African residents, or whether it will merely lead 
to an increase in specialised tax structuring to circumvent its application. It is 
however, submitted that, a degree of simplicity in South Africa’s CFC legislation 
is attainable, especially if there is the political will to do so.295 
 
11.4  RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB TAX AVOIDANCE THAT 
RESULTS FROM INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIP/CORPORATE 
HYBRID STRUCTURES 
 
                                                 
291   Olivier & Honiball at 8; Huxham & Haupt at 341. 
292  CIR v Dowing 1975 (4) SA 518 (A) at 524; s 231 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
293  See discussion in chapter 4 par 4.9 
294  Oliver & Honiball at 228. 
295  Australia is a good example. See chapter 5 fn 95.  
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This work has shown that tax avoidance can result when South African residents 
invest in offshore hybrid entities that are treated as corporations in one 
jurisdiction and as partnerships in another.296 Where an entity is treated as a 
partnership, the partners are taxable on their share of the income of the entity. 
Where the entity is treated as legal person, it is subject to tax on its income. The 
different treatment of hybrid entities in the two countries creates many tax 
planning opportunities.297  
 
Where a South African resident has an interest in a tax transparent foreign 
partnership, he will be taxed in South Africa on his share of the partnership 
income (section 24H(5) of the Income Tax Act). The partnership is not liable to 
tax since it has no existence as a taxable entity. However, the definition of the 
word “company” in section 1(b) of the Income Tax Act, which includes foreign 
companies, creates certain anomalies with respect to the taxation of foreign 
incorporated partnerships. This definition would for instance cover limited liability 
partnership (LLPs) that are considered companies in some countries like the 
United Kingdom, but are foreign to South African law. If a South African resident 
and a United Kingdom resident decide to incorporate an LLP in the United 
Kingdom, the tax implications are not clear. It may be argued the LLP is foreign 
company, CFC legislation can be applied to the LLPs. However for this 
legislation to apply, South African residents should hold more than 50% of the 
total participation or voting rights in the LLP.298 Although the United Kingdom LLP 
comes into existence upon incorporation,299 it has no shareholders or share 
capital.300 In this respect, it is doubtful whether CFC legislation can be applied to 
the members of a United Kingdom LLP.301 Investments in such entities could 
thus be used to avoid taxes. The above shows that the unique nature of some 
foreign incorporated entities creates anomalies based on the current wording of 
the definition of “company” in the Act. 
                                                 
296  BJ Arnold & MJ Mclntyre International Tax premier 2 ed (2002) at 144; Olivier & Honiball 
at 464-465. 
297  Arnold & Mclntyre at 144.    
298  S 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
299  Freedman  at 304; Jones et al at 292; D Armour Tolley’s Limited Liability Partnerships: 
The New Legislation (2001) at 2. 
300  Morse at 324. 
301  Olivier & Honiball at 434. 
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It is recommended that the definition of the term “company” in the Income Tax 
Act be amended to rectify the current anomalies that create loop holes for tax 
avoidance.302 It is further recommended that in order to create legal certainty 
South Africa’s tax legislation must be amended to specifically provide for the 
treatment of hybrid entities as tax transparent limited partnerships under the 
Act.303 However, this proposal should not be implemented without careful 
consideration and analysis. Specific mechanisms exit in other jurisdictions (such 
as the United Kingdom and the United States) which ensure the equitable tax 
treatment of the partners of these entities.304 This is currently not in place under 
South Africa’s tax law.  
 
11. 5 RECOMMENDATION TO CURB CONDUIT COMPANY TREATY 
SHOPPING 
 
In this thesis it has been pointed out that “treaty shopping” is one of the 
commonly used offshore tax avoidance schemes. “Treaty shopping” is, a term 
which refers to the use of double tax treaties by the residents of a non-treaty 
country to obtain treaty benefits that are not supposed to be available to them.305 
This is mainly done by interposing or organising a “conduit company” in one of 
the contracting states so as to shift profits out of those states. It has pointed 
out306  that one of the methods recommended by the OECD to curb this type of 
tax avoidance is by inserting a “beneficial ownership” provision in a tax treaty. 
Although this provision can be used to curb conduit company treaty shopping, its 
effectiveness is hindered by the fact that there does not seem to be a clear 
international meaning of the term “beneficial ownership”. Even the OECD does 
not provide a definition of the term. It only offers certain guidelines to the 
                                                 
302  Olivier & Honiball at 434 
303   S Zaaiman “Paragraph (b) of the Definition of Company: Anomalies Arising in Respect of 
Certain Foreign Incorporated Entities” (February 2007, Issue 12) KPMG International Tax 
Newsletter at 4. 
304   Zaaiman at 4. 
305 H Becker & F J Wurm Treaty Shopping: An Emerging Tax Issue and its Present Status in 
Various Countries (1988) at 1; S van Weeghel The Improper Use of Tax Treaties with 
Particular Reference to the Netherlands and The United States (1998) at 119.  
306  See chapter 4 par 4.1  under the heading “Specific treaty provisions suggested by the 
OECD to curb “conduit company treaty shopping”. 
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understanding of the term. The OECD Commentary on article 1 provides that a 
nominee or agent can not be considered a beneficial owner. Further that a 
conduit company cannot be regarded as a beneficial owner if, it has very narrow 
powers which render it a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of 
other interested parties.307 Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Convention provides 
that where a term is not defined in the Convention, the domestic meaning of the 
term may be applied. It is, however, argued that unilaterally relying on article 3(2) 
to apply the domestic meaning of the term “beneficial ownership”, is not the right 
procedure that countries should apply in finding an international meaning to the 
term.308  
 
Although South Africa is not a member of the OECD, most of South Africa’s 
treaties to a significant degree follow the OECD Mode Tax Convention.309 The 
“beneficial ownership” provision is used in most of South Africa’s tax treaties to 
curb conduit company treaty shopping. However, the term “beneficial ownership” 
does not constitute a clearly defined juristic concept in South African law.310 The 
Income Tax Act does not have a definition of the term. However, company law 
defines the term in respect to the ownership of shares whereby, nominees and 
agents are not considered to be beneficial owners of shares. In terms of section 
108(2) of the Income Tax Act,311 read together with section 231 of the 
Constitution of South Africa,312 when tax treaty is ratified and entered into the 
Government Gazette, its provisions are effective as if they had been incorporated 
into the Income Tax Act. Although a treaty is considered as part of the Income 
Tax Act, the lack of a definition of the term “beneficial ownership” in this Act, 
implies that this Act cannot be relied on to determine the treaty meaning of the 
term.  
 
Olivier and Honiball313 submitted that by concluding tax treaties which contain the 
                                                 
307 OECD 1987 Report in par 14(b). 
308  J D B Oliver, J B Libin, S van Weeghel & C Du Toit “Beneficial Ownership and the OECD 
Model” (2000) 1 British Tax Review at 45. 
309 Huxham & Haupt at 357 in par 16.9.4; Olivier & Honiball at 8. 
310  Olivier & Honiball at 413. 
311 Act 58 of 1962. 
312 Of 1996. 
313  Olivier & Honiball at 350. 
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concept “beneficial ownership”, knowing that it does not have a domestic tax law 
meaning of the term, South Africa has intended that an internationally accepted 
meaning of the concept must apply. It is this author’s submission that any 
attempt to define the term in a treaty context should be in line with the guidelines 
offered by the OECD.  
 
In coming up with a meaning of the term, section 233 of the Constitution requires 
that the courts must prefer an interpretation that is consistent with international 
law. Since the South African company law meaning of the term “beneficial 
ownership” seems to be in line with the guidelines offered by the OECD, it is 
recommended that our legislators should take cognise of the company law 
meaning, refine it and then come up with a meaning of the term in the Income 
Tax Act. Care should however be taken to ensure that the definition is not limited 
to a narrow South African interpretation, but it should carry a wide international 
meaning that is in line with the guidelines offered by the OECD. This would be in 
line with the recent United Kingdom Court of Appeal decision in Indofood 
International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, London Branch314 which 
ruled that in the context of tax treaties, the term “beneficial ownership” should be 
accorded an international fiscal meaning, taking into account the OECD 
literature, and that the meaning should not be restricted to a meaning in terms of 
domestic law. 
11.6 RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB TAX AVOIDANCE IN RESPECT TO 
OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
Regarding the legislation intended to curb investment in offshore trusts, although 
there are differences in the way the legislation works in the countries studied, the 
gist of the legislation is the same. Most perceived abuses that involve shifting 
income between trust settlors and beneficiaries appear to have been covered. 
The legislation also seems to have covered most schemes that take advantage 
of the discretionary powers of trustees. For example, it has been noted that 
where a founder seeks to protect funds from taxation, by investing them in a 
discretionary trust, but uses devices such as letters of wishes or protectors, to 
                                                 
314  [2006] EWCA CV 158. 
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retain control of the funds, the courts are now seeing right through the trust and 
declaring the assets to be still vested in the hands of the founder.315  In South 
Africa, the 2003 Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws 
Act316 also had the effect of discouraging residents from investing in offshore 
trusts.317 The “secrecy”, which is one of the appealing aspects of investing in 
offshore trusts, seems to have been thwarted by this Act, as tax amnesty was 
granted to the relevant applicants only when they disclosed their assets in foreign 
trusts. Although this amnesty was only for the 2003 year of assessment, the 
disclosure of assets in foreign trusts had the effect of extending South Africa’s 
tax base. It therefore appears that, for the ordinary taxpayer, investing in offshore 
trusts to avoid taxes is no longer a worthwhile tax planning device.  
 
This does not mean, however, that the offshore trust has altogether outlived its 
usefulness as a tax planning vehicle. For the more sophisticated taxpayers, 
offshore trusts are still a vehicle for tax avoidance. This is mainly the case, where 
both company structures and trusts are used to achieve tax advantages. South 
African legislators should therefore not relax in their effort to prevent the use of 
the trust as an offshore tax avoidance tool. Evidence shows that, when laws are 
enacted, taxpayers soon find ways of circumventing them in order to avoid taxes. 
The United Kingdom has responded to this phenomenon by being vigilant and 
enacting legislation to curb specific tax avoidance schemes as they arise.318 This 
does not seem to be the case in South Africa, where tax avoidance in respect of 
offshore trusts is curbed by relying mainly on section 7(8) and section 25B(2A) of 
the Income Tax Act. Although these provisions appear to cover a wide range of 
possible offshore schemes, they could still be circumvented by sophisticated tax 
planners. South Africa could fruitfully emulate  
                                                 
315   B Cameron “Why Offshore Trusts Have Lost Their Appeal” (26 July 2003) Personal 
Finance at 1. Available at  
  http://www.persfin.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=706&ArticleId=196524<, last accessed on 
4 June 2007 
316   Act 12 of 2003. 
317   Cameron at 1.  
318  As discussed in chapter 8 par 8.1.3, in the UK the anti-avoidance provision in Schedule 26 
to the  Finance Act 2000, which prohibits the use of “flip-flop” schemes, also extends to 
offshore trusts, in that beneficiaries are charged in respect of gains accruing to offshore 
trustees by virtue of a transfer of value made to them. Also, s 94 of the FA 2000 amended 
s 85 of the TCGA 1992 to block schemes that were utilised to avoid taxes in the United 
Kingdom where trusts are brought onshore and then exported. 
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the United Kingdom by being open to enacting scheme-specific legislation as the 
schemes arise. 
 
11.6.1 RECOMMENDATION TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN RESPECT TO OFFSHORE 
TRUSTS 
 
The study demonstrates that one of the means used to curb tax avoidance that 
results from investing in offshore trusts is to require residents to disclose their 
offshore investments. Both the United Kingdom and the United States have 
comprehensive reporting requirements in place that require the parties 
concerned to disclose the details regarding the dates when assets were 
transferred offshore, the names of the parties involved, and the time limits within 
which the parties concerned have to comply with the provisions.319 This is not the 
case in South Africa. Section 7(10) of the Income Tax Act merely places the 
onus of disclosing offshore investments on the taxpayer, who must report in 
writing to the Commissioner when submitting a tax return. Lack of 
comprehensive reporting requirements could give taxpayers the leeway not to 
disclose certain information, and to report their dealings in their own time and at 
their own pace. Comprehensive reporting requirements, with time limits, such as 
those in the United Kingdom and the United States, should be adopted in South 
Africa. It is recommended that section 7(10) be amended to include subsections 
that could possibly be worded as follows:   
(i) Where a person creates a non-resident trust, he/she/it must within 12 months report 
his/her/its address and the names and addresses of trustees and the date of creation of 
the trust. 
(ii) Where a person creates a non-resident trust or, transfers property to a non-resident 
trust, he/she/it is expected within 12 months to report details of the property transferred 
the date of transfer, the consideration (if any) and the identity of the trust. (iii) A founder of 
a non-resident trust that becomes a South African resident is expected, within 12 months 
of becoming a resident, to report his/her/its name, address, date of creation of the trust, 
and the names and addresses of the trustees. 
 
 
11.6.2   RECOMMENDATION TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
PENALTIES IN RESPECT TO INCOME ACCUMULATED IN 
                                                 
319   See discussion in chapter 8 par 8.1.4 on the details of the United Kingdom’s reporting 
requirements as provided for in s 745 of ICTA 1988.  
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OFFSHORE TRUSTS 
 
This study has shown that, in addition to requiring residents to disclose their 
investments in offshore trusts, the legislation of the three countries imposes 
certain penalties on taxpayers who fail to comply with the disclosure 
requirements. Under United Kingdom and United States legislation, one of the 
penalties imposed is the charging of interest on income that is accumulated in 
offshore trusts.320 In South Africa, in terms of section 75 of the Income Tax Act, 
where a taxpayer fails to comply with the disclosure requirements of section 
7(10), he may be liable for a fine or imprisonment for not more than 24 months. 
The taxpayer may also be subjected to additional assessment under section 79 
of the Income Tax Act. Further, in terms of section 78 of the South African 
Income Tax Act, where the Commissioner has reason to believe that a resident 
has not declared, or accounted for, any funds or assets owned outside the 
Republic, which could be attributed to that resident in terms of section 7 or Part X 
of the Eighth Schedule, the Commissioner must estimate the amount of foreign 
currency of such funds, or the market value of those assets. In addition to the 
above penalties, the practice of charging interest on income that is accumulated 
offshore could well be emulated in South Africa to strengthen the above 
provisions. Taxpayers would then be compelled to comply with the legislation for 
fear of interest charges. Section 75 of the Income Tax Act, which deals with 
penalties for failure to comply with reporting requirements, could be amended to 
include a subsection that deals with the charging of interest. The subsection 
could read as follows:  
Interest shall be charged on any income from a non-resident entity that accrues to a 
resident during a year of assessment, if that income is not repatriated, but is accumulated 
in a non-resident entity. 
 
11.7  RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE 
CHALLENGES POSED BY E-COMMERCE  
 
                                                 
320   In the United Kingdom, in terms of the Finance Act of 1991, interest is charged to 
beneficiaries who receive capital payments from offshore trusts. See discussion in chapter 
8 par 8.1.2. In the United States, in terms of s 668 of the Code, an annual interest charge 
is imposed on income accumulated in a foreign trust. In terms of s 671(a) of the Code, 
interest charges may also apply where an item is not included in computing taxable 
income. See discussion in chapter 8, par 8.2.3 and 8.2.5. 
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Although the countries studied have legislation in place that can be used to curb 
income tax avoidance that may result when investments are made in offshore 
trusts and companies, this study demonstrates that the efficacy of this legislation 
could be challenged by technological developments. The legislation that is in 
place today was designed when cross-border economic activity consisted mainly 
of the sale of manufactured goods and certain services. Today, services and 
transfers of intangible property have dramatically increased in importance. 
International tax rules based on a paradigm of property being manufactured and 
sold do not readily accommodate the deconstruction of the economic functions 
that characterise modern business.  
 
E-commerce may be conducted without regard to national boundaries, with the 
result that there may be no link between an income-producing activity and a 
specific location. In general, the current anti-deferral legislation specifically and 
income tax systems generally are in effect a vestige of the past, based on the 
physical world that presupposes operation within a relatively closed economy. 
Today, capital can traverse the world in a matter of nanoseconds; information is 
immediately accessible; and western capitalistic principles are sweeping 
throughout most of the formerly centrally planned economies. The current 
legislation is based on the physical – not the virtual – world, and it is therefore not 
yet in tune with the world’s emerging electronic economy. International initiatives 
against offshore tax avoidance seem to be more concerned about the erosion of 
countries’ tax bases than about addressing the inadequacies in the legislation 
that have resulted from e-commerce. There is no doubt that, if these 
inadequacies are not addressed, the tax revenues of various countries will 
continue to shrink with the growth of the Internet. 
 
It has been suggested that the correct response to this looming problem would 
be to adapt tax systems to this “new world”, rather than to attempt to adapt this 
“new world” to old tax systems.321 In essence, countries have to adapt their tax 
                                                 
321   MB Weiss ”International Tax Competition: An Efficient Or Inefficient Phenomenon?” 16 
Akron  Tax Journal (2001) at 130. 
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systems to accommodate the new international reality.322 This study has 
discussed some of the challenges that e-commerce poses to the current 
legislation.323 In response to these challenges, the OECD has called on countries 
to cooperate and begin formulating a policy on the taxation of e-commerce, 
where e-commerce flourishes and also where national sovereignty and neutrality 
of taxation are maintained.324 It has also been suggested that the taxation 
principles which are applied to conventional commerce (neutrality, efficiency, 
certainty and simplicity, effectiveness and fairness, and the flexibility of taxation) 
should also apply to the taxation of e-commerce. It has further been suggested 
that e-commerce should not be subjected to a new form of taxation, but that 
existing tax rules should be amended to cater for the taxation of e-commerce.325  
 
It is acknowledged that e-commerce is still in the early stages of its development, 
so it should not be unnecessarily regulated, as this would distort its development. 
It is also acknowledged that government attempts to regulate e-commerce are 
likely to be outmoded by the time enactments are made.326 However, it is a fact 
that with the world-wide exposure to the Internet, not only big enterprises, but 
also small companies and individuals are encouraged to engage in international 
trade, because of the various advantages e-commerce offers.327  
 
                                                 
322   Office of Tax Policy, US Department of the Treasury “Selected Tax Policy Implications of 
Global Electronic Commerce” (1996) at 1. Available at 
>http://www,ustreasury.gov/taxpolicy/internet.pdf<, last accessed 26 October 2006. 
323   See chapter 4 par 4.9; chapter 5 par 5.2.5. 
324   See OECD “Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce” (November 1997). 
Available at > 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_34223_2751231_1_1_1_1,00.html<, 
last accessed on 4 June 2007; see also OECD 6th Global Forum “Taxation Aspects of E-
commerce: Addressing the Challenges and Opportunities” (September 2001). Available at 
>http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/42/2349701.pps#279,1,6th Annual Global Forum<, last 
accessed on 4 June 2007. 
325   OECD Ministerial on Electronic Commerce: Ottawa Canada “A Borderless World” 
(October 1998). Available at >http://www.ottawaoecdconference.org/English/conference-
program/agenda.pdf<, last accessed on 4 June 2007. 
326   The White House “A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce” (1 July 1997) at 3. 
Available at >http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm<, last accessed on 4 
June 2007. 
327  For instance, through e-commerce, services can be outsourced to related or unrelated 
providers and manufacturing may be performed at multiple locations, using related or 
unrelated vendors that employ just-in-time inventory and modern logistics. Intangible 
values are recognised in the market and legally protected intangibles are used as 
commercial swords and shields. In addition, funds can easily be transferred electronically 
to offshore jurisdictions without such transfers being reported to tax authorities. See The 
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Rather than encouraging countries to amend existing tax rules to cater for the 
taxation of e-commerce,328 the OECD should encourage the world’s economies 
to begin to adapt their tax systems to the inevitable, instead of attempting to 
postpone the unavoidable.329 The current methods of amending or “patching” the 
old legislation to curb the new electronic developments should be changed, and 
new international provisions adopted that take the new developments into 
consideration.330  
 
Since the challenges brought about by e-commerce affect the international 
community,331 South Africa should work hand-in-hand with developed and 
developing nations, in order to come up with a feasible way of taxing e-
commerce transactions, so that the tax avoidance loopholes that e-commerce 
has created in the legislation can be closed. Although South Africa may have to 
await international trends as to how e-commerce should be taxed, in the 
meantime, in order to prevent the depletion of the tax base, it is recommended 
that South Africa should come up with means of resolving the identification 
problems that e-commerce poses (ie identifying the parties to a given 
transaction, and discovering where the transaction took place). In chapter 4, it 
was pointed out that the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act332 was 
enacted to provide for the facilitation and regulation of electronic communications 
and transactions. The Act contains certain provisions which, if complied with and 
effectively enforced, may alleviate some of the identification problems posed by 
e-commerce.333 On the whole, however, the Act does not provide for taxation 
issues in respect of e-commerce transactions.  
 
The Income Tax Act334 does not contain any provisions that can be used to 
identify parties to electronic transactions, or discover where the transaction took 
                                                                                                                                            
White House’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce at 3.   
328   OECD 1998 Report on “A Borderless World”. 
329   Weiss at 131. 
330   American Bar Association at 658.  
331   For a discussion on how the OECD has responded to the challenges of e-commerce, refer 
to chapter 5 in par 5.2.5.  
332 Act 25 of 2002.  
333 Refer to chapter 4 under the heading “South Africa’s response to the challenges posed 
by e-commerce” for the sections of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
that could be used to identify persons involved in e-commerce.  
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place. It can therefore, not be relied upon to curb any tax avoidance that may 
result from e-commerce. Although in 2003, section 74(1) of the Income Tax Act 
was amended to allow for electronic record keeping,335 this amendment does not 
contain any means of verifying whether a particular electronic document or piece 
of information is linked to a particular taxpayer. It is recommended that section 
74(1) of the Income Tax Act be further amended, to provide that the provisions of 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act336 shall be applied, in order 
to identify and tax parties to electronic transactions. A subsection could be added 
to section 74(1) to read as follows: 
For the purposes of charging income tax, taxpayers that submit electronic documents and 
electronic information shall be identified, and the authenticity of the electronic documents 
and information shall be verified by reference to the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
 
 
11.8 RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA’S 
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS 
 
The discussion in chapter 9 of this work has shown that South Africa’s Exchange 
Control Regulations make it illegal to transfer capital out of the Republic without 
the Exchange Control’s approval. In this respect, the exchange controls 
complement the anti-avoidance legislation in that they prevent the outflow of 
capital from the South that would result in the depletion of the tax base. For 
instance the exchange controls have been instrumental in ensuring that “loop 
structures” are not used to transfer capital out of South Africa.  
 
The complementary role of the exchange controls in preventing the depletion of 
South Africa’s tax base will be even more effective if the Currency Exchanges 
Act is amended to include a definition of the term “resident” that is similar to the 
one in the Income Tax Act, subject to certain exceptions that may be particular to 
exchange controls.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
334   Act 58 of 1962 as amended. 
335   S 67 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 45 of 2003 amended s 74 of the Income tax 
Act to provide that a “document” includes any printout of information generated, sent, 
received, stored, displayed or processed by electronic means. And that “information” 
includes electronic representations of information in any form. 
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11.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In conclusion, it has to be pointed out that, in adopting the above 
recommendations, care should be taken to give due cognisance to South Africa’s 
unique economic circumstances, in that it combines aspects of a developed and 
a developing economy.337 As a developing economy, South Africa should be 
careful not to introduce laws that are so rigid that they hinder international 
investment. However, it should not be forgotten that South Africa’s other identity 
as a developed economy has encouraged trade with developed nations. These 
nations (such as the United Kingdom and the United States) have a long history 
of curbing offshore tax avoidance, and most of the tax-haven  
jurisdictions are nations off the coastline of these nations. As South African 
residents get increasingly involved in international trade, they are exposed to the 
finer points of tax avoidance schemes, which our legislation may not be able to 
cope with. There is thus a need to strike a balance, so as to ensure international 
investment, and at the same time to ensure that our tax base is not eroded by 
offshore schemes, such as those involving offshore trusts and offshore 
companies. 
                                                                                                                                            
336 Act 25 of 2002.  
337 SARS “Discussion Paper on a Proposed System for Advance Tax Rulings” (2003) at 7. 
Available at 
>http://sars.gove.za/legislation/Discussion20%Papers/Discussion%20proposed%20 
sytem20%Advance20%Tax20%Rulings.pdf<, last accessed 7 November 2007. 
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